MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

President Nixon
Intelligence Advisory Board

PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon
Admiral Anderson
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Foster
Lt. Gen. Scowcroft

DATE: August 2, 1974

Anderson: Yesterday Hermiat and today Rogers. (losers)?

Another problem is testing phase. Why don't you just talk, Kissinger?

Kissinger: The nature of the strategic posture. Many systems would have

already been built for me. It's a strategic argument of US.

decisions, not result of Soviet argument.

This is the problem: Neither can gain short-term if other is

reasonably vigilant.

Foster: Your weakest link is our knowledge of their accuracy.

Kissinger: My point is the political decision for first strike is a
terribly tough one.

What are we trying to do in SALT? Trying to slow down their deployment rates.

Foster: What do you think of the intelligence you get, and what are the

Soviets up to?

Kissinger: High officials don't have the capacity for systematic large-scale

side-bitting— they are too busy.

Send detente statement to Leo Cherne
BY NARA, DATE 5/14/72

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY: sec. 5.7-23.1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

My point is that the potential
attacker for 1st strike is un-
likely. Thus, what are
We are doing? We are
conceptualizing everything
in the planning and the
thinking. What do you think
would happen if we
were to be in a ...

Tell the President that we
are working with the

corporate planning
large

DECLASSIFIED

of the statement
to the C. 1st

F. 2:45 A.M.