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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
William E. Colby, Director, Central Intelligence
Adm. Thomas Moorer, Chairman, JCS
Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: March 8, 1974
PLACE: Map Room

Kissinger: The big issue is, the Syrians have given us a line. It's a big concession for them just to get one, and it isn't clear back to the '67 line. Israel has offered the October 6th line with the evacuated territory to go to the UN.

I am trying to work out whether Israel will go back of Kuneitra and a line just east of the settlements. Sadat has said if Israel gives up Kuneitra, he won't back the Syrians if they reject it.

Israel is worried about nothing in the budget for '75. Check on this.

We must make them strong enough not to get them defeated but not enough to let them flout us.

I would like them to think Schlesinger is a bastard and I am a good guy.

I can push them to the edge of the Golan settlements.

SECRET/XGDS

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 5 B [1, 3]
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
[Discussion of the P. D., breakout of grant and credit, going beyond 2.2. Decision probably half grant and let them technically default and go beyond 2.2].

Schlesinger: On Diego Garcia, you will have to talk to Mansfield.

Kissinger: Won't the Israelis support Diego?

Moorer: Some are saying it's the foot in the door; we just want to expand our presence.

Kissinger: Hussein feels he has to cut his losses on the West Bank. If he can't make a deal with Israel, he would turn it over to the PLO. He proposed a four-kilometer withdrawal. They rejected it because it was inconsistent with the Allon plan. If he dissociates, at least we could then contact the PLO without undermining him.

Sadat thinks the PLO can be more flexible than Hussein.

We will start bilateral talks with the Saudis across the whole spectrum. Faisal is ready -- he feels wounded that the Shah is getting too much.

We will do the same with Iran. The Saudis want to take Abu Dhabi.

Schlesinger: The Libyans want air defense equipment.

Kissinger: I will make it next week. I am in favor.

Sadat said if the Soviet Union gets a base in Libya, he will send troops in. He wants to hold up air defense until the oil conference is over.

On intelligence, you should make a noticeable step-up after the commissions are established.

If the Saudis order more than we think they need, give it, so he can pass it around.

In Cairo, we are in a sensitive phase. Don't be bureaucratic or demanding. Be forthcoming -- if we are not greedy, Sadat, I am sure, will show us everything.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
Moorer: On demining. We can have it done in 66 days. We may start any time. It'll take 66 days and $5.5 million. We will do it at no charge.

Colby: They have three SAM's in the limited armaments zone. We will have to show it.

Kissinger: Yes, we should be honest.

Colby: 3.3(b)(1) 3.3(b)(1)

Kissinger: OK. Let's do it.

Schlesinger: Basing. Let's go to Cyprus.

Kissinger: I agree.

Moorer: State has gone out to Turkey again.

Kissinger: I want Cyprus. Tell State.

Colby: Who should run it?

Schlesinger: It shouldn't be a black program.

Kissinger: That is right. Leave markings on the plane.

They better not have gone out to Turkey.

Moorer: We are restricted in flying recon out of Great Britain until 15 March.

Kissinger: I think the Wilson government will be more cooperative.

Schlesinger: TK material for the Germans, you have no problems?

Kissinger: I would like to send it to Bonn first. Then you can make it available to Leber.
Schlesinger: We would like to do it quickly so we can use it in MC-161.

Kissinger: The Europeans have no strategy. We have to create the impression that to cross us is at least as dangerous as to cross the French. We can't let the Europeans organize on an anti-American basis. We have a good opportunity now, with a new British government, and the Germans are weak. They wanted a European-Arab meeting. Imagine getting 20 Arab countries together! [What happened in Brussels].

If Europe gets the idea that their unity prevents them from talking to us, they will withdraw more and more from NATO into the EC.

We want to counter Europe by using NATO.

Schlesinger: NSDM 220.

Kissinger: Let's hold on it.

Schlesinger: Warhead hardening and safety.

Kissinger: Let's go ahead on safety and slow down on hardening.

Schlesinger: I agree.

Kissinger: How about intelligence?

Colby: They don't get much.

Kissinger: Can you give them nothing? The French will try to make it a personal feud. We must stick together.

[To Scowcroft]. Get Guay here before he goes to Cairo.

Moorer: The Portuguese?

Schlesinger: The NSSM is almost ready.

Kissinger: We have already given P-3's, etc.
Schlesinger: Hold it. Where does the money come from? We’re in trouble in Southeast Asia. We need $400 million for Cambodia -- where do we get it?

Colby: Can we help Vang Pao?

Schlesinger: How about drilling off Sakhalin?

Kissinger: OK.

Colby: The GVN is in economic trouble.

Schlesinger: We should get the Saudis to help.

Kissinger: Let’s get the Commission started first.

Colby: Here is a study.

Kissinger: Sadat and Asad both said to me they told the Soviet Union on the 4th and 5th of October respectively, about the decision to go to war.

How about the Soviet attitude in the Middle East?

Colby: They are trying to keep up with you.

Moorer: The French have designated a (Commander in Chief) of the Indian Ocean fleet. The British have said they would keep ships there.

Colby: It is important not to humiliate the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: I agree. What do we do? Even if they play it straight, their style will screw things up. I can pay them off with a summit at CSCE.

Colby: A nightmare would be to have Brezhnev thrown out.

Kissinger: That’s right. We have to be careful about what proposals we make.
Colby: We can't push them into a corner. Maybe the trade bill can help.

Schlesinger: Thailand.

Kissinger: Give me a week to think about it and we will meet again.

Colby: I want to get rid of Air America.

Can we give mapping satellite photos to Canada?

Kissinger and Schlesinger: No!

Colby: We will get U-2's in the Middle East as soon as possible.

Kissinger: Yes.

Schlesinger: You will talk to Mansfield about Diego.
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TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . . Note

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