

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, August 13, 1974
9:00 a.m.

PLACE: Oval Office

[General Scowcroft came in late.]

Kissinger: The problem in Geneva is that the Turks see that the more the negotiations are protracted the more difficult the unilateral military move becomes. The Greeks are procrastinating -- they want to go home for 36 hours and then resume discussions. The Turks so far have refused to grant a 36-hour extension because it would make it that much harder to take unilateral action.

President: What would we do if the Turks moved?

Kissinger: We would have to vote against them in the Security Council. We would have our hands full to keep the Greeks from going to war. The Turks right now are extremely nationalistic. For a few years ago, the Turkish tactics are right -- grab what they want and then negotiate on the basis of possession. But if the Turks run loose on Cyprus, the Greeks could come unglued. We certainly do not want a war between the two, but if it came to that, Turkey is more important to us and they have a political structure which could produce a Qadhafi.

[Scowcroft left to call Macomber and returned after about 10 minutes.]



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Kissinger: We have been trying to bail the Cyprus situation out after it got out of control. The British have made a mess of it. If the Turks move to take what they want, they will be condemned in the Security Council and the Soviet Union will beat them over the head with it. Some of my colleagues want to cut off assistance to Turkey -- that would be a disaster. There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus. We will make a statement today that will get the New York Times off our back, but we should not twist their arm.

I would like to mention the Turkish poppy issue. President Nixon signed a letter to Ecevit which, because of Cyprus, we have not yet delivered. We could redo the letter for your signature, or I could send it. I think the whole poppy situation is a loser. Do you want to have a brawl with the Turks, or should I? Maybe I should do it.

President: The other side of the coin is that you already have very good relations with Ecevit and there would be less damage coming from me.

Kissinger: Let's wait a bit. If we come out of the Cyprus thing all right, we will have more leverage. The Turks can't focus on it now anyway.

President: Yes. Let's wait a bit.

Kissinger: Here is the Egyptian military request list. The top items we do not want to give them.

President: You mean giving them things through Saudi Arabia?


Kissinger: Yes. President Nixon in Cairo told them that there was some chance that the list that Defense suggested could be approved.

President: Would they be satisfied with that?

Kissinger: I could tell Fahmy that you are willing to proceed but that we would have to start with very low-visibility items.

President: Is there some rationale that Saudi Arabia needs this equipment?

Kissinger: Yes. Saudi Arabia has a big military purchase program and this would just be added. Isn't that right, Brent?



Scowcroft: Yes. They have a major program under way now.

President: Are these weapons offensive or defensive?

Kissinger: It's hard to say. We should probably start out heavy on ammunition -- that they need.

President: You think we should go ahead then? When would it start?

Kissinger: Not until after the first of the year. We can't really do it without letting Congress know.

President: Okay, if you think it is needed.

Kissinger: I think we should. Egypt is in a difficult situation. If we can't encourage the switch away from the Soviet Union and they turn back, there will probably not be another opportunity in our generation.

President: I think we should do it, but not these items Defense recommends against.

Kissinger: No. Those have not even been mentioned as possible.

The Syrian is coming next week. You should probably see him, but I think not give a lunch for him in order to show some preference. The Soviets are telling the Syrians that we are neglecting them. The Saudis are worried about you because they think you are pro-Israeli. Saqqaf is coming week after next. It would be very useful if you could pay special attention to him.

President: Fine.

Kissinger: You wanted to review the NSC system. The names of the principal subgroups change, mostly because the advisers change, but the core membership is the same for all the groups. The Under Secretaries' Committee is an implementing group. The IGs - Interdepartmental Groups -- are chaired by the Assistant Secretaries. The process is that we issue NSSMs, the IGs analyze the problem, prepare the paper, the Senior Review Group reviews the paper and then it goes to the NSC where you make the decision. Each President does things a little differently, but I think you should hear out each participant in the meeting but not make decisions in the meeting, with the implication of a vote by the members.



President: I agree.

Kissinger: Because otherwise the members will work out deals beforehand, like under Eisenhower who could only say yes or no to proposals, and to say no the way they were structured would be ridiculous. I think we should continue to give you memos containing sharply defined options. Under President Nixon every paper from a Cabinet officer went into him but through me, with a cover sheet. I must tell you that at the end President Nixon did not read the tabs. I would propose continuing this system.

President: Did it work down until the end?

Kissinger: It worked even at the end. I just wanted to point out that he only read my memo, not those from the Cabinet members.

President: I do not like agreed positions.

Kissinger: People will try to end run and get papers to you, especially at the beginning while the lines of communication are loose. I think it would be good if they knew that every paper had to come through me.

President: Does that include the JCS also?

Kissinger: The JCS is not the problem. The JCS problem is getting their views through the Secretary. Laird used to operate the system to play it both ways and change his positions. But Laird never played games in crises. The Major thing is to make clear to Defense that papers should come through me.

President: If I know they will get to me, that is fine.

Kissinger: You might want to tell the JCS today that you will expect to hear their views, that they have direct access to you but that you would expect normally that they would submit their views through the Secretary and through me to you.

President: My position -- shouldn't it be -- that they have the right to see me but I would recommend that their views should normally come through the Secretary and the NSC to me? This would not preclude a Chief from coming to me on important matters.

Kissinger: Sir, I would recommend that if papers come in through other channels, that you send them to Brent. We will get them to you within 24 hours.



President: There haven't been any end runs so far. I would like to point out that Jack Marsh will not interfere with your operation. He has been with me a long time and has done a lot of work in liaison with Defense and on the Hill. He has very good antenna for the Hill and I need him but I can assure you he will not get in the way.

Kissinger: I was not thinking about Marsh. But it is natural at this time for everyone to try to make runs. I just wanted to point out that the NSC system is designed to illuminate options, not to suppress them. When you get a paper, you need to have all viewpoints.

President: Nothing irritates me more than having people I trust argue with other people I trust. This merely upsets me. I have to sit down with Haig, Hartmann and Rumsfeld and sort this thing out. I just do not want petty bickering. If people do this sort of thing behind my back, they will be the losers.

Kissinger: Do you like to read cables?

President: Like what?

Kissinger: [Showed him some cables.]


President: No, not now.

Kissinger: Okay. We will just summarize the main things for you.

Tomorrow I propose we do the Soviet Union and Egypt.

[Turns to map.] On the West Bank, the Jordanian proposal was a ten-kilometer withdrawal along the river. Israel opposes such a scheme because they want to maintain strong points and if they move, they want to give up people. Israel wants to give back a sausage which would return most of the Arab people but keep most of the river.

There is now some confusion between the Jordanian and Egyptian views. Jordan says Egypt agreed that Jordan could go first, but Fahmy says Egypt has to go next. While I love the King, Egypt is more important. Also, Egypt is not willing to turn over sovereignty of the returned areas to Jordan but administration only, with UN troops.



These are the present Sinai disengagement lines. What Israel wants is a line here -- somewhat east of El Arish -- and down through Sharm el-Sheikh. One logical solution would be a line from El Arish to Sharm el-Sheikh. My scheme is to let Egypt move to the present Israeli line, demilitarize the territory to El Arish, and the Israelis would retain the territory east of that line.

The problem with the next step is the quid pro quo. One quid pro quo might be freedom of Israeli cargoes through the Suez Canal -- that is already agreed. There is not much reason for Israeli ships to go through the Canal. Freedom of passage through Bab el-Mandeb Strait is another possibility. Also UN forces as a more permanent feature rather than their six-month terms at present. Our arms supply to the Israelis constitutes our big clout.

If Egypt should shift back to the Soviet Union and take all the Arabs with them, we will have a massive problem. The Europeans and the Japanese would be against us also.

I think you should indicate to Fahmy that an oil embargo again would not be a free shot. But we have at the same time to tell Israel that we cannot stand another oil embargo. This sounds devious but it's really necessary. This settlement would take Egypt out of the war. Then we could deal with Jordan and then only Syria would be left.

President: When should we start?

Kissinger: Right away, but it depends on how much pressure you are willing to use on the Israelis. You would have to let the Jewish Community know that you want movement.

President: I have good relations with Jewish groups but I have already cautioned them, both about the settlement and about the Trade Bill.

Kissinger: No, you have excellent relations with the Jewish Community. If there is another war, you might have to use American troops. If Israel was winning, the Soviets would almost undoubtedly come in. If Israel were to lose, we would have a massive problem. My experience with the Israelis is that at the beginning of a negotiation Israeli newspapers all say we are selling them out. At the end of a negotiation, they are grateful for what we have done for them. They need to be brought to see there is no alternative.



President: You set up a meeting with the Jewish groups whenever you want.

Kissinger: I would wait a bit. First, you should have a meeting with Rabin.


Could you see the Ambassadors of India, Iran and Pakistan for five minutes? They are a little upset because you didn't meet with them.

President: How about Saturday?

Kissinger: Reston would like to meet with me to do a piece about your foreign policy perspectives.

President: That's fine. He did a good story about me when the going was tough.

Kissinger: I could discuss what is achievable in your Administration.



Give Greek 36 hrs
do not voluntarily appear

P/HAR 13 Aug 74 ✓

Put in Greece is Turkey see near info.
and protected, in case of a unilateral wave is.
Greeks are frustrating want to go home
for 36 hrs & then
Force antennas zone, establish informants
in that direction. Would have to appear
unilateral action which negotiation

P What would we do

K Vote against in SC. Have hard job to keep
Greeks from over Turkey and especially maintain
A few years ago, their tactics are right - get
what they want & then negotiate. But if
they were based on Cyprus, Greeks could cause
any kind. Turkey has been told to send Turkey
They were important & have a pot. structure
which could produce a Qaddafi.
We have come out

Deliberately, w/in context of friendship
Discussed w/P.

If give 36 hrs
we will work w
G to get antennas
to remain w/ us will a lot

K We are trying to limit this unit after it got out of control. If tanks move to take what they want, they will be condemned in SC & SO will beat them over the head w/ it. My colleagues want to cut off NATO - that would be disastrous. We US Marine Tanks can't have 1/3 island. We will make statement today for NYT, but shouldn't trust Tank ans.

Tank poppy: Proposed N letter to Tanks. we could hold it for you or I could send. I think poppy is a loser. Do you want a hand w/ Tanks or should.

P Other side of coin is you have good within w/ E civit.

K Let's wait a bit. If we come out of Cyprus all night, we will have some leverage. Tanks can't force on it none anyway.

P Yes lets wait a bit.

K Here is Egypt military request list. Top items we don't want to give them

P You mean three SA

K Yes. We told them - DOD approved but had a chance (N did in Cairo).

P Would they be satisfied

K I would tell Fabin you would do this unit start w/ low visibility items

P Do you have a rationale that SA needs this

K Yes. SA has a big mind buy and this would just be added

P Are there offensive or defensive

K Hard to say. We should start w/ ammo - that they need.

P You think they should pre-shall?



P When would they start

R Not till after 1st of year. Can't do it w/o letting
long term

P & if you think needed

R I think we should. I'm in difficult situation.
If we don't encourage this switch & they
then look to SU, put out another chance
in our generation.

P I think we should, but not these kind of things

R No, they realize that.

Syrian coming next week. You should
see him but no need to show preference.
Sand's are worried about you and they
think you are pro-SU. SU telling Syrians are
rejecting them. Say good coming week after
next - if you could pay special attention
to them

P Fine

R ~~that~~ You wanted to remove a NSC system
that the names of sub-groups change
because a advisors change - but a core
membership is a same. NSU USC is
an advisory group. The I's chaired by
Asst Secy. The US issues NSSM, a I's
usually go to a sub, the SRG reviews, then
goes to NSC where you make a decision.

Each P does differently, but I think you should
have read out but not make decision w/
implication of a vote.

P I agree

R Because otherwise, a members will work
out days beforehand - what be who would
only say yes or no. I think we should



continue to find sharp opinion mine.

Under N, long cabinet paper went in to P, but then, me, w/ cover sheet. N at end didn't read the Tabs. I would

~~A~~ proposing everything

P Did it work till the end?

K worked at the end, but he only read my memo

P I don't like a general position

K People will try to end some & get papers to you. I think would be good if they knew every paper had to come through me.

P Does that mean JCS also?

K The JCS are not a problem. It is getting them - Secy is which is a prob.

Chair would argue for JCS w/ Pers, give me a paper w/ 180° different position, then have different position w/ (makers)

But he never played journals in crisis.


Major thing is to make clear to Secy that they should come through me.

P If I know they will get to me, fine.

K You might want to tell JCS today that

P ~~they~~ My position - shouldn't it be - that they have right to see me, but recommend that their views should normally come through Secy & NSC to me. This would not preclude a Chief from coming to me on important things.

K So I would recommend that if papers come in through other channels, you send to



Map w/ all on proposal

Brent, We to you w/in 24 hrs.

P It won't be on so far. Marsh will not interfere w/ your operation. He has good intentions & I need him, but he won't get in way.

K I don't ^{think} anything about Marsh. But everyone will make sure ~~so~~ that natural. But a NSC system is designed to eliminate options, not suppress them.

P Nothing irritates me more than having people I trust be argued w/ others I trust & get it set down to Hing, Bob, Kern — and set this out. I don't want pretty bookkeeping. If people do it behind my back they will be losers.

K Do you like to read cables.

P No, not now.


K OK, we will summarize for you.

P Tomorrow we will do OISR, & E.

(To Map)

K On the bank, I don't proposal was 10 km w/development. I don't want, because they want stay points & if they move they want to give my people. I want to give them a sausage which would give back people but they most of a unit.

There is confusion bet J & E. If say E agreed to go first, but Fabin says E has to go next. E more important. E also not willing to turn over some to J, but admin only, w/ ON troops for (Sinai way) described present time. What I want is time here, & Sharon or Shale. A real logical solution would be hire from



→ Map showing Bab el Mandeb

el Arish to Sharm, etc

My scheme is to let E move to prevent I line, eliminating to el Arish, + ~~last~~ of that union I. Puckler is good. One might be I concedes - already agreed. Not much reason for I ships to go there could.

Bab el Mandeb is another one. UN pass as a more permanent fixture than Korea. Arms supplies are a big chant.

If E shifts back + takes all of them, we will have massive prob. All would be against us.

I think you should indicate to Fabiani that our embargo not a free shot. But back to tell I that embargo would be intolerable for us. Serious heart warning. This settlement would take E out of war. Then we could deal w/ J + then only Soviez would be left

P when start.

K Right way, but depends on how much pressure you willing to use. You would have to let Jewish community know you want involvement

P I have good relations w/ Jewish groups, but I have warned them.

K If another war you might need US troops. If I wins, Soviez will come in. If I loses, a massive prob.

My experience is at beginning of negotiation, I papers say ~~not~~ we selling them out, - at end they are grateful. They will be see no alternative

P You set my route w/ Jews whenever you want.



K I don't want a hat, First would be a mtg
w/ Rahim.

Could you see each of Duke, Jim, & Pat
for 5 minutes.

P Saturday

K Justin wants a piece about your FP
perspectives

P OK. He did good story when it comes

K I would discuss what is a character
in your Admin

