

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

AUTHORITY 6013526, NLFMR 01-105, #7

BY PMH NARA, DATE 05/14/2002

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General John Wickham, Military Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, March 6, 1974
8:00 a. m.

PLACE: The Pentagon



Kissinger: The Energy Conference just meant that the Europeans were more afraid of me than of Jobert. But I knew that the Europeans would get back together soon afterwards and I made contingency plans. So I talked to the Saudis. I told him of the threat from the radical Arabs. I told him we would let him supply arms to the other Arabs. We set up three commissions -- economic, military, and political. We should do the same with the Shah.

Schlesinger: We are in trouble again on Turkey. The Embassy is trying to negotiate electronic warfare.

Kissinger: I have no objection to Clements going when we send a military mission.

Schlesinger: You should get Colby to break out the file on the oil companies. They had planned a bilateral set-up like you are planning [reading from cable].

Kissinger: Brent, get it for me.

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I want this tightly controlled. The lunch group, plus a WSAG-type working group.

Have State inform Sadat of the attache going. The Egyptian thing is like the Chinese three years ago but we have to play it right. The Soviet Union lost its position in Egypt by asking for things; Egypt felt the Soviet Union was using them. We shouldn't ask for privileges for quite a while.

Schlesinger: How about a port visit?

Kissinger: Not until after the President's visit in August. Egypt will break with the Soviet Union this year and we have to be ingenious about getting military equipment. Kuwait is making a \$1.80 million purchase for Egypt. We must handle it quickly as the equipment for Kuwait. Let the Saudis buy extra stuff so some can go to Egypt.

We must keep Israel so strong that the Arabs can't defeat them. If they could, we would lose our leverage.

I am now convinced that the Soviet Union didn't know of the October war.

The Soviet Union has gotten little from detente.

Europe is tough only because of detente -- because they don't know what we will do. If we went back to a tough line, the Europeans would come to the Soviet Union -- like they now go to the Arabs. That is the same with the liberals in Congress.


Wilson will cut defense, but at least they like the United States and are reluctant about the EC.

Schlesinger: Will they throw me out of Holy Loch?

Kissinger: No. Take it easy on the Brits.

I am convinced we must break the EC. The French are determined to unify them all against the United States. France even attacked us through Brazil. What could France ever get out of it?

Schlesinger: France has lost its sense of mission. All the elements do it because they think Paris wants it, but they don't have a goal in mind.



Kissinger: Everything the EC has been able to do in the last year has been against U.S. interests.

This meeting with the Arabs -- who would want to get twenty Arabs together? The conservatives will lose their maneuvering room with the radicals and the Europeans will support the radicals.

The fact that the EC didn't ask to see me on March 4 when I was in Brussels is an interesting phenomenon. Scheel met with me right before the meeting, and didn't tell me what was going to happen.

Schlesinger: Is Heath finished?

Kissinger: I think so. I think the Conservatives are out for six years.

Schlesinger: What do we do about the Europeans? I think we should pull some forces out.

Kissinger: Not yet. The consequences are too dangerous. But we must work on the Brits and Germans.

The President was going to Europe in April to sign two declarations. The NATO one is okay. The EC one is meaningless but we could accept. Now we are calling a halt on the EC one.

We should send a similar cable and a similar mission to Iran.


Let's concentrate on the French. We work with the British and push them toward the Germans. Let's try for awhile to work with the British.

Let me go to SALT

Someone has managed to implant in the public mind that you and I are split. I think most of the leaks on SALT have come out of Defense.

Schlesinger: Fred and Sy Weiss are close to the Jackson staff. [Wall Street Journal Editorial.]

I have said there are no divisions within the government.



Kissinger: I don't feel we are in conflict -- but it seems as if we were, the country couldn't stand it. The way this debate is going, the President is being put into a box -- that while Defense is wanting to build up our defense while Kissinger wants to give things away. Then if the President makes an agreement, he is giving things up.

Schlesinger: All our preference is for a permanent agreement. You think we can't get it and it would collapse the talks. We backed off and agreed to a NSDM -- but then there is an issue on bomber payload. It can't be treated as equivalent to missile payload.

Kissinger: That isn't what bothers me. I think Moorer is playing a cynical game.

Bomber throwweight is strategically different. It is okay for freedom-to-mix purposes.

From the Soviet point of view, they have gotten little from detente. What were their goals? To lull the United States, and weaken the alliance. The press in the United States is hard on Brezhnev -- for supporting Nixon.

Schlesinger: I don't want a SALT agreement which is disadvantageous. What do you want?

Kissinger: I want the sniping to stop and the line that only Defense is concerned with the national interest.

Schlesinger: Let's frizz up bomber throwweight. Bomber throwweight is subject to a number of special considerations, such as air defenses.

Kissinger: You and I need a long session next week so you know the range within which I am operating.

The Soviet Union is in desperate shape over the Middle East. Asad may want things the way they are -- but for the ceasefire, he would have counterattacked. But for Egypt, but for the Soviets' lack of support, and but for the U.S. Any line he agrees on he must then defend.

They can't possibly be in the same room with Israel. It just couldn't work.





If I can push Israel past the October 6 line and Kuneitra. I can get the other Arabs to push Asad and that would give him an excuse. There may be no second phase in Syria.

We have to try to keep the Soviet Union from wrapping everything into one grand negotiation.

Schlesinger: Can we get Saudi money into South Vietnam?

Kissinger: Let's get the embargo lifted and the commission set up first.

Faisal is jealous of the Shah and asked why we preferred him.

Let's get out a NSDM on the Saudi Commissions, and the luncheon group and working group. Put Treasury on the working group.

[He shows the Graham Martin cable on \$850 million aid for South Vietnam.]

Schlesinger: Thailand -- here is the problem. Their government in July is civilian. They will press for our withdrawal and won't let us keep a permanent base structure.

Kissinger: I am not sure your evidence is accurate. Is a new agreement necessary by summer?

Schlesinger: Yes. The civilian government is hostile. We must thin out around Bangkok.

Kissinger: Let's get the staff work done by Friday. We will talk at lunch. We need the Kintner reaction by then. We have to decide: (1) Should we talk to the Thais? (2) When? (3) And what magnitude of reduction?

Schlesinger: If we can agree with the Thai military on a base structure by July 1, the military can make it stick.

Kissinger: What about Suez mine clearance?

Schlesinger: You have to distinguish between mining and removing [explosives] ordnance. The removal of mines from the water we will do.

Kissinger: Sadat wants Egypt to see that the Americans are doing something. Could we do the dredging if there is no ordnance problem?

Schlesinger: I will have to check. It probably is illegal for Defense to pay.

Kissinger: What can we do to keep the Soviet Union happy? We have MBFR but that may be premature. CSCE is cheap. The Germans or French will probably give it away anyway and we should beat them.

Let's talk SALT next week.

Schlesinger: We must still watch Southeast Asia.

Kissinger: In many ways South Vietnam is the hinge of our foreign policy.

The personal assistant of Sadat will be here next week. Just tell him we will not let him down and we want to cooperate.

Schlesinger: I want to stop off in Iceland to give them love and kindness on the way to NATO.


We might contemplate making a Korean division mobile.



HAR/Schles

6 Mar

[1974]



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- R - Energy Conf just meant that Euros were more afraid of me than John. But I knew that the Euros would get back together soon after + I made contingency plans. So I talked to Sanchez. I told him of threat from Radical Arabs. Told him we would hit him supply drive to other Arabs. Left my 3 emissaries - econ, mil, pol. Should do some w/Stein
- S - as in trouble again on Turkey. The embassy is trying to negotiate electronic way.
- R - I have no objection to Kennedy going when we send a mil. mission.
- S - you should get Colby to break out a file on a bit company. They had planned a bilateral set up while you are planning (working case)
- R - Brent, get it for me. I want this tightly controlled. The bin Laden group, plus a CIA type working group. Have State inform Sadat of attack group. Egyptian thing is like Chinese 5 years ago but we have to play it right. We lost to Pakistan on E by asking for things E didn't feel SO was using them. We should not ask for permission for just a while

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BY PMH NARA, DATE 05/14/2012

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S - How about post visit?

K - Not until after Pres visit in Aug
I will meet w/ SV this year & we had
to be vigorous about getting military.
Kerwin is making \$150 purchase for E.
Hurdle is probably as equip for Kerwin
Let Sanders buy extraneous, so some
comes to E.

We must keep it so strong that Arabs
can't object them. If they would, we would
lose our leverage.

I am convinced SV didn't know of it
was.

SV has gotten little from detente.

Europe is tough only because of detente -
because they don't know what we will
do. If we want back to tough line, E and
would come to SV - like now to Arabs.

Some w/c liberals in Congress
who will not defend us but at least
they like US & are reluctant about
~~some~~ E.C.

S - Will they throw us out of Holy Land

K - No take it easy on Brits.

I am convinced we must break E.C. The
French are determined to unify against
US



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France even attracted more than Brazil.
What could France even get out of it?

S - France has lost its sense of mission.
All the elements do it because they
think Paris wants it, but they don't
have a good idea in mind.

K - Everything EC has been able to im-
port last year has been against US
interest.

This meeting w/ Arabs - who would
want to get 20 Arabs together? They
conservatives will be their maximum
w/ w/ radicals & the EC will
support the radicals.

But that EC didn't ask to get one or two
when I was in Buenos Aires is interesting
phenomenon.

I shall meet w/ one expert before meeting,
& didn't tell me what was going to happen.

S - Is Heath finished?

K - I think so. I think Conservatives are out
for a year.

S - What do we do about the EC. I think
we should pull the pieces out.

K - Not yet. Consequences too dangerous. Best



XV est - waffle statement that we remain
committed to take similar action.

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we must work on B + W issues.
Powers going to E in April to sign 2
declarations. NATO and R. E. are
meaningless but we could accept, have
we calling halt on E. one.

K - we should send similar cable to
similar mission to T. one.

Let's concentrate on French, work w/ B
+ push them toward Germans. Let's
try for a while to work w/ B.

Let me go to SALT -

Someone has managed to trumpet in
public that you and I are split. I think
most of the leaks on SALT have come out of
Defense.

S - Ford + Wess are close to Jackson staff
→ (Wall Street Journal editorial)
I have said there are no openings w/in
1 year.

K - I don't feel we are in conflict - but even
if we were, country couldn't stand it.

The way this debate is going, Pres is
being put under a box that will
Defense is wanting to build up
which wants to gain things along.

They T. here if Powers agreement, he
is going things up



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J - All our performance is for personal
agreement. You think we can't get
it & it would collapse talks.
We backed off & agreed to N.S.I.M. - but
there is issue in brother payload.
Can't be treated as equivalent to
missile payload.

K - That isn't what brothers want. I
think Moscow playing a cynical
game.

Brother's thinking is ^{strategically} ~~diff~~
different. It is OK for payload miss
payloads.

From S & point of view they have gotten
little from detente. What ^{can} ~~do~~ their
goal? Kill US, weaken allies.

Press in US is hard on Bez - for
supporting dixer.

J - I don't want a SALT agreement which
is disadvantageous. What do you
want?

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K- I want shipping to stop & rethink
that only Ref is concerned w/ a
total interest.

S- Let's fugg up bumper thru night.
Bumper thru night is subject to
a transfer of special considerations,
some have been addressed

K- You & I need long ~~studies~~ studies
So ~~to~~ you know range w/in
which I'm writing.

SU is in desperate shape over ME.
Coal may want things & every thing
are - but for US to avoid home
country attached

- Best for E
- Best for SU lack of support
- Best for H.

Any time he agrees on he must
then defend.

They can't possibly be in a same
room w/ I. It just couldn't work.



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K - If I can push I paid Oct 6 bill
& Amtrak, I can get certain Amks
to push Assad + that would give
him our excuse.

There may be no Assad phase
in Syria.

We have to try to keep SU from
wrapping everything into our general
negotiations.

S - Can we get Saudi money with SWK

K - Let's get embargo lifted + Commission
set up first.

Faisal is fed up of the Shah + what
why are preferred him.

Get out X SDNI on Saudi Commission.
Cheremine group + working group.
Part Mission on working group

→ (Martin cabinet \$50 million
aid).

S - Thailand. Here is problem. Thai
Govt in July is critical. They will
press for withdrawal + won't let us keep



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permanent base structure.
K - I am not sure your evidence is accurate. Is new agreement necessary by summer?

S - Yes, Cambodian part is hostile. We must thin out around Bangkok.

→ { Past staff work done by Friday
Talk at lunch

Get Hunter reaction by _____

(1) Should we talk to Thavis

(2) When

(3) What requirements of structure.

(S) You can agree with their wishes on base structure by July 1, the military can advise it strike)

K - Say ~~downing~~ mine clearance.

S - Distinguish between mining & removing (defensive) ordnance.

Removal of mines from water we will do.

K - Sacket wants E to see that Americans care during something.



Resistant - is it still resistant?

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R - Could we do a deal - if there is no ordinance problem

S - I will have to check.

It probably illegal for defense to pay.

K - What can we do to help CSU buy NATO, but may be purchase CSCE is cheap. Communists & French will probably give it away anyway & we should have them.

Let's talk SAKI next week.

S - We must still watch SEA

K - In many ways SON is bridge of our foreign policy.

Personnel next of Sakat be here next week. Just tell him we will not let him down & want to cooperate.

S - I want to stop off in Iceland to give them best & kindness one way & NATO.

We might contemplate making Korean division mobile

