REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ... National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ... Cable
CREATOR'S NAME ... Scowcroft
TITLE ... Nixon and Senators Long and Bennett
CREATION DATE ... 05/23/1974
VOLUME ... 2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID ... 031400145
COLLECTION TITLE ... National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations
BOX NUMBER ... 4
FOLDER TITLE ... May 23, 1974 - Nixon, Senators Long and Bennett (no memcon, just summary and background documents)
DATE WITHDRAWN ... 08/20/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST ... GG

[Signature] 9/21/05
PLEASE DELIVER TO BREMER/ROOMAN FOR THE SECRETARY
MAY 23, 1974
TO: JERRY BREMER/PETER ROOMAN FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. BREAKFAST THIS MORNING WITH LONG AND BENNETT WENT VERY WELL. THEY AGREED TO BEGIN MARK-UP OF THE TRADE BILL IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MEMORIAL DAY RECESS. IF YOU WOULD START WORKING WITH JACKSON TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE TITLE IV IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING YOUR RETURN, THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION REGARDING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A COMPROMISE ON JACKSON-VANIK. LONG INDICATED HIS FEELING THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME EROSION OF SUPPORT FOR JACKSON-VANIK AND HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION MEMBERS HAD MADE A VERY GOOD IMPRESSION IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS COMMITTEE ON THE JEWISH IMMIGRATION ISSUES. (REPORTS FROM SIMILAR MEETINGS WITH SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ARE THAT DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WENT BADLY AND THE SOVIETS MADE A VERY UNFAVORABLE IMPRESSION.)

2. AS I AM SURE YOU HAVE HEARD, MANSFIELD IN TAKING A TRIP THIS WEEKEND, HE IS STARTING OFF IN PARIS AND LAST NIGHT HE CALLED THE PRESIDENT TO ASK FOR OUR ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING A COURTESY CALL ON GISCARD. HE TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT HE WANTED TO TELL GISCARD THAT THE DEMOCRATS WERE SOLIDLY BEHIND THE PRESIDENT ON FOREIGN POLICY. THE PRESIDENT TOLD ME TO CALL KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET AND ENLIST HIS ASSISTANCE AND TO ASK IRWIN TO OFFER TO PUT UP MANSFIELD AT THE RESIDENCE. THIS HAS NOW ALL BEEN ARRANGED. MANSFIELD TOLD ME TO TELL YOU HIS...
4. I briefed the Vice President this afternoon and he asked me to send you his regards and his admiration for the work you are doing. He noted the polls citing you as the most popular man in America and he said he would be happy to be your campaign manager.

5. I will report separately on the President's meetings with Aziz Ahmed and the Soviet parliamentary delegation.

Warm regards.

426
Put in 4pm Nancy file

Wrapping cable WHAR

on Pres. lunch, talk

Song & Bennett
Brent:

The basic problem for the President with Long and Bennett is to get them to move to markup without our being able to promise to deliver a compromise on Title IV. If we were willing to let the Trade Bill die and concentrate on the EXIM legislation, there would be no point in the President's seeing the Senators. (I strongly advise against getting tricky!)

So -- the President must argue for the Trade Bill on grounds of our general foreign policy and our specific interests in liberalized trade and effective negotiations with our trading partners.

Second, he must make the general case against Jackson-Vannik that (1) it is self-defeating in terms of its ostensible goals, (2) it undermines our credibility as a government, (3) it deprives us of important instrumentalities in dealing with the Soviets, since it removes our capacity to use trade policy either for rewards or for punishment, for incentives or pressure, (4) it hurts us economically.

Third, he must make the specific argument that the standards and certifications required by Jackson-Vannik cannot be met.

This being so, there is a possibility of a veto if the bill were passed with Jackson-Vannik (not much of an argument with Long since he will simply refuse markup.)

We will work on a compromise, either with Jackson or with others or both; but we think Long should start markup even before we know the outcome. This will help create a climate in which compromise becomes feasible.

The President should not offer specific language except to say that we would reluctantly accept conditional extension of MFN and continuation of EXIM and our compromise efforts will be in that direction. (I agree with Chuck's formula for Eberle's 5th paragraph.)
US-SOVIET ECONOMIC LEGISLATION: STATUS REPORT

1. Trade Bill. The trade bill remains lodged in Chairman Long's Finance Committee, awaiting a resolution of the Jackson-Vanik question. Long has said that he considers this the main obstacle to markup. There is general acceptance of the proposition that, at this time, the problem can only be resolved by a Kissinger-Jackson compromise. Meanwhile, considerable pressure is developing in favor of a compromise and against the rigid Jackson position. Most recent indications of this trend appeared in Senator Kennedy's decision after his return from the USSR to seek a compromise, and the ADA resolution of this month. The latter calls for a switch from the Jackson-Vanik "ultimatum" to a compromise which provides incentive to the Soviets to permit progress in emigration practices.

It is our estimate that approximately 20 of the 74 original co-sponsors of the Jackson-Vanik resolution are now firmly committed to compromise. Several of these will attract numerous other votes. Those Senators whom we have identified as definitely ready to desert Jackson-Vanik in favor of a compromise are:

- Javits
- Dole
- Percy
- H. Scott
- Case
- Fannin
- Hanson
- Mathias
- McGovern
- Stevenson
- Kennedy
- Long

Another illustration of the erosion of Jackson-Vanik support was the negative House Banking Committee vote on May 21 on the Ichord amendment (prohibiting Exim loans to the USSR until Jackson-Vanik has been acted on by the Senate). Sixteen of the 18 votes cast against Ichord were former Jackson-Vanik supporters. In short, if a compromise is proposed, the pressure is building on Jackson to accept it.

We understand that Senator Long would move to mark up the trade bill as early as the first half of June, and the bill with a compromise formula on Jackson-Vanik could be passed by the Senate by the end of the month. Long's Committee is also handling the Sugar Act and the Energy Tax Bill, the Debt Ceiling; the possibility for calendar congestion is serious.
Therefore, a prompt resolution of Jackson-Vanik would help prospects for Long to act on the trade bill before he becomes bogged down with these other measures.

On the other hand, if no compromise is worked out and we are unable to force an alternative solution on the Jackson supporters, the bill will be put aside by the overtaxed Finance Committee and the outlook for the bill would be very dim.

2. Exim Bank Legislation. The Exim Bank authorization bill is still in the Subcommittees of the House and Senate. Congressman Ashley’s Subcommittee is prepared to vote out the Administration’s bill by the 4th of June, and House floor action would be likely shortly thereafter. In the Senate, Stevenson’s Subcommittee is also getting ready to mark up by the end of May. In both Houses, the likelihood of floor amendments designed to restrict the Bank’s ability to operate with the USSR is inevitable unless the Jackson-Vanik problem has been resolved in the context of the trade bill. Even if this has been done, we would expect that the Exim Bank authorization legislation is likely to be encumbered in both Houses with amendments providing for either limits on the size of individual projects with the Soviet Union without first acquiring a Congressional review of the project, or prohibitions against loans for energy-related projects.

The Exim Bank announcement of the $180 million loan to the USSR for a fertilizer project so far has not generated significant criticism, perhaps reflecting extensive consultation with key Members prior to the announcement.

3. Export Controls. The Stevenson and Ashley Subcommittees are both in the process of preparing to mark up legislation for the Export Administration Act. No substantive difficulties are expected. It is possible, if export control legislation arrives on the floor before a Jackson-Vanik compromise, that this could be a vehicle for the Jackson-Vanik amendment.
TO: NATIONAL CONVENTION
FROM: Foreign and Military Policy Commission

SUBJECT: Human Rights and Soviet-American Relations

Concern for human rights in other countries is a concept firmly established both in the American tradition and the international community, resulting in widely accepted international covenants and declarations -- including the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is proper, therefore, that the U.S. use all appropriate means to express its concern for the violation of human rights in the Soviet Union.

Substantial debate exists within the United States as to the best way to accomplish our twin goals of improving relations with the Soviet Union as well as increasing that nation's commitment to human rights. The Administration, on the one hand, appears to prefer to conclude bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union with virtually no regard for the way in which the Soviet Union treats its own citizens. On the other hand, a coalition of liberals and conservatives, in the name of human rights, is advocating severe restrictions on trade which can injure chances of bringing the Soviet Union closer to the free international community, while leaving the rights of Soviet citizens unimproved.

We support the purpose of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, but believe that because it is presented as an ultimatum it is less effective in achieving its laudable purpose than a more flexible approach, one that would provide both a strong encouragement for the Soviet Union to extend human rights internally, and give the United States an opportunity to encourage Soviet compliance.

We therefore urge modification of the Jackson-Vanik amendment so that congressional grants of most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment, credits, and credit guarantees to the Soviet Union are carefully and closely monitored. In no circumstances should the Soviet Union receive credit treatment preferential to that afforded other nations. Moreover, grants of MFN, credits, and credit guarantees to the Soviet Union should be limited in scope and Congress should be required to review continuously whether MFN, credits and credit guarantees should be extended or renewed, in light of evidence of Soviet compliance with the human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, to which the Soviet Union is a party.