THE WHITE HOUSE

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TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

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BY <u>dal</u> NARA, DATE <u>6/3/1/0</u>

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs

Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME:

Saturday - June 22, 1974 8:00 a.m. - Breakfast

PLACE:

The Pentagon

Schlesinger: What is this about the G-class submarines?

[Dr. Kissinger explained the provision of the 1972 SALT agreement which included the G-class submarines in the limitation if they were modernized.]

The other leak was that we agreed not to replace the Titans with submarines during the life of the Interim Agreement. We did this because the JCS said they would build no submarines before the Trident. Zumwalt said he didn't want to build the 640 model. Therefore, we had to put a ceiling on submarines, since we weren't going to build more and the Soviets were.

Schlesinger: Remember we needn't stop deploying Minuteman III at 550.

<u>Kissinger:</u> I think we don't have the domestic structure for a SALT agreement. We are so undisciplined, this is a national disaster. We will look back on this as a national disaster.

The JCS were consulted on the TTB.

Schlesinger: There's no problem on the TTB if we can change the effective date. We could then live with 75 kilotons even. 150 would give us a margin of error.

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Kissinger: How could SALT I be a disadvantage?

Schlesinger: I agree. You don't have to argue with me,

Kissinger: The big issue is the President is under impeachment and the government is dividing into feudal kingdoms. No document is safe from leaking. Take the Israeli resupply issue: It was not a big thing but it's been blown up to which of us was against aid to Israel. That was not the issue. There were bureaucratic hangups and my perception is that the Pentagon started these leaks. There was no policy disagreement during the week of October 6.

Schlesinger: Why not say this publicly?

Kissinger: I will. In a press conference on Monday.

Schlesinger: I gave <u>Time</u> an interview. I said the decision was made on October 13 and I followed it.

<u>Kissinger:</u> The facts as I recall them are that we promised them full replacement but it would be done after the war, because we thought it would be over in a week.

Schlesinger: I agree. We went to the airlift when we thought Israel would collapse.


<u>Kissinger:</u> The differences between you and me that week were marginal. But we must be able to discuss tactics without fear that Gelb will come out with a blast. I never put out any stories except to say that the Gelb thrust was 180° off. The basic fact is that the Middle East war was the bestmanaged crisis ever.

The fact is that Jackson told me that Defense said I was the roadblock.

Schlesinger: The policy was great. If anything, you leaned 10% more forward than I.

<u>Kissinger:</u> But my feeling is that Defense is cutting up our policy. State used to, on things like counterforce, but I think I have them under control.

Schlesinger: If the facts on the October war are as we have said, there is no problem.



<u>Kissinger:</u> The tragedy is that with a Watergate President, we cannot afford a fight between State and Defense.

I want to say I will do my damnedest on my side. I don't think we can do anything on SALT. The President might be tempted to try to hit a home run.

I think your SALT proposal is impossible without something on SLBMs...

Schlesinger: We could do that.

<u>Kissinger:</u> What Zumwalt wants is a return to the total Cold War -- to face them down totally.

Schlesinger: We must prevent a Soviet breakout.

Kissinger: But if there is no agreement, they will break out, and we will have to break out too.

I floated 700 to Dobrynin and they rejected it. If we had only ICBMs, your proposal would be good.

Schlesinger: A breakout: would be disastrous.

Kissinger: I think we should get away from numbers. Let Brezhnev and the President decide what they are breaking -- but nothing precise. If we are willing to slip or give up B-1, Trident or reverse Poseidon, it may be possible. We can't keep our program and have them give up theirs.

Schlesinger: They must know that our program is not immutable.

<u>Kissinger:</u> Is it possible to get some thinking out loud -- with no content, but to keep things going? Otherwise Zumwalt will prevail -- because we can't get a big program without calling the Soviets treacherous and returning to the Cold War.

Schlesinger: But the Soviets must know that too.

<u>Kissinger</u>: I will tell Dobrynin this today. But we must stop this public debate -- it will kill the country.

Schlesinger: I agree. Continuation of the arms race is bad for the country and the world.

<u>Kissinger</u>: Any ideas must come from us. The Soviet military is stupider than ours.

Schlesinger: Tell Brezhnev the Poseidon warheads were designed to penetrate ABM. We have exercised restraint.

Kissinger: I have five minutes of other things.

Here is a letter the President gave to Golda on long-term aid [Tab A]. Notice there are no numbers attached. They have sent us a letter with numbers in.

Peres wants to come next week. Is that all right?

Schlesinger: Okay. My reservations are on laser-guided, Cobra, and Lance.

Kissinger: There is no commitment on anything but Lance. They want new aircraft in '77 and say they have a commitment in principle.

Schlesinger: I told them there were no unsurmountable problems.

<u>Kissinger:</u> I think a long-term commitment is in our interest because then we don't have to have a big annual debate on it. Then we can cut down on deliveries.

Schlesinger: How about Egypt?

Kissinger: What you have said is very helpful. What is this military team?

Schlesinger: It's to go into the lessons learned from the war, and the military structure.

<u>Kissinger:</u> You know of the list that Scowcroft and Wickham drew up. We decided that Kuwait wasn't the way to go, but through the Saudis. Maybe in six months or a year, Egypt could buy directly. From the list worked out, the Saudis can add to their orders.

The best thing to do with Israel is not to refuse but to hold up on deliveries. Don't refuse Peres.



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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHANGE

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BY del NARA DATE 8/3/10

Office of the secretary of Defense

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