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7 FLASH DE Z 240219Z MAY 74 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH EM THE SITUATION ROOM TOHAK300 TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM C R E T SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY VIA HH41487 PLEASE DELIVER TO BREMER/ RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY Tn: HENRY A. KISSINGER FRDM: BRENT SCOWCROFT THE PRESIDENT MET WITH THE SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION FOR ABOUT 30 MINUTES THIS MORNING, FOLLOWED BY A 20-MINUTE PRIVATE MEETING WITH PONOMAREVA WHO SAID HE HAD A MESSAGE FROM BREZHNEV. THE OPEN MEETING WAS THE STANDARD LITANY OF U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS. THE PRESIDENT DISCUSSED SUPERPOWER RESPONSIBILITIES DECLASSIFIED, with partions exempt FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD. PONOMAREV DESCRIBED THE DELEGATION'S MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON AND THE VALUE OF SUCH EXCHANGES. HIS ONLY INTERESTING COMMENT WAS THAT HE FELT IT NECESSARY THAT POLITICAL DETENTE SHOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH MILITARY DETENTS. IN THE PRIVATE MEETING, PONOMAREV PASSED BREZHNEV'S GREETINGS, AND REITERATED THE INVITATION TO VISIT MOSCOW. HE SAID BREZHNEV EXPECTED AS MUCH FROM THE THIRD SUMMIT AS FROM THE FIRST TWO, AND FOR THAT PREPARATERY WORK WAS NEEDED. ADVANCE PREPARATION OF DOCUMENTS AND, TO A MAXIMUM EXTENT, ADVANCE AGREEMENT ON THE DOCUMENTS, WAS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO AVOID PROLONGATION OF SUMMIT DISCUSSIONS OR EVEN COMPLICATIONS. THE ISSUES WHICH BREZHNEY FEELS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AT THE SUMMIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS; FURTHER ADVANCES ON SAL: THE WORK ON CSCE AND HOW TO BRING IT TO A CLOSE; AND THE MIDDLE EAST. ON THE MIDDLE EAST. BREZHNEV POINTED OUT THAT "FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME" THERE WAS AUTHORITY NOT APPROPRIATE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE OF IMPORTANCE "IF THE PRINCIPLE ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST COULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE SUMMIT MEETING." PONOMAREV SAID "YOU ARE AWARE THAT KISSINGER

*WHSR COMMENT * *

WILL VISIT MOSCOW IN PREPARATION FOR YOUR TRIP." LASTLY,

BREZHNEY WANTED TO CONVEY HIS HOPE FOR MEN-- IN FULL AWARENESS

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OF THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS IN THAT REGARD.

AS A SEPARATE POINT, BREZHNEY WANTED THE PRESIDENT TO KNOW THAT KENNEDY, IN HIS MEEING WITH BREZHNEY, HAD SUPPORTED THE UPCOMING SUMMIT MEETING AND HAD NOT RAISED ANY MATTERS

"RELATED TO THE FUTURE ELECTIONS IN THE U.S."

THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED BRIEFLY TO PONOMAREV ASKING HIM TO CONVEY HIS COMMITMENT TO WORK IN THE AREAS WHICH BREZHNEY HAD RAISED. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, HE SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING THAT THE U.S. MIGHT BE TRYING TO PLAY A UNILATERAL ROLE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SOVJET UNION. OUR PRESENT VERY ACTIVE ROLE WAS DUE TO OUR UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL THE PARTIES. THE PRESIDENT ENDED WITH THE REQUEST THAT BREZHNEY BE TOLD THAT WE WILL BE TRYING AT THE SUMMIT TO DEVELOP COMMON POLICIES IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES.

WARM REGARDS.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET/NODIS

XGDS-3

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Nixon

Soviet Parliamentary Delegation

Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME:

Thursday - May 23, 1974

11:15 a.m.

PLACE:

Cabinet Room

The White House

President: I want to extend a very warm welcome to you. This, you know is our Cabinet Room -- I guess this is your Politburo Room -- but the members of the Politburo are much more important than the Cabinet members.

The most important thing about this meeting is the fact it is occurring. It is one more sign of the results of the developing relations between us and our summit meeting. We have had space, medicine, trade, now parliatarians, through these commissions. I have received each delegation, and General Secretary Brezhnev has also received American delegations to the Soviet Union. Being very pragmatic, we all know that just because we have meetings like this, doesn't mean we have instant solutions for all problems. Dobrynin is an expert negotiator, but even he hasn't solved all the problems -- like SALT. [laughter] Seriously, that doesn't matter. We agree on many things; on others we don't. The important thing is we are meeting on these issues. We will bargain hard with each other, but the purpose is to reach agreement, not to end up in confrontation.

We are talking not simply about relations between us, but there can be no lasting peace in Europe unless the United States and Soviet Union are for it. The same in the Middle East. And looking at Asia and the world in general, unless the super powers are for peace and better relations there will be no chance.

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DECL**ASSIFIE**D E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

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As you have found, there are those in this country and elsewhere who oppose detente. I say to them they do not understand the overriding fact of the world today -- that because of the enormous power each of us has, making every other power look weak, the peace of the world is in our hands.

I would close with another point that those who oppose detente don't understand. Better understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union is not at the expense of any other nations and isn't directed at other nations. We find it hard to convince some of our friends, but that is the fact. It is in that spirit I look forward to meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow and to more agreements between us.

Ponomarev: Mr. President, our delegation expresses its gratitude at the chance to meet with you. The mission of the delegation is to establish contact between the Supreme Soviet and the United States Congress. As regards the principle of work and activities of the delegation, it is upholding the principle of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between our two countries. We have had a busy three-day schedule. We have underlined the big importance of the treaties and agreements that were signed during the last two summit meetings. Our delegation has the instructions of the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet leadership to express support for the line laid down in those two visits and to extend that line in the future.

We also said that we consider it necessary that political detente should be pursued and supplemented with military detente. This has been well started by the agreements on limitation of strategic weapons and on the non-use of nuclear weapons.

We have had good discussions with the Congress and did not evade questions. Sometimes the discussions were acute. From our side, we clarified our position and set forth our arguments to convince those in the Congress who had different views. You know better the different views in the Congress.

We consider that our stay has been useful in the development of U.S.-Soviet relations. We proceed from the understanding that your visit to the summit would contribute to better understanding and contribute to the resolution of questions of politics, economics and defense. We are instructed to invite a Congressional delegation to the Soviet Union. We are satisfied that the leadership of the Congress received the invitation willingly and we look forward to its official acceptance. We consider such exchanges and relations useful because they enable us to know about each other's lives and problems and to disperse the problems of the cold war and clear up distortions created by the

press. We also consider that our two groups can contribute to peaceful relations between our two countries and to international relations as a whole. Our actions for peaceful coexistence and cooperation don't contradict our relations with our allies, but on the contrary.

You are right in saying the Soviet Union has been visited by American Congressmen and businessmen and were received by Brezhnev. These visits are important. We have already heard Senator Scott and Mr. Dent say they were satisfied with their meetings in the Soviet Union. Our delegation is convinced that such contacts are useful in focussing at the summit meetings and the line of peaceful coexistence. It was inevitable that our encounters with the Congress were favorable. We said what we wanted and listened to what they had to say. Useful and fruitful work has been done. Of course we are clear that all questions can't be solved in one meeting, but we go step-by-step.

Thank you, Mr. President.

President: Let me conclude by saying that I sat there from 1953 to 1960. Ike sat here. Relations between us were different. It was a period when the United States was far ahead in nuclear power. The important factor between us today is we meet as equals. It is my belief that that is a better basis for fruitful negotiations than when there was great inequality. The greatest legacy I hope to leave -- as well as your leaders -- is a legacy of peace, not only between the Soviet Union and the United States (who never have fought each other and I hope never will) but for the whole world, which only the Soviet Union and the United States can accomplish.

Let me make one last point: Because of the great difference between our systems, our Congress and press may speak with different voices from me. But remember, I speak for a majority of the 205 million American people. That majority wants our dialogue to continue; they want limitation of arms, they want cooperation to reduce differences in Europe, and programs and agreements on environment, health and other areas where we are cooperating. Despite what you may read or hear in the Congress on detente, my position is that of the great majority of Americans.

<u>Ponomarev</u>: We hope the problems of further detente and limitations of arms will find further resolution during the summit.

If you have any questions, I am prepared to answer, but I have a message from General Secretary Brezhnev.

Before departing the Soviet Union I saw General Secretary Brezhnev and he wanted me to tell you this. He wanted me to give you his regards and best wishes and to tell you that our policy with regard to the United States will continue as laid down at the summit meetings. The same view point is shared by our entire leadership. In accordance with that basic line, we reiterate our invitation to you to visit Moscow, which was passed through Secretary Kissinger. Our leadership doesn't suffer from considerations of expediency, and we consider that we should pursue the line of development of U.S.-Soviet relations. There remain many questions to be resolved to consolidate detente and to move forward.

General Secretary Brezhnev wanted me to tell you that we expect as much from the third meeting at the Summit as from the first and second. For that we need preparatory work -- preparation of the proper documents and to the maximum extent agreement on these documents -- because in the absence of decisions agreed on in advance, the summit meeting could be prolonged and complications could arise.

What questions could be considered? Such as further development of U.S.-Soviet relations; a further advance on SALT, the work of the Geneva Conference [CSCE] and how to bring it to a close, and the question of Middle East.

On the Middle East, I should say, inter alia, the following: The Party leadership conveyed to you a message on the Middle East last week. You know the state of affairs in the Middle East very well, and we should adhere to the understanding that the U.S. should act in cooperation with the Soviet Union. Some time ago for a certain period of time there was not such cooperation, and this was discussed by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Kissinger and you. General Secretary Brezhnev underlined the fact that it would be of importance if the principal aspects of the Middle East could be resolved before your visit to Moscow. You are aware that Secretary Kissinger will visit Moscow in preparation for your visit.

And finally, General Secretary Brezhnev asks me to convey his hope for MFN. We are aware of your efforts to pass the bill, but we have seen the opponents of the bill and such action. Our leadership gives its due to your leadership in the development of relations and expresses its willingness to go along the same way. This path of peaceful coexistence corresponds to the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union and whole world. We are prepared completely to go in this direction.

These were my instructions from General Secretary Brezhnev. The strengthening of trust between the United States and Soviet leaderships and its further strengthening in specific treaties and agreements would contribute to peaceful development in the world.

Now let me mention a couple of separate points. Senator Kennedy was received by General Secretary Brezhnev. General questions of U.S.-Soviet relations were discussed. Senator Kennedy supported your visit to Moscow. Any matters related to further relations were not raised by Senator Kennedy and General Secretary Brezhnev. General Secretary Brezhnev wanted you to know this.

President: Please convey to General Secretary Brezhnev my commitment in the fields you mentioned: SALT, CSCE, Middle East (at least preliminary), MFN (I can't wave a wand but I worked on some Senators this morning). On the Middle East, there should be no misunderstanding. The United States is not trying to play a unilateral role at the expense of the Soviet Union. Now our role is active because we are the only ones who can influence Israel, who are the key. I assure you that when General Secretary Brezhnev and I meet, we will be trying to develop a common policy in the interest of both countries.

[The meeting ended.]

Pres / Sor Parliamentary Del 23 mg 1115 I want & extend my come worker willow. K you, This, you know is an entiret men -I gives the is your Polithere brown - but brunding footten bour to were very ntent the whit weember. Worst mystart this at this only is fat it is oriening, It is one more singer of a resert of obliging whaters without a I am summit whity, was have had space. me hime trul now purhatario, then Coverins. I have weenful lack and Bry thus aborecel US ally whis & as or Bung my praymetric, all know that just ho come contin inty who the does do but mum we I me motint dolutions for all prothers. Doby is yent rogaliting, count them he hourt orthe att and priva - lite first Lenously, that classest mutter. Whe agreem many thing, another we chut. was - un inil brugarin hard w/lach orthing but purpose is to war agreement, wort & ending in confinition, we an truly not snight what whatis net no - there can be soo brothy pear in Em muho Usos vi ane for it - dome in ME, and twhing at assuranted my good, makes thre will be no chows so you har family this and these in this imenting & ebentine who appre eliterts of say & throw then do not mulestand orunding party c world today - he comes of enormors junes

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