MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON September 29, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE
FROM: Brent Scowcroft
SUBJECT: Meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira, on Sunday, September 29, 1974, 9:45 a.m. in the Oval Office.

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira,
Brazil
Secretary Kissinger
Brazilian Ambassador Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft

President: Welcome.

Silveira: I brought you a message from President Geisel. He called about Mrs. Ford.

[The press was admitted for a brief photograph session. The President and the Minister spoke informally about Mrs. Ford's operation. The press then departed.]

President: It was nice of you to stay over to see me.

Silveira: I am honored to see you. I had a good meeting with the Secretary. We have very good relations since we came to office. I told the Secretary that our policies should eventually converge. We are trying to be ever more democratic. Of course we had our revolution. In Brazil, the military never directly took over the government as they did in Argentina.

Kissinger: I told the President that Brazil had a good military service and an outstanding Foreign Service.
President: It is great credit to your talent and the skill of the government.

Silveira: We hope some day you will come to Brazil.

President: I would like to. I haven't seen as much of Latin America as I would like.

Silveira: You are the typical person who would be liked in Brazil. Our peoples are closer than we would admit.

Kissinger: They are a bit nationalistic too. They think God is a Brazilian.

Silveira: And you say, "In God we trust," We are patriotic. We like the flag; we like military music. We have less terrorism than elsewhere.

Kissinger: You haven't had a tradition of civil disruption.

President: Are your students quieter?

Silveira: Students are the same everywhere. But our students are ambitious. Other Latin Americans want to be heroes; ours want to work.

Kissinger: It is a stupendous country. I was there once and am seduced forever.

Silveira: We believe in social benefits, but in a measured fashion.

Kissinger: They licked a terrible inflation.

President: In the sixties, didn't you have over 100 percent?

Silveira: Yes. We have a good pension system.

President: We admire your development program and your control of inflation.

Silveira: We have a new Ministry of Social Security. We have oil problems. We have doubled our imports aside from oil.
Kissinger: Silveira will separate the Arabs from us.

Silveira: We should separate the Arab-Israeli dispute from oil. The October war had a good influence on inducing Israel to negotiate.

Kissinger: Brasil has a good, mature relationship with the Arabs.

Silveira: That is true. I talked with [Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs] Saqqaf and asked him if he wanted to disrupt the world economy. It is necessary to arrive at a solution to the problem.

President: Dr. Kissinger and I have been meeting with the parties and we are insisting on movement.

Silveira: Saqqaf told me he was pleased with you. They are more responsible now and have something to lose. I told Saqqaf that if we don't solve this, they will hold only paper for their oil. I saw all the Arabs and I told them it is in their interest to solve the problem.

President: The speeches I made were on that point.

Kissinger: We were talking about Cuba before you arrived. Castro made a strong anti-U.S. speech. He attacked the President; he said, "Throw the U.S. out of the OAS, keep oil prices up." The same old thing.

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President: Secretary Kissinger assures me that the relationship in this respect is perfect. We will continue to do so.

Silveira: And we will. We are not inclined to vote in favor. At best we will abstain.

Kissinger: If they keep this up, we will vote against it.

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We must play down Castro, but the Cuban issue itself is important.

SPORETR / NODIS
President: But in the United States Castro is a symbol. There is an affinity between the American and Cuban people. But Castro makes it very hard for us to do anything.

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Silveira: We feel the same. You described our position exactly. We are not interested in relations with Castro.

President: Even an OAS suspension wouldn't mean that we would suspend our bilateral embargo.

Silveira: We feel the same.

President: They have more to gain than we.

Kissinger: We have nothing to gain from Cuba, except a bit with the other Latin Americans. Castro shouldn't get the illusion we are on the run.

Silveira: Anytime you can come to Brazil we would be happy to have you. We very much like Americans and you are the type of person we like.

President: Secretary Kissinger is going to visit in January. I want to get him out of the United States; he is the most popular man in the United States. Seriously, he is the best Secretary of State in my lifetime. We are very fortunate to have him.

Silveira: We are an enthusiastic, hopeful people. We live in a country where we can dream. It is not like Honduras.

Kissinger: I don't like Brasilia, because the talent of the Brazilians is spontaneity. But the concept of Brasilia is stupendous.

Silveira: I told Dr. Kissinger that we might get oil prices down if we would try to get industrial prices down and compensate them for inflation.
Kissinger: Assistant Secretary-designate William D. Rogers in his confirmation hearings said Brazil would be having terrible economic problems.

President: Would it help if I would say that I am very impressed with your economic progress?

(The Minister indicated yes, and words to that effect were incorporated in the statement.)
INITIAL

TO:   PRES
KISSINGER
SCOWCROFT
DAVIS

FROM:   KISSINGER, H
COLBY, W
SCHLESINGER, J

SUBJECT: MERCOSUR, PNA, ZMG, MF, BOLIVIA

INITIAL ACTION

MEMO FOR HAK
MEMO FOR PRES

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPY TO HAK/SCOWCROFT
STAFF SECRETARY
FAR EAST
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MID EAST / ISRAEL / AFRICA / NO. ASIA
EUROPE / CANADA
LATIN AMERICA
UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC
SCIENTIFIC
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
NSC PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
OCEANS POLICY
INTELLIGENCE

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION AGENT

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1974

SECRET/NODIS

SUMMARY MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Summary of Conversation Between President Ford and Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira on Sunday, September 29, 1974, at 9:45 a.m. in the Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Minister of Brazilian Foreign Affairs Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira
Secretary Kissinger
Brazilian Ambassador Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro
Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft

The first part of the meeting was an exchange of information about Brazil, in which the high professional quality of Brazil's military forces and foreign service was noted. Foreign Minister Silveira said he hoped that President Ford would come to Brazil some day, and the President said he would like to see more of Latin America, including Brazil. The President spoke highly of Brazil's development program and control of inflation.

There was an exchange of comments about the situation in the Middle East, in which both sides noted their efforts to impress upon the Arabs the importance of a responsible position.

The discussion turned to Cuba. Castro's recent strongly anti-United States speech was noted. Both sides noted that Castro's behavior could affect their vote at the Quito Rio Pact meeting. The Foreign Minister and the President said that a suspension of OAS sanctions would not automatically entail a lifting of each country's own embargo on Cuban contacts. Both expressed the concern about appearing to yield to Cuba.

President Ford agreed to mention in the public statement following the meeting how impressed he was with Brazil's economic progress.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.8
MBC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, W452-12-3064

BY:______, NASA, DATE:______
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Summary Memo of President's Meeting with Brazilian Foreign Minister, September 29

Attached for your information is a summary memorandum of the President's September 29 conversation with Foreign Minister Silveira.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
10-15-74
FOR BUD McFARLANE

Bud:
Maybe you can sign off for Brent on this one.

Steve Low
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 15, 1974

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: STEPHEN LOW

SUBJECT: Memcon -- President Ford's Meeting with Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira on September 29

1. Attached at Tab A for initialing for the President's Files is a retyped version of the President's meeting with Foreign Minister Silveira.

2. Attached at Tab B is a "summary" version of the meeting which our Embassy and State have asked for. If you approve, we will arrange to have it forwarded to them.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you initial the Memorandum for the President's Files at Tab A.

2. That you approve our forwarding the Summary Memorandum at Tab B to State and our Embassy.

Attachments:

Tab A -- Memcon for President's Files
Tab B -- Summary memo (for State & Embassy)

SECRET/NODIS

TOP SECRET X03 (3) CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President
Ambassador JoaoAugusto de Araujo Castro, Ambassador of Brazil
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Sunday, September 29, 1974
9:45 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: Welcome.

Silveira: I brought you a message from President Geisel. He called about Mrs. Ford.

[The press was admitted for a brief photograph session. The President and the Minister spoke informally about Mrs. Ford's operation. The press then departed.]

President: It was nice of you to stay over to see me.

Silveira: I am honored to see you. I had a good meeting with the Secretary. We have very good relations since we came to office. I told the Secretary that our policies should eventually converge. We are trying to be even more democratic. Of course we had our revolution. In Brazil, the military never directly took over the government as they did in Argentina.

Kissinger: I told the President that Brazil had a good military service and an outstanding Foreign Service.

President: It is great credit to your talent and the skill of the government.
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President: I would like to. I haven't seen as much of Latin America as I would like.

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Kissinger: They are a bit nationalistic too. They think God is a Brazilian.

Silveira: And you say, "In God we trust." We are patriotic. We like the flag; we like military music. We have less terrorism than elsewhere.

Kissinger: You haven't had a tradition of civil disruption.

President: Are your students quieter?

Silveira: Students are the same everywhere. But our students are ambitious. Other Latin Americans want to be heroes; ours want to work.

Kissinger: It is a stupendous country. I was there once and am seduced forever.

Silveira: We believe in social benefits, but in a measured fashion.

Kissinger: They kicked a terrible inflation.

President: In the '60s, didn't you have over 100%?

Silveira: Yes. We have a good pension system.

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Silveira: We have a new Ministry of Social Security. We have oil problems. We have doubled our imports aside from oil.

Kissinger: Silveira will separate the Arabs from us.

Silveira: We should separate the Arab-Israeli dispute from oil. The October war had a good influence on inducing Israel to negotiate.

Kissinger: Brazil has a good, mature relationship with the Arabs.
Silveira: That is true. I talked with [Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs] Saqqaf and asked him if he wanted to disrupt the world economy. It is necessary to arrive at a solution to the problem.

President: Dr. Kissinger and I have been meeting with the parties and we are insisting on movement.

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Kissinger: We were talking about Cuba before you arrived. Castro made a strong anti-US speech. He attacked the President; he said, "Throw the US out of the OAS, keep oil prices up." The same old thing.

Silveira: We have parallel positions. We consult closely.

President: Secretary Kissinger assures me that the relationship in this respect is perfect. We will continue to do so.

Silveira: And we will. We are not inclined to vote in favor. At best we will abstain.

Kissinger: If they keep this up, we will vote against it.

Silveira: Castro is being stupid. Many Latin American ministers sent him a cable saying it was essential that he behave. The best hope is the Soviet Union will no longer be interested in confrontation and the radicalism he represents. It is expensive for them.

We must play down Castro, but the Cuban issue itself is important.

President: But in the United States Castro is a symbol. There is an affinity between the American and Cuban people. But Castro makes it very hard for us to do anything.

Silveira: It is the same with us. Our Congress will not let us be too forgiving to Castro.
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Kissinger: I don't like Brasilia, because the talent of the Brazilians is spontaneity. But the concept of Brasilia is stupendous.

Silveria: I told Dr. Kissinger that we might get oil prices down if we would try to get industrial prices down and compensate them for inflation.

Kissinger: [Assistant Secretary-designate William D.] Rogers in his confirmation hearings said Brazil would be having terrible economic problems.

President: Would it help if I would say that I am very impressed with your economic progress?

[The Minister indicated yes, and words to that effect were incorporated in the statement.]
S.  I brought your copy over today. I had a bit of trouble with it.

P.  Great. Thank you.

S.  I had some difficulty with the text. I did some corrections to the
    text. I thought it was a bit unclear, but I wanted to be
    sure to make sure the text was correct.

P.  I understand. Thank you for the effort. I'm glad we could
    make the corrections.

S.  You're welcome. It's always better to have things clarified.

K.  Speaking of things, I heard about the recent events in
    Argentina.

P.  Yes, I heard about the recent protests. It's a difficult situation.

S.  It is. I hope things can be resolved soon. It's important for
    the region.

K.  I agree. What's on your mind?
S. We have oil wells. We have doubtless an export from oil.
K. Situation with regard to Cuba presently.
S. We should export 1.5 objects from oil. It was had
a good influence on reducing the negotiations.
K. Brazil has a good, positive relationship with Cuba.
S. That time, I talked to Soyoff and asked him if he wanted
to discuss a world conference. It was very, very cautious on a
relationship to Cuba.

P. It has been meeting we detectives, we are meeting
in secret
S. Soyoff told me he pleased of you. They are more say
como than anything else. doctoring. Tell Soyoff
if we don't solve this, they will hold up for
the oil. I saw all Cuba and I tell them it in their
interest to return poker.

P. The speech of the statement on that point.
K. We were talking about Cuba before your arrival. Castro needs
a strong anti-US speech. Attached! Leave US out of this,
they will press up... some old thing
S. Can have parallels of this. We cannot really
P. Because of a relationship in this regard is placed.
we will continue.
S. And we will. We would not limit the vote in
that. At least we will obtain.
K. If they keep this up, will they go up?
S. Castro is being argued. Many have written that him
as the person in secret that led hand. But
hope it is SO will be large an interest in
compensation + reduction he supports. It is
expensive for them.
we must play down Castro, but to Cuban issue
really is important.

P. But in US, Castro is a spearhead. Three or four
not US + Cuban people. Castro makes it very hard
for us to do anything.
In a room univ, our language will not let us be too familiar. Cut off.

We had worked out our strategy for Pinto + Brazil. Unfamiliar and would not be a good model for the money. Along

that we could both obtain. How we have been

part. We want some way to yield to Cuba.

We feel secure in our political and economic policies.

We want continued relations with Cuba.

We feel secure. It's not in the current

market.

They have more to gain than us.

We have nothing to gain from Cuba, except a bit of other

national esteem. Costing shouldn't put Cuba in our

norm.

Anytime you can come to the get we would be happy
to know. We're very much like Americans just

type person in this.

If you do get us out of here - he

would probably move in the US. Someone in that

state with these.

We are an enterprising people. We live in

country where we can obtain. Not like Americans.

Do not like the idea of Brazil being

so prominent. But can't really keep him in the picture.

Tell if it might get still more down of me

would be a great benefit for us. How can we

now, for example.

We have in this situation bringings and Brazil could

in having trouble in this position.

Hope it helps. Good

The only way managed to come prop.