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TO:
HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT

THE PRESIDENT'S 15 MINUTE MEETING WITH AZIZ AHMED LASTED ABOUT
40 MINUTES. AHMED POINTED OUT THE THREAT FACING PAKISTAN. HE
OBSERVED THAT INDIA'S DEFENSE BUDGET IS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS
EVER, THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS SHIPPING ARMS TO INDIA AND NOW
INDIA HAS EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE. ON PAKISTAN'S OTHER BORDER,
THE SOVIET UNION IS HELPING THE AFGHANS TO ARM AND IS SECURELY
ENCOURAGING BALUCHISTANI IRREDENTISM. PAKISTAN IS THEREFORE
SURROUNDED BY ENEMIES WHO ARE RECEIVING OUTSIDE MILITARY
SUPPORT.

PAKISTAN ON THE OTHER HAND IS STILL VERY WEAK. THE PAKISTANIS
APPRECIATE OUR ASSISTANCE WITH THEIR TANK MODERNIZATION BUT THAT
DOES NOT ADD TO THEIR MILITARY ARSENAL. THEY NEED DEFENSIVE
WEAPONS — SAMS AND ANTI-TANK MISSILES. THEY NEED HELP RIGHT
AWAY AND THE U.S. IS THE ONLY ONE WHO CAN REALLY PROVIDE IT.
FRANCE WOULD SELL ARMS BUT THEIR PRICES ARE EXORBITANT BECAUSE
THEY KNOW THE PAKISTANIS HAVE NO REAL ALTERNATIVE.

BESIDES ARMS, BHUTTO ASKS CONSIDERATION OF A GUARANTEE TO
NON-NUCLEAR POWERS BY NUCLEAR POWERS AGAINST NUCLEAR ATTACK.

THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT WE HAVE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
NEW SITUATION NOW UNDERWAY AND WE WOULD CONSULT CLOSER WITH
PAKISTAN AS THINGS DEVELOP. HE SAID WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DO
WHATEVER WE COULD — SUCH AS THE ARRANGEMENT WE HAD WORKED OUT
ON THE TANKS — BUT WE WERE SEVERELY LIMITED IN OUR ABILITY TO
GIVE MILITARY HELP. WE WOULD DO OUR BEST, HOWEVER, EITHER

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The President also said that we would use our influence, both with India and the Soviet Union, to restrain them with respect to any possible adventurism against Pakistan. We would also analyze carefully Bhutto's concept for a guarantee of non-nuclear powers. He pointed out that the PRC was a good friend of Pakistan and that we would keep in touch with the Chinese on this issue.

Ahmed reported that India had gone to war in the past during times when the U.S. had good relations with it and the Soviet Union was completely unscrupulous. The Pakistanis, therefore, could not depend on the restraint the U.S. would try to induce. Bhutto is worried about what to tell his people and his military when states on both sides of Pakistan were rearming and only Pakistan had no access to military equipment.

The President, in conclusion, assured Ahmed that the U.S. was committed to the independence and integrity of Pakistan, that we were under no illusions with regard either to the Soviet Union or India, and that we would do everything we could to assist them in meeting their needs.

I think the meeting served the purpose for which it was intended.

Warm regards.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs, Pakistan

DATE & TIME: Thursday - May 23, 1974
10:30 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

Ahmed: It is kind of you to receive me. I bring regards from Prime Minister Bhutto. We and the people of Pakistan are distressed about Watergate. It is very disturbing to us that it has been dragged out.

President: Don't you worry about that; we will take care of that.

Ahmed: You know our situation, but let me bring you up to date. Our prisoners are back and we thought we could move to normalization with India. There still were a couple of problems. India's defense budget is the highest ever; the Soviet Union ships arms to India; Brezhnev's visit has resulted in more arms -- including SAM-6 and 7s. After Swaran Singh's visit to Moscow, 400 officers went to Moscow for training, and after he went to Afghanistan, 300 Afghans went to India.

These developments disturb us. They are building their army, but not to attack the PRC.

And we have no designs on Afghanistan. If the Soviets give them arms, it helps them with their irredentist aims. The Soviet Union tries to show they are not behind the Baluchistan movement.
And while we were wondering why there is this Indian buildup, here comes the nuclear test. We were not surprised, but shocked. There is a tendency to play it down in some quarters, and Mrs. Gandhi says it's "peaceful." We think the Soviet Union will enable them to build nuclear weapons. This detonation we think is just a first step in the development of nuclear weapons and a delivery system.

The timing of the explosion is interesting. The Prime Minister was in Peking a week ago. The PRC said they are ready now to establish relations with all states in the subcontinent. Why this timing? Is the Soviet Union or Mrs. Gandhi trying to prevent better relations with the PRC?

Apart from the indirect pressure by the Soviet Union on us -- and on Iran through Iraq -- the idea is to get control of the Gulf, so we must be brought to heel.

Iran has moved to placate the Soviet Union. The Shah supported the South Asian security pact and said he would help implement it. On 14 March the Soviet Union sent this message to Bhutto (He reads from note at Tab A):

"Pakistan's membership of CENTO and the activization of its participation in the military activities of the bloc is, in our opinion, an anachronism and it can scarcely meet the interests of the peace-loving countries of this region interested in making the process of relaxation of tension irreversible." The message also refers to Asian Collective Security in Asia and asks Pakistan to consider supporting the idea and making a statement on the question.

So then the Soviet Union is getting more and more specific about the Asian Security System. We have no desire to be drawn in.

So here we are. Two things worry us. We are still weak. The provision of tanks is helpful and we are grateful we won't have to pay. But that doesn't add to our arsenal. We need defensive weapons -- SAMs and anti-tank missiles. It is only for defense against India -- and Afghanistan, which might not stand aside in another war.

The Prime Minister would like some help soon. And could the nuclear powers give a guarantee to the non-nuclear powers against nuclear attack? You gave one guarantee to India when China attacked. We think it would be helpful, not just for us but also for many others if more countries get nuclear weapons. A system which would rule out blackmail would reduce the incentive to get nuclear weapons. It is an immediate problem for us, but a general one for all.
We are worried. We are holding out, trying to work for peace. You have been very kind and gracious.

President: But not able to do very much. We must begin with an assessment -- you should make one also -- on the implications of the Indian nuclear weapons. We will keep you informed on our analysis.

If it is, as you describe, a Soviet attempt to encircle Pakistan and a move to another partition -- as a part of a move to the Indian Ocean -- we must assess that also.

Another point is what the U.S. can do. You know what restrictions have been put on us. We have done what we could on tanks and will continue. We will see on defensive capabilities what we can do directly or indirectly.

We will do what we can with India. We are starting a dialogue with them. Now, India in the past has not been easily dissuaded. But I think you know it is better for the U.S. to have some influence with India rather than leave it to the Soviet Union. The independence of Pakistan is a principle to which we are committed. We will use our influence to help you defend that independence, both by getting you the means and helping with other countries.

The Afghanistan thing is worrisome. An irresponsible Afghanistan could be the last cannon on the deck. You couldn't fight on two fronts. Of course, our position on the Asian Security system is the same as yours.

I would summarize thus: we will help as we can with military equipment, but we can't promise. Secondly, we will use our influence with India and the Soviet Union to restrain them. Third, your concept of a guarantee for the non-nuclear countries is one we must assess. We must hold this close -- who knows who could be next?

The Prime Minister is very sophisticated, both about his neighbors and about what we could do to affect the actions of those neighbors. We will make clear with the Soviet Union our determination about Pakistan. India needs our help and we will use our influence to focus India's energies internally and not externally.

It seems to me that the non-nuclear countries need some sort of guarantee. We may not be able to put it in a treaty.

Ahmed: But the nuclear countries must know it,
President: The PRC is your friend. They don't want an expanded India. We will keep in close touch with the Chinese on this. The PRC already has some nuclear capability. Your best hopes are the PRC and the United States -- not in collusion but cooperating together, and by the U.S. playing a strong diplomatic role with the Soviet Union and India.

How we implement this we must work out. Trust what I told you at the time of the previous war. We did it with little support. But our actions then -- and now -- reflected our policy.

We are doing an assessment on these developments; you do likewise, and we will keep in close touch on what steps to take -- publicly and privately -- to ensure Pakistan's survival.

I am under no illusions about the Soviet Union -- or India. Nor about Afghanistan, since they may be a Soviet puppet. But keep close lines to the PRC. They can't help much now.

Ahmed: Thank you, Mr. President. Let me make just one or two brief comments. You should have influence with India, and with the Soviet Union. But India has gone to war when you had good relations with them. And the Soviet Union is unscrupulous. I don't know if they would stop in a crunch.

And what do we tell our people? Not to worry? And for our armed forces: Everyone on both sides of us is rearming; only we can't get arms. We try to get something from France but it's only on tough financial terms. We are getting a few things, but the price has gone up 100% during our negotiations. Since we have no alternative, we have to pay the price. Our position is difficult.

President: I hate to have such a serious problem raised without being able to reassure you. I am seriously concerned, and we will take up at the highest level what we can do. We understand your assessment and we see what your neighbors are doing. I have no answers now, but we will try to develop answers at the highest level to the new situation. We don't want to promise what we can't deliver. Maybe your guarantee idea has merit. I promise we will look into it.

Ahmed: Thank you, Mr. President.
March 74: Message

"Pakistan's membership of CENTO and the activization of its participation in the military activities of the bloc is, in our opinion, an anachronism and it can scarcely meet the interests of the peace-loving countries of this region interested in making the process of relaxation of tension irreversible". The message also refers to Asian Collective Security in Asia and asks Pakistan to consider supporting the idea and making a statement on the question.
A: Kind to receive me. Being regards from Shahid.

W.e. & people abt. an extension to the Afghan. 

Can't believe it so it doesn't make any sense.

P: Don't worry about that. We will take care of that.

A: You know, one report, the news? I was paying 

such a bill. We had our finance and had to 

understand we could not make a statement. Still 

we can't afford it. We don't have a budget. My 

text, I'll show some pics. They want 

the result in new terms - nothing. SAI 

G.A. 2. After Singh went to Moscow. We 

went to Moscow. They're going to 

Afghanistan, so Afghan went to India. 

These don't like it. They should think again. 

not to attack PRC.

And we have no changes on Afghan. I 

we give them money it helps them 20\% 

discount on money. S.U. this is how they can 

not attack Balochistan.

And which we were wondering why, this hard brick, 

the case is similar, too. We have soft 

sympathetic bit shocked. This is thinking 

to pay it down in some quarters and 

Ghadar says it's possible. We think it 

will enable to build some project. It's difficult: 

we think is just a 1st step in any project of 

urban, etc, etc, etc.

Train for Afghan is actually. We're planning 

care of steps. We can and they only want to 

create more of our threats in Afghanistan 

Why this train? Do S.U. a Ghadari train to 

prevent this from happening.

PRC
Apart from a mutual pressure of S & S on each other from long ago, there was a great center of
gravity, so and must be brought back.
This has moved a planet.
So the S is not expected. S. & S are security part & part will help implement it.
Only would do so. It is a better one.

So the S. is getting more secure, especially with
again. Security system, we have no choice to

So there are 2 things very new - now we can still
work. Freedom of tokens is helpful and useful.
We cannot have backup, but that doesn't add to

We need only defensive Upon S & S's
automatic weapons. Only for defense against

And (I) will do what I might not think

I'm not sure, maybe not, and could

without your agreement, we are to non

without yours, against nuclear attack.
Your grace did guarantee to India when

We think it would be helpful, not just for us, but also others if more

have got more. A system which would

make sure that total would have movement
to get similar signs. It is to make sure

yet, but a good one, of course.
We can understand our holding out, trying to

work for peace if you can help it.

I don't want to be very much. I want to be

as perfect as you should like me as
On the basis of the above, we will
have an organized plan of action.
If it is as we always do, a sort of attempt to
execute the - to a month within
preliminary— as a part of a move to Asia.
Don't we must stress that also;
often point is what we can do, for them.
What has this been put on us. We have
done what we could on Turkey, with concise. We
will see in exposing capabilities, what we can
do shortly a member.
We will do what we can in India. We plan
a scheme— that from India in part not
acceptable elsewhere. I think you know it will
be us to have some influence of India
in turn too, that to S.U. breaker
of the most to the point, which we are
contractible. We will list our influence
to help you defend that which is both
by getting some means, to help us/other
the two.

This apple thing is the same. Our
mutually. Apple will as a test common-
came did. You could not forget I guess.
Our future on Asia Safety system is
is quite a gone.
I would imagine this: we will help
area can refresh here. Can't promise (1)
area still need help of India on S.U. To
mention (2) Your concept of government
for man, unlike is an area, understand.
We must hold this one, who knows the
and many.
The PM is very sympathetic both about this 
impact on what we could do to great effect 
of their sympathies. We will make sure 
that our commitments about Nato. An aid 
will help and we will use our influence to 
ensure that internally will happen.

Sure to me now one will need some fairly 
generous - we may not be able to put all on 
the line.

A. Keep some reserves we must have it.

PCE is gone, Find. They don't want objectives.

In line we will keep in close touch with Chinese 
or they PCE already has some some major, 
Very last hope could be US - not in coalition,

Don't sell, Together, and by US playing

They say, well US put India.

Are we in the net this we must know. That is 
what I tell you at time of previous war we 
1.75 in the central point. But that time - we 

While one know.

We doing an assessment on these - you 
with Borries and will begain cal back over 
steps to that - nobody I propose - to make 

more concerned.

Frankly no illusions about SA - a futile.

Why about Afghan, sensitive need a Soviet issue. 

But keep this line to the story can't help with 
here.

A. One is very concerned. You should build 
up some of police, +S,But to his regret 
to have certain upon you had past within of them.
+ S is one autonomous. Don't turn off the 
would stop in a crunch. And with.
When people ? God is angry ? and for our
Annual fairs. Every one on both sides of us
is summing - only we can't put an
arm to put something from time - but
our tempo from a time. We gotta
a few things but more has gone up costs
during our negotiations. We have our two
alternatives, we have to pay a fine. Our partner
is difficult.

I heard they have such a series but wouldn't be
here. Warning you. I am much concerned
and we will take care of that but what we
can do. We understand your concern
and will do what you can do. We are taking
over the project but we can't promise what
we can do. We have to do the best we
can. We will do our best.