MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Archbishop Iakovos, Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church of North and South America
Reverend John Tavlarides
Reverend Dimitrios Kalaris
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Tom C. Korologos, Deputy Assistant to the President

DATE & TIME: Monday - October 7, 1974
4:45 - 5:20 p.m.
PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

[The press was admitted briefly for photographs and then dismissed.]

Kalaris: Mrs. Ford was very gracious and patient with us at the bazaar. Are you using your worry beads?

President: Yes. That was just the day before her operation.
I wanted to talk with you about the difficult situation in Cyprus, the change of government in Greece, and what we can do to help the situation.

I am sure Secretary Kissinger has told you what we are trying to do. We are trying to get Turkey to be cooperative and to support and work with the new Greek Government. We also want to keep the matter outside large forums like the UN -- who can't really contribute to a solution. Our friends -- like AHEPA -- sometimes don't understand that we are the only ones who can influence the Turks, and these amendments really hurt what we are trying to do.

We have talked to the bipartisan leadership and they understand, but they get overridden by the mail from back home. But unless we are able to use our influence with Turkey, nothing can be done.
Kissinger: That is right. Turkey has agreed to three basic principles. They are willing to make some gestures. If aid was cut off to get a first step, and then it gets restored, it can't be used again. We want the threat of a cutoff, but not an overreaction on the first stage and then having nothing left for the follow-on. We are sorely tempted to accede to the Soviet idea and throw it into the UN.

President: Look at the situation now in the Mediterranean -- with what's happening in Portugal and Spain. Franco is old. And in Italy they don't have a government. The Middle East is a potential tinderbox. The Mediterranean is crucial. If we don't have flexibility with the Turks we see no prospect of a settlement and we would have to throw it to a UN forum.

I will veto the continuing resolution if it has an Eagleton-type amendment. It would only hurt the Greeks and turn Turkey to the East. We have offered an amendment. If that is turned down, I will veto. This is harmful to the Greek Government and Greek people. We want a strong Greek Government, not a left or Communist-oriented government. The Mediterranean is a pretty dismal picture.

Iakovos: Do you think the Turks will act in good faith?

Kissinger: I don't know. But I worked out a scheme with Mavros. They know they must make unilateral concessions initially and they have accepted our propositions which include the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

The first talks would be between Clerides and Denktash. The Greeks know that the only way progress can be made is for us to influence the Turks. We were asked by Mavros not to get concessions before November 17 when Greece will have its elections. He also wanted the negotiations to include Aegean problems. So before 17 November we are trying to get movement on principles. Turkey has said that if the aid is cut off they won't negotiate. We will buy an amendment which would cut aid if Turkey acts in bad faith. If aid is cut off and Turkey grants what we want, we don't have the leverage anymore.

Iakovos: These are the first two or three unhappy months of my 15 years. I can't reason with my people. They are demonstrating against me. Could you make a brief statement which would help me?

Kissinger: The Greeks have pleaded with us not to announce concessions. They want it to emerge as a gift from Turkey. If I said this was all arranged with Greek acquiescence, I would be breaking faith with Karamanlis.
Iakovos: Here is a letter I got from Karamanlis. Does it agree with your understanding with Karamanlis? [He hands over the paper attached at Tab A.]

Kissinger: [reads it] It is more or less the same.

Iakovos: If you could talk just in terms of the 200,000 refugees, not even negotiations.

Fr. John: Some symbolic gesture.

Kissinger: We did condemn the Turks for their actions. We also made strong statements of support for the Greeks.

Fr. John: Could you call the Greek-Americans in Congress? Maybe you could explain it.

President: I would be glad to. But I wanted to speak to Archbishop Iakovos to put the facts before him, to explain our desire to help and our feeling we are the only ones who can help.

Fr. John: Brademas and others don’t trust the Turks.

Iakovos: I understand your position. I can’t be everywhere at once. I talk around the country but they don’t listen.

President: Our problem is that Karamanlis doesn’t want it to look like we are out in front.

Kissinger: They want it to look as if we are not involved, as if they did it all on their own. We have been in close consultation with the Ambassadors at the UN, and so on, but we can’t put it out.

We trust Karamanlis.

Iakovos: As I told you, help must come from the U.S.

Kissinger: We will do that when Turkey has a government. But they won’t yield to the appearance of pressure. We must maneuver to start the process. Then we could use pressure to keep the negotiation going. We don’t need the pressure now, but when we start to talk pull-back and drawing a line. We are trying to deliver concessions to Karamanlis for his elections and to appear as a gift. We have a list of gestures that is
agreed by the Greeks but not yet by the Turks. The Clerides-Denktash talks would start this; then Greek-Turkish negotiations would start after the elections, including the Continental Shelf issue in the Aegean.

Fr. John: You are losing sight of the impact of the invasion.

Kissinger: You forget how this started. We were accused of being pro-Greek at first.

Iakovos: Can't you make a brief statement which would calm our people?

Kissinger: The leaders of AHEPA will tell you Clerides thanked us for what we have done.

Kolaris: The Greek-Americans think we have done nothing.

President: The Greek Government doesn't want it to appear as if there is motion. Not before their own election.

Fr. John: I think you have to call the Greek-American Congressmen and tell them what you have told us.

Kissinger: If the Turks fail, we are in better shape if we can hold it over their heads than with an obligatory cutoff.

Korologos: The Congressmen are political animals. The question is how do we stop the pressure from the Greek community?

Iakovos: That is why I need a statement.

Kissinger: We can't say we will help in the return of refugees. The Turks will do that as a unilateral gesture, not as a result of our pressure.

President: Can we say we will maximize our humanitarian aid? Would that help? That we will help the refugees without saying we will get them back?

Iakovos: Whatever you can do will be helpful.

[The meeting ended.]
I The United States has committed grave errors in its handling of the Cyprus Crisis. She could have prevented the tragedy, but did not do so. And to make matters worse, she neither condemned nor did she register disapproval for the atrocities committed by the Turks in Cyprus.

II Consequently an extremely intense and dangerous anti-American spirit dominated and continues to dominate the hearts and minds of the people in Greece.

III Caramanlis desires to cast this spirit out, but is fearful he will not succeed in his efforts if Washington does not help him with some concrete and positive gestures.

IV In order to achieve a much-desired solution of the Cyprus problem, the United States must exert every possible pressure upon Turkey which committed the crimes on Cyprus.

V If an honorable solution of the Cyprus problem proves to be impossible the whole situation will worsen to the point where war is inevitable, for Greece will never accept the situation created by Turkey in Cyprus.

VI Caramanlis is afraid that in the event of war, both the Balkans and the Middle-East will explode and the country which will benefit will be Russia.
Declassified

P/Falceps/Fuhrer John/Em K. Vandel
K/Knseter. 7/774

(Please)

(1) Have you heard any genuine buzz about any peace talks?

(2) Yes, they started a few days before last weekend.

I wanted to talk about the situation because I thought of you in Sweden and what we could do for

.(3) I know K has told you what we think is going to

be our strategy, but I wanted to get feedback from you.

Some groups in the UN who can contribute most.

Our former ally, Algeria, doesn't understand why our allies who can contribute in Turkey.

There are tremendous really hard what we keep

here.

We have tried to get the leadership but they understand but get everything back to

same. We have to turn some aggressive,

self-inflicted, can be done.

(3) That is right - France against the

French principles. Also:

If you were not off base for 1st day

it would be stupid, aren't you saying again.

We cannot control our allies, most countries

1st things, the threat is for failure

the greatly tempt to throw it into the UN.

P.L. on the 27th - Portugal, Spain -

France, etc. - don't have a good

That the UN is a potential blowout. If

an event had failed and France were ized

now prospect of settlement would have

to throw it into the UN. France

I would write a CR if it happens and
I don't think I will act in your favor. I don't know that I worked out scheme as a measure. They thought that they could make a deal. Congress would accept our proposition. They considered that any way they could make a deal to influence.
I am a little busy at present, so my handwriting is not very good. (Handwritten)

K It is more a love letter.

I If you could take part in some of our discussions and activities, it would be very helpful.

J I am sympathetic.

K We did read your letter. We are grateful for your statement of support for our efforts.

J I will send you a copy. I hope you will understand our position.

P I am glad to hear about your intention to support. I think it is important to engage with those who are willing to help.

J I understand your concern. I am not sure what can be done at this time. I wish we could achieve unity but it seems difficult.

P Our goal is to ensure that we do not lose the war we are fighting.

K They want it too and they believe it will be achieved. But we have been in close consultation with others, but we cannot put it out.

J We want peace.

I As I told you, help must come from somewhere.

K We will do that, but it is not easy. I know they won't yield to pressure. We cannot manipulative methods. We must work hard. We need a little guidance, but when we take full lines and deliver our messages to Kara.
In his election to office as a gift, we cannot have a list compiled by a Congress bill not put in. Thanks. Charles/Don’t be wound about this, then. G-T report, still, enough to decide, mainly tent, myself.

You being right if you say it partly: summarise. If you just know this started, we could have

East Newark at 1st

I can’t figure. Make brief statement, with words which come across.

K. The leaders of flyers will tell you Election was

Democracy as for what our leaders.

3. Great One. Think we have done nothing.

I can’t start counting 1 & 2 again as if

there is motion, This irrelevant.

J. I think you have to call G-T Congressman. It’s not what you heard to me.

K. If [redacted] fail, we are in better shape than

of disbehavior we can tell it over then to be

Kern. The Congressman are political friends. How long

they pressure from G-T’s having

I. That’s why I said statement.

K. We must try to add help in return of

representatives. Thanks will be that as simulated

question, not our presence.

P. Can we try we will maintain simultaneous

aid. Would that help.

I trust we will help a sleeping (also a dying

we will get them back).