

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME:

Saturday - June 22, 1974
8:00 a.m. - Breakfast

PLACE:

The Pentagon

Schlesinger: What is this about the G-class submarines?

[Dr. Kissinger explained the provision of the 1972 SALT agreement which included the G-class submarines in the limitation if they were modernized.]

The other leak was that we agreed not to replace the Titans with submarines during the life of the Interim Agreement. We did this because the JCS said they would build no submarines before the Trident. Zumwalt said he didn't want to build the 640 model. Therefore, we had to put a ceiling on submarines, since we weren't going to build more and the Soviets were.

Schlesinger: Remember we needn't stop deploying Minuteman III at 550.

Kissinger: I think we don't have the domestic structure for a SALT agreement. We are so undisciplined, this is a national disaster. We will look back on this as a national disaster.

The JCS were consulted on the TTB.

Schlesinger: There's no problem on the TTB if we can change the effective date. We could then live with 75 kilotons even. 150 would give us a margin of error.

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Kissinger: How could SALT I be a disadvantage?

Schlesinger: I agree. You don't have to argue with me,

Kissinger: The big issue is the President is under impeachment and the government is dividing into feudal kingdoms. No document is safe from leaking. Take the Israeli resupply issue: It was not a big thing but it's been blown up to which of us was against aid to Israel. That was not the issue. There were bureaucratic hangups and my perception is that the Pentagon started these leaks. There was no policy disagreement during the week of October 6.

Schlesinger: Why not say this publicly?

Kissinger: I will. In a press conference on Monday.

Schlesinger: I gave Time an interview. I said the decision was made on October 13 and I followed it.

Kissinger: The facts as I recall them are that we promised them full replacement but it would be done after the war, because we thought it would be over in a week.

Schlesinger: I agree. We went to the airlift when we thought Israel would collapse.

Kissinger: The differences between you and me that week were marginal. But we must be able to discuss tactics without fear that Gelb will come out with a blast. I never put out any stories except to say that the Gelb thrust was 180° off. The basic fact is that the Middle East war was the best-managed crisis ever.

The fact is that Jackson told me that Defense said I was the roadblock.

Schlesinger: The policy was great. If anything, you leaned 10% more forward than I.

Kissinger: But my feeling is that Defense is cutting up our policy. State used to, on things like counterforce, but I think I have them under control.

Schlesinger: If the facts on the October war are as we have said, there is no problem.



Kissinger: The tragedy is that with a Watergate President, we cannot afford a fight between State and Defense.

I want to say I will do my damndest on my side. I don't think we can do anything on SALT. The President might be tempted to try to hit a home run.

I think your SALT proposal is impossible without something on SLBMs...

Schlesinger: We could do that.

Kissinger: What Zumwalt wants is a return to the total Cold War -- to face them down totally.

Schlesinger: We must prevent a Soviet breakout.

Kissinger: But if there is no agreement, they will break out, and we will have to break out too.

I floated 700 to Dobrynin and they rejected it. If we had only ICBMs, your proposal would be good.

Schlesinger: A breakout would be disastrous.

Kissinger: I think we should get away from numbers. Let Brezhnev and the President decide what they are breaking -- but nothing precise. If we are willing to slip or give up B-1, Trident or reverse Poseidon, it may be possible. We can't keep our program and have them give up theirs.

Schlesinger: They must know that our program is not immutable.

Kissinger: Is it possible to get some thinking out loud -- with no content, but to keep things going? Otherwise Zumwalt will prevail -- because we can't get a big program without calling the Soviets treacherous and returning to the Cold War.

Schlesinger: But the Soviets must know that too.

Kissinger: I will tell Dobrynin this today. But we must stop this public debate -- it will kill the country.

Schlesinger: I agree. Continuation of the arms race is bad for the country and the world.



Kissinger: Any ideas must come from us. The Soviet military is stupider than ours.

Schlesinger: Tell Brezhnev the Poseidon warheads were designed to penetrate ABM. We have exercised restraint.

Kissinger: I have five minutes of other things.

Here is a letter the President gave to Golda on long-term aid [Tab A]. Notice there are no numbers attached. They have sent us a letter with numbers in.

Peres wants to come next week. Is that all right?

Schlesinger: Okay. My reservations are on laser-guided, Cobra, and Lance.

Kissinger: There is no commitment on anything but Lance. They want new aircraft in '77 and say they have a commitment in principle.

Schlesinger: I told them there were no unsurmountable problems.

Kissinger: I think a long-term commitment is in our interest because then we don't have to have a big annual debate on it. Then we can cut down on deliveries.

Schlesinger: How about Egypt?

Kissinger: What you have said is very helpful. What is this military team?

Schlesinger: It's to go into the lessons learned from the war, and the military structure.

Kissinger: You know of the list that Scowcroft and Wickham drew up. We decided that Kuwait wasn't the way to go, but through the Saudis. Maybe in six months or a year, Egypt could buy directly. From the list worked out, the Saudis can add to their orders.

The best thing to do with Israel is not to refuse but to hold up on deliveries. Don't refuse Peres.



K/Schlesinger 22 June 1974

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Memo For _____

S- What is this about a class sub?

K (Explained)

Other deal is that we agreed not to replace titans w/ subs during a life of an interim agreement. We did this because JCS said they would build no subs before Trident. Zumwalt said he didn't want to build 640 mch. i.e. we had to put a ceiling on subs, since we weren't going to build more than the Soviets.

S Remember, we needn't stop deploying MIMI III at 550.

K I think we don't have a domestic structural free SALT agreement. We are so unorganized this is a world disaster. We will look back on this as well legals.

JCS were consulted on ITB

S No prob on ITB if we can change effective date. We could then have 6/75 kt even. 150 would give us

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→ Galt articles about Oct alert
+ responsible
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Memo For _____

margin of error

L- How could SALT I be disadvantageous

S- Legals; you don't have to argue w/ me.

K- Big issue is Perm/No implementation + just dividing into federal kingdom. No document is safe from being taken down by any physissee. It was not a big thing but blown up to whether we was against and to I. That was a issue. There were bureaucratic hangers & my perception is that Pentagon started these letters. There was no policy disagreement during week of Oct 16.

S- Why not say this publicly.

K- I will. In press conf meeting

S- I gave time interview, Swiss division made Oct 13.

K- Facts as I recall them is we promised replacement but would be done after war, because we thought



Memo For _____

It would be over in a week.

- S- Agree, we must be on alert when we thought I would collapse.
- H- The difference between you & me this week was marginal. But we must make decisions w/o fear that GALT will come out w/a blast. I never put out any stories except to say the Galt threat was 180° anti.
- The basic fact is ~~is~~ that the Middle East war was a last-unmanaged crisis war. The fact is that Jackson told me that Defense said I was a roadblock.
- S- The policy was great. If anything you leaned 10% more forward than I.
- H- But my feeling is that Defense is cutting up any jobing. State used to, or counterforce, but I think they have them under control.
- S- If facts ~~as~~ on Oct was all we have said, there is no problem.

Memo For _____

- K- The tragedy is that w/a Watergate Plus, we cannot afford a fight with State & Sec. I want to say I will do my damndest on my side. I don't think we can do anything on SALT. Pingot be tough to hit home now. I think your SALT proposal is my mouth w/o teeth on SLBMs...
- S- we could do that.
- K- what I meant is a return to a total cold war - to feel them down totally.
- S- we must pursue a SALT break
- K- But if no agreement, they will break out, & we will have a break out too.
- ~~I want to~~
I floated 200 to Dohy & they rejected it. If we had only



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Memo For _____

ICBM's, your proposal would be
 good

S- Draft must be discussed

K- I think we should get away from
 #s. Let Bug + P decide when they
 are heading - nothing precise.
 If we willing to slip a gear up
 B-1, Trident or several Poseidon
 it may be possible. We can't
 keep our eye + have them gear
 up there.

S- They must know ~~that~~ our
 eye is not unmovable.

K- Is it possible to get some thinking
 out loud - no contract, but to
 keep things going.
 O'Connor + Zumwalt will point -
 because we can't get a big eye

Memo For _____

W/O calling some treacherous &
 returning to Cold war.

S- But some must know that too.

K- I will tell why this today, but
 we must stop this position
 debate - it will kill country.

S- I agree. Continuation of a arms
 race is bad for country &
 world.

K- Any ideas must come from us.
 Our military is stupider than
 ours.

S- Tell Bug ~~for~~ Poseidon warheads were
 to penetrate ABM, we have special
 constraint.

K- 5 minutes of other things.
 Here is letter Pym to Golda.
 While there are no #s attached.
 They have sent us a letter w/ # 0 in.



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Memo For _____

Perez wants to come next week.
Is that all right?

S - OK. My reservations are on bases,
Cuba, Lance.

K - No contract on anything but home.
They want new act in??
say they have contract in principle

S - I told them no insurrection table
puts.

K - I think long term contract is
in our interest because we don't
have a big annual debate. There are
care cut down on deliveries

S - How about E.

K - what you have said is very
helpful. What is this week. time

S - I ~~was~~ learned & structured.

K - You know of a list 100 & 1000

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Memo For _____

check up. Use checklist of what
wasn't a long to go but then Sanchez.
Maybe in 6 mos or 1 yr E could
help directly. From a list worked
out, Sanchez can all of their
orders.

K - Best thing to do w/ E is not refuse
but to hold on - otherwise. Don't
use Perez

