MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Senator George D. Aiken [R - Vermont]
Congressman John J. McFall [D - California]
Senator John O. Pastore [D - Rhode Island]
Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. [D - Virginia]
Senator Hugh Scott [R - Pennsylvania]
Senator Mike Mansfield [D - Montana]
Congressman Carl Albert [D - Oklahoma]

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, July 10, 1974
8:30 a.m.

PLACE: The Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: Joint Leadership Meeting on the Summit Trip to Moscow

The President: We have a full plate today. I will go over the Brussels meeting and highlight Moscow and Henry will follow up on the meetings with the European leaders following the summit. They were significant. Those of you who saw the communiques and heard the public utterances know most of what went on.

The stop in Brussels was useful. The Europeans have always been concerned about a US-Soviet condominium. We stopped to consult and sign the NATO declaration.

When I went to Europe in 1969, they thought we should do something about China and relations with the Soviet Union. The problem then for them was a possible US-Soviet confrontation. Since then, European attitudes have turned 180°. They have urged a European
Security Conference on us; now they are cooling on it and on the idea of having a summit conclusion. Detente is a period of great opportunity and also of danger for the alliance. The Europeans wanted our assurances on security but they have been less than cooperative on economics, the Middle East, etc. They can't have it both ways -- they can't keep our forces up and confront us everywhere else. They don't always have to agree -- but they can't go off on their own and in antagonism. In Brussels, I met with the NAC and then individually with Schmidt, Wilson, Rumor and with others at the reception. Giscard was not there -- he is more cooperative but he still depends on the Gaullist forces and he can't move too fast. The Alliance was invigorated by this. The allies said they would try to strengthen their forces. The Alliance got a security shot in the arm -- which is difficult when all of them see the tension receding. On the economic side, we laid the foundation for more cooperation between the US and the Community. The Europeans' interests were almost exclusively economics. After talking with them, I wouldn't exchange our problems for theirs.

About Moscow: We didn't know the type of public reception we would get. There had been differences on the Middle East conflict and the October confrontation. The Soviet approach to the Middle East is to do everything at once. Ours is to use Geneva but also anything else which is helpful. They insist on having the Palestinians and immediate withdrawal to the '67 frontiers. That would blow up any conference. Thanks to Henry, we have cooled the area. Therefore the positions of the US and Soviet Union were far apart.

The discussions this year were the fullest and the least belligerent, and the relationships were "friendliest" in the proper interpretation of that term. We have laid over the years the groundwork for laying the hard problems out on the table, discussing them frankly, not giving up about disagreements but to continue to grapple. The Soviet Union now has positive interest in good relations with the United States.

In the bilateral area, it can't be said that these nonsecurity agreements will keep them from confrontation with us when our interests clash; but each one gives them an incentive not to throw over detente. We signed some new agreements -- in economics, housing, energy, and on research on the artificial heart. These don't get much play.

Then we discussed the international field. Europe. The Soviet Union wants a CSCE summit. We agree we'll do it if the substance warrants.
On the Middle East, they accepted the proposal that we must continue bilateral step-by-step efforts but they insist on playing a role and even more so on an early Geneva Conference. Our position is -- if you take the steps remaining, to get a pull-back on both fronts, the West Bank and the Palestinians -- if you lay it all out in Geneva, everyone there would oppose us and Israel. So they don't agree, but will go along with some bilateral efforts -- but we can't say this publicly.

Southeast Asia was also mentioned.

In the strategic area, we made some progress which if it happened two years ago would have been monumental. On ABM, we agreed to go to one site. Their field covers not only Moscow but also much of their industry and a missile field.

The TTB: The Soviet Union proposed it. Their motives are that we are far ahead in testing. They are worried about the Chinese, so the threshold at 150KT makes sense. Our military think that more testing is essential but fundamentally a comprehensive test ban is unverifiable. We won't yet submit the TTB because of the side issue of peaceful nuclear explosions. We will work out agreement on PNE. They have agreed on prior announcement and observers. It's the first on-site inspection ever agreed.

On environmental warfare, we agreed to talks. While it doesn't seem important now, but who knows what science will bring?

SALT is the toughest of all, as I told you before. The Soviet throw weight is greater but our advantage is enormous -- we have a 3.5-to-1 advantage in warheads and also in sophistication and accuracy. As we look to the future, if the Soviet Union agreed to freeze now, it would be freezing itself into a public position of inferiority -- which they won't do. The Soviet Union has a missile advantage, but you get hit by warheads. We would first discuss this, but our own warhead advantage doesn't include our allies -- but they count them. They are also worried about China; and we might have to be also. In 1972, I had a rough 4 1/2 hour session on Vietnam. In 1973, from midnight, we had a rough three hours on the Middle East. Had we crumbled in either case, there would not have been a Vietnam settlement or the present Middle East situation. What we come up with now was an agreement to conclude a 10-year agreement on quantitative and qualitative steps. We have to
choose whether to conclude an agreement which will protect us and yet be acceptable to them or, with their MIRV breakthrough, go into a race which we will win but which would leave neither side really better off. There comes a point where it makes no difference who has the most. Those are our choices -- negotiate a decent agreement or increase our defense and race with them.

Kissinger: At one point, we told Brezhnev what he would have with MIRVs; he confirmed our intelligence estimate. Then he told us what we had, which included everything -- bombers, overseas bases, everything. We never think this way, because we think of second-strike. The significance is that they can’t hit NATO without fearing we will hit them as they cannot hit us, or if they hit NATO and the US, we will still have enough.

The President: I had a talk with Grechko. We agreed that Henry would go back this fall. We have narrowed the differences. There is still a gulf, but we hope we can agree on something. If we can’t, they will go balls out, and with their throw weight, it will be a problem. It would be a race no one would win. We are laying the groundwork for a longer-term agreement.

Senator Aiken: What effect will the French development have?

The President: The Soviet Union puts great emphasis on French and British developments -- and also the Chinese. Looked at coldly, they are mini-powers.

Kissinger: After France has finished its program in 1980, they will have one half as many warheads as we have on one Poseidon.

The President: The last thing the Europeans want is for us to be more inferior to the Soviet Union, but they also fear a runaway race.

A Senator: Where is China? Better than France?

Kissinger: Not much better. They will have one-third as many as one Poseidon by 1978.

The President: But the Soviet Union thinks the Chinese are going much faster.
Kissinger: Also, how much is enough? The Chinese in four years could kill millions of Russians, and might accept millions of Chinese killed.

McFall: What would be a reasonable agreement? Can they both agree?

The President: We think so. It is very complex. All systems must be considered. We can't discuss numbers now. Our general view is that all of us concerned with this must not adopt the view of why bother to try for an agreement because we could win a race. But we don't want a bigger budget -- neither do the Soviets -- but lacking an agreement, we will move and have told them so.

Pastore: We have had a deterrent policy for 25 years. Our military now think those could be a limited nuclear war. That is impossible. Do the Soviets think that?

The President: The Soviets believe in inevitable escalation.

Kissinger: Soviet weapons are not geared that way.

Senator Pastore: Then why have more artillery shells?

Kissinger: We must distinguish between battlefield and strategic.

Pastore: A President shouldn't have to make a holocaust decision because artillery shells are 30 miles from the front.

Kissinger: We agree, but then we need more conventional forces.

The President: That is the point. More and more weapons won't help us.

Pastore: Let the Germans put up the forces.

Kissinger: The tough speeches the President made last spring have brought the Europeans to fundamentals. The changes in Germany and France have been very helpful.

The Europeans now also see that our energy institutions were far-sighted. They all wanted to talk energy. They are all running balance of payments deficits because of oil prices. Also the new deposits
coming in are short-term and lending is on a long-term basis. They now realize we weren't talking hegemony but enlightened self-interest to keep Europe healthy. The Europeans now want to cooperate. France has been stuck with exorbitant oil prices as result of bilateral deals, and energy cooperation is working so well that Giscard now wants to cooperate if he can do it without publicly reversing his course.

On the previous summits, the Europeans feared condominium. This time most felt it was successful -- it contributed to easing the atmosphere; they liked the measured way we are proceeding; and it encouraged progress on CSCE and MBFR. I made good progress on those two without backbiting. The most troublesome things are US domestic carping over US inferiority. Spain asked about Zumwalt's comment on the Navy having to stay out of confrontations. We must get the Europeans to strengthen their forces. The Soviet Union can't get superiority strategically, but at some level, though, strategic forces cancel each other out and conventional forces become critical.

They are okay on SALT, but they don't know enough to discuss the details. Their concern is to look into the future and their concern is economic.

Italy is in bad shape. Talking to them is like talking to a Harvard professor's seminar. With the communists and fascists, the democratic factions have little maneuver. They are tempted to move to the communists and we told them that would be dangerous.

**Scott:** Isn't it time they have decent alternatives?

**Kissinger:** Yes, they need able democratic parties to govern. In France, Giscard wants to cooperate; he has no hangups. They just need time and must maneuver carefully. Whatever France's policy, as long as they don't bring pressure on their allies, we can work it out.

Schmidt has none of Brandt's rapid sentimentality. Where a year ago they thought we needed them, that has changed. In the Middle East they see we are right and we are urging them to move in economics, as long as it is supportive.

**Byrd:** What were the issues that were impossible of resolution?

What are parameters of trade and what are the quids pro quo?
Kissinger: There are words being thrown around. Take throw weight. Married with MIRVs and high accuracy, they can be dangerous against fixed targets -- so they are more vulnerable than we. So far things have not gone to maximum MIRVing. If we can keep it there, we are okay. But if they put 20 MIRVs on a missile, it would be a problem. Also, we can put a big missile in the Minuteman III silos if need be.

In the Crimea we each told the other our intelligence projection of the each other's forces. Any MIRV limitation we could accept would severely limit them and look bad. Also, most of the buildup is coming just at the end of the extended period. We thought if we could extend the time, we could put a cap on numbers which is below the capacity of each side and slow down the arms race. It's still large numbers, but the instability comes from each racing. There is no way an attack on the United States could leave us with less than 4,000 warheads.

The President: An agreement means nothing unless it means both sides restrict what they would otherwise do.

Kissinger: We could have juggled the numbers, but it would have been hard to justify that it was less than their program. We want either to restrict them or to be sure they refuse to be limited.

The economic agreement doesn't involve transfer of resources. They facilitate trade.

There is a myth developing that detente is one sided. But:

1. We settled Vietnam on our terms.
2. We squeezed them in the Middle East in an unbelievable way.
3. We protected Berlin.
4. We stopped a Cuban submarine base.

What did they get? Some Ex-Im credits, a little trade, some wheat -- which was not part of detente. We tie everything to good foreign policy behavior. If we prevent benefits to them, they will go back to the cold war.

The President: The balance of trade with the Soviet Union is very favorable.
Kissinger: And if we don't trade, the Europeans and Japanese already are doing it, and it's better if it's done under our close controls than without them.

The President: We are trying to work out methods how a private trading economy can trade with a state system. Also, it will eventually pertain to the PRC.

Scott: They are opening a big trade center.

Kissinger: Look at the record. Every time they have moved, we have been tough. We have showed them if they move militarily, we will stop them. Conversely, if they cooperate, we will make it useful. Remember, until the 1972 summit, there was no trade at all.

When you get the Soviet leadership and news talking the success of detente, it gives them a stake -- though they can change.

We have paralyzed the left in Europe with this policy. What would happen if we had one crisis after another? There were no commitments as to loans, or transfer of resources.

The President: We told them we couldn't yet get MFN but we're working on it.

Three things moved them at this summit:

1. What will happen with China? Will they force us into detente with China and opposition to them?

2. Why didn't they react in Vietnam and the Middle East? Why did they settle Berlin? (1) fear of the tough United States. They are still obsessed with World War II. The people were out, and they could not do it just for peace but for friendship. Good relations with the United States is in their interest. They are doing better but they are far behind Europe and even more so, the United States. (2) The more stake we can give the Soviet leadership and people in peace and cooperation, the more they will lose if detente fails.

MFN -- you can say: "cut them off" -- but it applies in spades to the Chinese. But the more we can give them a stake in good relations, the more we can influence them. If we can get the trade bill, it may improve trade, and it will be more help on Jewish emigration than if
we slam the door. In 1969 there were less than 1,000 per year; last year it was 33,000. This year it's down, probably because of the October War. So we need them to fear us but also there has to be a positive element to give them an incentive. There is no give-away. There will have to be a quid pro quo, but no unilateral giveaways. Without MFN, they certainly won't change their policies.

Cedarburg: Any thought to sending the Secretary of Defense to Moscow?

The President: It might be good for someone to talk to Grechko.

Kissinger: If we want to drive the Europeans and Chinese crazy, just let the military staffs talk.

The President: That is not what the leadership is saying. But it is a sensitive area.

Mansfield: It is most inadvisable, Mr. President, and you better keep control.

The President: I will.

----------: Netherlands defense cuts.

Kissinger: I think it won't happen.

Albert: How about energy?

Kissinger: It's an agreement on research and development exchanges on alternative sources, etc. It has nothing to do with purchases of Soviet energy, resources.

The President: Just an exchange.

Mansfield: Aren't these private deals?

Kissinger: For Armand Hammer, etc., yes -- but this agreement is on technical exchange. The development of energy resources is private. This is totally separate.
Joint Leadership Hty 10 July, '80

P. Have full feeling. I wish to put remarks & repertoire

McNamara & Kissin will follow my words & encourage

following comments on their theme in part.

The overall sense of winds & purpose with which

this meeting is attended.

In Brussels our useful. Some always concerned

about US-S&CC & communism, US stopped to commit

+ sign declaration.

When I went to Eura in 69, they thought we

should be setting about PAC & relations w/f. 5

First then for them over US-S&CC cooperation.

Entire attitude have turned 460. They repel

50% of French now; now they are working on it &

tame conclusion. Date a new period of great

opportunity role of longer && allowing. I have made

some approximations on security but they been

less than scope on economics, etc. They

can't have it both ways - buy our power & export

us everything else. They don't always have to agree -

but they want to offer them own integration.

In Brussels, I met w/ NH, SM, Clark, Schiffs, Clinton,

Romme + others at reception. General thought -

he more expensive but still makes on Gambit

Pace I can't ever [sic] part. The Alliance was very good,

Westward would lift them to power. Alliance

got so security that in one - difficult when

all the terms meeting. On some vital won't

old formula - new concept US & community.

Entire mixture were almost exclusively econ.

Also thinking of them, I wouldn't exchange over

our future policies.

About bonfire - didn't hear - type public.

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negotiation will end yet. There had been some movement on the Russian side - a few steps forward and a few back - but nothing significant. The situation is still in flux. I guess we need to focus on the positive. The second phase is more challenging. It will require patience and persistence.

During the past year, we've had to deal with several unexpected challenges. For instance, we had to negotiate with a new supplier, which was unexpected. We had to adjust our production schedule to accommodate this change. The result was a delay in delivery, which was not ideal. We have learned from this experience and are making adjustments to avoid similar issues in the future.

We have also had to deal with changes in the market. The demand for our product has fluctuated, requiring us to adjust our production levels. We have implemented a flexible production plan to better respond to these changes. This has allowed us to maintain our competitiveness in the market.

In conclusion, while there have been challenges, we have made progress in our negotiations and have adapted to changes in the market. We remain committed to finding a resolution and moving forward.

As always, I encourage you to continue to share your thoughts and feedback. It is valuable to our decision-making process. Thank you for your continued support.
Their field case, normally known but not much
unhygienic & mobile field
ITB - SU preferred it. Think 1st move - we are preferred
in war. They could trade PRC to trade 1st & SU had
more sense. Than suddenly some tactic
doesn't work, but fundamentally a STB is successful.
We won't get without ITB because of side issues?
PRC - We will make out agreement on PRC - they had
agreed on prior commitment & Ambrose - 1st on the
agreement now.
E mission of war - we agreed to do so, while keeping
their important turn, but who knows what would
will happen.
SAI I - Tough to tell, as I told you before. SU TW is
工業 infinit, but our advantage is enormous - 5/1
already in numbers & also in aggressive accuracy. As we look to future, if SU agreed to forge war;
their would be two points of inflection - which
They said the SU has missile advantage, but you
get rid by arguments. We would have done this, but
our combinational advantage doesn't make common alliance - but
they can't alone. They also wanted about PRC: we
might have to also. In 1971, H-D a rough
4 h from war. In 1973, same midnight, we
had rough 3 hours MF. Had we operated in
other case, there would not have been MF settlement
or present ME situation. What we came up on now
was a commitment to balance is go against our
precondition & prioritization steps. We have to choose
whether to conclude an agreement which will protect
not just be accepted here, which
MIRV balance, go with a hard test which
At one point, we told Syg what the world had to say. He asked us what we had to say. We told him what we had to say. We thought this way because we think of it this way. So is that they can't tell NATO what to say but they can say what they can. So if they tell NATO and US, we will talk about what we think. I had a talk with France. We agreed it would go back to the fact we have some small deal. They see us but we hope we can agree on something. If we can't, they will go back and say there is no superpower. It would be a problem if there is no superpower. We begin preparations for longer-term agreement.

When asked what effect will French influence have?

P. So far they have some influence in the region. It's also like we have talked to them, they are more passive.

K. After the war, France, and new, they have increased their role in 1940, they will need to go stronger and be more involved.

P. The best thing would be to have China and the US, but they also fear a summary move.

— Where is China? Behind the US?

K. Not much farther, they will have to move or lose the game by 78.

P. But the US thinks PRC is going much farther.
R. Also, how much is enough. Like in four years. £200,000 million. If so, is just over £2 billion. If so, I would agree. I mean, I'm sure that all of us... It's not as if we're not adapting or why bother to try for agreement. Because we can lower costs, but we don't want long-term budget. But this is, sort of, it's... I think on agreement we will, you know, hold them off.

K. We have the...settlement going to 1.5%. Contributing some of the... Change would be limited. More wise. That's possible. Or somehow that?

P. Sure believe in variable. Accelerate.

K. Sure. I agree. We are not general. That way.

P. There may have some utility... Threw.

K. Must distinguish, but... Without... Purpose now, when how to make a... (inaudible) decision. Because only there. Our 30 miles from... But.

K. He agreed, but then we will more... Essential.

P. There is part. Everyone agrees want help groups.

K. There is part. Everyone agrees want help group.

K. The... My way of making... Topic. There is fundamental changes in... That been been very helpful.
Euras war also the news from Europe. The US was trying to
take energy. They all seemed to
be doing it. But European
prices were quite different
because of the oil price. Also, everyone was
worried about what Europe was doing.
It was a tricky time. It was very
fighting began. But eventually self-interest
began to kick in. Every now and
then, there was a hint of a price increase. But
mostly, there were talks of talks. It was
very complicated. One general
remembered, "Europe has been trying to
get a foothold in the market. But
now it seems to be going well."

On another front, it was a
bit different. The US was
notching progress in
their work. The most
important was the US
 diplomatic corps. They
were doing well. They
continued to work on the
problems. One thing they had to
work on was the US state.
It was a bit difficult, but
they were making progress. They
were not getting somewhere, but
on some level, they thought they could work
on it. The pressure became intense.

The US was not sure. They didn't know enough to
decide. But they were trying to
look at it. It was a complex
case. But, it seemed to be moving in
the right direction. The US
was looking forward to
getting there. It was a hard
task, but with patience and
determination, they thought they
could do it. They worked hard and
showed determination. They
insisted on moving to empty
out the US state.
On 5-2-23, we had one of our first team meetings.
P. An agreement means nothing unless it means
both sides are committed to it. If they want to be in agreement, they should write it down.
K. We could have talked it over, but it would have
been hard to justify it to their peers. We want to look like we're doing things the right way.
We want them to see us working on it so
sure they want to be involved.
The new agreement doesn't mean more for us, we've already done it.
They facilitate things.

What exactly do we need?
1. We talked VR on some terms
2. We agreed terms in ME, wait until we agree
3. We talked before
4. Stopped those, they don't want to share.

What they got? Two X, one with 5, one with 7, one with 10, one with 15. We're only going
if you're going to help with it. If you're going to help with it, they will give it to us.

K. The team is so far away.

K. And if we don't make Enzo + Joyce already, we'll better don't make one that contacts them,

P. We're trying to work out methods that are private,

Training can teach if we're motivated.
           can teach it.

The opening big thing comes
K. Every time they have saved, we have been hurt. We have been hurt if
they don't do it. We will stop them. Cowardly.

If they don't do it, we will make it happen.

P. Based on the 1.5 summit, there was no
trust at all.
When you get to Shumen they are Turkish in all of it, not just in a little. They will change.
They have a story of the kings and the pride, what could happen if we tried and those were often on another.
These were our countries as to whom, as thoughts of immersed.
1. We talk about these, what if we got MFN and working with it.
2. This meant that we, this meant:
  a) What will happen to China (China in the
     biggest NATO + opposition to China).
  b) Why choose they what an UN MCP. Why
     think Stalin? (i) From the tough US. They
     still obeyed us on it. The people were out, i
     they came but just for peace but for friendship.
     God wanted us on their interest killing
     better but they feel behind, Europe came twice to us
     2) The more stable we can give more stability, appl
     cion peace + easy, e more they will live of definite
     fields.
MFN. You don’t say but their off - applies in
regards to NCS. But Euros can connect them
a state in good relations, e more we can
propose them. If we can get a good deal,
not more major, it will be more help
on Jewish immigration. Then if we there close
for 6/9 long there 2000 each, cost 65 or 53 each. This
open them, put because I feel a
So we need them to feel we can today, a private
accelerate to give them much of. That is how
garbages. There will have to print, but
we outlined gurarg. We're M.I.N, they
cannot permit change their position.

Furflying. Any thought to sending Sarah to Russia.
P. Might be good for someone to talk to her also.

K. If we want to miss Europe, we say y, just
not will stop talk.
P. That with what Carter was saying. But direction.

Tranquil if most in mind the P + you will in key
control.
P. pundit

I understand defense.

K. I think it won't happen.

Albert. How about buying

K. 65 exchange on alternative energy as nothing

to deal/purchase of how energy resources.
P. Just exchange.

Tranquil. Don't them favorite clubs.

K. American Hammer, etc. yes - must say that
as can then exchange. Plowmen of energy.

Tranquil is prime. This totally agrees.