

***** ~~T O P S E C R E T~~ ***** COPY

3

OP IMMED
DE [] #2805 1420257
O 220030Z MAY 74 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH
FM THE SITUATION ROOM

TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY VIA []

25X

WH41442

TDHAK 270

PLEASE DELIVER TO BREMER/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

MAY 21, 1974

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

THE PRESIDENT MET TODAY WITH DHIRA AND LUNS. BOTH MEETINGS WENT WELL WITH NO MAJOR SURPRISES OR DISASTERS. THE DHIRA MEETING LASTED ABOUT 40 MINUTES, WITH CONSIDERABLE TIME BEING UTILIZED EXCHANGING STATEMENTS ABOUT U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS. BEING THE CORNERSTONE OF PEACE IN THE PACIFIC. DHIRA RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET-JAPANESE SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ASKED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT HAD ANY INITIAL THOUGHTS ON THEM. THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED VERY GENERALLY, SAYING THAT WE VIEW THE PROJECTS AS A WHOLE POSITIVELY, BUT THAT JAPAN SHOULD MAKE SURE IT PROTECTS ITS OWN INTERESTS AND GETS ADEQUATE RETURN FOR THE TECHNOLOGY AND FINANCING THAT THE USSR NEEDS. DHIRA POINTED OUT THAT IN THE JAPANESE VIEW IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE U.S. TO COOPERATE IN THE OIL AND GAS PROJECTS IF THE JAPANESE WERE TO PROCEED. THE PRESIDENT ASKED FOR DHIRA'S VIEWS OF CHINESE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS. DHIRA RESPONDED THAT THEY REALLY DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON BUT THEY WOULD SEEK SMOOTH RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE PRC REGARDLESS OF ANY CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP WHICH MIGHT EVENTUATE. THE PRESIDENT ASKED FOR THE JAPANESE REACTION TO THE INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST. DHIRA SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY SHOCKED BY THE EVENT AND IT WAS NOT LIKELY TO AFFECT JAPANESE POLICY SUBSTANTIALLY. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THIS WOULD STIMULATE OTHER COUNTRIES TO GO NUCLEAR BUT IT WOULD NOT EFFECT JAPANESE POLICY.

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH LUNS WAS MORE FREE-WHEELING AND THE PRESIDENT OBVIOUSLY ENJOYED HIMSELF. THEY TALKED

DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempt
AUTHORITY OAC Dec 1987 12/16/84; State v. Sent 3/9/04
BY [] DATE 4/12/07

* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *

SEC FILE

RECALLED
PAGE 01

PSN:049317

TDR:142/01:11Z

DTG:220030Z MAY 74

***** ~~T O P S E C R E T~~ ***** COPY

***** ~~T O P S E C R E T~~ ***** COPY


AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT PERSONALITIES -- FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMAN. THE PRESIDENT GAVE A GENERAL RUNDOWN ON THE MID EAST, STARTING WITH THE OCTOBER ALERT. ON CSCE THEY AGREED THAT THE LEVEL OF STAGE THREE WOULD DEPEND UPON THE SUBSTANCE OF STAGE TWO AND THAT THE LEVEL WOULD BE ARRIVED AT AFTER CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THERE WAS A FAIRLY DISJOINTED DISCUSSION OF MBFR, THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF WHICH WAS A STATEMENT BY LUNS THAT GALLEY SAID HE HAD FOUND THE SOVIET MILITARY VERY POWERFUL AND VERY ARROGANT. GALLEY CLAIMED THEY ACTED AS THOUGH THEY COULD GET ANYTHING THEY WANTED. LUNS MADE A PITCH TO HAVE SOMEONE GIVE NATO A PREVIEW BRIEFING OF THE SOVIET SUMMIT. THE PRESIDENT AGREED TO DO SO AND LUNS THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT WANT TO STOP TO MEET WITH THE COUNCIL ON HIS WAY BACK FROM MOSCOW. THE PRESIDENT'S ONLY RESPONSE WAS THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO DO THAT SOMETIME. DISCUSSION ON U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIPS WAS FAIRLY SOLID. THE PRESIDENT TOOK A GENERALLY TOUGH LINE AND LUNS AGREED WITH HIM.

IKLE HAS SENT YOU A MEMO ON THE GENEVA PROTOCOL, PROPOSING A NEW COMPROMISE AS A WAY AROUND THE ISSUES OF HERBICIDES AND TEARGAS. HE WANTS TO FLOAT IT QUICKLY ON THE HILL IN THE HOPES OF GETTING AGREEMENT BEFORE THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. WE DO HAVE AN INTERAGENCY PAPER ON THE SUBJECT ON WHICH ALL AGENCIES HAVE NOW COMMENTED EXCEPT STATE (I SUSPECT THEY ARE AWAITING YOUR RETURN). THERE ARE SPLIT VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT AND I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD MOVE TO THE CONGRESS BEFORE WE HAVE RESOLVED THE ISSUE WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. IF YOU CONCUR I WILL SO INFORM IKLE.

STOESSEL HAS SENT IN A CABLE SAYING THAT KORNIYENKO HAS EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN ABOUT WHEN AN ADVANCE PARTY MIGHT BE SENT TO MOSCOW AND THAT OTHER OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO SOUGHT ASSURANCE THAT THE VISIT WILL TAKE PLACE. THERE ARE ALSO PERSISTENT INQUIRIES AMONG OUR PRESS PROBING (I FEAR HOPEFULLY) AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SUMMIT IS SLIPPING. DO YOU WISH ME TO DO ANYTHING WITH DOBRYNIN ABOUT SETTING A DATE OR DO YOU WISH EVERYTHING FROZEN UNTIL YOUR RETURN?

I HAD PLANNED TO CABLE YOU ABOUT SCHLESINGER'S CONVERSATION ABOUT THE KALB BOOK BUT I TOLD YOU THE THRUST OF IT ON THE PHONE. HE HINTED THAT YOU WERE TELLING STORIES AROUND TOWN ABOUT DEFENSE BEHAVIOR IN OCTOBER. I POINTED OUT THE LES GELB ARTICLE AND OTHER CONTRARY RUMORS, WHICH CERTAINLY HAD STARTED SOMEWHERE. I GOT NO RESPONSE TO THAT OBSERVATION.

WARM REGARDS.
751



PSN:049317 RECALLED PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:142/01:11Z DTG:220030Z MAY 74

***** ~~T O P S E C R E T~~ ***** COPY

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/XGDS - 3

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon
Masayoshi Ohira, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Tuesday - May 21, 1974
12:00 noon

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

[The press is admitted for photographs.]

President: I had a good visit with Prime Minister Tanaka in Paris [on April 7, at Pompidou funeral]. Please extend my regards to him.

Ohira: I will. Thank you.

President: Where do you go from here?

Ohira: I go to New York tomorrow night.

President: You got a degree? How many have you received?

Ohira: It's my first one.

President: Will you make a speech?

Ohira: No, I was very fortunate.

[The press leaves]

Ohira: I am most honored to have this opportunity to pay a courtesy call on you in what must be a very busy schedule. I first want to convey Prime Minister Tanaka's warmest personal wishes to you. I feel also most honored to be invited to one of the honored universities of the United States -- Yale University. I consider it a great honor.



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Dep. inv. no. 2/8/04
BY: JWA
MADA DATE: 8/5/04

SECRET - XGDS - 3

I am grateful for the opportunities I have had here to meet with American officials yesterday and this morning. Yesterday I spoke with Ambassador Rush and today I renewed my friendship with Ambassador Ingersoll and had a serious discussion with him. I missed Dr. Kissinger here in Washington, but that is abundantly compensated by the fact that his efforts for peace are succeeding under direction of the President. I am pleased not only for the success and dignity of the United States but also for the cause of world peace. I would like to emphasize that our close relationship with the United States provides a firm basis for our foreign policy and is the cornerstone of our efforts to build peace in Asia and the world. We want to build on this relationship and I feel very grateful to discuss this with you today. We feel our close ties with the United States have even greater significance and importance now during a situation in Asia where there is not yet sufficient stability -- and in the whole world.

I want to take this opportunity to say that the importance we place on U.S. relationship is also the basis of Prime Minister Tanaka's foreign policy. I want to emphasize this.

President: Jim Hodgson will be my new Ambassador. Although he was Secretary of Labor, he has broader experience. He is a worthy successor to Ingersoll who has moved to broader responsibility for Asian policy.

Ohira: We are indeed looking forward to having Mr. Hodgson with us at the earliest date.

President: I totally agree that the cornerstone of peace in Asia is the U.S. - Japanese relationship. We are the strongest democratic powers in the area, and as we move into an era of peace that will become even more important. It is also important to recognize that Japan and the United States as world economic powers work closely with the European Community.

In the Middle East, I can tell you we have reached a breakthrough in the negotiation on disengagement between Israel and Syria. However, there are difficult odds and ends to be worked out. We are hopeful they will be. This agreement, coupled with the Israeli-Egyptian agreement, while temporary, bring the possibility for broader talks for peace in the Middle East. We feel that once the momentum begins, while the going will be hard, we can succeed. As we learned last October from an economic standpoint, the impact of war on economies like the U.S. and Japan is catastrophic. That is why we believe that all should support our efforts -- which are not selfish efforts -- to get the parties together for a peaceful settlement.

Other areas over the long term which are of even more concern are Japanese relations with the Soviet Union and the PRC. I think the policies of the U.S. and Japan are parallel here. While the Soviet Union and the PRC don't get along too well, our joint policy is to get along with both without taking sides. I note that Japan is proceeding with discussions with the Soviet Union on developing their oil and gas reserves and with increasing trade and contact with the PRC. We think this is correct from a pragmatic point of view, for you and for the United States,

What are the Foreign Minister's ideas on changes in the PRC? Will there be a change in leadership or will it continue?

Ohira: We are trying hard to grasp what is the situation in the PRC and what are the implications. I feel, though, that we don't have an answer. Our relations with the PRC are proceeding naturally and as common sense dictates. Should there be a change in leadership, we must and can continue smooth relations.

President: I feel that whatever leadership change occurs in the Soviet Union and the PRC, while people change, interests remain the same. So, as far as we are concerned, we must be evenhanded. Both will watch us to see we don't tilt to one side or the other.

Ohira: I agree entirely with that point.

On the Siberian development projects, the Prime Minister conveyed to you the status of the projects. I wonder if you have any ideas to express.

President: We look positively on the directions in which you are moving. We think you must move carefully to protect your interests. They need the technology and the money you can bring; they must pay a price to get that cooperation.

As you know, several American companies are interested. While we can't control them, we would welcome cooperation between them and Japanese companies. Any time we can work together it is to our mutual benefit. Japan today does not speak with a big military voice but it speaks with a mighty economic voice, and we trust that in the years ahead more weight will be placed on economic factors.

In the meantime, the U.S. intends to maintain its military strength against the Soviet Union -- and they will toward us. We will try to negotiate SALT at the summit; I can't predict what will happen but it will progress. We

can't have unilateral reductions of strength around the world, though, because that strength maintains the balance for them as well as for us. Speaking of our mutual security agreement with you -- while once the PRC strenuously objected to it three or four years ago, they seem not to object now. That is obviously for pragmatic reasons. A defenseless Japan wouldn't be in their interest, because they couldn't do anything about it -- but it might be in the interest of one of the negotiators. Our policy of mutual cooperation is in the interest of keeping a balance throughout the area in the interest of deterring those who might be interested in adventures in the area. I will direct Secretary Kissinger to keep you and Prime Minister Tanaka informed of our negotiations with the Soviet Union and on the Middle East and so on, but primarily on the Soviet Union because they vitally affect you and the Europeans.

Ohira: I am most grateful to you for your remarks. As you stated, there is increasing understanding of the importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty -- by us, by the PRC, by the Soviet Union and by the Japanese people. We can't be complacent and we must strengthen our ties further.

I appreciate your comments on the Siberian projects, and it is essential for us two to cooperate in these projects.

President: What is the reaction in Japan to India's nuclear explosion?


Ohira: Actually I heard the news in New York and I haven't been able to digest it or get Japan's reaction. We are not shocked substantively and it is not likely to affect our policy substantively.

President: I guess the question is of a chain reaction for others to go nuclear.

Ohira: That is difficult to tell, but I can say that Japan is in no way thinking of going nuclear. Japan doesn't contemplate going nuclear. That is my responsibility and I can say Japan is not going to change its policy.

President: I would not indicate what Japan should do, but I would just point out the increasing likelihood of nuclear war as more states acquire these devices. Of course, the answer is to look to working even harder to strengthen a structure of peace -- economically, politically, etc. -- so that states will reject the option of force, nuclear or otherwise. It sounds idealistic but there is no other way to approach the problem.

Please convey my best wish to the Prime Minister, to Mr. Fukuda and our other friends in Japan.



Ohira: I certainly will to Prime Minister Tanaka and your other good friends.
Mr. Fukuda will come on June 10 to Washington.

Pres/O'Brien

21 May 1974

12 noon 1-10



P Hal good visit w/T in Paris. Please extend
my regards

O Thanks

P Where do you go from here

O To NY tomorrow

P You got a degree. How many

O First one

P Speech?

O He was very fortunate

Pres leaves

O Next wanted to use this opportunity to
pay country call on you in what must be
very busy schedule. I first went to every Tomko
comment personal write to you. I feel also not
unusual to be invited to one of Harvard University
of US - Yale U. I was invited at a great honor.
I qualified for opportunity yesterday & this evening.
Yesterday spoke w/ Bush & today I reviewed my
friendship of Bush. In general had serious
discussion w/ him. I missed to be in
Wash. but is abundantly compensated by part
his efforts for peace and seriously under direction
of P. Pleased not only for success & dignity
of US but also for cause of world peace &
that emphasizes on close relationship w/ US provides
a firm basis for our F/O is conversation for
efforts to build peace in asia & world. We
want to build on this relationship & I feel very
grateful to discuss w/ you today. We feel our
close ties w/ US have been quite significant & important
our long relation in Asia where there
is not yet sufficient stability - and in
whole world

start


as a way to take this opportunity to say importance we place on the relationship is also basis of Tanaka I-E
Wants to emphasize.

P Holzman will be my new Amb. Altho
he was Secy of Labor. He has broader experience.
He a worthy successor to Ingersoll who has
more to broader exp. for asian policy.

O We are indeed looking forward to having Holzman
w/ us at embassy soon.

P I totally agree that cornerstone of peace in
Asia is US-Jap relationship. We are strongest
empowers in area & as we move into an era
of peace that will become even more important.
Also important to recognize that Jap + US
as world super powers, work closely w/ E.C.
Regarding M.E., we have a breakthrough in
disengagement but I-O-S. However they are
difficult odds & need to be worked out - we
hope they will be. This agreement, coupled
w/ I-E agreement, will trigger by
provision for broader talks for peace in
M.E. will full once momentum begins, which
going will be hard, but we can succeed.
As we heard last Oct from our standpoint,
a sign of war on economic like US + Jap is
catastrophic. That why we believe all should
support our efforts - which not selfish - to
get parties together for peaceful settlement.

Other areas are long term which are of more
more concern are Jap relations w/ SU + PRC.
I think position of US - Jap are parallel here.
w/ both SU + PRC don't get along too well, our
foreign policy is to get along w/ both w/d taking sides



I note Jap. proaching w/ discussion on \$50 and
+ gas volume & w/ increasing trade & contact w/
PRC. We think this is correct from pragmatic
point, for you & for US. What are Fed's views
on changes in PRC? Change in leadership
or will it continue?

○ We trying hard to grasp what is set in PRC &
what are implications. I feel that we don't have
answer. Our relations w/ PRC are proceeding naturally
& as common sense dictates. Should there be change
in leadership we must & can continue smooth
relations.

✓ I feel whatever leadership change occurs in SU
PRC that people change, interests remain same.
So, as far as we're concerned, we must
be ever watchful. But watch us & we must
don't get to one side or other.

○ I agree entirely w/ that point.
Our Siberia export projects, I'm concerned status
of projects. I wonder if you have any
ideas to express.

✓ We look particularly on treaties in which
you are involved. We think you must
word carefully to protect your interests. They
need the tech & money you can bring. They
must pay a price to get that exp.

As you have several Am companies are
interested. While we can't control them, we
would welcome cooperation between them &
Jap companies. Any time we can work together
it is to mutual benefit.

Japan today does not speak w/ big military
force, but w/ a mighty economic force & we

trust that in years ahead more weight
will be placed on ~~or~~ ^{or} other factors, but in meantime,
US intends to maintain its military strength
vs SU - & they will tunnel us. We will
try to negotiate SALT at summit, but can't
predict, but will progress. Can't have
mutual reduction of strength around world
then, because that strength maintains a
balance for them as well as for us. Speaking
of one most security agreement w/ you, while
once PRC strongly objected - 3-4 yrs ago,
they seem not to object now. That is mainly
for pragmatic reasons. A opposite Japan would
be in their interest, could they could not do
anything about it - but it might be in
interest of chief negotiators. Our policy of mutual
cooperation is in interest of keeping balance
throughout world in interests of deterring those
who might be interested in adventures in
area. I will direct K to keep you & I
informed of negotiations w/ SU - & NAE, etc -
but primarily SU because they initially
oppose you & E negotiations.

O I am most grateful to you for your remarks.
As you stated, there is increasing understanding
of importance of US-Jap Security Treaty, by us,
PRC, SU, & Jap people. We can't be complacent
& must strengthen our ties further.

Appreciate your comments on Salsman projects
but is essential for us to cooperate in
these projects.

P What is reaction in Jap to India's new experiment

○ Actually I heard news in NY that he had been able to go against it or get Jap reaction. Was not shocked substantially, & not likely to affect our policy substantially.

✓ I guess position is of chain reaction for other Jap nuclear.

○ That is difficult to TM, but I am saying that - Jap is one way think of acquiring nuclear - Jap doesn't want to get going nuclear. That is my view. & I am saying Jap not going to change its policy.

✓ I would not indicate what Jap should do, but just point out increasing likelihood of war was a more stable & quiet device. Of course, as much as possible move back to working even harder to strengthen a structure of peace - disarm, job, etc - so that states would reject a option of force - nuclear otherwise. Sounds realistic but no other way to approach it.

Please convey best wishes to PAM, love Frank & our other friends in Jap.

○ I certainly will to T and other good friends. Frank will come on June 10 to