

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

President ^{Foreign} ~~State~~'s Intelligence Advisory Board

PARTICIPANTS: President ~~Ford~~ ^{Nixon}
Admiral Anderson
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Foster
Lt. Gen. Scowcroft
DATE: August 2, 1974

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6
MR 07-26 #1 DOD Ltr 3/13/07
CIA Ltr 2/28/07 NSC Memo 11/24/98
BY WAL NARA DATE 9/4/07

Anderson: Yesterday Hermit and today Rogers. (losers)?

Another problem is ^{the testing phase.} ~~the testing phase.~~ Why don't you just talk, Kissinger?

Kissinger: The nature of the strategic posture. Many systems would have been retired already ^{but} ~~lost~~ for me. ^{Differences in} ~~it depends on~~ missile size and ^{of US- agreement} ~~weight~~ ^{of US- agreement} ~~are unilateral~~ decisions, not result ~~of~~ Soviet argument.

This is the problem: Neither can gain ^{strategic superiority} ~~short run~~ if other is reasonably vigilant.

Teller:
Felt: Your weakest link is our knowledge of their accuracy.

Foster: They might only need one weapon per weapon.

Kissinger: My point is that the political decision for first ^{Strike} ~~super~~ is a terribly tough one.

What are we trying to do in SALT? Trying to slow down their deployment ~~interest~~ rates?

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Foster: What do you think of the intelligence you get, and what are the Soviets up to?

Kissinger: ^{High} ~~High~~ officials don't have the capacity for systematic large-scale side ^{thinking} ~~lying~~ - they are too busy.

Send detente statement to Leo Cherne



