MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Richard M. Nixon
Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the UN
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
    and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. John Scali, U.S. Ambassador to the UN
Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft,
    Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:
Saturday - June 1, 1974
12:30 p.m. - 1:00 p.m.

PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House

President: You're off on a trip?

Waldheim: Yes, I leave tonight.

President: I have followed closely what you have done on the Middle East matter.
It's been difficult at times because of our Soviet friends. But we believe the UN
has a useful and indispensable role to play in the Middle East. We count on you
to get the forces in place. Dr. Kissinger will discuss this with you. In your
discussions with Middle East leaders, they will want to discuss the details of
what comes next. This was the most difficult negotiation I have seen in my life --
leaving Vietnam. Kissinger thinks maybe more so.

This is the beginning of a long journey. No one should assume we will
solve it right away. We will continue as we have, with each playing a role --
the U.S. its special role. We need patience and perseverance. We trust no
one will blow it up with some crazy action. If you would convey this to the
leaders -- with my best wishes and desire for a peaceful settlement. Our role
is not that of imposing a settlement but of mediating and bringing the people
together. Secretary Kissinger will play the primary role. We also are going
to the Soviet Union. Overriding Soviet-U.S. relations regarding the Middle East

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is that whatever our differences in the Middle East -- this was proved in the 
UN -- it cannot draw us into conflict. To put it another way, I summarised 
publicly -- there will be no Middle East peace unless we are both for it. 
There can't be if the Soviet Union is actively against it. These countries 
are now looking more to the U.S. If the Soviet Union decided to torpedo the 
Middle East, it would be difficult. That is why our relations are so important. 
That is also why the U.S.-Chinese relations are so important.

Didn't Kissinger do a great job?

Waldheim: The whole UN is pleased.

Scali: It was, but you would have thought Gromyko did it.

Kissinger: That hurts them with the Arabs.

President: I don't want publicly to say we did it all to keep the Soviets out. 
Everybody knows it, but publicly we don't freeze them out.

Waldheim: Everybody knows. But it is important that tactically Dr. Kissinger 
gave the impression of Soviet participation. We must keep this great power 
cooperative. It is very important.

President: Our talks with Brezhnev are very frank and blunt, but friendly. 
We don't want to embarrass them. We want at least their reluctant acquiescence.
Henry knows, I sent three reassuring messages to Brezhnev and told Dobrynin we 
don't want to go down the October road again -- that was too close.

Waldheim: We are interested in complementing what you and Kissinger are 
doing. It is not realistic to think that all problems can be solved in New York. 
Many complain about the Great Power role; I say they used to complain when 
the Great Powers weren't engaged. We must all work together, we with our 
role and you with yours. I appreciated Secretary Kissinger keeping me informed 
so I could dampen the criticism.

President: Ambassador Scali is in the Cabinet. We will keep you and him 
informed.

The important point is -- when the UN was formed there was a view 
among the naive that the UN could solve all the world's problems. It does 
solve many, and there are many unknown ones which could erupt into brush-fire 
wwars. When the Great Powers' interests are involved it is hard for the UN 
to take over a dispute. But anytime the UN can handle a problem, we welcome it.
Kissinger: We are in closest touch with the Secretary-General. We kept him informed. We believe in the closest cooperation.

Waldheim: I couldn't agree more. There are so many problems that we need cooperation, and without American cooperation, we won't have a chance.

President: What matters is what works -- if it is right. Anything which works to avoid confrontations we should try.

Waldheim: Yes. I try to tell my people that. Success is what counts.

Let me raise the matter of assistance to developing countries. There was an unfortunate incident at the Special Session. Your proposal arrived the last day. I would be gratified if we could count on your support. The North-South confrontation will be the big future problem. I am most unhappy about what happened in the General Assembly.

It is the steamrolling of things which can't work because the countries that have to implement it don't support it. It is better to be more moderate and get something through. But some of these people have a different way of thinking. The U.S. can help if it cooperates -- wither multi or bilaterally.

Scali: The Secretary-General is aware that bilateral aid counts as much as multilateral aid.

President: We need both. We are urging the Japanese to do more. They may prefer bilaterally. We use both. In some cases bilateral is better -- it is preferred by the recipient and by Congress sometimes.

Waldheim: I appreciate this. Our role is a coordinating one. In the Sahel we did this. The wheat said "sent by the U.S." which is fine, but we have to coordinate the distribution. This is our important role.

Are you going to the Middle East?

President: I am considering it. We will let you know.

Waldheim: I am happy that Kissinger succeeded. It makes my job easier.
P. Offer a trip.

W. Yes, I don't think we will do that right away. We will not.

P. I think I should have an idea what you mean about an NLRB matter. It's a different thing because of the funds. I think we need to do something about it. We might want to do something about it. In the meantime, we need to do something about it. We can discuss it later.

J. It's a complex matter.

P. It's a complex matter. We should talk about it right away. We will not do this now. We will discuss it later. We need to discuss it later. We need to do something about it. We need to do something about it. We need to do something about it. We can discuss it later.

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Don't mean they are doing it. That's why we've never been able to understand me. I'll explain it. It would be big. That's why we've never been able to understand me. That's why we've never been able to understand me. Did you do your job?

1. The whole UI is flawed.

Scumbag in a suit – you could have thought.

2. It's all right.

The whole UI is flawed.

Scumbag in a suit – you could have thought.

3. It's all right.

I don't want public. I say once did it all.

Scumbag in a suit – you could have thought.

4. Everybody knows. But important that I

Tactfully keep impression of you prolonging.

We went buy the great push hope. It is very important.

5. Once take out what shows that (but)

people. We don't want to understand. But

we want them to understand as possible.

6. Of that, I need a mapping. Why to

buy a real deal? We don't want it off down.

7. I need you. That's to close.

We are interested in compliance. What you

K done. Not unlikely to think all put

can be told. So, many in a large

about a party. I say seriously need to

explain the current project. We must

old work to gather, with a new style

your responses. I promise K has

expected so I could design certain

8. Could in summary. We will keep you

+ terms informed.
9. Important point de - when UN prima - can -
way among races - hit straight UN can -
take all unde part. It does to say man -
way unthink only which would effect with
think for us. When I say what won't -
would wouldn't land for UN to take over the
But any time UN can handle a part, we
wonder it.

K - of - can almost find it / say man - we
ought to maybe Chivalry Corp.

5. Could not speak mine - in any part that
we need in - m/o of L - R - O - can't ask to
your chance.

6. What matters is what works - if it is right.
Any way which works I avoid complications
probably.

7. Yes, I try to tell my people that Success is
what counts.

8. Agreement to delegate - unfortunately
what it might mean. Your proposal
 sounded that day, would be great if we
could start our own agreement, N - S important
with big factors.

9. Must not forget what happened in 64.
It is the ability of things which mattered
most in cause militarily. China don't
say part. Better to be more realistic -
got something there. But since of those
people there are many of them. As can
try of its cover - other must be relatively
S. G. I turnover bilateral and must a work
as minute.

10. We need both. We enjoy hope they way.
person involved. We are both. In one case I thought better - perhaps by saying it! Opposite conclude.

In School we did this - what sort of "yesDigital" which fair, but we need to work on it.

Are you going to ME?

W. Happy 18! Remember: Whatever gets you.