MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Monday - October 7, 1974
PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: I have been telling the Israelis that if they didn't move with Jordan, things would get tougher and tougher with the PLO. Now there is a resolution to have Arafat speak at the UN as representative of the Palestinians. If we vote against it, we get an explosion in the Arab world and we would have five countries with us; if we abstain, Israel may refuse to negotiate. On balance, I recommend to vote against, but we will pay a heavy price.

President: Where will you be on the 14th?
Kissinger: Algeria. It will be murder either way.

President: What is the best way to get the negotiations going? If we vote for...
Kissinger: You can't vote for. The choice is between abstention and a negative. If we abstain, we will have a strong Israeli reaction.

President: What will we gain with the Arabs?
Kissinger: It'll be a slight plus with the Arabs, because it means tacit acquiescence. If we vote against, the Soviets will make the most of it. Our idiot Ambassador in Cairo...

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DELTA "FILE CTRL" 10/3/84
DELTA NARA Date 10/3/84
President: The land transfer in Egypt...

Kissinger: No, he did this right. This has been under way for a year. It's a straight swap of land.

President: They are paying with PL 480?

Kissinger: No, that is the $10 million for charity. It is totally useless in Egypt. It was for Children's hospitals. It is a vicious attack.

President: Wayne Hays can be an SOB or a help. Why don't I get him to defend it?

Kissinger: He has known about it for months. This was in our submission to Congress. (He describes the inaccuracies in the Post article.)

President: I can call Wayne. He can get on the floor. He likes to tackle the press.

Kissinger: He can say he has known about it all along and has an open mind on the subject. But it may start a campaign.

President: But he could set the record straight if someone raises it.

Kissinger: No, what Elites did is to plan to attend an Egyptian victory parade. I have told Elites to get the Palestinian vote moved to past our elections. If they don't, this gives us an excuse to vote against it. I could explain our situation on my trip and then I could offer private diplomatic talks with the PLO. That would raise hell if Israel found out.

[The President talks to Wayne Hays.]

President: On the PLO, if we abstain and that keeps Israel frozen, that would be wrong. That is top priority.

Kissinger: The Arabs shouldn't have made us vote now and they must know the limits of our policy. So I am inclined to vote no. I will tell Sadat and Hassan we will have political contact in New York.

Dinitz said you had said you were with him on long-term aid.
President: I didn't say that at all. We were just milling around there.

Kissinger: I told him that. They also said it was promised after the first of the year in talks with Rabin.

President: I said it depended on the negotiations.

Kissinger: In the context of a settlement you can put in our authorization. In the absence of that, they must go on an annual basis.

President: There was no commitment in the absence of progress.

Kissinger: Dinitz said you did say that Saturday night. Nixon gave the impression he would give Golda a letter that we wouldn't push them off the Golan. They want such a letter now. I agree with that position, but I am afraid of a letter like that. I think it is better to break the commitment. With Golda you could trust. They will blame me, not you for the broken commitment.

President: I will make that decision. No.

Kissinger: Maybe after another move with Syria you could do it. I showed Dinitz some paper language of a general commitment. He said that was not good enough.

I will take along the protocol of what you promised. I support import restriction, not by dollar amount.

President: The economic people think an arbitrary cutback would hamper our economic recovery. What we will say is we attempt a billion barrels a day voluntary effort. If that doesn't work, we will go mandatory. They said the French had given up their program.

Kissinger: That is fine. But if it's mandatory, dollars are better than quantity because it creates an incentive for lower prices.

Portugal. There are two issues: One is what it means for our government. I predicted this in April. We have done in spring $150,000. If we don't get in shape, in a year we will be in the same condition in Greece. The situation in Greece is not because of Cyprus; it is the anti-Americansim of the Greek left.
the right is also anti-American because of our anti-junta line. If we don't rein in the Congress, we will have a violent shift in Greece. Italy is next.

President: Let's do it.

Kissinger: I must be candid. Colby is a cautious bureaucrat and the estimators are liberal democrats. Portugal, Diego Garcia, South Vietnam -- they are changing on all of them. Schlesinger agrees.

Schlesinger is preparing contingency plans for the Middle East. He says it would take two months and Diego Garcia.

The 40 Committee briefing was a disgrace.

President: I agree. We are doing virtually nothing.

Kissinger: The Ambassador is a disaster. Portugal is probably down the drain.

President: Are they good there?

Kissinger: [CIA and South Vietnam]

President: We could tell Colby if it leaks, the high level of the CIA would be changed.

President: I lived near a CIA guy. He was very liberal and I told Betty...

Kissinger: [CIA and South Vietnam]

President: Is this Catholic priest a problem?
Kissinger: It wouldn't have developed had Thieu not been in trouble. He is in trouble because the aid is going down. It is a vicious cycle. We attack our allies for repression and cut aid; the aid cut leads to a decline in morale.

Scowcroft: NSC representation.

President: Not Art Hartman. Rumsfeld is okay.

Kissinger: Could we have Sonnenfeldt as a notetaker? He will be demoralized if he's not. I worked out something with Rumsfeld on leaks.

President: There is another story in the New York Times on the Rabin thing.

* * *

[The AID people come, and then leave.]

* * *

Kissinger: I am having a press conference. I thought I would be tough on Chile. Turkish aid will come up. There is conflicting advice on eligibility and on extent of ineligibility. We presented this to the Leadership.

President: And they told us to go this way.
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL: National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL: Memorandum of Conversation

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DESCRIPTION: Re SALT, Jackson Amendment

CREATION DATE: 10/07/1974
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