MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, March 19, 1974
8:00 a.m. [Breakfast]

PLACE: The White House

Kissinger: This European thing will work out okay. They are pissing in their pants.

Schlesinger: I want to travel along the Central Front.

Kissinger: Don't go until after the middle of April. We don't want things to move too fast. We need to stay tough.

Schlesinger: I want to put pressure on the Europeans to make changes on the Central Front.

Why move Strausz-Hupe?

Kissinger: Politics.

The Germans have promised to have consultation with us before they take decisions. The British have gone even further.

Schlesinger: We should write down the list of NATO military needs and make the Europeans shape up. Jones says the British are really obstructionists in NATO -- subtly. We need new command arrangements.
Kissinger: I agree. We have troops there to either give us a more flexible response or to prevent European neutralism. If we can't get it, we should organize our defense rationally for us.

I wouldn't reassure the Europeans about keeping our troops in Europe.

Schlesinger: I am not. I have told them that we must have a military reason to keep our troops there.

Diego Garcia.

Kissinger: I defended you to Stennis. I only didn't know why it had to be by supplemental.

Schlesinger: I need to tell Congress that the British don't have a veto on its use.

Kissinger: You can't tell them there is a codicil.

Schlesinger: Can I tell Hebert we have high confidence?

Kissinger: Yes.

Schlesinger: For Suez, we need a Presidential letter.

Kissinger: Okay.

Schlesinger: I don't know if we can pay for it.

Kissinger: If possible, I think the Navy should pay for it. We need to be forthcoming to the Egyptians.

Schlesinger: How about Zumwalt for SACEUR?

Kissinger: Not bad, except he is Navy. Haig would be a good SACEUR.

Schlesinger: I gather the Soviets are not pushing on SALT.

Kissinger: It is hard to say. Gromyko told me only Brezhnev could make a decision on it.

Schlesinger: Why should they push?
Kissinger: What have the Soviets gotten from detente. The psychic satisfaction of reducing the chance of war and gaining equality with the U.S.

Nothing else. We have defused the peace movement here. The Middle East must be painful to the Soviets.

Schlesinger: Part was their fault.

Kissinger: No nation admits that. And we stalled, obfuscated, etc., on the Middle East last year and they had nothing to give to the Arabs. So they passed arms because they couldn't give the Arabs anything else. Everyone miscalculated. The Soviets probably think I screwed them at the end of October by not proceeding jointly. They have been humiliated.

So I think they will make an effort on SALT.

Schlesinger: I think we could be more forthcoming on MBFR than on SALT.

Kissinger: JCS are starting to go the same way in MBFR as in SALT -- toward cynicism.

Schlesinger: The JCS have revised their SALT position. I don't agree completely, but it is thoughtful.

Kissinger [reads JCS paper]: Not bad. It may even be possible. What does Zumwalt want?

Schlesinger: To be tougher.

Kissinger: How?

Schlesinger: We have all Trident and they are restricted to G and H.

Kissinger: The problem is if the Soviets want to break out MIRV from a permanent agreement.

Schlesinger: Zumwalt is on thin ice on air defense. If the Soviets applied it to ASW, we are in trouble.

We got to deal with the FBS.

Kissinger: Maybe we can deal with it in MBFR.
But even if we did it in SALT, we don't have to disband the forces, just pull them out of range.

The only thing I can tell the Soviets is we can put it into MBFR and look at it benevolently.

One way of restricting MIRV is by missile fields.

Schlesinger: It is interesting.

We need $50 million more on Canadian needs and PD on it. It is being held up in State.

Kissinger: By whom?

Schlesinger: The security assistance people. You have to start testimony -- early April.

Kissinger: I won't be here much in April. Let's work it out.

Schlesinger: Israeli aid. There are two decisions -- the breakout of the $1.5 billion and PD to go above $1.5.

Kissinger: Let's give everything the Arabs don't like in connection with the Syrian disengagement. (Gun-ships -- probably don't give them Cobras, or anybody in the Middle East.)

Schlesinger: Thailand. It is important that we announce 10,000 now -- it doesn't matter over what period. We must negotiate with the Thai military a permanent presence.

Kissinger: On SALT. FBS, we can try to put it into MBFR. If they want to break out a MIRV deal, I will bring it back.

For your thinking, the President might want a MIRV deal and we must not make it look like a sell-out. Even a slowdown in MIRV deployment is in our interest. I will go no further than to elicit Soviet proposals.

Arms for Egypt. They are making a massive move toward us. They have given us a big shopping list. There are two ways we can provide it. I don't want to give them high-visibility items. One way is third countries.
Schlesinger: There is no problem in doing this, only that it may have to become public.

Kissinger: We must be cold-blooded about it. We maybe can give high-visibility items to the Saudis and let them keep them there for a while.

NSSM 177. We must get going.

Schlesinger: Let's not do it in the DPRC. Let's do it in our SRG.

Kissinger: Okay. Set up a meeting to discuss the issue.

Schlesinger: Hewlett-Packard. You are in favor.

Kissinger: Yes. I want to know before it happens so I can get some political mileage.

Schlesinger: The sub SIOP briefing -- the briefing leaves out the political deficits.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

19 Mar. 74

H.R. Haldeman

The President to the Secretary of State:

I think these things will work out OK. They are playing it close to us. We should be patient.

S. (Signed) Haldeman

The President to the Secretary of State:

1. I want to get along a little better.

2. I don't want to go to the EEC summit unless it's April 7. We can't avoid it, so we'll have to go.

3. I want to get pressure on EEC to make Hungarians Central First.

4. Why make Strauss? It was

5. The Germans have promised consultation. The French have promised consultation.

6. We should put them in a position where they can't escape.

7. NATO military needs to make a European strategy.

8. We should also seek to strengthen the positions of Europe.

9. The British have agreed to help us.

10. I've told them that

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BY (NARA, DATE 8/14/84)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

We must have a military mission. It began two years ago.

S - White House,

K - I wouldn't have to. I don't think it should be done. It would have to be by agreement wanted to be by agreement.

S - I would tell them that they don't have to

K - You can't tell them that it's not in your

S - Can I tell Hubert about it and have him high confidence.

K - Yes.

S - Sure. We will send a letter.

K - OK.

S - Don't know if we can pay for it.

K - Effective shipment is going to be hard to get. We need to be firm on this issue.

S - How about 2 million for Greece?

K - Not that, but he is now.

Hubert would be in good position.

S - 9 million. Some would pay up. 5

K - Good story. Georgie told me early morning could make a decision on it.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S - Why should they fight?
R - What have some portion from Stalin
Replies satisfactorily realizing
this change of course.

S - Nothing else.
R - We have alleged a peace movement.
S - Must then proceed to talk.
R - Part was their fault.

R - We cannot continue that and are
stalled, defeated, etc. Our ME last
year & they had nothing to give
us - Arabs. So the peace arms
because they could not give & want
anything ahead.

S - Compare our values with

R - Some people think it's a success at end
of Oct, by not proceeding towards. They
have been involved.
S - So I think they will make an effort
in SALT

R - I think we could be more forthcoming
in SALT than on SALT

S - Can't agree. So some way in SALT
no in SALT - need expression.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S: I've heard several times about your SALT position. I don't quite completely, but it is thought to be a

K: (Kindsle is over) don't tell in our

S: - I think Viking

K: - How?

S: - We have all FASST, they attack

K: - Problem is if SASS want to trade it

S: - We can't get you

K: - We can't deal with PRS

S: - We can deal with MBIR

K: - But even if we did it in SALT, we don't have to do much more, just let it work out of range.

Why, since I can tell? SASS is the

Can put it into MBIR, but it

wouldn't

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

On my way to speaking this thing
MIRV's in by scenario talks.

K - This interesting.

S - We read and move on Condor
and P-0 on it.

K - May hold again State.

K - By whom.

S - Security basis, soon have to
start thinking. Endly agreed.

K - Don't let her bring it up,
but we will be.

K - Faisal and I. There are 2 hours
head, 500,000 after.

K - Let's see, every time the Arabs
don't like in connection to a
Turkish disregardment.

(Consider the possibility don't go
them inside - anybody in ME)

S - They important that we assume
12%, non-combat matters.
On what period, we want a positive role in the military, a permanent presence.

K in OX, F, B, C, we can try to put it in the NGPR. If they want to trade into a MIE deal, I will give it back.

For your thinking, if you want a MIE deal & we would not make it into the sell-out. I would go no further than to stick with your guidance.

Given for E, they are making an immense deal now toward the end. They went from quiet to doing something big. This way we can pursue, don't want to give them high visibility then.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S: There is no problem in doing this, and that it was done to become public (by community pressure)
K: I must let cold blood about it. We might even give Shape, remain silent, stone. A Sandie, let them keep them there faces with
S: NSSM-177, (c)Must it go on,
K: Let's just do it in NPR. Let's do it on S.R.
P: K: Yes, set upon meeting to amend existing.
S: Hand in Hand, I'm an in form.
K: Yes, I want to know what it takes to get some political mileage.
S: Set Scope higher. The briefing lines went a political subject.