

Scowcroft files only

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: June 6, 1974
12:00 Noon

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: Those Arabs take time.

Schlesinger: We are doing well on the Hill. We will beat Mansfield by a substantial margin. We have cultivated and turned around Tunney and Huddleston. They will vote for smaller cuts.

President: Yes. Mike does it every year.

It may be premature on SALT because I don't know the positions. We will meet on the SALT. Al has told me about the Nitze letter to the bureaucracy not wanting any agreement.

Schlesinger: I disagree.

President: Let me tell you how I see the players. It is amusing that Defense, State, and everyone now see Communism is bad and you can't trust the Soviet Union. I knew both of those things all along. Nitze's view is that we should stonewall the Soviet Union on everything -- SALT, MIRV, TTB, ABM. I understand. There are differences in objectives within the bureaucracy. State would like it to blow up because they didn't dream it up -- the same with CIA. In the DOD -- not you -- they would like to stonewall so we get a bigger budget -- more ships, etc. That is not totally selfish. They honestly believe no agreement is to our advantage. It's like in SALT I -- although we didn't give anything up.

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AUTHORITY RAC Review 12/6/04; OSC/state guidelines
BY lolo NLF, DATE 4/13/07

Frankly, as Secretary you have to lead the Department. You must express your views. It has been the practice of recent secretaries to send over letters to get on record -- with something that can't be accepted or refused, so it can go either way. I am disappointed to see you go this route. You can see me anytime. I am not going to sell the U.S. down the river. I think it is bad for the Department to piss on what I am doing. Either you run the Department or we will have to do something else. There is still civilian control. They can express their views but they must display restraint. I would expect it from State and CIA, but not from Defense.

You remember the yeoman. I have supported Moorer through thick and thin.

Now DOD comes up with propositions which are unacceptable. I would hope you would come up with something which is not completely unacceptable. I know it would be nice to get out and demagogue; go out and push for a big DOD budget. But that is not the course to go. This offsets our ability to affect Soviet behavior in the Middle East and Europe.

I know you and Kissinger had a flap. He is tired and doesn't tell you everything.

You are a member of my close team. I would hope you would help us out on this. You are as smart as Kissinger. Laird and Richardson don't know this business. I want your help, but not a letter which is written for the record. If it works, the history books will give credit to everybody. If not, you can blame me. I have talked the same way to Kissinger. I don't want a problem now. You are key in Defense. I don't care what CIA says -- I do care about you. The political decisions are mine.

Schlesinger: I agree. I think those are areas to work on and I want an agreement. I have worked on the JCS and brought them around slowly. They have bought some of the MIRV deal. I agree with the ABM. The Defense Report held out hope for restraint on ABM. In MIRV I would hope for an agreement. I supported our MIRV proposal and got the JCS to go along. That would have constrained the Soviet Union. A MIRV agreement is desirable, but it must constrain the Soviet Union.

President: Why don't you bite the bullet on throwweight? Can't you put big missiles in the Minuteman holes.

Schlesinger: Yes we can. I have ordered a big Minuteman R&D program. My position is that we must match the Soviet Union. I would prefer to do it at a low level, but at a high level if necessary.

It would be good to restrain MIRV, but 1,000 is no constraint. We couldn't explain that to ourselves. If we can obtain restraint on their part....

The ICBM throw-weight would have held them to 300. I told Kissinger to try 360 - 450. If we can constrain them to that, it is a good deal.

President: The Soviet Union is in a box too. We may have to have an agreement in principle and go back later for an agreement. Their problem is agreeing at a summit to what would appear inferiority. We know it doesn't mean a damn thing; neither side has the first strike. What are we talking about is how this insanity of ever bigger forces can end. **Stability** is what we need. I know it is hard for us to agree to something which appears to put us in an inferior position.

Brezhnev is a gruesome negotiator -- he's tenacious, tough, direct, with enormous stamina. It will be a brilliant wrestling match. But hinging on it is whether detente goes on. Read my speech carefully. It is a fact of life that neither can use its strength to change the internal system of the other. What can we do? Our interests are different in most areas of the world. So we need trade -- although it's not so important as Simon thinks) -- and so on, so we can keep the momentum going, so when we have something like last October -- a confrontation -- there is enough in the pot that they will not risk it. They must have something. Brezhnev has staked his future in it. Our interests in the Middle East, Europe, China, require keeping the Soviet Union going. But not at the cost of apparent inferiority. Not that it means anything. Zumwalt's comments are bullshit. We are first in the Navy, and tactical aircraft.

Tell the JCS I want to build a constructive peace. Building missiles won't do it. Tell the JCS the President believes in a strong Air Force, Army, Navy. But if we get into a strategic arms race, the money will go into that.

Schlesinger: The purpose of such a statement is to get the Soviet Union to a deal. I shall pass your instructions.

President: I will take the responsibility if it fails and give everyone else credit if it succeeds. But we are at a critical juncture. We have to be bold, not foot-dragging. The bureaucracy opposed the China initiative. The Middle East was the same way. People are irritated by Southeast Asia, Phnom Penh still hasn't fallen. That irritates people. Why did we do it? To make our credibility work. Southeast Asia was about Europe, the Middle East, and everywhere.

I'm under no illusions. I am not seeking a deal for a deal's sake. To the extent Kissinger needs restraint, I will use it -- though I don't think he needs it. He's done a fantastic job in the Middle East -- only perhaps exceeded by Vietnam.

We need your help. Help Kissinger to devise a way around this. I will take on Brezhnev. I made the speech about the U.S. being second to none. The American people in their simplistic way are not on a peace-at-any-price kick, but they want peace. Many of my friends are horrified at our even talking to the Soviet Union. But are we going to leave the world running away with an arms race, or will we get a handle on it?

Schlesinger: I share that view. I supported the MIRV proposal and modifications.

The Soviet Union is building 2500 missiles. We could sign an agreement to limit them to that. Leave them the SCUD's, etc., for the PRC. I believe there are propositions which would not be embarrassing to them and would let you come back with a splendid agreement.

The President: You should talk with Kissinger. We don't know right now what is negotiable. When we know, you and Kissinger sit down and work it out.

If they hard-line us, we tell them to go to hell. I won't make an agreement at any point. Nitze sucks up martinis with his Georgetown friends and badmouths me and I don't like it.

Schlesinger: I will tell him that was no way to behave.

President: He participated with McNamara in dismantling the whole Defense structure.

Schlesinger: He fought McNamara and Clifford on Vietnam. He sent that letter to me. I don't necessarily agree.

President: He is bright and I don't care who he drinks with. But I won't tolerate insubordination. When I make a decision I expect support or they get out. That is the way it has to be.

Schlesinger: One technical point: A MIRV'd ICBM is different from an SLBM and can't be treated the same. SLBM's are smaller; there is less command and control, etc. They are not equivalent. We can go on with production of Minuteman III. You could offer to close the line and limit Poseidon -- but we must get something.

President: We can't cut back our allies. They have a few forces and will be with us. So will the Chinese. Chou is ill, but while the men may change, their interests won't. With the Soviet Union on their border they need the U. S.

Schlesinger: Your revolution in the Mideast and China are the outstanding hallmarks of your achievement. You and Kissinger deserve the credit.

President: Don't overlook the Soviets. Detente served a useful purpose in the Mideast.

Pres/Schlesinger

1200 June 6, 74

P Those cards take time

S We doing call once a week. We will be transferred by assist. managers. We have estimated + toward around Tuesday, Handwritten. They will vote for something else.

P Yes. Make it every year.

May be prewritten on SALT card don't have prior. We will ~~the~~ meet on the SALT. Al has told me about two Wtzy letters & a concerning not making any agreement

S 2 days

P Let me tell you how some players. It is concerning that DOD, State, etc. was for insurance is bad & you can't trust SU. I know both of them.

Wtzy's view is we should stall SU on everything - SALT, MIAV, TTB, ABMI been historical. There are big restrictions on financing. State would like to blow up because they didn't dream it up - some C.A. In DOD - not you - they would like to stall well so we get bigger budget - more ships, etc. But totally selfish - they haven't taken us agreement to our advantage - like SALT I - other they are didn't give anything. Frankly, or say you have to deal with you must explain your views. It has been practice of what say to send our letters to get a record - can't be accepted or refused - so can go another way

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AUTHORITY for SAC Review 12/16/04; NSC/State guidelines
BY WA NLF, DATE 4/13/07

I disappointed to see you go this route.
You can swim any time.

I want you to sell US down a line.
I think it is bad for ~~you~~ Dept to focus
on what I can buy. Either you run
a Dept of or we will have to do
something else.

There is still similar control. They
can't give more but must be
display limit - I would expect from
State & CIA but not Def.

You remember a woman I heard
reported more than thick - this
was DOD Com by w/ proposals which
are unacceptable.

I would hope you would cover up
w/ something which not completely
unacceptable.

It would be nice to get out & disrupt
go out & push for big DOD there.
But that not a course to go. This affect
our ability to affect Sov behavior in
NIE & Eur. (China being referred)

I know you & K had a flap. He
tried & doesn't tell you anything.

You a member of my last team.
I would hope you would help us on
this. You summit as K. have, but we
don't know this business. I want your
help, but not a little which is with
for record. If it works, a history
book will give credit, if not you
can blame us. I have talked

I was wrong to K. I don't want a further
lower. You are key in Def. I don't
care what CIA say - I don't care about
you - The political decisions are ^{made} ~~made~~
S I agree, I think there are areas to work on
and I want an agreement. I have worked on
CDS & bought them covered already - they
have bought one of MIRV deal. I agree w/
ABM. Def report held out hope ~~that~~ for
restraint on ABM. In MIRV I would
hope for agreement. I supported one
MIRV proposal & got CDS to go along. That
would have constrained S.U. A MIRV
agreement is desirable, but it must
constrain S.U.

P Why don't you bite bullet on TCS. Can't
you put big missile in ^{MM} ~~MM~~ halo

S Yes. I have ordered a big MIRV - R&D
by partner is we must match S.U. would
prefer at low level, but at high level of
warfare.

It would be good to restrain MIRV, but
1000 is no constraint. We would like
to be considered. If we can obtain restraint
on their part.

That ICBM TCS would have held them
to ~~300~~. I told K to buy 361-450. if we
can constrain to that, it is good deal

P S.U. is a big too. They have to have
agreement in principle & go back later
for agreement. Their job is getting
at a summit to what would appear
in principle. We have different views

a damn thing. Another has 1st strike. What
are we talking about - how the necessity of
ever bigger command. Stability is what
we need. I know hard for us to get to
something which opposes & puts us in
inferior position.

Brez is a glib negotiator - anxious
though, direct, enormous stamina. It will
be helluva wrestling match. But hanging
ask it & whether clients go on. Read
my speech carefully. It is part of life
that neither can use its strength to change
internal system for other. What can we
do? Our interests are different in most
areas of world. Some need trade, (rather
not so important as Soviet think) etc so
we can keep MacArthur going, so
what we have something like lost it
- a confrontation - third is enough in
a pot they will not risk it. They
must hand - Brez has staked his future
on it - our interests - NE, E, Asia, China,
require keeping SU going. But at cost
of apparent inferiority - not that it means
anything. Zimmolt wants bullshit
we are not in way & take care. Tell
FCS I want to build unimpaired
peace. Building missiles won't do it.
Tell US Pres he's in strong AI,
Army, Navy. But if we get in that
area here, coming will go into
that.

So purpose of our statement is to get

S & S to a deal. I shall be your interim
P I will take my way if it hurts & gives
all the credit if it succeeds. But not
at critical juncture. We have to be
bold, not feet dragging. Being very
opposed China invitation. I & ME
same way. People are excited by SEA
P. I still haven't fallen. Why do it? To make our
credibility work. SEA was about E, C,
M, E, everywhere.

I have no illusions - I not seeking a
deal ~~off~~ for deal sake. To extent K could
assist I will use it - tho don't think
to work it - He done fantastic in M, E -
only perhaps exceeded by VA.

We need your help - Help K to deliver
a way around this. I will talk to King.
I make a speech about VI being second ^{none} ~~best~~.

~~USA~~ US people in ^{their} (Sino) ~~way~~ are not in full
at any price but they want peace.

Many of my friends are horrified at our
talking to C.S.U. But are we going to lose
- world running away w/ arms race or
get a handle on it.

S I believe that now. I suggested the MIRC
proposal & modification.

SU is building 2500 vehicles. We could
sign agreement to limit to that. Have
them SCV etc for PRC. I believe there
are proposals which could not be
embarrassing to them & let you come back
w/ splendid agreement.

P You should talk w/ K. We don't know
right now what is negotiable. When
we know, you + K sit down + work
it out.

If they hard line us, we tell them to go
to hell, no agreement at any point.
Nifty in smoke, my maintain w/ agreement
points + handshake handwritten note +
I don't like it.

S I want to tell him that we want to balance

P He participated w/ our work in monthly
diff structure.

S He fought McDonnell + Stiff on
U.S. He sent that letter to me, I don't

mess with you

P He might not care who he checks w/
But I want to control market in the
When I make a decision I expect
support or they get out, way it has
to be

S One tech point, a MIRD ICBM is
diff from SBRM & can't be treated same.
SBRM is smaller, less cost, etc. They
are not equivalent, we can join
w/ prod of M11 III. You could offer to
close China, limit production - but we
must get something.

P Can't over look our allies - They have a
few pieces + will be w/ us. So will
choose. China is ill, but which way
may change, interests want. W/SU
can break they need US

S Your resolution on M.F. + P.R.C. are

on Saturday hallmarks of your admin +
you + K. Chawla - init

P. But verily c. Sas. Details should be
useful project in KE.