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PLEASE DELIVER TO BREMER/RQDM.N FOR THE SECRETARY
MAY 22, 1974
TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

THE PRESIDENT MET WITH THE CENTO FOREIGN MINISTERS TODAY
AND DELIVERED WHAT AMOUNTED TO A 45 MINUTE MONOLOGUE.

HE BEGAN BY DESCRIBING CENTO AS BEING CONSIDERED TO HAVE
MUCH LESS MEANING TODAY THAN IN THE PERIOD DURING WHICH IT WAS
FORMED. AS A MILITARY ALLIANCE, IT IS NOT VERY MUCH AND THE TURKS
AND THE PAKISTANIS HAVE ON OCCASION WONDERED WHAT GOOD IT WAS
WHEN THEY HAD A MILITARY PROBLEM OF THEIR OWN. BUT THE COUNTRIES
OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE COMMON INTERESTS THAT OVERRIDE THEIR VARIOUS
MILITARY CONCERNS -- SUCH AS THE SURVIVAL OF PAKISTAN. THE
STRENGTH AND ECONOMIC VITALITY OF THE CENTO COUNTRIES IS
IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE OF THAT AREA OF THE WORLD. THE CENTO
TREATY IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE STABILITY OF THE AREA BECAUSE
IT GIVES AN ADDED ELEMENT TO DISCOURAGE THOSE WHO MIGHT BE TEMPTED
Toward ADVENTURISM.

THE PRESIDENT THEN BEGAN TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT EACH OF
THE COUNTRIES, BUT NEVER GOT FURTHER THAN PAKISTAN. REGARDING
PAKISTAN, HE SAID THAT, WITH DUE REGARD FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONCERNS, WE WOULD DO WHATEVER WE COULD TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN,
THERE HAD BEEN ONE PARTITION OF PAKISTAN AND THERE COULD BE
NO MORE TO THE EXTENT THAT THE U.S. REESTABLISHES A
DIALOGUE WITH INDIA, OUR INFLUENCE WOULD BE TO RESTRAIN
INDIA.

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DECLASSIFIED, WITH AUTHORIZATION, TO REESTABLISH A
DIALOGUE WITH INDIA, OUR INFLUENCE WOULD BE TO RESTRAIN
INDIA.
SECRETARY GENERAL ASSAR THEN THanked THE PRESIDENT FOR
MEETING WITH THE GROUP AND FOR HIS WORDS OF ENCOURAGEMENT.
HE SAID THAT THE MINISTERS ARE AWARE, AS THE PRESIDENT HAD
POINTED OUT, THAT THE SITUATION FOR CENTO HAD CHANGED GREATLY
BUT THEY STILL THOUGHT THERE WAS A NEED FOR THE ALLIANCE AND
HAD DISCUSSED IN THEIR MEETINGS TRACING A COURSE FOR THE FUTURE.

THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED TO ASSAR BY REVIEWING AGAIN THE
CHANGES SINCE THE FOUNDING OF CENTO. HE THEN SHIFTED INTO HIS
STANDARD RUNDOWN OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
NO SURPRISES.

FOLLOWING THAT THE PRESIDENT DISCUSSED THE PRAGMATIC NATURE
OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, THE DIFFICULTIES OF
SALT, ETC. -- ALL IN STANDARD TERMS. HE MOVED ON TO THE PRC
AND TALKED ABOUT THE NEED FOR A DIALOGUE WITH THEM, THEIR
INTEREST IN A STRONG U.S., AND THEIR RIVALRY WITH THE SOVIET
UNION.

THE PRESIDENT THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE U.S. DIALOGUE
WITH OUR POTENTIAL ENEMIES WAS IN SUPPORT OF, NOT IN OPPOSITION
TO, OUR FRIENDS. HE POINTED OUT IN CONCLUSION THAT THE MIDDLE
EAST, AND EVEN MORE SO CENTRAL EUROPE, WERE VITAL AREAS FOR
SUPER POWER RIVALRY. ALLIES AND FRIENDS MUST TRUST EACH OTHER
IN THESE CRITICAL TIMES AND THE U.S. WOULD MAINTAIN ITS
STRENGTH AND SUPPORT OF ITS FRIENDS.

AS THE GROUP WAS WALKING OUT, CALLAGHAN EXPRESSED THE NEED
FOR A NATO DECLARATION AND A TRADE BILL. THE PRESIDENT DID
NOT COMMENT ON THE NATO DECLARATION BUT SAID WE WOULD HAVE
A TRADE BILL PROVIDED CONGRESS WAS REASONABLE AND AT A
MINIMUM DID NOT CUT OFF CREDIT FOR THE SOVIET UNION.

AT LUNCH AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY FOLLOWING THE MEETING,
CALLAGHAN REMARKED TO ME THAT HE THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT HAD
PUT ON AN AMAZING PERFORMANCE. HE SAID HE WAS MOST IMPRESSED
AT THE PRESIDENT'S INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
WITH ALL THE OTHER THINGS HE HAD ON HIS MIND.

WARM REGARDS.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon
CENTO Foreign Ministers
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, May 22, 1974
12:50 p.m.

PLACE: The Cabinet Room

(The Press came in for photos)

President: How have you been?

Callaghan (UK): I remember our seminar in Number 10 Downing.

President: That was Callaghan's job.

(The press departs)

President: I am delighted to meet with you. CENTO in the minds of
the world has much less meaning than there used to be. Even here,
the Turks and Pakistanis say "What good is it when we have a military
problem? We just sit around and talk." Candidly, the Iranians' feeling
is that they can take care of themselves.

Why continue CENTO? Let's start with the bottom line: As a
military alliance, it isn't there -- it's not like NATO. But we
have common interests including military concerns -- like the
survival of Pakistan. For us, that is of vital importance. To

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have healthy, strong economies in this group of nations is vital. It is important in the future of South Asia, and the survival of each country with some sort of -- not guarantee -- but an added element to discourage those who might infringe on your sovereignty.

The United States is bilaterally committed to each of you -- not only to your survival but to cooperate economically for progress.

The fact that the U. S. has this commitment -- shared by Great Britain -- has a restraining influence on those who might be tempted--to go under or over a border to destroy a country's independence.

So what we have should not be detracted. The situation is different from the Dulles days, but the need remains. Like the NATO situation has change, but if it weren't there, adventurism would be encouraged.

Callaghan: Don't even mention it.

President: But whatever the country in NATO -- Great Britain, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy -- if they didn't have association and the U. S. holding the ring against any super power -- if that didn't exist, the race to Moscow would go apace.

Callaghan: That's right.

President: Now individually. I wish we could have done more for Pakistan in the previous struggle. As far as the U. S. is concerned, one partition of Pakistan is enough. And, considering Congressional concerns, we will do whatever we can to support Pakistan's independence and strength. We have done something; perhaps we can do more. Pakistan's problem is most delicate. To the extent the U. S. reestablishes a dialogue with India, our influence will be to restrain India.

We don't want a monologue. We consider this alliance, which came in when the threat was very different...there have been many changes, with the Soviet Union, etc. Pakistan has had a tragedy. But no more.

What can CENTO do about all these things? What does the commitment mean if it is not backed up by military responsiveness? It does mean something, because if we share a common commitment we can be helpful to each other whatever the problem.
Assan: Thank you for seeing us. I know how busy you are. In the past two days we have referred more than once to the strong words you gave us last year. We all thank you for your strength and encouragement. We know the situation has changed but we think the need for the alliance continues. We have talked about tracing our course for the future. It has been a great meeting.

President: The original reason for CENTO -- like NATO -- was security. We now need more -- to broaden our relations.

If I could digress to the Middle East a bit. Basically in the Syrian-Israeli talks we have had a breakthrough. I have been bouncing messages to Israel and to a lesser degree to Syria over the past weeks. Secretary Kissinger has done a magnificent job. Disengagement will come -- maybe not this week. The major problem has been dealt with, but the lesser ones could hang us up -- they become relatively more important.

But disengagement is only temporary. And negotiations will now go forward in Geneva for a permanent solution -- like Jerusalem, that is the toughest nut. We are accused of playing a unilateral role by pushing others out.

The reason Secretary Kissinger is there getting a disengagement is because we are the only one who can broker it now. Our purpose is not to establish American domination or to exclude others from economic or political development in the area. Some other countries of the area don't want the Soviet Union, some may. Israel can't event talk to them.

The policy is to move all the parties to participate in a settlement. We carry the major burden because we can move Israel, and without that, no settlement can be made. For Israel, it is far better to have the U.S. as a friend of Egypt than an enemy of Egypt. Sophisticated leaders within Israel like Rabin understand; the Jewish community wants exclusive American support of Israel.

Israel feels that with arms they can win over the foreseeable future. Not as well as before, but they made it costly. But Israel's ability to survive must not depend on an acre of sand, but on the attitude of her neighbors and whether these neighbors make a confluence of power opposed to Israel's survival.
We feel the interests of us all here are served by our negotiating realistically with the Soviet Union. We have no illusions, nor do they. When the Soviet Union has to make a decision whether to meddle, they must weigh that against everything else they have on the plate with the United States. We need idealistic talk, but we have to be pragmatic.

In the Middle East, despite our different interests and vital as it is—for the Soviet Union they see the resources and geographic position and their game is understandable; the US has a special tie with Israel which has hurt us with the Arabs. This tie doesn't serve the United States. Looking down the road, the U.S., Israel and Arab interests will be served by the U.S. playing a constructive role and not tied just to Israel. As I told Prime Minister Wilson, there can't be permanent peace unless we are for it, to influence Israel. It can't be done if the Soviet Union is against it, because of their power.

Our policy is toward the whole world. With the Soviet Union, for example, we are working on SALT—it is internationally important. Each of us can destroy the other within an hour. Neither one of us has illusions about the other, but if they are in isolation or in a posture of confrontation, they can't listen if we say "Don't push our friends around." But if they have some other things going....

With China, I am the original anti-Communist and Mao is the original Communist. But they are probably concerned about their isolation and possible threat from their neighbors. As they looked around, they saw India, with contempt, to the west the Soviet Union, to the east the United States, to the Northeast, Japan, an economic giant but economically a pygmy. Pragmatically they didn't want a hostile U.S. For the U.S. -- each of them has better relations with the United States than with each other -- right now the basic threat to survival is the US-Soviet conflict. But one fourth of the world is Chinese, and they have nuclear weapons. They are smart and energetic. In 20 years they will be a major nuclear power. Should we let them sit there in isolation? Or should we develop a dialogue? Now they need us; later they might now. We will try to play a constructive role in China's relations with its neighbors.
We can't insure peace, but our purpose is -- we believe in the right of all to choose their own way -- to help them to be independent. We fought in Korea and Vietnam for that. But to do that effectively, we must talk to potential enemies to see if there are different incentives for them to pursue different courses. When we go to the Soviet Union and China, we do it to make the world a safer place for our friends.

Callaghan: Outstanding. If you weren't President, you would have made a brilliant Foreign Minister.

President: I have visited all your countries. I have a strong feeling for each of them. We want you to survive and we are for you. Sometimes we can do as much as we would like, but our dialogue with the opposition is in support of, not opposition to, our friends. But the Middle East, next to Central Europe, is a vital area for the super powers. Unlike Vietnam--the Cambodia mission, the December bombing--some said the Soviet Union and China would intervene. I didn't think so, because they wanted North Vietnam to succeed but not at the cost of confrontation with the United States. The Middle East is different and Europe especially so.

We must realize we are participating in decisions which could decide the peace of the world. We must trust each other. We will maintain our strength so that none thinks he can bluff us or go to war with us without cost.

Callaghan: We need the NATO declaration and the trade bill.

President: Provided they work out the credit restriction. Otherwise, t'ye can't get MFN.

Assar: This is my last year.

(Cuff links are passed out.)

President: I can tell you a story. Israel was asking for too many F-4's. I told Golda the main thing was trust, that we had problems and that we would do what we could.
1. NSC MEMO. 111 Mt8, SAFTEP GUIDELINES / Oc 3/8/01

2. NATO's role in the crisis is more than that of a spectator. It is important to the achieving of a resolution of the conflict. NATO's role is to ensure that the conflict is resolved in a way that is acceptable to both parties. The role of NATO is to provide a framework for the discussion of the crisis. The role of NATO is to provide a framework for the discussion of the crisis.

3. The crisis in the Middle East is a complex one. There are many factors that contribute to the situation. The role of the United States is to work with the other countries in the region to find a solution. The role of the United States is to work with the other countries in the region to find a solution.

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it has changed but if it wasn't there, it wouldn't be counterproductive.

Don't know what I think.

P: Don't know, could be NMD-6B vs.

E: 8IA, if they didn't have something

US, they may want any anger there.

If that didn't exist, I can't imagine it would

Right.

Now, would it make sense for

fail in perfect strong. As far as US is

concerned, in that, that would be the thing,

enough. And, essentially, in means,

we could do that, we can't support. The

marriage & strength. The band was something,

perhaps could mean. The fails is most

simple. To extent US, not in the deal

of 20 different ways, will be & remains

doesn't.

Don't wonder, yesterday. We considered

o'clock, which came in when that now

very different... There have been many

challenges, & lots, lots. Lots has held tragedy

but no more.

What was said about all those things.

Wasn't that contrary to what is already

building. "Better than" is building.

issue if we start common. Until we can

be helpful to much better situation, etc.

Assan: Thanks for seeing us. Come back when you

are, tomorrow. Be sure 2 days we have

marked more than once if they were to

phone me last year, we will think you
I agree the arrangement will have to be changed but think it will be没问题。我们刚才谈了关于重新考虑我们课程的未来。这与问题有关。

主要问题在是CNO与CNO-1的相似性。如果我能够影响CNO-1。

但话说——我需要快速行动。最近发生重大变革。CNO的领导和联邦政府的大力支持将是至关重要的。可能需要在CNO-1和CNO之间做出选择。

目标是快速跟进。将重新考虑重要性。

解读力至少是目前的。

很抱歉，我刚刚才明白这里有点混乱。我们现在正在重新考虑它。

我建议在下一步中，我们可以一起认真考虑它。

此外，它似乎没有理由与我们目前的立场不一致。因此，我希望我们可以继续讨论这个话题。
I face a new thing which comes over personal
future - not in all or I, but my children,
they, but I didn't expect it to
be, but I think I missed it
on me, and of course - but an attitude of
my jealousy, or whether anything under
influence of public opinion & approval I assumed, we
will make it our business, we should try to not
my studying it. Sometimes, if it is, we have
the alternatives, we did. They. When it has to
make a decision whether to trouble, they must
work this against even this else they there
with the rest. We wish, we think. We, inside, Whit.
then we end to be pragmatic. In
M.E., despite our different interests & initial end it
is the SE. They are conscious & now pollution
& our game is understandable. We have our
which has been on r/dance, that
the rest and. U.S. history from vivid. U.S.
very. Our problems will be shared by U.S.
playing constructive role of our past future.
We are watching. They can be just most good
rivals no one are part (principle). Can't be one
of S.U. is a constant (because of their future).
Our job is travel whole world. U.S. far society
are working on SP. - it entirely important, such
are being cotton. Our, an hour. Hours, bullets
are all about cotton. But if they are in relation
an improvement. Our want help of me. My dad
produce perhaps second - but if they don't some
after that, [illegible]
with the original. When I'm true
original. Cost, but any just remains about
situation, positive or related from neighbors. So
the last year we've been in (continued), it's important to keep US, UK, France, and Germany in mind. Proportionally they are big. But in reality, China, Japan, and India are more important than the US and UK. If China and Japan are closer to each other, it might be a good idea. If China and Japan are far apart, there will be tension. I think it's important to remember that in the US, China, and Japan.

Now, if we talk about China and Japan, they might not have the same strategic interests. Japan might also be interested in Korea and China. But if we talk about China and Japan, we need to keep in mind the different incentives for them to engage different countries. China and Japan might need to work together on some issues.

I'm not sure if you want to, but you could make a blanket FDI.
cost of competition of US. M'6 is different
+ East

We must realize we are participating in
decisions which could have great cost. We
must act rationally. We will need
our strength to help other think to can
help me a great many to otherwise.

C. The visit and NATO delegation changes

P. Provided there needed a freight

rotation. Could it work?

Again This is last plan

(Protected writings)

P. Story. I asked for F-16s. With Golden

must. We can count, we had just

there would do what we could.

D. poor not self