MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General John Wickham, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, March 6, 1974
8:00 a.m.

PLACE: The Pentagon

Kissinger: The Energy Conference just meant that the Europeans were more afraid of me than of Jobert. But I knew that the Europeans would get back together soon afterwards and I made contingency plans. So I talked to the Saudis. I told him of the threat from the radical Arabs. I told him we would let him supply arms to the other Arabs. We set up three commissions -- economic, military, and political. We should do the same with the Shah.

Schlesinger: We are in trouble again on Turkey. The Embassy is trying to negotiate electronic warfare.

Kissinger: I have no objection to Clements going when we send a military mission.

Schlesinger: You should get Colby to break out the file on the oil companies. They had planned a bilateral set-up like you are planning [reading from cable].

Kissinger: Brent, get it for me.
I want this tightly controlled. The lunch group, plus a WSAG-type working group.

Have State inform Sadat of the attaché going. The Egyptian thing is like the Chinese three years ago but we have to play it right. The Soviet Union lost its position in Egypt by asking for things; Egypt felt the Soviet Union was using them. We shouldn't ask for privileges for quite a while.

Schlesinger: How about a port visit?

Kissinger: Not until after the President's visit in August. Egypt will break with the Soviet Union this year and we have to be ingenious about getting military equipment. Kuwait is making a $1.80 million purchase for Egypt. We must handle it quickly as the equipment for Kuwait. Let the Saudis buy extra stuff so some can go to Egypt.

We must keep Israel so strong that the Arabs can't defeat them. If they could, we would lose our leverage.

I am now convinced that the Soviet Union didn't know of the October war.

The Soviet Union has gotten little from detente.

Europe is tough only because of detente -- because they don't know what we will do. If we went back to a tough line, the Europeans would come to the Soviet Union -- like they now go to the Arabs. That is the same with the liberals in Congress.

Wilson will cut defense, but at least they like the United States and are reluctant about the EC.

Schlesinger: Will they throw me out of Holy Loch?

Kissinger: No. Take it easy on the Brits.

I am convinced we must break the EC. The French are determined to unify them all against the United States. France even attacked us through Brazil. What could France ever get out of it?

Schlesinger: France has lost its sense of mission. All the elements do it because they think Paris wants it, but they don't have a goal in mind.
Kissinger: Everything the EC has been able to do in the last year has been against U.S. interests.

This meeting with the Arabs -- who would want to get twenty Arabs together? The conservatives will lose their maneuvering room with the radicals and the Europeans will support the radicals.

The fact that the EC didn't ask to see me on March 4 when I was in Brussels is an interesting phenomenon. Scheel met with me right before the meeting, and didn't tell me what was going to happen.

Kissinger: Is Heath finished?

Kissinger: I think so. I think the Conservatives are out for six years.

Schlesinger: What do we do about the Europeans? I think we should pull some forces out.

Kissinger: Not yet. The consequences are too dangerous. But we must work on the Brits and Germans.

The President was going to Europe in April to sign two declarations. The NATO one is okay. The EC one is meaningless but we could accept. Now we are calling a halt on the EC one.

We should send a similar cable and a similar mission to Iran.

Let's concentrate on the French. We work with the British and push them toward the Germans. Let's try for awhile to work with the British.

Let me go to SALT . . . .

Someone has managed to implant in the public mind that you and I are split. I think most of the leaks on SALT have come out of Defense.

Schlesinger: Fred and Sy Weiss are close to the Jackson staff. [Wall Street Journal Editorial.]

I have said there are no divisions within the government.
Kissinger: I don’t feel we are in conflict -- but it seems as if we were, the country couldn’t stand it. The way this debate is going, the President is being put into a box -- that while Defense is wanting to build up our defense while Kissinger wants to give things away. Then if the President makes an agreement, he is giving things up.

Schlesinger: All our preference is for a permanent agreement. You think we can’t get it and it would collapse the talks. We backed off and agreed to a NSDM -- but then there is an issue on bomber payload. It can’t be treated as equivalent to missile payload.

Kissinger: That isn’t what bothers me. I think Moorer is playing a cynical game.

Bomber throwweight is strategically different. It is okay for freedom-to-mix purposes.

From the Soviet point of view, they have gotten little from detente. What were their goals? To lull the United States, and weaken the alliance. The press in the United States is hard on Brezhnev -- for supporting Nixon.

Schlesinger: I don’t want a SALT agreement which is disadvantageous, What do you want?

Kissinger: I want the sniping to stop and the line that only Defense is concerned with the national interest.

Schlesinger: Let’s frizz up bomber throwweight. Bomber throwweight is subject to a number of special considerations, such as air defenses.

Kissinger: You and I need a long session next week so you know the range within which I am operating.

The Soviet Union is in desperate shape over the Middle East. Asad may want things the way they are -- but for the ceasefire, he would have counterattacked. But for Egypt, but for the Soviets’ lack of support, and but for the U.S. Any line he agrees on he must then defend.

They can’t possibly be in the same room with Israel. It just couldn’t work.
If I can push Israel past the October 6 line and Kuneitra, I can get the other Arabs to push Assad and that would give him an excuse. There may be no second phase in Syria.

We have to try to keep the Soviet Union from wrapping everything into one grand negotiation.

Schlesinger: Can we get Saudi money into South Vietnam?

Kissinger: Let's get the embargo lifted and the commission set up first.

Faisal is jealous of the Shah and asked why we preferred him.

Let's get out a NSDM on the Saudi Commissions, and the luncheon group and working group. Put Treasury on the working group.

[He shows the Graham Martin cable on $850 million aid for South Vietnam.]

Schlesinger: Thailand -- here is the problem. Their government in July is civilian. They will press for our withdrawal and won't let us keep a permanent base structure.

Kissinger: I am not sure your evidence is accurate. Is a new agreement necessary by summer?

Schlesinger: Yes. The civilian government is hostile. We must thin out around Bangkok.

Kissinger: Let's get the staff work done by Friday. We will talk at lunch. We need the Kintner reaction by then. We have to decide: (1) Should we talk to the Thais? (2) When? (3) And what magnitude of reduction?

Schlesinger: If we can agree with the Thai military on a base structure by July 1, the military can make it stick.

Kissinger: What about Suez mine clearance?

Schlesinger: You have to distinguish between mining and removing (explosives) ordnance. The removal of mines from the water we will do.
Kissinger: Sadat wants Egypt to see that the Americans are doing something. Could we do the dredging if there is no ordnance problem?

Schlesinger: I will have to check. It probably is illegal for Defense to pay.

Kissinger: What can we do to keep the Soviet Union happy? We have MBFR but that may be premature. CSCE is cheap. The Germans or French will probably give it away anyway and we should beat them.

Let's talk SALT next week.

Schlesinger: We must still watch Southeast Asia.

Kissinger: In many ways South Vietnam is the hinge of our foreign policy.

The personal assistant of Sadat will be here next week. Just tell him we will not let him down and we want to cooperate.

Schlesinger: I want to stop off in Iceland to give them love and kindness on the way to NATO.

We might contemplate making a Korean division mobile.
WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

K - I was very glad you said that Eisenhower was spending some time in Berlin.

B - I am sure that the Fiihrer would get back together soon after the 24th.-

P - Well, I see... I think I hear that he's at a meeting right now. Tell him we would like him to get back together soon.

S - Yes, on that. Again on Turkey. The ambiguity is trying to make it better between 10-24.

K - Well, you have a decision to make now of what we would like to do. I really do not know what you are planning.

S - Yes, that is quite true. We have a lot of work to do.

H - German, get it done.

K - Could you possibly give me a little more on our position.

H - I think that we should be working on the 24th. We have an idea of where our position is.

S - Yes, that is quite true. We should be working on that.

H - I think that we should be working on that. We should be able to find a position for you.

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY EXISTED: NARA, DATE 05/12/2012

BY: NARA, DATE 05/12/2012
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S: How about just visit? 
K: Not until after the war is over, but I will make a visit some time this year. We have to be generous about getting the people back home to make it as much fun as possible. Washington is making a 100 million for $1. Meanwhile, we are being for Kennedy, but we can't have that. There is a problem of the way to some camps. 
K: We almost forget the things that are not of interest. If they would, we could stop some of them. 
S: Some criminals are admitted from the East. 
K: We have given back from abroad. 
S: There is no way to be sure. 
K: Europe is temporarily because of different reasons. They don't know what we will do. The more we can do, the better the world. 
S: Would you like to have a dollar? 
K: We should not interfere. We'll have to keep it as long as possible because US can do without it.
S: What training do you need today? 
K: No. The training is easy. 
S: We need them and we don't want to have to. The thing we are interested in is to stay. The US.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

France have cut off their Brazil. What will France try to get out of it?

9. France have cut off their Brazil.

All I think they do it because they think Paris wants it, but they don't have a good mind.

K - Everything's been quiet in France, they done against US antibody.

This stopping us here - are you going to get to cross together? The US forces will be then maximum soon if GAMECIAL is ENSWELL stop to radicals.

But that ENSWELL didn't agree to see me on any other than British interests in this country.

Shouldn't we have some input before only, + shouldn't talk about what we're going to happen.

S - Hasn't started?

K - I think so. I think our mistakes are not for sale.

S - What are we doing to ENSWELL. I think we shouldn't tell them forces at

K - Not yet. Interpreted the dangers. Best
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Reagan on Euskay [Euskat] to sign 2
child labor, NATO and E. E. with
meanings but ask to accept, how-
we both held in the past.

K - Are you still sending similar lists
similar manner to Euskat.

I also understood that French, West/G.
+ push their French Germans, lists
They plan for a total in March.

Let me get to S.P.A.

Someone has managed to implement in
police that you will be right. I think
most of all these have come out of

Defense.

S - Earl + Andrew with Clark to Jackson stuff
+ (State staff general editrial)

I have heard this on no paper in C.C.

K - I don't feel too in guilty but enough
haven't been any change of it. I
think this debate is going. They is
bracket with it to take that which.

Think about your things along.

Keep the B. Pointed agreement, he
so many things up.
I - All our problems in the front agreement, I think we can't get it - it will be lengthy. We'll make off a deal to resume - but there is some who are keen on pushing. Can be tried as equivalent to

K - That is not difficult. We'll probably

think. Never playing a cyclic game.

Previously, things were different. It is OK for positive mix of processes.

From a point of view, they have gotten little from Britain. What is their goal? To kill US, our own? None. They in US is hard on us - they...

I - I don't want a bad agreement which...

is detrimental. What do you want?
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

I want to bring up the subject of the
that only I am concerned with

5 - I think it's a matter of

Brecker-ism is subject to
a breach in its old

K - you and I need to keep

so that your - be aware of
which is apparent

S V is in keeping with the ME

They may want to go this way -

- but in the small house

- but for E

- but for the S V lack of support

- but for us

Any but the arguing on the want

Then it could possibly be even more

11 I - if just couldn't run.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- If I can push, I think it's b/c + Amin & I can get 2 big ads to push Saudi + that would give him an issue.

- There may be no sound plan in Reagan.

- We have to try to help N from zapping everything with our sound negotiations.

S - Can we get Saudi money with S/W
K - Let's get the large S/W + Commission out of tail.
    - Faisal is feeling that going to Saudi is too why we preferred him.

- Cut out N.S. on any Saudi Commission.

- Kuwait or whatever from N.

- Have to get Saudi $50 million.

- Things O, have to get 30, Faisal can't take R, 60, is within. They will push for if demand + won't let us feel
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

K - I don't see why we can't agree in principle. Is there agreement
necessary by summer?
S - Yes, General, we need to be in position to move them out around Bangkok.
But still work and try.

Talk at lunch.

Our meeting at Truman

Wilton and Lake Thayer

(c) future

2. What sanctions are we using?
3. How quickly can we prepare the military for these sanctions by July?
4. The military can manage it, etc.

K - Long decision mine clearance.

S - Destabilization between United States and China. Recommend by the 15th of August.

K - Socket wants E to talk to American.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

K - Are you going to delay the signing of the
agreement?
S - I will have to consult.
K - That is all I can do to keep you happy.
S - The United States will not agree
with that. We cannot agree
with that.
K - The United States will probably agree in any
way.

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We must undertake something,
don't we?