MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Secretary Henry A. Kissinger
Senator Mike Mansfield
Senator Hugh Scott
Senator William Fulbright
Senator George Aiken
Senator Hubert Humphrey
Congressman Thomas O'Neill
Congressman John Rhodes
Congressman Thomas Morgan
Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen

L/General Brent Scowcroft
Mr. William Timmons

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, September 26, 1974
PLACE: Family Dining Room, The Residence

SUBJECT: Bipartisan Leadership Breakfast with the President

The President: I appreciate Mike's holding the Foreign Assistance Bill so we could talk over Turkish aid, the Foreign Assistance Bill and the Trade Bill.

Doc, you approved the modified Turkish language.

Congressman Morgan: It passed by a vote of 19 to 11.

The President: I hope we can make it stick on the floor. Then, Mike helped get the same into the Senate aid bill. Henry, would you explain the situation we are in.
Secretary Kissinger: Let me do two things -- explain the diplomacy and then the legal situation.

The Greek domestic situation is extremely complex. Karamanlis is caught between anti-US forces on the left and right. There is Papadopoulos on the left (who was strong enough in '67 to stimulate a coup); and on the right are the military types from the junta.

Karamanlis and Mavros are personally pro-US. They talk differently, however, for public consumption.

Congressman O'Neill: How did the junta judge so wrong on Cyprus?

Secretary Kissinger: We got no high-level warning of the coup. Neither did Makarios. We earlier had had some rumors which we passed to him.

The junta made a basic wrong judgment. They thought in terms of the 1964 situation. But in 1964 there was a strong Cyprus government and a popular Greek government. And as a result of '64, the Turks vowed never would they let it happen again. The junta was living in a dream world -- in the early days after the coup it wouldn't give concessions to keep the Turks from invading.

Karamanlis is trying to steal support from the left and the right before the November elections. Take his actions with respect to NATO -- Karamanlis is trying to steal the thunder from the left. He has really done a minimum. Mavros was upset because he was the only foreign minister called on in New York. He thought it wouldn't look good back home.

The Greeks know the outcome will be worse than on July 15. Any conceivable outcome before the elections would have to be of a character which would hurt them. They hope in a negotiation to wrap in other issues with Turkey. It was our judgment that there was nothing we could have done which would have stopped the second Turkish offensive.

Immediately after the second attack began, we invited both Prime Ministers here or offered to send Ambassador Bruce to meet with them. These were all rejected.

We told Karamanlis that we understood the need for some anti-US propaganda, but there was danger it would prevent us from helping them. He quieted it down thereafter. Then Karamanlis asked for a private emissary. We sent Tyler. Karamanlis told him that in direct negotiations, he would have to ask far too much. He gave us a list of what he would need in direct negotiations and then gave us a smaller list of demands which he said he could get by with
in direct negotiations. Then he said he would rather not be involved at all -- so he wouldn't have to accept the responsibility. He could accept a communal talks outcome which he couldn't accept if he were directly involved.

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The Greek problem is presentational. Mavros was very friendly with me and asked for economic and military aid -- but publicly he has had to make some troublesome statements. He told me he would get Makarios under control. He asked privately that I go to Turkey to bring back a concession, but they are reluctant to ask me publicly. But all this is tactics. Both the Greeks and Turks substantially agree on this general process.

In Turkey, Ecevit has a government problem because his coalition wanted annexation in Cyprus. He is looking for a partner who would be willing to negotiate with Greece.

Greece is willing to give Turkey 20% of the island, and the Turks are willing to reduce their holdings to 33%. Somewhere in between will work.

We are ready to use leverage on Turkey (whatever you think of our policy), but if we cut off aid ahead of time we will lose that leverage. If we are tough beforehand, the Greeks -- who will be tough negotiators anyway -- would have leverage over us. With an aid cutoff, the Greeks would expect concessions no one could get them. These restrictions would lose us the Turks without helping the Greeks and destroy this process I have been describing. It is going pretty well really -- but it will move in fits and starts. Cutting off aid doesn't help the Greek moderates because it cuts their maneuvering room -- they can't point to objective necessities for compromise.

The legal provisions are such that we can and probably should cut off aid. We could avoid the cutoff by the following (read from talking paper):

-- Find the Turks not in substantial violation
-- Self-defense
-- Treaty of 1960 creates doubt
-- Law applies to future, not past action
The President felt we should not make a strained legal interpretation without talking with you. Even if we cut off, does it apply to pipeline, and how about the $50 million grant exception? A cutoff without the pipeline cutoff would infuriate the Turks without leaving any effect for a year.

The negotiations timetable can't be speeded. All of this represents the nature of our problem and why we don't want an automatic cutoff but rather to use the threat of it for leverage.

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Senator Fulbright: What is it?

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This gives the Greeks the opportunity to say at any time there isn't any.
The language in yesterday's amendments call for "good faith efforts by the Turks."

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Congressman Frelinghuysen: But we don't have an ideal solution and the House vote shows clearly what the sentiment is.

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Senator Mansfield: Our policy in Cyprus has been good. There are all sorts of dangerous possibilities in this situation. I oppose aid but I want to support our diplomacy.

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Senator Fulbright: Turkey has always been afraid of the Soviet Union. They wouldn't turn to them.

Senator Mansfield: No, you are wrong. They would turn to the Soviet Union and the Arabs.

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The President: Then, by the time the recess is over, there may be some progress and we could take care of it in the Authorization.

Senator Aiken: To summarize -- all this maneuvering must be kept from the public.

SECRET-
Congressman Rhodes: How is the US Greek Community divided?

Secretary Kissinger: The responsible ones are for Karamanlis and the demonstrators are for Papadopoulos.

Congressman Rhodes: Suppose Iakovos met with the President and then made a good statement.

Congressman O'Neill: Before the coup the Greek Congressman were out of touch with the US-Greeks -- who supported the junta. Now they want to get back in touch with their constituents by being tough.

The President: We will put tough language in the Senate Authorization and keep the Senate CRA with the Brooke Amendment. Then after the recess, progress would get us off the hook.

So it's crucial to get to Iakovos.

Congressman Rhodes: I think it would add to our problems to put a tough amendment on the Senate bill.

The President: Let's spend just a minute on Jackson-Vanik. I met with Scoop last Saturday. My position is to have a waiver. If, at the end of the year the Soviet Union hasn't performed, I would kill MFN. The Soviet Union has agreed they wouldn't interfere with applications and any applicant could leave, except for security cases.

Secretary Kissinger: That's about 1 or 1-1/2% of the total.

The President: And no harassment. If they stick by that, I would so certify and MFN would continue. We propose to Scoop a procedure like we had on the pay bill. Scoop wants affirmative action by the Congress under a complicated system he says will ensure the Congress will act.

Senator Fulbright: That won't work.

Senator Scott: No, it won't.

The President: Scoop has worked out a complicated procedure, but you know it can be circumvented.

Why we would even be willing to let it be a one-House veto.

Senator Humphrey: What has Javits said about all this.
Secretary Kissinger: What the President described is what the Soviets have told us. But they won't guarantee a specific figure and they claim emigration is down because of the Middle East situation. There is probably something to that (described Belgian action on re-emigrants). We would communicate all these understandings in a letter to Scoop and he would answer back with his clarifications.

Senator Humphrey: To Scoop? And how about the rest of us?

Secretary Kissinger: Scoop would write back and say he understands 60,000 is what we could expect as an adequate figure. The Soviets will not agree to that. And you know there is no way for the Soviet Union to live up to every detail of these requirements, so Jackson could use every isolated example to scream bad faith. (Described how we couldn't require typed applications.)

No government could or should live up to this intrusion.

Senator Fulbright: We certainly wouldn't.

Secretary Kissinger: But we would certainly know through the Jewish network of systematic violations. And Brezhnev sort of has promised personal attention individual cases. But the Soviet Union has not agreed to 60,000 and Jackson at the end of the waiver period could scream trickery. We do not accept his specific number.

[The President mentioned the Kudirka case to show Soviet cooperation.]

Senator Humphrey: I'm glad to hear they are human. If you think the Greeks have pressure, we have more from the Jews. You've got to get the top Jewish leaders in and tell them what has been done. The President has an ironclad case on this.

Senator Scott: We have made these points to the Jewish Community. The Israeli Government has to . . . (interrupted).

The President: If the Jackson-Vanik Amendment comes up, we can't buy it. So there would be no trade bill and probably no Jewish emigration. The way to go is our way so we can get a trade bill and emigration.

Senator Mansfield: I couldn't vote for the bill as Henry has described the process.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: Would you leave Scoop's letter unanswered?

Secretary Kissinger: We would reply saying we understand this is your view -- a waffle. But he would always claim trickery.
Senator Humphrey: Why not spell out this to the leadership? Why to Scoop? I am mean too. We know the President won't let non-compliance turn into a political football. It is absolutely safe. Democratic politics will be wild in 1976. The President should spell out the understandings -- or Henry, but not to Scoop.

Senator Scott: If sentiment here is opposed, just tell Scoop what the leaders think.

Secretary Kissinger: We could put in a letter from me what I have described.

Senator Humphrey: Someone should spell it out to the committees, not to Scoop.

Senator Scott: Tell Scoop there should not be a private treaty.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two choices -- if we write a letter to the leadership and he replies, he is just one Senator. But if we write him and he replies, it is part of the legislative record.

Congressman Rhodes: A letter should go to Senator Long.

Senator Humphrey: A letter should go to Long. Then, anyone can send a letter back who wants to. If Scoop gets a letter, others who may have certain ambitions will want one.

The President: We brought this up because we are here working hard on this problem and I wanted the leadership to know the precise situation. I hope Scoop won't feel we undercut him.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union says they can't accept MFN if affirmative action is needed every year.

The President: Tell them about the Camp David meeting, Henry.

Secretary Kissinger: Based on our oil speeches, we have called a Big Five meeting.

What we are seeing is one of the largest transfers of economic and therefore political power in history. Italy, for example, can't meet its deficit. Recycling gives the Arabs life and death control over the industrial world -- by pulling out the investment they could cause economic chaos. Some have said let the Arabs take over the foreign aid programs from the developed countries. If the Arabs take over foreign aid -- they haven't shown that inclination yet -- they could buy up the whole Third World. Libya, for example, literally buys up countries.
We have no brilliant answers but we want to put this problem to them and some possible approaches:

(1) Consumer restraint.

(2) Explore a fund which would equalize the burden -- maybe a tax.

(3) Build on emergency sharing agreement -- from selective to general boycott.

We must realize we face a serious change in world political structure.

Senator Scott: The industrialized world won't tolerate strangulation at the hands of a few Arabs. It never has happened before in history.

Secretary Kissinger: There has never been this kind of power transfer without war. European attitudes are now changing.

If this trend continues, Japan, for example, will build a military force to take action.

Senator Humphrey: Your conference should agree on joint R&D. You need to announce something. We need really to get going.

No one knows how to deal with this shift in capital.

We should tell the Arabs we will pay $7 a barrel and no more.

We don't have a concerted effort. The people will respond if we tell them cold turkey.

Senator Fulbright: Why don't we ask the Jews to settle Jerusalem as part of the package?

Senator Humphrey: You keep looking at me when you say things like that. I have talked more cold turkey, or Humphrey that you have.

The President: You have been great to come and take all this time. Thank you very much.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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Secretary Kissinger
Senator Mike Mansfield
Senator Hugh Scott
Senator William Fulbright
Senator George Aiken
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Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
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SUBJECTS: Turkish Aid; Jackson Amendment; Energy Cooperation

Turkish Aid:
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Senator Fulbright: That won't work.

Senator Scott: No, it won't.

The President: Scoop has worked out a complicated procedure, but you know it can be circumvented.
Why, we would even be willing to let it be a one-House veto.

Senator Humphrey: What has Javits said about all this?

Secretary Kissinger: What the President described is what the Soviets have told us. But they won't guarantee a specific figure and they also claim that emigration is down because of the Middle East situation. There is probably something to that. There is a problem in Western Europe already with people wanting to go back. We would communicate all these understandings in a letter to Scoop and he would answer back with his clarifications.

Senator Humphrey: To Scoop? And how about the rest of us?

Secretary Kissinger: Scoop would write back and say he understands that 60,000 is what we could expect as an adequate figure. The Soviets will not agree to that. And you know there is no way for the Soviet Union to live up to every detail of these requirements, so Jackson could use every isolated example to scream bad faith. The Soviets could ask for typed applications. No government could or should live up to this sort of intrusion.

Senator Fulbright: We certainly wouldn't.

Secretary Kissinger: But we would certainly know through the Jewish network about systematic violations if there are any. And Brezhnev has promised to give his personal attention to individual cases. But the Soviet Union has not agreed to 60,000, and Jackson at the end of the waiver period could scream trickery. We do not accept his specific number.

[The President mentioned the Kudirkas case to show Soviet cooperation.]

Senator Humphrey: I'm glad to hear they are human. If you think the Greeks have pressure, we have more from the Jews. You've got to get the top Jewish leaders in and tell them what has been done. The President has an ironclad case on this.

Senator Scott: We have made these points to the Jewish Community. The Israeli Government has to . . . (interrupted).
The President: If the Jackson-Vanik Amendment comes up, we can’t buy it. So there would be no trade bill and probably no Jewish emigration. The way to go is our way so we can get a trade bill and emigration.

Senator Mansfield: I couldn’t vote for the bill as Henry has described the process.

Congressman Frelighuysen: Would you leave Scoop’s letter unanswered?

Secretary Kissinger: We would reply saying we understand this is your view -- which is a waffle. But he could always claim trickery.

Senator Humphrey: Why not spell out this to the leadership? Why to Scoop? I am mean too. We know the President won’t let non-compliance turn into a political football. It is absolutely safe. Democratic politics will be wild in ’76. The President should spell out the understandings -- or Henry -- but not to Scoop.

Senator Scott: If sentiment here is opposed, just tell Scoop what the leaders think.

Secretary Kissinger: We could put in a letter from me what I have described.

Senator Humphrey: Someone should spell it out to the committees, not to Scoop.

Senator Scott: Tell Scoop there should not be a private treaty.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two choices: If we write a letter to the leadership and he replies, he is just one Senator. But if we write him and he replies, it is part of the legislative record.

Congressman Rhodes: A letter should go to Senator Long.

Senator Humphrey: A letter should go to Long. Then anyone can send a letter back who wants to. If Scoop gets a letter, others who may have certain ambitions will want one.

The President: We brought this up because we are here working hard on this problem and I wanted the leadership to know the precise situation. I hope Scoop won’t feel we undercut him.
Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union says they can’t accept MFN if affirmative action is needed every year.

Energy Cooperation

The President: Tell them about the Camp David meeting, Henry.

Secretary Kissinger: Based on what the President and I have said in our oil speeches, we have called a meeting of the Big Five to concert our policy.

What we are seeing is one of the largest transfers of economic power and therefore political power in history. Italy, for example, can’t meet its deficit. Recycling gives the Arabs life and death control over the industrial world. By pulling out investment, they could cause economic chaos. Some have said, "Let the Arabs take over the foreign aid programs from the developed countries." If the Arabs take over foreign aid -- they haven’t shown that inclination yet -- they could buy up the whole Third World. Libya, for example, literally buys up countries.

We have no brilliant answers but we want to put this problem to them and discuss some possible approaches: One element would be consumer restraint, or conservation. Second, we would explore establishing a fund which would equalize the burden -- maybe a tax. Third, we would build on the emergency sharing agreement and strengthen it for the range of threats, from selective to a general boycott.

But basically we must realize that we face a serious change in the world political structure.

Senator Scott: The industrialized world won’t tolerate strangulation at the hands of a few Arabs. It never has happened before in history.

Secretary Kissinger: There has never been this kind of power transfer without war. European attitudes are now changing. If this trend continues, Japan, for example, will build a military force to take action.

Senator Humphrey: Your conference should agree on joint R&D. You need to announce something. We need really to get going.
No one knows how to deal with this shift in capital.

We should tell the Arabs we will pay $7 a barrel and no more. We don't have a concerted effort. The people will respond if we tell it to them cold turkey.

Senator Fulbright: Why don't we ask the Jews to sell Jerusalem as part of the package?

Senator Humphrey: You keep looking at me when you say things like that. I have talked more cold turkey, or Humphrey, than you have.

The President: You have been great to come and take all this time. Thank you very much.
Leadership Breakfast
26 Sept.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Deartment China
O'Neill, Rohlfing, Albright only one who
said yes or
Henry: I can see why I was held it the
hours like a close compact.
Doc: Don't want to do this, we had just
ended our decision making.
Kiss not take first time.
R. Kraus said 95% of words in praise in
870 miles of Italy
Sawt - 1/5 of the points have eyes closed
with 25% of positive points.
P. Yes, we don't want to do this. We
have thrown that away.
Henry: 5/5 of them saying it yet true.
P. We've decided to hold it to 8/15 at
the end of the week.
Doc: You approx market levels
Lawrence
Now - 1/4
P. I hope we can make it stick on the
P. Three kids baked a cake with S.
Smith and Bill. It would have origi
K. Ext very close to thing - explain obli.time.
Great chance with the being coming.
Know great respect for 2 anti-views
Papademos (whining now)
in 27 to 28 standard a way. Octin
in a group.
Kanak & Maran are presentable for US.
P. They do great thing for just coming.
Tog: How did they go wrong on Syriza.
K: Just got the timing of event.
Within
Hil Matheson
Indicate major from every judgment.
Forgetting who was fighting for the good
democratic and popular action. Some
& Trudely wanted more against
Jordan was doing in a beauty middle-
level but give conclusion to keep
Trends from invading.
Kane is trying to steal support from 
his friends in Brussels. The NATO-
France is facing a similar problem in the 
Nordic countries. They have agreed that if 
Nordics accept the nuclear option as 
I called it, the 
Germans know that the day will be over 
July 15. Any operation before elections 
will be too close to front lines. They hope 
that it will be in October or November.

It was easy to make a calculation, but it was difficult to realize it. There are 
only two steps to take: 1) to stop the 
French move, and 2) to stop the 
Tunisian move. Immediately after the 
Tunisian move, the French told the US 
Representative to stop the 
French move, and the US told the 
French to stop the 
Tunisian move. Kane said that 
the French option is not 
too close to the 
front lines. He wants to make 
the French option a 
small but visible one. Then he 
will decide whether he should 
accept the 
French option or not. He 
could accept a compromise 
with the French 
which is both 
acceptable and 
the French 
involved.

As time goes on, we think that the French 
will not be interested in 
the French option. The 
French have no 
interest in the 
French option. They 
have no interest in the 
French option. Kane 
said that 
The French 
option is 
not too close to the 
front lines.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The mood is dreadful. Greek post is presentable. M. Vouras was very friendly and we voted for
more + tried + but in both cases he has been fairly cool. He told me he would get
Drakos to see us. I went and he talked to him. I asked if he went to
his room, he said no, but they reluctant. He
was unwilling. But this is tactics. Both
Greece + Turkey + individually agree on the
good prices.

In Paris, we don't have much to
because of end of winter season. It's slowing for
producers until spring + in the
future.

Considering to give to 20% of return +
Turkey willing to reduce to 20%. Somewhere in that
will work.

Wasn't it wise to encourage in Turkey (whether
government or policy) but if we

...
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Strained legal interpretation of taking/giving. Even if we put off, does it stop pipeline, + comment 40% mil spend suspension. Cutting the pipeline would implement a GDP deficit for a year.

Input: I feel that can't be speeded. All this is one part + why we don't want any cuts, try to defend it as far as

I think, it why comment of yesterday is good.

Fed. What is it?

K. This required extra, progress +

I think, we'd do any. Unusual would do good until pretty

I am. Your view /Fed. OB.

K. A. Almost that any other legal

Other. How do we respond to some cuts

friends.

K. If/when /there is

burnout, that will help keep us off.

Federal. Fewer would mean Bandwagon

with fight. Argument is correct was

changed to main story.

K. One can get through, interpreting

fall out floods + situation makes

problem - it is a /R move specifically

problem.

K. One of the terms we can bring pressure

from. We will lose advantage.

Federal - how soon get out of compromising.

K. If pneumonia would do to start off

incent at all done.50-75

This would force Tuesday to dictate

position in which two Thursday
give enormous + Graphs wouldn't

want to endorse because they would

want to wait to see what effect

cut-off was having.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Feb 6.4 - About our own ideal situation, this house with them.

Rohr - Eisenhower told me this makes me feel your own since we will.

What are you telling Senate action on C & K now? Can I bring some thing in.Further.

K - Can someone try to House sometime & try to understand E's actions on E & K now.

Try - Would you talk of C & K early.

Wright - We have a Council & would try to find out to do in a Conference.

Rohr - That's what we need.

K - If we can have House long. I mean we had a daily argument about progress & would like to have Wangery.

Rohr - Have about offer of 1942. We need both Greece & Turkey.

P - Sure. Turkey could take some NATO at least in back.

K - Potential for Turkey publicly of NATO is greater than Greece. We have a population & a part of Europe.

G - Had it. Of Turkey there in US about, we in trouble.

Henry - We have a good of evidence. More must be from a time thing. Something is very poor to that we can point to. We can make a case by we having something to point to.

K - There is a US election in Nov too.

K - Our position is Turkey will give a concession, but Greece asked that we don't do it. Even they insist it about their position & write for in front they think there.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

P Two docs - with tomorrow +
C P Moody

Tell - why can't take it to UN. Then
we wouldn't have all this argument.
P - Gravle + I'm thinking about
the treaty at the UN is for France.

State wants UN can't do anything
and it will just go as it is. If we
vote away from them, so probably
will move toward them. Turkey is
more my weight to it.

Far - Turkey always friendly so
France - no. They would want S.U.

India - India is going to wait till
US birthday. They don't want to commit
on the whole issue. If they don't call off
on India, it will have to trade.

Turkey - How about a Turkish Trade
Agreement 2-3 a year and
another machine of items.

Hemp - Import we could hang onto
a good stuff. He sent the other kid to
want them to talk to 7. They rejected
it.

Nada - Push take up with Turkey.

Hemp - France has mild amount so
France is my choice. Just tough on us
about not to negotiate a good offer.
P - There is a time sense is over,
maybe some days.

Now - Summary - At all this morning
will be kept from public.

Roosevelt House House is US basis. 
quarantined?

RE: l. I. B. one for Korea +
democracy and for payment.
Rhoda: SupperJakobs met -2
Puck: & then made your statement
Tape: Greek Congress amendment
of truth w/DS Greeks-who negotiated
in jncte. Then they won't get
truth in truth.
P: We put troops right on straight
Amth. + keep Status quo as
break adjourn. Then with
mass or keep would put me off
+ 3 more.
I: So it crumbled & got to Jakarta
Rocco: I think it would be best to
put the troops around in Sth's Hill.
P: Just a minute on Jakarta-Numm:
Met w/Scary last Saturday
my position is minor at end of
year- if SO doesn't perform we
wanted bill MF: Ni. S U agreed
they wouldn't veto if Griffith
any small, 20 threat. Newsroom
chaos.
K: That about 1 a 1.2%?
P: And the amendment. Then
J would write & SR in would write
a separate provision into pony bill.
Scary wants 1 free application
First. Wait while
S: No. No I won't
P: Scary hasn't made any kind of
provision, but you know it
can be manipulated.
We would be writing to let it
deem all right.
Harry: What has Jakarta said?
P: What Patrick said is what Smith
himself said. But they won't
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Germann or specific point. When claim wass capacitor is drawn
for over - $150,000. Probably
something in it (charges)
the question. We would comment
that understanding in a bath
& song a bit would amount to it.

Hoop - How about this we
K " was granted with a bit a may
to understand the one is
adequate min. We have done
S tied to the way this to many data
attachment so Jackson could demand
back plus (byjine). We sent
a mild or should lend up to the
witness. But we would turn
of congratulated much. And Buz
has promised prompt attention.
A third case -

But S8. has not agreed to
his own & Jackson could demand
460. We do not accept his
depression."

"I mentioned it. It & 6. has
as free speech for white & red
money. Ed to back they Surrea.

If you think. It is a free person &
and have more. You get to get
up Jewish be in the talk
them what has been done. I have
comment on this.

Scott. We have much these put... -
back lead has to.

P. If Boardman came & we
could be it. So no Trade bill
I probably no Jewish immigration.
This way it go. I am very to get
a trade bill + immigration.
WASHINGTON

WR: I wouldn't write in till as he chairman.

F: What? Would you have songs like 'Flooded'?

K: It should only come as an understanding. It's between us.


S: Comrades. There isn't a single football. Doesn't politics only work in this. Pathetic spell out a revolution here.

K: Now, I think you have it wrong. Tell S. You can't the leader think.

K: We can put it in a letter from me and I send.

H: Sorry. Someone should spell out the winter, not to scrap.

S: Tell S. Shouldn't get in a political party.

K: I think. Why not with a leadership of her with just one person. But if both we with them + the people, it is just as big a word.

R: He adds. A letter should for a century.

H: Better send it to long. Then anyone can send a little wish. If S. Can get a letter, others will benefit me.

P: We thought this was a way to defeat the house party. The money to them. People will. I hope S. Can send.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

We have no brilliant answers, but we want to put this point through the food of some present aggression.
(1) Economic restraint.

(2) Expose a fund which will equalize a broader, maybe a tax.

(3) And an emergency financing agreement from all states to assist us in action on importation.

We must stabilize and face a deeper change in world power and necessity.

Scott - The industrial world would need a strange regulation of balance of a few states. These two happened in history.

Korean this form of pressure brings us some. Exact attitude is non-varying.

By this hand we think, they will
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Well, we've seen a lot of action. 
Humph. Good boy, take me on joint R&D. Your work is 

something. Can 

we make it real, Nat? 
We can make it work. And this 

ship? It's capital. 
We should have it. And we will. 

But if our minds were no more, we 
could have a 140-foot spout, 

This people will regard if we 

tell them real truth. 

Humph—why didn't we adopt Jews & Arabs 
Jerusalem as part of a package. 

Humph—your key is right. We 

have talked more Turkey. 


(Chump) than you know. 
P. Your time been great to come 
take all this time. 140-year