

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald Ford
 Ismail Fahmi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Arab Republic of Egypt
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday - October 5, 1974
 7:30 - 8:51 a.m. (Breakfast meeting)

PLACE: First Floor Private Dining Room
 The White House

[The conversation opened with small talk about Indian Summer in the U.S. and about the ceremonial opening of the Jefferson Room at State which Minister Fahmi had attended the evening before.]

Kissinger: Ismail and I had good talks in New York, and I thought it would be good for him to give us an idea of how the situation looks to President Sadat.

Fahmi: I appreciate this opportunity. President Sadat sends his best wishes for Mrs. Ford's recovery.

I can't complain about developments since October on a personal basis. On a personal basis it couldn't be better. But speaking as Foreign Minister, I can't plan for the future of my country on that basis and especially in view of the problems in which your country has been involved. It has a very bad effect on your country abroad. The world looks to you for stability and guidance.



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
 CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY: [Signature], MARI, DATE 5/5/04

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I have no problem with Henry, but all these things make us wonder. We want to know what the policy of the United States is. My feeling is the responsible people in the United States don't act on an urgent basis with respect to the Middle East. If the Soviet Union continues to have the strong role in Egypt it has had for 15 years, they will continue it everywhere in the Middle East. They tried to pressure Egypt and we stood fast. Now they see they made a mistake and they are trying to recover. Now I am going to Moscow October 14 to prepare for a Summit.

Do we have to go back to the Soviet Union and say, "You were right; you told us so?"

President: There should be no doubt about me and Secretary Kissinger personally and our desire to expand relationships with you. Dr. Kissinger and I had a very tough week with the Congress, but we laid it on the line that we had to have continuity in foreign policy and we had to be able to act without a lot of restrictions. They may cut the amount, but we made our point on the restrictions. I think we won.

Kissinger: It was a net gain.

President: And Congressman Passman has assured me there will be money for Egypt in the aid bill. There is a realization that the situation in the Middle East is tenuous -- that there could be a war, or an embargo. I think Congress is more open to equitable treatment for the Arabs than ever before. We have enemies, but the leadership is with us.

Fahmi: It is not a question of money. We can manage on whatever. There are many factors we must consider.

I expect Israel to take some military measures against Syria -- big or small. They think the Soviet Union gave too much to Syria and they have to do something. I know it is not serious, but Israel maybe needs it psychologically to show they are still supreme. Also, if you don't prevent them from doing something it will destroy your relations with the Arabs, and that they want. Israel wants you to have bad relations with Egypt. In the '50s they planted bombs in U.S. installations in Egypt to blame Egypt.

When we have a peace settlement we have no objection to a guarantee to Israel, but we want one too. President Sadat confirms this.



I say all this because if there is no progress soon, it will be very explosive and the Soviet Union will be back in. President Sadat hates the Soviet Union. When President Nixon came, it was not just being polite. It was the people showing their discontent with the old policies with the Soviet Union. Now our relations with the Soviet Union are zero. But they know they made a mistake and they are now trying hard.

Kissinger: Yes, I think you will be offered anything you want in the military field.

Fahmi: Right now you are doing nothing in the area; there is no American presence. Even the USIA operation is poor. It isn't the money.

Kissinger: They are judged in the Middle East as the first country to move to the United States. So to the extent we don't have a presence and we can't get the bill through Congress, it looks like an Egyptian mistake.

Fahmi: We need your cooperation to move again.

President: Dr. Kissinger and I have an excellent relationship. He has my total policy support.

We are on the right track in the Middle East. Our policy is fully supported in America. It has been a hallmark of constructive policy here. It has succeeded, and the people support it and expect us to move forward. They know that if we don't move, all is in jeopardy. There are Israeli supporters who don't see it in a balanced way, but want arms. So we must move forward to avoid more war.

Fahmi: That we need your assurances on.

Kissinger: President Sadat last October gambled on my assurance last fall -- to go for the longer-term objectives rather than the short-term. The error of the past has been to lump everything together, and then everyone can be mobilized against it. We are breaking it up one step at a time, so that all the opposition doesn't coalesce. But we have to prepare the ground, and that takes time.

Fahmi: But they (the American Jews) will bring pressure on you -- even personally. How do we know you will stick to your guns?





I feel I can get everything from the Soviet Union if I want. But the end result will be escalation and a new situation. There will be a war in one, two, five years. I am a nationalist. If there is no action by you, I leave my country and the Middle East high and dry. And I have no assurances.

President: I see your point. You can get what you want from the Soviet Union, but an arms race and war are the only result.

Kissinger: Then we would have to support Israel militarily.

President: But the Soviet Union cannot bring peace. I can assure you we will cooperate in the negotiations, help you economically and militarily.

Kissinger: If you go back to the Soviet Union, we will have to demonstrate you can't get anything from the Soviet Union.

Fahmi: We don't think you should give them all they ask for.

Kissinger: Despite what you read in the Israeli newspapers, we gave them almost no heavy equipment. What we gave made no strategic difference, and it exhausts their credit so they have to come back to us next year.

You do have a military problem, with your equipment running down, and if no Soviet Union equipment coming in and the other Arabs are getting it. It is not easy for us, and the Saudis are not too efficient. I am seeing the Shah next month, and he is more efficient and reliable. But at some point we have to do it openly.

Fahmi: You will have to guarantee that Israel takes no action against Syria.

Kissinger: I told Rabin that I would oppose an Israeli-initiated military operation against Syria.

Fahmi: If Syria is forced to fight, we will be blamed. The only winners would be Israel and the Soviet Union. To restore the present situation would be almost impossible.

President: We think it would take 25 years.

Fahmi: We need some concrete progress on the Sinai front. This is a must. If Kissinger can do it in not more than two months, that is good. It is necessary. We are working with the extremists, to change the image of the United States. It can be done, but it is tricky and could go either way now.

Kissinger: Can you make a Sinai move alone?

Fahmi: Sure. Not to a peace. We must proceed slowly. We must get some equipment from the Soviet Union, but I can make it sweeping or just enough to get by.

Kissinger: You must do what you want, but a sweeping deal would cause an outcry that you are a Soviet stooge. The next move will be tough, because in the Sinai the next move will interrupt a decade of infrastructure. I told the President when he came in that there would be an attack on me and an attempt to split me and the President.

But we can't move before November 5. You didn't notice, but the President got additional aid to Israel taken out of the Continuing Resolution -- for the first time ever.

The next step in the Sinai is much more important than the first, because now there is no logical stopping place.

Fahmi: No one can accuse us of being a Soviet satellite. We get nothing from the Soviet Union now and we need something. But if we get nothing from the Soviet Union and nothing from you, and are asked to make more concessions, my army will think I am foolish. We have to get some equipment, but the issue is whether it will be a lot or a little. If we can get something from you early next year, we can get by with only a little [from the Soviet Union].

The oil people are the biggest political amateurs -- nice to us internally but with loudspeakers outside.

Kissinger: The reason I arranged this appointment is because I agree with Fahmi's appraisal. I think Sadat is very exposed. Last November he made a big gamble. There is no doubt he is anti-Soviet. But the radicals are using his moves against him, and if he gets no progress for his efforts and no help from us, he is in trouble.

Fahmi: What he needs is movement in the Middle East more than arms. We are diversifying our arms supply now -- your allies are selling to us.

President: We must push Israel into the arena to participate.



Kissinger: What Israel is asking for is an end of belligerency. We have to find a formulation -- you can't give that -- something which looks like progress toward peace without giving up your principles.

Fahmi: Sadat can give nothing more than military disengagement. It has to be described that way. Non-belligerency is out of the question. We could not sign anything like that. Politically he couldn't survive. He can sign a military agreement and some other things. But for him to make another big move in Sinai without a move on the Syrian and Jordanian fronts would be a big political move: It would get us out of the conflict, and what more could they want?

Kissinger: I had a brutal meeting with Allon yesterday because he said he would discuss only non-belligerency.

Fahmi: Khaddam came to Cairo only to block any separate move by Cairo. We agreed there would be no separate political move. So it must look like a military one.

Kissinger: So Israel will try to force the next move to be a political one. Israel likes to make offers which look reasonable and which the Arabs can't make.

The radicals want to make Egypt look like it is betraying the Arabs; Israel wants Egypt to look like it is resisting progress to peace.

The Soviet Union is pushing for a total solution in order to freeze the situation and make progress impossible. If there is no progress in the next six months we are in bad trouble.

Fahmi: The Jewish lobby thinks it can manipulate any American President.

President: I won't bow to that kind of pressure. And there is less support for Israel than ten years ago. Vietnam made the American people much more cautious and less likely to back Israel.

Fahmi: I am glad to hear this. I will convey it to Sadat. We will work out how to present all this in connection with my trip to the Soviet Union.

I am glad to hear what we can do in the next three to four months.

But I can't avoid getting some Soviet arms.



Kissinger: We realize this. But the impact here -- like the Soviet deliveries recently -- is played in our press as a failure of American policy and Egypt's going back to the Soviet Union.

Fahmi: We lost 125 MIG's. We have to get them back, unless you can give me 120 -- or 60 early in the year, nothing now, and I keep it quiet. But otherwise I have to get something.

Kissinger: If you have big shipments coming in early, we will face massive pressure to ship big to Israel. Rabin has already said the President committed to a long-term arrangement. That is not so. We said we couldn't even consider it before the first of the year.

Fahmi: Then give us 50 F-4's. We are the only ones who haven't restored our forces since the war.

Kissinger: The Soviet Union won't do it for nothing.

Fahmi: Yes, they will, this time -- just to kick the U. S. out of Egypt. They have suffered greatly and they will give everything I ask to get you out of Egypt. I am not threatening you; I am just talking frankly.

President: Suppose they gave you 120 planes. That won't help achieve peace. We are committed to work out an arrangement for peace in the Middle East. Providing equipment beyond your needs doesn't help achieve peace.

Fahmi: Yes, but I have no choice but to strengthen the military. We are not going to war -- that is out of the question -- but we have to do something. And a political settlement alone with Israel would be suicide. A move on Syria too would help.

Kissinger: That is impossible now. We will never move under what looks like Soviet pressure. If they give arms and then we move, the Soviet Union will claim the credit. That we won't tolerate. We have our limits too.

Fahmi: But if no move on Syria, who has to defend you? Us. We are the defenders of the United States in the Arab world.



P/Fahme/K

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Transcribed
by PWR
01/17/74

Speeches (Lindian summer)
Jefferson Room

K Donald & I had talks in NY and I think
it would be good for him to give us
an idea of how it looks to Sadat

F Appreciate this opportunity + Sadat sends
best wishes to Mrs F + me
I can't complain about airports since
out on a personal basis. On personal
basis it couldn't be better. Best speaking
at F.M., I can't plan for future of my
country on that basis - esp in view of a
pers view which your country has been
broached - Has a very bad effect on your
country abroad. The world looks
to you for stability + guidance.

I have no prob w/ them, don't all these
things make us wonder - we want to
know what policy of US is. My feeling
is a reg. people in a US contact on
an urgent basis w/ respect to ME. If
a SO continues to have a strong role in
it has had for 15 yrs, they will

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BY W, NARA, DATE 5/5/04

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sometimes it may work in ME. They
tried to pressure E + we stood fast.
When they see ~~we~~ they made a
mistake + they trying to work.
how I going to pressure OJT 4 to prepare
a summit purpose?

Do we have to go back to 50 x say you
were right, you told us so.

P No doubt about me + K personally + our
desire to expand relationships w/ Egypt.
K + I had a very tough week w/ C. C. but
we laid it on the lines that we had
to have continuity in F.P. to ~~act~~ act as a
lot of restrictions. They may not
amount but we ~~will~~ made an
point on the restrictions I think we can

K It was a wet quip.

P Carl Passman has assured me there
will be money for E in aid bill. There
is a major c. set in ME is
tumors - could be a war, esp embargo.
I think they were open to equitable
treatment than ever before. We have
announced, but leadership is w/ us.

GENERAL

P

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F Not a question of money. We can manage our relations. There are many factors we must consider.

I expect I to take some mid. measures against Syria - big & small. They think SU gave too much to Syria & they have to do something. I know it not dreams, but I maybe needs it to say to show they are still extreme.

Also if you don't prevent them from doing something it will destroy your relations w/ Arabs & that they want.

I want ^{you to know} bad relations w/ E. In 50's they planted bombs in US installations in E to harm E.

When we have a peace settlement we have no objection to a guarantee to E - but we want one too. Sadat confirms this

I say all this because if we progress from it will be very explosive & a SU will be back in. Sadat

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but the C S U. When Nixon came, it was not just being polite. It was a people showing their ~~dislike~~ discontent w/ C old policies w/ C S U. Now our relations w/ S U are zero. But they know they make a mistake & they are now trying hard.

K Yes I think you will be open to anything you want in mid. field.

F Repeat - now you are doing nothing in a area - no presence. Even USIA open is poor. It isn't money.

K They are privileged in ME as 1st country to ~~invest~~ C S U. So to extent we don't have a presence, can't get hold them any, it looks like an E mistake.

F We need your cooperation to move again.

P K & I have excellent relationship. He

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has very total policy support.
We are one right track in ME. Our
policy is fully supported in US. It has
been a hallmark of constructive policy
here. It has secured a people support
it & expect us to move forward. They
know if we don't move, all is in
jeopardy. There are F supporters who
don't see it balanced, but must
move. ~~we~~ we must move to prevent
to avoid more war.

F That we need your assurance -

R Solid but it guaranteed as my
assurance last fall - to go for long
term objectives rather than short
term.

E ^{every} - just has been to bring
everything together & then everyone
can be mobilized against it. We
are heading it up one step at
a time, so all opposition doesn't
evaporate. But we have to pursue

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ground & that takes time.
F But they (jews) will bring pressure
on you - even personally - How
do we know you will stick to
your guns.

I feel I can get everything from S U
if I want. But the net result will
be escalation & war soon. There
will be a war in 1, 2, 5 yrs.
I am a realist. If there is no
action by you, I leave my country
& ME high & dry. And I have
no resources.

P I see your point. You can get what
you want from S U, but arms race &
is only result.

R Then we would have to support
I implicitly

P But S U can not bring peace.
I can assure you we will cooperate
in a negotiation, help you even
& militarily.

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K If you go back to SU we will
have to demonstrate you can't get
anything from U

F We don't think you should give

K Despite F warnings, we found them
almost ~~none~~ no heavy equip.
What is your main strategic
obj, + it exhausts their credit
so they have to come back to us next
year.

W/ you equip running
down

You do have a real prob. if you
equip early in the ^{strategic} ~~year~~ when it
is not easy for us + c. Sanchez are
not too efficient. Selling a tank
empt month + he is more effie.
+ available reliable. But at some
point we have to do it quickly

F You want to guarantee I take
no action against Syria

R I told Kellin that ~~we~~ I will
oppose, will open against Syria

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

F If Syria is forced to fight, we will
be ~~forced~~ - only winners would be
F + SU. To ~~the~~ ^{the} present set
would be almost impossible.

P we think 25 years.

F We need some concrete prog on
Syrian front. This is a trust.

If K can do it in not more than
2 months, good. It is necessary.
We working w/ experts to change
a range of - V.S. It can be done, but
it tricky + could go either way now.

K Can you make a Syrian move alone?

F Sure. But to a place. We must
proceed slowly. We must get some
equip from U, but I can make
it sweeping + just enough to
get by.

You must do what you want, but
a sweeping deal would cause anxiety
you are sure things. But more
will be tough, because in Syria

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Next week will attempt a deal
of infrastructure. I told P when he
came in there would be an
attack on me & attempt to split me
& P.

But we can't move before Nov 5,
you didn't notice, but I got
additional aid to I taken out of PRA -
1st time ever.

The next step in Syria is much
more important than 1st because
now there is no logical stopping
place

F No one can accuse us of being too
satellite, ~~we were too close to~~
we get nothing from SU now &
we need something, but if we
get nothing from SU & nothing
from you, ^{+ asked to make more concessions} I very ^{am} ^{would}
think I am foolish. We have to
get some thing, but how is
whether a lot or a little. Of me.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Can get something from you early
next year, we can get by w/ only
a little!

The oil people are a biggest political
anathema - nice to us internally
but w/ loudspeakers outside.

R Reason I arranged this opt is
because I gave w/F appraisal.
I think Sakat is very opposed, but
was he made a big gamble. ~~He~~
Then no doubt he is anti-SU. But
radicals are using his name
against him, & if he gets ~~votes~~
we pay for his efforts & no help
from us, he is in trouble.

F What he needs is investment in
ME more than arms. We diverting
our arms supply now - you
allow one satellite to us -
I believe your appearance here, P,
& will relay to Sakat. ?

P also must pull I into arena
to participate.

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R What I asking for is end of bellig.
We have to find a formulation -
you can't give that - something
which looks like progress to peace
w/o giving up your principles.

F Sadat can give nothing more than
military drying. Has to be described
that way. No bellig is out of
question. We could not sign any-
thing like that. Politically he couldn't
survive. He can sign with
agreements & some other things. Best
for him to ~~try~~ make another
big move in Sinai ~~and~~ w/o
move on Syria & Jordan fronts would
be big political move - it would
get us out of a conflict & what more
could they want.

K I had brutal meeting yesterday
because he said he would discuss only
non-bellig.

F K had had come to Cairo only to
block any separate move by Cairo

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

As a agreed there would be two
separate political moves. So it
must look like unity.
K So I will try to ~~make~~ peace can't
want to be a political act. I like
to provide offers which look reasonable
& which Arabs can't make.
The radicals want to make E look
like it betraying Arabs, I want
E to look like it resisting progress
to peace.

SV is pushing for total solution
to ~~for~~ freeze sit & make prog
irreversible. If we prog in 6 mos
we are in bad trouble.

F The Jewish lobby thinks it can
manipulate any Am president
P I want now to that kind of pressure.
And there is less support for E than
10 yrs ago. UN made US people
much more cautious & less likely

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to back I.

F I'm glad to hear this I wish every
to Sadat. We will work out
how to present all this in connection
w/ trip to SU.

I'm glad to hear what we can do
can meet 3-4 ours.

But I don't want to avoid getting some SU
arms.

K We realize this. But a report
have - when I see documents exactly -
is placed in our files as evidence
of US policy & E going back to SU

F We lost 120 MIG's. We have
to get them back unless you
can give us 120 - a 60 each
in a year, ~~then we~~ nothing
now, + I keep it quiet. But
otherwise I have to get something

K If you have big shipments

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coming in early, we will
face massive pressure to ship
big to I. Rabin has already said
I'm committed to long term arrangement
That was to - said couldn't consider
it before 12/7 year.

^{Then}
F I don't see 50 F-4's. We are only
ours who haven't entered our press
said war.

K SU won't do it for nothing.

F Yes they will this time - just to
back US out of E. They have suffered
greatly + they ~~will~~ will give anything
I want to get you out of E.

I'm not cheating you - just
talking frankly.

P. Suppose they give you 120 planes.
That won't help achieve peace. We
could to work out arrangement for
peace in M.E. Providing things

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

by under no circumstances
F 1/15, but I have no choice but
to strengthen military, we are not
going to war - out of question -

anyway we have to do something - And
a political settlement alone w/ it
could be sufficient - A peace on Syria
too would help.

R) We will make sure under what
brooks like Syria pressure. If they
give arms & then we move, CSU
will claim credit. That we want
to treat. We have our hands to.

F But if no peace on Syria, who
has to defend you - no, we are
a defender of the US in a Arab
world.