NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017639

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum of Conversation
CREATOR'S NAME Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft
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DATE WITHDRAWN 03/31/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

and Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Saturday, August 24, 1974

9:20 - 10:04 a.m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office

Kissinger: Brent will call Annenberg.

We have set September 18th for your UN speech. You will be the only one that week.

President: Okay. Give me a draft speech.

<u>Kissinger:</u> On the Greece-Turkey situation. We got Clerides to talk to Denktash. Then he went to Athens. We don't know whether this is posturing or whether Clerides now won't talk to the Turks.

We must keep the Soviets out of the negotiations. We must try to keep the UN Conference from happening or make sure that nothing comes from it.

We must show the Greeks they can't use the Soviet Union against us.

We must tell Karamanlis.

It is important to keep the Greeks with the West, but it must not be the French being the scavengers riding on an anti-American wave in Greece. I hope that the French will cooperate in keeping it out of the Security Council. We must tell the Greeks that the status quo works against them. We can't use our influence against the Turks unless the Greeks stop their anti-Americanism.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B 3
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

I told the Greek Americans that if this anti-Americanism is encouraged, they were putting Papandreau into office. There was no anti-Greek sentiment or tilting.

We need Europe's support to prevent the Security Council meeting. See if the Greeks are willing to have serious talks on strategy. I think you shouldn't write a letter yet-they will publish it-but I will on your behalf.

President: Shouldn't we continue our talks with Clerides?

<u>Kissinger:</u> Could we send Brown a note from you thanking him for the message?

Brown should see Clerides. Intransigence will freeze the situation -that is what Turkey wants. The Greeks stirring up international
opinion will accomplish nothing.

I could write Ecevit saying we oppose a Security Council meeting, but the Soviet Union has asked for joint auspices and we can't get anything going without some Turkish concessions which we would hold in trust. Tell the Greeks that whatever their assessment of the past is, they can't get anything without our help. They should send someone here or that Kissinger will go to Europe.

President: Who would they send? Mavros?

Kissinger: They probably can't send anyone here -- maybe I'll go to Europe. Karamanlis is a smart politician -- he can't be doing this because of Cyprus. He must be trying to court the left with anti-Americanism. The danger is he can't go so far as Papandreau. Also, bringing in the Soviets is totally against their interests and must indicate Karamanlis' comern.

<u>President:</u> Would the military stop anything bad from happening?

Kissinger: From the beginning of the change in Greece, I said it would be tough for them to stop with Karamanlis. Military intervention next time might well take a Qaddafi-like form. The reason we weren't anti-Greek at the outset of the Cyprus problem is we foresaw problems for the Greeks and didn't want to be blamed. Karamanlis came in and we got blamed anyway. I was worried about Greece deployments. A Makarios-Papandreau atmosphere in Greece is a poor prospect. That is why we can't break with the Turks.

To stop the Turks we would have had to threaten a cutoff and promise them two-thirds of what they got. The Greeks couldn't have it and we still would have been the whipping boy. Now we must extract from the Turks and we are better off that way now.

I told the Greek-Americans there is no possible motive for us to be anti-Greece, and I sent Kubisch to their convention. In two to three weeks they will bring a larger group down and you might want to meet with them.

<u>President:</u> Good. Then you will do these three things today. Will the Security Council meeting go?

<u>Kissinger:</u> Anyone can call for a meeting. We should maneuver against it, and if it happens, we should make no move to help. We can't let the Soviets be used as blackmail against us.


President: Will the Europeans be with us?

<u>Kissinger:</u> The Turks will oppose. Maybe the French will be with us, if they see their real interests. The British want to hit a home run. The Chinese probably will oppose. The Greeks either don't want a negotiation now or they are being very irresponsible.

The meeting shouldn't be more than 20 minutes, so the other Europeans don't get nervous.

You should meet Giscard only after you meet Schmidt. They mentioned January -- that may be a trial balloon. You could make noises about him being welcome here, or you could go to Martinique. Say you appreciate close consultation between Kissinger and Sauvagnargues on the Greek-Turkish crisis. Sauvagnargues will be here for the UN and you should meet him. Tell him if the situation takes an anti-American form and the Soviet Union starts to move in between NATO states, it would be bad.

We started to have talks and broke off. You could make an elliptical remark.



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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL .		•	National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL	·· •		Note
DESCRIPTION		•	Scowcroft's notes from August 24, 1974 meeting with Ford and Kissinger
CREATION DATE			08/24/1974
VOLUME		•	4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER COLLECTION TITLE		•	National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations
			August 24, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger
DATE WITHDRAWN WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST .			

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