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MAY 21, 1974

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

THE PRESIDENT MET TODAY WITH OHIRA AND LUNS. BOTH MEETINGS WENT WELL WITH NO MAJOR SURPRISES OR DISASTERS.

THE OHIRA MEETING LASTED ABOUT 40 MINUTES, WITH CONSIDERABLE TIME BEING UTILIZED EXCHANGING STATEMENTS ABOUT U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS BEING THE CORNERSTONE OF PEACE IN THE PACIFIC. OHIRA RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET-JAPANESE SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ASKED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT HAD ANY INITIAL THOUGHTS ON THEM.

THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED VERY GENERALLY, SAYING THAT WE VIEW THE PROJECTS AS A WHOLE POSITIVELY, BUT THAT JAPAN SHOULD MAKE SURE IT PROTECTS ITS OWN INTERESTS AND GETS ADEQUATE RETURN FOR THE TECHNOLOGY AND FINANCING THAT THE USSR NEEDS. OHIRA POINTED OUT THAT IN THE JAPANESE VIEW IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE U.S. TO COOPERATE IN THE OIL AND GAS PROJECTS IF THE JAPANESE WERE TO PROCEED. THE PRESIDENT ASKED FOR OHIRA'S VIEWS OF CHINESE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS. OHIRA RESPONDED THAT THEY REALLY DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON BUT THEY WOULD SEEK SMOOTH RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE PRC REGARDLESS OF ANY CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP WHICH MIGHT EVOLVE.

THE PRESIDENT ASKED FOR THE JAPANESE REACTION TO THE INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST. OHIRA SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY SHOCKED BY THE EVENT AND IT WAS NOT LIKELY TO AFFECT JAPANESE POLICY SUBSTANTIALLY. HE DID NOT THINK WHETHER OR NOT THIS WOULD STIMULATE OTHER COUNTRIES TO GO NUCLEAR BUT IT WOULD NOT AFFECT JAPANESE POLICY.

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH LUNS WAS MORE FREE-WHEELING AND THE PRESIDENT OBVIOUSLY ENJOYED HIMSELF. THEY TALKED...
AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT PERSONALITIES -- FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMAN.
REMEMBER, THE PRESIDENT GAVE A GENERAL RUNDOWN ON THE MIDDLE EAST, STARTING
WITH THE OCTOBER ALERT. ON CSCE THEY AGREED THAT THE LEVEL
OF STAGE THREE WOULD DEPEND UPON THE SUBSTANCE OF STAGE TWO
AND THAT THE LEVEL WOULD BE ARRIVED AT AFTER CONSULTATION
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THERE WAS A FAIRLY DISJOINTED DISCUSSION
OF MFR, THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF WHICH WAS A STATEMENT
BY LUNSFORD THAT GALLEY HAD FOUND THE SOVIET MILITARY
VERY POWERFUL AND VERY ARROGANT. GALLEY CLAIMED THEY ACTED AS
THOUGH THEY COULD GET ANYTHING THEY WANTED. LUNSFORD MADE A PITCH
TO HAVE SOMEONE GIVE NATO A PREVIEW BRIEFING OF THE SOVIET SUMMIT.
THE PRESIDENT AGREED TO DO SO AND LUNSFORD THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE
PRESIDENT MIGHT WANT TO STOP TO MEET WITH THE COUNCIL ON HIS
WAY BACK FROM MOSCOW. THE PRESIDENT'S ONLY RESPONSE WAS THAT
HE WOULD HAVE TO DO THAT SOMETIME. DISCUSSION ON U.S.-
EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIPS WAS FAIRLY SOLID. THE PRESIDENT TOOK
A GENERALLY TOUGH LINE AND LUNSFORD AGREED WITH HIM.

IKE HAS SENT YOU A MEMO ON THE GENEVA PROTOCOL, PROPOSING
A NEW COMPROMISE AS A WAY AROUND THE ISSUES OF HERBICIDES
AND TEAR GAS. HE WANTS TO FLOAT IT QUICKLY ON THE HILL IN
THE HOPE OF GETTING AGREEMENT BEFORE THE MOSCOW SUMMIT.
WE DO HAVE AN INTERAGENCY PAPER ON THE SUBJECT ON WHICH ALL
AGENCIES HAVE NOW COMMENTED EXCEPT STATE (I SUSPECT THEY ARE
AWAITING YOUR RETURN). THERE ARE SPLIT VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT
AND I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD MOVE TO THE CONGRESS BEFORE WE
HAVE RESOLVED THE ISSUE WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. IF YOU
CONCUR I WILL SO INFORM IKE.

STOESSSEL HAS SENT IN A CABLE SAYING THAT KORNIYENKO HAS
EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN ABOUT WHEN AN ADVANCE PARTY MIGHT BE
SENT TO MOSCOW AND THAT OTHER OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO SOUGHT ASSURANCE
THAT THE VISIT WILL TAKE PLACE. THERE ARE ALSO PERSISTENT
INQUIRIES AMONG OUR PRESS PRODING (I FEAR HOPEFULLY) AT THE
POSSIBILITY THAT THE SUMMIT IS SLIPPING. DO YOU WISH ME TO
DO ANYTHING WITH DUBRINV IN ABOUT SETTING A DATE OR DO YOU WANT
EVERYTHING FROZEN UNTIL YOUR RETURN?

I HAD PLANNED TO CABLE YOU ABOUT SCHLESINGER'S CONVERSATION
ABOUT THE KALB BOOK BUT I TOLD YOU THE THRUST OF IT ON THE PHONE.
HE MENTIONED THAT YOU WERE TELLING STORIES AROUND TOWN ABOUT DEFENSE
BEHAVIOR IN OCTOBER. I POINTED OUT THE LES GELB ARTICLE AND
OTHER CONTRARY RATINGS, WHICH CERTAINLY HAD STARTED SOMEWHERE.
I GOT NO RESPONSE TO THAT OBSERVATION.

WARM REGARDS,
761
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon
Masayoshi Ohira, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Tuesday - May 21, 1974
12:00 noon

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

[The press is admitted for photographs.]

President: I had a good visit with Prime Minister Tanaka in Paris [on April 7, at Pompidou funeral]. Please extend my regards to him.

Ohira: I will. Thank you.

President: Where do you go from here?

Ohira: I go to New York tomorrow night.

President: You got a degree? How many have you received?

Ohira: It's my first one.

President: Will you make a speech?

Ohira: No, I was very fortunate.

[The press leaves]

Ohira: I am most honored to have this opportunity to pay a courtesy call on you in what must be a very busy schedule. I first want to convey Prime Minister Tanaka's warmest personal wishes to you. I feel also most honored to be invited to one of the honored universities of the United States -- Yale University. I consider it a great honor.
I am grateful for the opportunities I have had here to meet with American officials yesterday and this morning. Yesterday I spoke with Ambassador Rush and today I renewed my friendship with Ambassador Ingersoll and had a serious discussion with him. I missed Dr. Kissinger here in Washington, but that is abundantly compensated by the fact that his efforts for peace are succeeding under direction of the President. I am pleased not only for the success and dignity of the United States but also for the cause of world peace. I would like to emphasize that our close relationship with the United States provides a firm basis for our foreign policy and is the cornerstone of our efforts to build peace in Asia and the world. We want to build on this relationship and I feel very grateful to discuss this with you today. We feel our close ties with the United States have even greater significance and importance now during a situation in Asia where there is not yet sufficient stability -- and in the whole world.

I want to take this opportunity to say that the importance we place on U.S. relationship is also the basis of Prime Minister Tanaka's foreign policy. I want to emphasize this.

President: Jim Hodgson will be my new Ambassador. Although he was Secretary of Labor, he has broader experience. He is a worthy successor to Ingersoll who has moved to broader responsibility for Asian policy.

Ohira: We are indeed looking forward to having Mr. Hodgson with us at the earliest date.

President: I totally agree that the cornerstone of peace in Asia is the U.S.-Japanese relationship. We are the strongest democratic powers in the area, and as we move into an era of peace that will become even more important. It is also important to recognize that Japan and the United States as world economic powers work closely with the European Community.

In the Middle East, I can tell you we have reached a breakthrough in the negotiation on disengagement between Israel and Syria. However, there are difficult odds and ends to be worked out. We are hopeful they will be. This agreement, coupled with the Israeli-Egyptian agreement, while temporary, bring the possibility for broader talks for peace in the Middle East. We feel that once the momentum begins, while the going will be hard, we can succeed. As we learned last October from an economic standpoint, the impact of war on economies like the U.S. and Japan is catastrophic. That is why we believe that all should support our efforts -- which are not selfish efforts -- to get the parties together for a peaceful settlement.
Other areas over the long term which are of even more concern are Japanese relations with the Soviet Union and the PRC. I think the policies of the U.S. and Japan are parallel here. While the Soviet Union and the PRC don't get along too well, our joint policy is to get along with both without taking sides. I note that Japan is proceeding with discussions with the Soviet Union on developing their oil and gas reserves and with increasing trade and contact with the PRC. We think this is correct from a pragmatic point of view, for you and for the United States.

What are the Foreign Minister's ideas on changes in the PRC? Will there be a change in leadership or will it continue?

Ohira: We are trying hard to grasp what is the situation in the PRC and what are the implications. I feel, though, that we don't have an answer. Our relations with the PRC are proceeding naturally and as common sense dictates. Should there be a change in leadership, we must and can continue smooth relations.

President: I feel that whatever leadership change occurs in the Soviet Union and the PRC, while people change, interests remain the same. So, as far as we are concerned, we must be evenhanded. Both will watch us to see we don't tilt to one side or the other.

Ohira: I agree entirely with that point.

On the Siberian development projects, the Prime Minister conveyed to you the status of the projects. I wonder if you have any ideas to express.

President: We look positively on the directions in which you are moving. We think you must move carefully to protect your interests. They need the technology and the money you can bring; they must pay a price to get that cooperation.

As you know, several American companies are interested. While we can't control them, we would welcome cooperation between them and Japanese companies. Any time we can work together it is to our mutual benefit. Japan today does not speak with a big military voice but it speaks with a mighty economic voice, and we trust that in the years ahead more weight will be placed on economic factors.

In the meantime, the U.S. intends to maintain its military strength against the Soviet Union -- and they will toward us. We will try to negotiate SALT at the summit; I can't predict what will happen but it will progress. We
can't have unilateral reductions of strength around the world, though, because that strength maintains the balance for them as well as for us. Speaking of our mutual security agreement with you -- while once the PRC strenuously objected to it three or four years ago, they seem not to object now. That is obviously for pragmatic reasons. A defenseless Japan wouldn't be in their interest, because they couldn't do anything about it -- but it might be in the interest of one of the negotiators. Our policy of mutual cooperation is in the interest of keeping a balance throughout the area in the interest of deterring those who might be interested in adventures in the area. I will direct Secretary Kissinger to keep you and Prime Minister Tanaka informed of our negotiations with the Soviet Union and on the Middle East and so on, but primarily on the Soviet Union because they vitaly affect you and the Europeans.

Ohira: I am most grateful to you for your remarks. As you stated, there is increasing understanding of the importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty -- by us, by the PRC, by the Soviet Union and by the Japanese people. We can't be complacent and we must strengthen our ties further.

I appreciate your comments on the Siberian projects, and it is essential for us two to cooperate in these projects.

President: What is the reaction in Japan to India's nuclear explosion?

Ohira: Actually I heard the news in New York and I haven't been able to digest it or get Japan's reaction. We are not shocked substantively and it is not likely to affect our policy substantively.

President: I guess the question is of a chain reaction for others to go nuclear.

Ohira: That is difficult to tell, but I can say that Japan is in no way thinking of going nuclear. Japan doesn't contemplate going nuclear. That is my responsibility and I can say Japan is not going to change its policy.

President: I would not indicate what Japan should do, but I would just point out the increasing likelihood of nuclear war as more states acquire these devices. Of course, the answer is to look to working even harder to strengthen a structure of peace -- economically, politically, etc. -- so that states will reject the option of force, nuclear or otherwise. It sounds idealistic but there is no other way to approach the problem.

Please convey my best wish to the Prime Minister, to Mr. Fukuda and our other friends in Japan.
Chira: I certainly will to Prime Minister Tanaka and your other good friends. Mr. Fukuda will come on June 10 to Washington.
21 May 1974

P. Hel good to see you in Korea. Please extend my regards.

- [Handwritten notes on the page are not legible.]

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Dear [Name],

I hope this message finds you well. I am writing to express my gratitude for the opportunity to serve as the US representative to the Secretariat of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This assignment has provided me with a unique opportunity to contribute to the strengthening of transatlantic relations.

Yesterday, during a meeting with Mr. [Name], we discussed the importance of fostering mutual understanding and cooperation between the US and our European partners. I believe that through dialogue and engagement, we can build a stronger and more prosperous future for our nations.

Please convey my respect to Mr. [Name] and his team. I am confident that our cooperation will continue to grow stronger.

Sincerely,

[Your Name]
want to take this opportunity to say my opinion
that the relationship should be
more pronounced.

P

I thought what was important was
that we have a strong economic
relationship, not just a trade
relationship. The current
tendency is to deepen the
relationship, not just trade,
but also to cooperate
more closely in other
areas.

O

We are indeed looking forward to seeing Hungary
as soon as possible.

P

It is a question that is a matter of concern.

Once we have a good relationship, we can
strengthen our cooperation in various areas.

I expect that it will become even more important
to work together on issues like energy,
security, and technology. We should
continue to develop our economic
and political ties.

In the meantime, I believe that
we can build on our
current cooperation and
move forward.

My hope is that we will
work together effectively.

I believe that we can achieve
our goals by working
as a team.

My impression is that we
should continue to
strengthen our relationship,
not only in trade,
but also in other areas.

I think it is important that we
continue to work together,
not just for our own
benefit, but also for the
benefit of both countries.

I see that we
have a good
basis for
our cooperation.

I am optimistic that we
will be able to achieve
our goals together.

I believe that we can
work together to
achieve our
goals,
not just on
our own,
but also for
the benefit
of our
countries.

I see that we
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achieve our
g
In the first paragraph of discussion on the 12th of April, we had a meeting with the council of the city. We think there is some confusion regarding the plan for the new building. What was Hull's idea on changes in 12th? Change in building or what it contains?

0. We try to keep what is not in the plan.

1. People are quite flexible, so it's likely we don't have to change the plan. Our plan is flexible, actually.

0. People are flexible, actually.

0. I feel the plan is flexible enough to allow changes.

0. Our plan is flexible. We can make changes as needed.

0. We can make changes as needed.

0. Our plan is flexible. We can make changes as needed.
trust that in years ahead more weight will be placed on these factors, in making U.S. attain a maintenance level sufficiency to 50-1st, they will stand us. We will try to negotiate 54-1st at summer, but very
explicit, but Until pressure cannot have unanimous indications of strength and until
there is some indication of strength in them, or until for us, gaining 8-1st spot strength appears 1-2 of you, while
since 1-2 spot strength objective 3-4 years, they remain not to do it yet. That is driving
for frequent reasons. A Demise they couldn't
be in their interest, coal they and look at
any this short it but it might be
intertwined, and improves, one going of mutual
exposure and in interest if they're
expected mere in mutual of dealing there
also might be mutual in advance in
some. I can't breech it to they can't
of mutual negotiation 1/50 - 1/35, it
but primarily 30 because they initially
apparently 5-4 responders. 

D: Am most grateful to you for your remarks,
As you stated, there's unsure uncertainly
of negotiations of US-Joy seventy thirty by 250,
1-2, joy people. We can't be complacent
most along the on this parties.
Opponent's can's renegotiate S/50-1-35, it
yet, primarily 30 because they initially
apparent 5-4 responders.

P: What's relation in 1-50, federal, maintenance
- Actually I heard news in NY and heard from ability to go today or get going earlier. Was not headed substantially more likely to appear on going substantial.

- I guess position is of them see this for this, to go medium.

- That is difficult, but I am sure there is one way to get going to make many, say, direct contributions for smaller. That is any way. I know, say not go to change to going.

- Would not indicate what they would, but just want to see behind Paris was done, states required decided. Of course, some changes were back to working some harder to support a starting if peace and order, etc. to start state would reject a option of peace between.

- Some individuals last reaction very disappointing yet.

- Please convey best regards and PLM, etc.

- Felt better once often based in NY.

- I will wait with T and other good friends. Embark now, come on June 10.