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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: *President Ford*
 Archbishop Iakovos, Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church of North and South America
 Reverend John Tavlarides
 Reverend Dimitrios Kalaris
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Tom C. Korologos, Deputy Assistant to the President

DATE & TIME: Monday - October 7, 1974
 4:45 - 5:20 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
 The White House

[The press was admitted briefly for photographs and then dismissed.]

Kalaris: Mrs. Ford was very gracious and patient with us at the bazaar.

Are you using your worry beads?

President: Yes. That was just the day before her operation.

I wanted to talk with you about the difficult situation in Cyprus, the change of government in Greece, and what we can do to help the situation.

I am sure Secretary Kissinger has told you what we are trying to do. We are trying to get Turkey to be cooperative and to support and work with the new Greek Government. We also want to keep the matter outside large forums like the UN -- who can't really contribute to a solution. Our friends -- like AHEPA -- sometimes don't understand that we are the only ones who can influence the Turks, and these amendments really hurt what we are trying to do.

We have talked to the bipartisan leadership and they understand, but they get overridden by the mail from back home. But unless we are able to use our influence with Turkey, nothing can be done.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
 CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

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 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
 BY: JGA
 MARA, DATE 5/6/04

Kissinger: That is right. Turkey has agreed to three basic principles. They are willing to make some gestures. If aid was cut off to get a first step, and then it gets restored, it can't be used again. We want the threat of a cutoff, but not an overreaction on the first stage and then having nothing left for the follow-on. We are sorely tempted to accede to the Soviet idea and throw it into the UN.

President: Look at the situation now in the Mediterranean -- with what's happening in Portugal and Spain. Franco is old. And in Italy they don't have a government. The Middle East is a potential tinderbox. The Mediterranean is crucial. If we don't have flexibility with the Turks we see no prospect of a settlement and we would have to throw it to a UN forum.

I will veto the continuing resolution if it has an Eagleton-type amendment. It would only hurt the Greeks and turn Turkey to the East. We have offered an amendment. If that is turned down, I will veto. This is harmful to the Greek Government and Greek people. We want a strong Greek Government, not a left or Communist-oriented government. The Mediterranean is a pretty dismal picture.

Iakovos: Do you think the Turks will act in good faith?

Kissinger: I don't know. But I worked out a scheme with Mavros. They know they must make unilateral concessions initially and they have accepted our propositions which include the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

The first talks would be between Clerides and Denktash. The Greeks know that the only way progress can be made is for us to influence the Turks. We were asked by Mavros not to get concessions before November 17 when Greece will have its elections. He also wanted the negotiations to include Aegean problems. So before 17 November we are trying to get movement on principles. Turkey has said that if the aid is cut off they won't negotiate. We will buy an amendment which would cut aid if Turkey acts in bad faith. If aid is cut off and Turkey grants what we want, we don't have the leverage anymore.

Iakovos: These are the first two or three unhappy months of my 15 years. I can't reason with my people. They are demonstrating against me. Could you make a brief statement which would help me?

Kissinger: The Greeks have pleaded with us not to announce concessions. They want it to emerge as a gift from Turkey. If I said this was all arranged with Greek acquiescence, I would be breaking faith with Karamanlis.



Iakovos: Here is a letter I got from Karamanlis. Does it agree with your understanding with Karamanlis? [He hands over the paper attached at Tab A.]

Kissinger: [reads it] It is more or less the same.

Iakovos: If you could talk just in terms of the 200,000 refugees, not even negotiations.

Fr. John: Some symbolic gesture.

Kissinger: We did condemn the Turks for their actions. We also made strong statements of support for the Greeks.

Fr. John: Could you call the Greek-Americans in Congress? Maybe you could explain it.

President: I would be glad to. But I wanted to speak to Archbishop Iakovos to put the facts before him, to explain our desire to help and our feeling we are the only ones who can help.

Fr. John: Brademas and others don't trust the Turks.

Iakovos: I understand your position. I can't be everywhere at once. I talk around the country but they don't listen.

President: Our problem is that Karamanlis doesn't want it to look like we are out in front.

Kissinger: They want it to look as if we are not involved, as if they did it all on their own. We have been in close consultation with the Ambassadors at the UN, and so on, but we can't put it out.

We trust Karamanlis.

Iakovos: As I told you, help must come from the U.S.

Kissinger: We will do that when Turkey has a government. But they won't yield to the appearance of pressure. We must maneuver to start the process. Then we could use pressure to keep the negotiation going. We don't need the pressure now, but when we start to talk pull-back and drawing a line. We are trying to deliver concessions to Karamanlis for his elections and to appear as a gift. We have a list of gestures that is



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agreed by the Greeks but not yet by the Turks. The Clerides-Denktaş talks would start this; then Greek-Turkish negotiations would start after the elections, including the Continental Shelf issue in the Aegean.

Fr. John: You are losing sight of the impact of the invasion.

Kissinger: You forget how this started. We were accused of being pro-Greek at first.

Iakovos: Can't you make a brief statement which would calm our people?

Kissinger: The leaders of AHEPA will tell you Clerides thanked us for what we have done.

Kolaris: The Greek-Americans think we have done nothing.

President: The Greek Government doesn't want it to appear as if there is motion. Not before their own election.

Fr. John: I think you have to call the Greek-American Congressmen and tell them what you have told us.

Kissinger: If the Turks fail, we are in better shape if we can hold it over their heads than with an obligatory cutoff.

Korologos: The Congressmen are political animals. The question is how do we stop the pressure from the Greek community?

Iakovos: That is why I need a statement.

Kissinger: We can't say we will help in the return of refugees. The Turks will do that as a unilateral gesture, not as a result of our pressure.

President: Can we say we will maximize our humanitarian aid? Would that help? That we will help the refugees without saying we will get them back?

Iakovos: Whatever you can do will be helpful.

[The meeting ended.]

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Mtg. with Iakovos
Oct. 7, 1974 1B

- I The United States has committed grave errors in its handling of the Cyprus Crisis. She could have prevented the tragedy, but did not do so. And to make matters worse, she neither condemned nor did she register disapproval for the atrocities committed by the Turks, in Cyprus.
- II Consequently an extremely intense and dangerous anti-American spirit dominated and continues to dominate the hearts and minds of the people in Greece.
- III Caramanlis desires to cast this spirit out, but is fearful he will not succeed in his efforts if Washington does not help him with some concrete and positive gestures.
- IV In order to achieve a much-desired solution of the Cyprus problem, the United States must exert every possible pressure upon Turkey which committed the crimes on Cyprus.
- V If an honorable solution of the Cyprus problem proves to be impossible the whole situation will worsen to the point where war is inevitable, for Greece will never accept the situation created by Turkey in Cyprus.
- VI Caramanlis is afraid that in the event of war, both the Balkans and the Middle-East will explode and the country which will benefit will be Russia.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By WV, NARA, Date 5/6/04
state review 3/10/04



P/Fakeera/Father John/Fr Kolarib
K/Kurologor.

7 Oct 1974

(Puss)

Kolai: Mrs Ford was very genuine & patient w/ us etc has done
Are you using your own books?

P: Yes. That was quite dry before here of course.
I wanted to talk about dry situation by you, change
of part in Geneva & what we can do to help a
part.

I sense K has told you what we're trying to
do. We're trying to get T to agree to ^{1st stage + work} ~~with~~ ^{large}
some Greek govt, & to keep outside ^{large}
groups like UN - who exist contribute - out.

One friend - like Ateya - don't understand
we can only see what can influence & Turchs
& these arrangements really hard what we're trying
to do.

We also have turned to by active leadership &
they understand but get overriden back
home. Unless we can see influence
w/T, nothing can be done.

K: That is right - T has agreed to 3 _____
basic principles. Also 5 _____

— If aid was cut off from 1st stage
& it gets restored, can't be used again.


We want threat of cutoff, want overreaction
on 1st stage, & nothing left for follow-on
We are being tempted to ^{exceed to 50%} throw it into a UN

P: Look at sit. in med - Portugal, Spain -
France old, Italy - they don't have a govt.
The ME is a potential tinderbox. If
we don't have flex w/c Turchs and see
no prospect of a settlement & would have
to throw it to a UN forum
I would veto a CR if it have Egyptian

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State view 3/10/04
BY Wa, NARA DATE 5/16/04



type movement. It would hurt Greeks & Turkey & East. We have offered an amendment. If that turned down I will vote. This happens to Greek and people. We want strong Greek part, not left or Soviet oriented part. The budget is a pretty dismal picture.

I Do you think it will act in good faith

K Don't know. But I worked out scheme as I know. They know they must make unilateral concessions initially & have accepted our proposals which include

truth
worthy
response

Greek ~~fact~~ fact talks would be let. ~~Eldest~~ ~~Dunkles~~ ~~fact~~ know that a only way prog can be made is for us to influence Turkey.

We were asked by Innes not to get concessions before Nov 17. Also wanted budget to include a year parts. So before 17 we are trying to get movement in principle. There said if aid cut off they want negotiation. We will buy amendment which would cut aid if Turkey in bad faith.
If aid cut off & T grants

I The 1st 2, 3 working months of my (T) yes - I can't reason w/ my people. They are demonstrating against me. Could you make a brief statement which could help me.

K The Greeks have phoned w/ us not to announce concessions. They want it to emerge as a gift from T. If I said this all arranged w/ Greek acquiescence, I would be breaking faith w/ Karam.

I There is a letter. Does it agree w/ your understanding of Kara (Karens or letter)

K It is more a less formal.

I If you could talk just in terms of 250 rows of pages, not even negotiations.

J Some symbolic gestures.

R We did Kushner & Tanks. We also made strong statements of support for Greeks.

J Could you call a G-7 ^{meeting} Congress? Maybe you could explain it.

P I'm glad to. But would it speak to I to put facts before him, our desire to help, our feeling we only ones who can help.

J Beckman & others don't trust Tanks.

I I understand your position. I can't be everywhere at once. I talk around a country but they don't listen.

P Our job is Kara doesn't want it to look like we are in front.

K They want it to look as if they not involved, as if we did it all on their own. We have been in close consultation w/ Arabs, ^{at UN, etc.} but we can't put it out.

We trust Kara.

I As I told you, help must come from US

K We will do that when it has a govt, but ~~we~~ they won't yield to appearance of pressure. We must maneuver to start a process. Then we could use pressure to keep ~~the~~ going. We don't need a pressure now, but when we talk full ~~ball~~ & drawing a line ~~trying~~ to deliver emissions to Kara for



for his election & to appear as a gift. We
~~and~~ have a lot agreed by Greeks but not
yet. Turks. Edwards/Dunkles would start
this; then G-T report start after election, including
cont. relief.

J You losing sight of ~~case~~ impact of a mission
K you just know this started. We a small thing
~~for~~ ~~the~~ Greek at 1st

I Can't you make brief statement which would
calm some people.

K The leaders of Alpha will tell you Edwards ~~will~~
checked us for what we had done.

RR Greek Am think we have done nothing

P Greek Govt doesn't want to appear as if
there is motion. This crucial

J I think you have to call G-A Congressmen &
tell them what you have told us.

K If Turks fail, we are in better shape than
of obligating - we can hold it over their heads

Keep. The Congressmen are political animals. It would be
stop pressure from Greek community

I That why I need statements

K We can't say we will help in return of
refugees. Turks will do that as unilateral
gesture, not our pressure

P Can we say we will ~~maintain~~ humanitarian
aid. Would that help.

That we will help a refugees (w/o saying
we will get them back)

?

