

*Scowcroft files only*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ - XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon  
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger  
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: June 6, 1974  
12:00 Noon

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

President: Those Arabs take time.

Schlesinger: We are doing well on the Hill. We will beat Mansfield by a substantial margin. We have cultivated and turned around Tunney and Huddleston. They will vote for smaller cuts.

President: Yes. Mike does it every year.

It may be premature on SALT because I don't know the positions. We will meet on the SALT. Al has told me about the Nitze letter to the bureaucracy not wanting any agreement.

Schlesinger: I disagree.

President: Let me tell you how I see the players. It is amusing that Defense, State, and everyone now see Communism is bad and you can't trust the Soviet Union. I knew both of those things all along. Nitze's view is that we should stonewall the Soviet Union on everything -- SALT, MIRV, TTB, ABM. I understand. There are differences in objectives within the bureaucracy. State would like it to blow up because they didn't dream it up -- the same with CIA. In the DOD -- not you -- they would like to stonewall so we get a bigger budget -- more ships, etc. That is not totally selfish. They honestly believe no agreement is to our advantage. It's like in SALT I -- although we didn't give anything up.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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AUTHORITY RAC Review 12/6/04; OSC/state guidelines  
BY lolo NLF, DATE 4/13/07

Frankly, as Secretary you have to lead the Department. You must express your views. It has been the practice of recent secretaries to send over letters to get on record -- with something that can't be accepted or refused, so it can go either way. I am disappointed to see you go this route. You can see me anytime. I am not going to sell the U.S. down the river. I think it is bad for the Department to piss on what I am doing. Either you run the Department or we will have to do something else. There is still civilian control. They can express their views but they must display restraint. I would expect it from State and CIA, but not from Defense.

You remember the yeoman. I have supported Moorer through thick and thin.

Now DOD comes up with propositions which are unacceptable. I would hope you would come up with something which is not completely unacceptable. I know it would be nice to get out and demagogue; go out and push for a big DOD budget. But that is not the course to go. This offsets our ability to affect Soviet behavior in the Middle East and Europe.

I know you and Kissinger had a flap. He is tired and doesn't tell you everything.

You are a member of my close team. I would hope you would help us out on this. You are as smart as Kissinger. Laird and Richardson don't know this business. I want your help, but not a letter which is written for the record. If it works, the history books will give credit to everybody. If not, you can blame me. I have talked the same way to Kissinger. I don't want a problem now. You are key in Defense. I don't care what CIA says -- I do care about you. The political decisions are mine.

Schlesinger: I agree. I think those are areas to work on and I want an agreement. I have worked on the JCS and brought them around slowly. They have bought some of the MIRV deal. I agree with the ABM. The Defense Report held out hope for restraint on ABM. In MIRV I would hope for an agreement. I supported our MIRV proposal and got the JCS to go along. That would have constrained the Soviet Union. A MIRV agreement is desirable, but it must constrain the Soviet Union.

President: Why don't you bite the bullet on throwweight? Can't you put big missiles in the Minuteman holes.

Schlesinger: Yes we can. I have ordered a big Minuteman R&D program. My position is that we must match the Soviet Union. I would prefer to do it at a low level, but at a high level if necessary.

It would be good to restrain MIRV, but 1,000 is no constraint. We couldn't explain that to ourselves. If we can obtain restraint on their part....

The ICBM throw-weight would have held them to 300. I told Kissinger to try 360 - 450. If we can constrain them to that, it is a good deal.

President: The Soviet Union is in a box too. We may have to have an agreement in principle and go back later for an agreement. Their problem is agreeing at a summit to what would appear inferiority. We know it doesn't mean a damn thing; neither side has the first strike. What are we talking about is how this insanity of ever bigger forces can end. **Stability** is what we need. I know it is hard for us to agree to something which appears to put us in an inferior position.

Brezhnev is a gruesome negotiator -- he's tenacious, tough, direct, with enormous stamina. It will be a brilliant wrestling match. But hinging on it is whether detente goes on. Read my speech carefully. It is a fact of life that neither can use its strength to change the internal system of the other. What can we do? Our interests are different in most areas of the world. So we need trade -- (although it's not so important as Simon thinks) -- and so on, so we can keep the momentum going, so when we have something like last October -- a confrontation -- there is enough in the pot that they will not risk it. They must have something. Brezhnev has staked his future in it. Our interests in the Middle East, Europe, China, require keeping the Soviet Union going. But not at the cost of apparent inferiority. Not that it means anything. Zumwalt's comments are bullshit. We are first in the Navy, and tactical aircraft.

Tell the JCS I want to build a constructive peace. Building missiles won't do it. Tell the JCS the President believes in a strong Air Force, Army, Navy. But if we get into a strategic arms race, the money will go into that.

Schlesinger: The purpose of such a statement is to get the Soviet Union to a deal. I shall pass your instructions.

President: I will take the responsibility if it fails and give everyone else credit if it succeeds. But we are at a critical juncture. We have to be bold, not foot-dragging. The bureaucracy opposed the China initiative. The Middle East was the same way. People are irritated by Southeast Asia, Phnom Penh still hasn't fallen. That irritates people. Why did we do it? To make our credibility work. Southeast Asia was about Europe, the Middle East, and everywhere.

I'm under no illusions. I am not seeking a deal for a deal's sake. To the extent Kissinger needs restraint, I will use it -- though I don't think he needs it. He's done a fantastic job in the Middle East -- only perhaps exceeded by Vietnam.

We need your help. Help Kissinger to devise a way around this. I will take on Brezhnev. I made the speech about the U.S. being second to none. The American people in their simplistic way are not on a peace-at-any-price kick, but they want peace. Many of my friends are horrified at our even talking to the Soviet Union. But are we going to leave the world running away with an arms race, or will we get a handle on it?

Schlesinger: I share that view. I supported the MIRV proposal and modifications.

The Soviet Union is building 2500 missiles. We could sign an agreement to limit them to that. Leave them the SCUD's, etc., for the PRC. I believe there are propositions which would not be embarrassing to them and would let you come back with a splendid agreement.

The President: You should talk with Kissinger. We don't know right now what is negotiable. When we know, you and Kissinger sit down and work it out.

If they hard-line us, we tell them to go to hell. I won't make an agreement at any point. Nitze sucks up martinis with his Georgetown friends and badmouths me and I don't like it.

Schlesinger: I will tell him that was no way to behave.

President: He participated with McNamara in dismantling the whole Defense structure.

Schlesinger: He fought McNamara and Clifford on Vietnam. He sent that letter to me. I don't necessarily agree.

President: He is bright and I don't care who he drinks with. But I won't tolerate insubordination. When I make a decision I expect support or they get out. That is the way it has to be.

Schlesinger: One technical point: A MIRV'd ICBM is different from an SLBM and can't be treated the same. SLBM's are smaller; there is less command and control, etc. They are not equivalent. We can go on with production of Minuteman III. You could offer to close the line and limit Poseidon -- but we must get something.

President: We can't cut back our allies. They have a few forces and will be with us. So will the Chinese. Chou is ill, but while the men may change, their interests won't. With the Soviet Union on their border they need the U. S.

Schlesinger: Your revolution in the Mideast and China are the outstanding hallmarks of your achievement. You and Kissinger deserve the credit.

President: Don't overlook the Soviets. Detente served a useful purpose in the Mideast.

Pres/Schlesinger

1200 June 6, 74

P Those cards take time

S We doing call cards. We will be transferred by assist. managers. We have estimated + found several times, Handwritten. They will note for marks in cards.

P Yes. Make lists it every year.

May be preparation on SALT card don't have prints. We will ~~the~~ meet on the SALT. Al has told me about two Wtzy letters & a concerning not making any agreement

S 2 days

P Let me tell you how some players. It is concerning that DOD, State, etc. was for insurance is bad & you can't trust SU. I know both of them.

Wtzy's view is we should stall SU on everything - SALT, MIAV, TTB, ABVI been historical. There are sig restrictions on financing. State would like to blow up because they didn't dream it up - some C.A. In DOD - not you - they would like to stall well so we get bigger budget - more ships, etc. But totally selfish - they haven't taken us agreement to our advantage - like SALT I - other they are didn't give anything. Frankly, or say you have to deal with you must explain your views. It has been practice of what say to send our letters to get a record - can't be accepted or refused - so can go another way

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AUTHORITY for SAC Review 12/16/04; NSC/State guidelines  
BY WA NLF, DATE 4/13/07

I disappointed to see you go this route.  
You can swim any time.

I want you to sell US down a line.  
I think it is bad for ~~you~~ Dept to focus  
on what I can buy. Either you run  
a Dept of or we will have to do  
something else.

There is still similar control. They  
can't give more but must be  
display limit - I would expect from  
State & CIA but not Def.

You remember a woman I heard  
reported more than thick - this  
was DOD Com by w/ proposals which  
are unacceptable.

I would hope you would cover up  
w/ something which not completely  
unacceptable.

It would be nice to get out & disrupt  
go out & push for big DOD there get.  
But that not a course to go. This affect  
our ability to affect Sov behavior in  
NIE & Eur. (China being referred)

I know you & K had a flap. He  
tried & doesn't tell you anything.

You a member of my last team.  
I would hope you would help us on  
this. You summit as K. have, but we  
don't know this business. I need your  
help, but not a little which is with  
for record. If it works, a history  
book will give credit, if not you  
can blame us. I have talked

I was wrong to K. I don't want a further  
low. You are key in Def. I don't  
care what CIA say - I don't care about  
you - The political decisions are <sup>made</sup> ~~made~~  
S I agree, I think there are areas to work on  
and I want an agreement. I have worked on  
CDS & bought them covered already - they  
have bought one of MIRV deal. I agree w/  
ABM. Def report held out hope ~~that~~ for  
restraint on ABM. In MIRV I would  
hope for agreement. I supported one  
MIRV proposal & got CDS to go along. That  
would have constrained S.U. A MIRV  
agreement is desirable, but it must  
constrain S.U.

P Why don't you bite bullet on TCS. Can't  
you put big missile in <sup>MM</sup> halo

S Yes. I have ordered a big MIRV - R&D  
by partner is we must match S.U. would  
prefer at low level, but at high level of  
warfare.

It would be good to restrain MIRV, but  
USSR is no constraint. We would like  
to be considered. If we can obtain restraint  
on their part.

That ICBM TCS would have held them  
to ~~300~~. I told K to try 361-450. if we  
can constrain to that, it is good deal

P S.U. is a big too, they have to have  
agreement in principle & go back later  
for agreement. Their job is getting  
at a summit to what would appear  
in principle. We know current news

a damn thing. Another has 1st strike. What  
are we talking about - how the necessity of  
ever bigger command. Stability is what  
we need. I know hard for us to get to  
something which opposes & puts us in  
inferior position.

Brez is a glib negotiator - anxious  
though, direct, enormous stamina. It will  
be helluva wrestling match. But hanging  
ask it & whether clients go on. Read  
my speech carefully. It is part of life  
that neither can use its strength to change  
internal system for other. What can we  
do? Our interests are different in most  
areas of world. Some need trade, (rather  
not so important as Soviet think) etc so  
we can keep the market going, so  
when we have something like lost it  
- a confrontation - third is enough in  
a pot they will not risk it. They  
must hard - Brez has staked his future  
on it - our interests - NE, E, China,  
require keeping SU going. But at cost  
of apparent inferiority - not that it means  
anything. Zornovt Unwanted bullshit  
we are not in way & take care. Tell  
FCS I want to build unimpaired  
peace. Building missiles won't do it.  
Tell the Pres he's in strong AI,  
Army, Navy. But if we get in that  
area here, coming will go into  
that.

So purpose of our statement is to get

S & S to a deal. I shall be your interim  
P I will take my way if it hurts & gives  
all the credit if it succeeds. But not  
at critical juncture. We have to be  
bold, not feet dragging. Being very  
opposed China invitation. I & ME  
same way. People are excited by SEA  
P. I still haven't fallen. Why do it? To make our  
credibility work. SEA was about E, C,  
M, E, everywhere.

I have no illusions - I not seeking a  
deal ~~off~~ for deal sake. To extent K could  
assist I will use it - the don't think  
to work it - He done fantastic in M, E -  
only perhaps exceeded by VA.

We need your help - Help K to deliver  
a way around this. I will talk to King.  
I make a speech about VI being second <sup>none</sup> ~~best~~.

~~USA~~ US people in <sup>their</sup> (Sino) <sup>pro</sup> ~~pro~~ way are not in full  
at any price but they want peace.

Many of my friends are horrified at our  
talking to C.S.U. But are we going to lose  
- would running away ~~at~~ w/ arms race or  
get a handle on it.

S I believe that now. I suggested the MIRC  
proposal & modification.

SU is building 2500 vehicles. We could  
sign agreement to limit to that. Have  
them SCV etc for PRC. I believe there  
are proposals which could not be  
unpleasant to them & let you come back  
at splendid agreement.

P You should talk w/ K. We don't know  
what's negotiable. When  
we know, you + K sit down + work  
it out.

If they hard line us, we tell them to go  
to hell, no agreement at any point.  
Nifty in strike, my maintain w/ agreement  
points + handbooks handwritten note +  
I don't like it.

S I want to tell him that we want to balance

P He participated w/ our unions in monthly  
diff structure.

S He fought McDonnell + Stuffed on  
UW. He sent that letter to me, I don't

mess with you

P He might not care who he checks w/  
But I want to control worker union  
When I make a decision I expect  
support or they get out, way it has  
to be

S One tech point, a MRO ICBM is  
diff from SRBM & can't be treated same.  
SRBM is smaller, less cost, etc. They  
are not equivalent, we can join  
w/ prod of M11 III. You could offer to  
close China, limit production - but we  
must get something.

P Can't over look our allies - They have a  
few pieces + will be w/ us. So will  
China. China is ill, but which way  
may change, interests want. W/SC  
can make they need US

S Your resolution the ME + TRC are

on Saturday hallmarks of your admission +  
you + K. Chawla - in it

P. But we have a lot. Details should be  
useful for you in KE.