

1a

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Jerrold Schecter, Time Magazine (For part of meeting)

DATE & TIME: Thursday - September 5, 1974
11:00 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

Kissinger: I had a meeting on Soviet strategic developments we have to watch. They are not violations, but they are something we have to watch closely.

On your schedule: You are speaking to the UN General Assembly on the 18th. I have to testify also. The detente hearings. I can do it either before or after.

President: I think after is better. We also have these foreign ministers coming down for visits.

Kissinger: Yes. I could testify on the 19th. While you are at the UN, we might arrange a meeting with the Chinese.

Right now my UN speech is scheduled on the 23rd. Is that too close to yours?

President: No.

Kissinger: There is one thing you might want to put in your speech.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/XGDS

~~TOP SECRET~~ XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY lcl, NARA, DATE 3/20/04 Review 3/19/04

President: I notice the Soviets are making efforts to let some specific cases go.

Kissinger: Yes, and releasing Kudirka is a special favor for you.

On your Japan trip -- you must decide on Kyoto and Nara. They propose two days. You might want only one day.

President: Yes. I want a minimum of sightseeing. One day is plenty.

Kissinger: When we went to China there wasn't much sightseeing you could do looking through 200 press people.

President: The press response to George [Bush] was very positive.

Kissinger: The rapid response from the Chinese indicates pleasure. It's obvious the Chinese consider it a sign of the special significance we attach to the relationship.

So in Japan you'll have one day for sightseeing.

President: Yes. Let them decide where.

Kissinger: There is a suggestion you go to Hiroshima. I oppose that.

President: I agree completely.

Kissinger: On SALT, we could announce the delegation. The only change is May. He is good.

President: OK. I read the two SALT papers. They were very helpful.

Kissinger: You want to turn off the Boggs thing.

President: Hartmann already did. I like the other idea. [The meeting with Mexican President Echeverria], Where is that?

Kissinger: You'd start at Mexicali. You'd get a very positive response in connection with the desalinization agreement.

President: What is the date?

Kissinger: It's not set.

President: Late October would be good.



Kissinger: That is what we tentatively thought about.

[The President explains to Schecter that Brezhnev had sent a note disclosing that Simas Kudirka, the Lithuanian defector, was being allowed to emigrate to the U.S. as a favor to Ford. Secretary Kissinger reads to Schecter the note which Brezhnev sent. [Tab A]

Kissinger: I will ask Dobrynin how it should be handled.

On the Congress: We are having a paper prepared on Foreign Assistance in three parts: Military aid for Vietnam; Economic aid for Vietnam; and all other amendments which restrict your authority.

Without massive effort on your part, we are in trouble on Vietnam. If we don't do enough, it doesn't matter how much too little. North Vietnam seems undecided. You might want to consider meeting with the Congressional leaders next week. We are in trouble both with the restrictions and the dollar amounts. There are restrictions which would hurt Greece and Turkey also.

That gets me to Cyprus. My view is we should keep the British in the game but not let them run away like the last time. Bhutto fell through [as an intermediary]. The French visited Ankara, but...

[Mr. Schecter leaves.]

Kissinger: It is working out well - every other attempt at mediation is failing. Karamanlis is moving to us. The main problem is Mavros. I sent Tyler out there and he is going to see Karamanlis on Monday or Tuesday. He should lay out on what terms we can be helpful.

The Turks must permit some refugees to return. That is clear. And there has to be some force reduction, and some pullback.

President: Will the Turks give that much?

Kissinger: It will take a massive effort. That is why I don't want to needle the Turks now.

We should sell our involvement for Greek moderation -- because we will have to really squeeze Turkey.

The more the Europeans act like scavengers the better off we will be -- because they can't deliver. The Congress is now trying to force an aid cut-off to Turkey. That would be very bad.



President: When will the aid bill get to the floor?

Scowcroft: In a week or two.

Kissinger: Tyler will be back next Monday.

We could stay in the background; get Cypriot communal talks going and Geneva at the same time, but with a more assertive U.S. role to provide a framework. I could meet separately with the Greeks and Turks to lay out the terms for Geneva, but I won't know until Tyler returns.

Sadat wants me to come out. I don't see how I can do that.

President: Could you combine Greece and Turkey with the Mideast?

Kissinger: Yes, but I promised Indira also. That would take 10 days at the end of October.

Just after I leave Moscow, you could announce the Vladivostok meeting.

President: That would be politically and substantively helpful.

Kissinger: We could tell the Soviets we would do it if progress warranted it.

After you leave Vladivostok, maybe I should break off and go to Peking. That would stick it to the Soviet Union and make the Chinese feel good.

President: I would like to go.


Kissinger: You can't go until we settle Taiwan. On this trip I would say what we plan. Then you could settle it. We have to have an iron-clad agreement against military action. Because we have to drop the defense treaty.

President: Can we do it? There will be a storm.

Kissinger: The other thing would be to let you go and try to settle it. It would be a hell of a meeting to get you stuck with.

President: Does that involve economic deals and everything?

Kissinger: It's no problem economically. We could do it like Japan. But we would recognize Peking as the sole government and give Taiwan some fuzzy status. We could do it for a trip by you in the spring of 1976 or fall of 1975.



President: I think politically 1975 would be better.

Kissinger: The sooner the better for the PRC.

President: I am concerned about Vietnam and the other amendments on Turkey. I am willing to meet with the leaders and also Brademas. I think if I sat down with them and laid out the problem and said, "You can screw it up and end up with a mess."

Kissinger: Karamanlis knows we didn't do anything [to harm him]. But he can't have Papandreou push him to the right. He says he's getting out of NATO which means little. He has got to show that the Papandreou policy would get nothing. I think the time is ripe to meet with the Greeks, maybe by the end of next week.

President: Let's do it with the Greek Congressmen first. Let's keep in mind for the 12th, 13th, or 14th.

Kissinger: On the NSC meeting, I propose five minutes telling you what the proposals are, then a 15-minute CIA briefing, then I go through 15 minutes of political framework, then a general discussion. I suggest you make no decision at the meeting.

The Rabin visit will be the toughest you have had. I want to go over it tomorrow at our meeting.

At the meeting we should not go into too much detail because of the risk of leaks to Israel.

Do you want Rockefeller there? It is risky, but has merit in showing him his responsibilities.

President: I think he should be there. He is perceptive and we show confidence that he will be confirmed.

At the NSC the basic discussion will be the Israeli "Urgent List" and their 10-year plan. It's \$40 billion for 10 years. Just the O&M is \$4 billion a year for the whole thing, and that is over half their GNP. It will not be a contentious meeting; there is no bureaucratic defense or study. The issue will be to give Rabin something without taking away their incentive to cooperate in the negotiation.



A



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10

September 4, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Ambassador Dobrynin has given us the following message with respect to Simas Kudirka:

"Your President has already been informed that because of the interest of the President, Kudirka was given pardon and he is now at his home in the Lithuanian Republic. The situation at present is as follows: As a result of disagreement which occurred in his family, Kudirka up until now has not applied to the local authorities about his wish to immigrate permanently to the United States. When he does so it will take several days to consider his application and to process the proper documents. After that has been done, Kudirka and those members of his family who so desire will be able to leave the Soviet Union and go if they like to the United States."



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

18

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

August 31, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Ambassador Dobrynin has just given me the following message relating to Simas Kudirka.

"Kudirka has been released from detention as a result of a Pardon. He is given the possibility now to return to his home in the Lithuanian Republic and to get employment. The question of further possible steps concerning Kudirka in connection with President Ford's request is under continuous consideration. For the personal knowledge of the President, Mr. Brezhnev would like him to know that he is keeping this question within the scope of his personal attention."

*Thanks / keep me posted / I am most interested -
JRM*

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *ld*, NARA, DATE *3/30/04*



P/K 5 Sept 74

K I had early on Sun start chapters we have to watch. But relatively brief they are something we have to review.

Schedule your speaking to UH on 18th & have to ~~split~~ ^{split} early. Also, I think can do it within before 12 pm.

P I think after so better. Was also have three for coming during for month.

K I ~~can~~ could testify on the ~~20th~~ 19th while you are at UH and might arrange meeting w/ PRC.

Right now my speech schedule 2 3rd & that to close?

There is one thing you might want to put your speech.

P I notice C & S are making efforts to let some specific cases go.

K Yes + Kubie is a special favor for you.

On Japan trips you must decide on rights & have. They proper 2 days. You might want only 1 day.

P Yes. I want minimum of right selling. One day plus

K In PRC there wasn't much representing you would do there. 200 press people.


P Press response to George very positive

K PRC rapid response indicates pleasure.

Okinawa PRC excels at a sign of respect.

Will have one day for right selling

P Yes. Let team decide where



K Suggestion you go to Hiroshima. I agree

P I agree completely.

K On SALT, we could announce deployment. Very strong in May. Demand

P Ok. I need 2 SALT papers. Keep together

K Term of Boggs thing

P Notions already exist. I like other idea. What is that.

R Start at Tripoli. Very positive response in connection of checking the agreement

V Date?

K Not set

P Late Oct would be good.

K That is what we tentatively thought about.

(Peppermint Kuchika & Sheeter) (Kuchika may join Boy or Kuchika)

K I will ask Boy how should be handled


Our Congress - can bring paper prepared for UN in 3 parts: UN

Ecan UN

All other which is what you contribute.

W/o massive effort on your part, we in trouble in UN. If don't do enough, don't matter how much we talk. N/16 seems unrealistic.

You might want to consider only w/ procedures kept weak. In trouble both w/ restrictions + dollar amounts. Restrictions would limit most G-T also.



R I would meet separately w/ Govt & beyond a time for Geneva, but would have to try to return. So let's write me to your court - don't feel better can do that.

P Could you combine AT w/ MF.

R Yes, but I promised Justice also - that would take 10 days and get out.

^{Just} P After I leave Moscow, you could arrange Vlad visit.

P That would be pol. & sub. helpful.

R We could tell Soros and would do it if pay warranted.

After you leave Vlad, maybe I should book off to go to Peking - that would stick it to SV & make PR feel good

P I would like to go.

R You can't go til we settle Tension. In this try I would say what we plan. Then you could settle it. Hurts have been elad agreement against visit return. Could we have to dry dry treaty.

P I have wait to a stern Consue do it? The other thing would be to let you go & try to settle it - would be a hell of a visit & get you stuck w/

P Does that involve even deal & everything

R We just even - like Jay. We would say Peking as a goal & give Tension some fuzzy status. We could do it for



a trip by you going 26 or post 25.

P I think probably 25 would be better

K Same as better for PDC.

P I am concerned about UK & other commitments as Turkey. I writing & meeting leaders & also Bruderas. I think if I get down w/ them & laid out a path & said you can see it w/ a road map w/ a mess

K Kar & Prouce are likely to do anything. But he can't have Pagan push him to right, he getting out of NATO which means better. He got to show Pagan policy would get nothing. I think time is now ripe to meet w/ Ankara - maybe by end next week.

P Lets do it w/ Greek Commission etc.


Lets begin mind for 12, 13, 14

K On NSC mtg, I propose to start telling you what proposals are, then IT mind a brief, then I go through IT minutes of political framework, then get discussion. Suggest you make no decision.

Rubin visit will be through your hands had. Want to see it to occur at our mtg.

At mtg we should not go into too much detail because of leaks to the Doyn want look there? Really but must be showing something

P I think should be there. Her is perspective



* in some confidence he will be.

→ (Comparison about 900 in NSC meeting)

At NSC a basic discussion will be on impact

of 10-yr plan, 40 bil per 10-yr. Just at all

of bil/yr for whole thing & that over 40 than ACP.

It will not be a contentious matter - there is no

bureaucratic def on study. The issue will be

to give Robins something w/o