MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:  
President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Bipartisan Congressional Leadership

DATE AND TIME:  
Monday, January 21, 1974
10:00 - 11:40 a.m.

PLACE:  
The Cabinet Room

SUBJECT:  
Bipartisan Leadership Meeting on the Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement

President: Welcome back to the new session. Welcome back, John Scali. There will be two meetings this week - one on the Middle East today and one on energy on Wednesday. We moved the State of the Union to the 30th because of the Women's National Press Club.

We don't know when the oil embargo might be lifted. Henry will cover that, plus the Egyptian agreement.

Kissinger: First, let me go over what our strategy has been. The conflict at the end of October had found us on one side, the Arabs with Soviet backing on the other side, and the oil embargo. We were a potential enemy to the Arabs; Israel was in a trauma digging in on the new lines they had taken. The debate in the UN was whether Israel should withdraw five kilometers, and Israel refused. Even had they done it, the situation would not have been substantially changed. The military situation was very unstable and the possibility of renewed war was high.

At this point, the President decided we should cooperate with the Soviet Union and set up the Geneva Conference.

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Resolution 242 means different things to different parties. The problem with a general conference is that the Soviet Union would take an intransigent position which the Arabs would have to support and there would be a deadlock. Instead, we decided to move by stages within a comprehensive framework. None of this could have been done without President Sadat. He is a wise leader. He was willing to talk with Israel at Kilometer 101 and to trust us.

President: Compare Nasser and Sadat. Nasser had a mystique but he was persona non grata with conservative Arabs. He had to take radical positions on Israel, and after the Aswan Dam, with the United States. We underestimated Sadat -- because he didn't have the charisma. But he didn't have the debt to the radicals, the utter hatred of Israel, etc. Egypt is a non-oil state, yet he can lead the Arabs.

Kissinger: Nasser was a pan-Arabist; Sadat is an Egyptian nationalist, yet Sadat is better able to lead the Arabs. Nasser scared the Saudis silly. There are three levels of Arab problems: the Arab-Israeli problem itself; the internal political conditions in each country; and the relations to other Arab countries. For example, Asad described the internal problems he had moving in directions like Sadat was going -- they are enormous. Without Sadat having moved, there would be no chance.

In November I told Sadat that if he wanted enforcement of Resolution 339, he could get it with a great deal of pain; but if he would work with us, we thought we could get a major move; with some effort, a real disengagement. To Sadat's credit, he didn't know whether he could pull it off -- neither did I. Golda had been tough here. We had 2:00 a.m. meetings at the Blair House.

President: Henry usually doesn't mind that.

Kissinger: [Joke about making love to Golda and her having shingles.] We told Sadat that we wanted to get this major movement with the consent of Israel, not by raping her -- and nothing could be done prior to the Israeli elections. So we needed time to convert Israel. Also we needed it to educate Egypt as to what was possible. For six weeks we engaged in academic debates with both sides. Israel said they would win another war. We said, even so, where are you? And for us, it was a dead end street. We finally convinced them to develop a plan of their own. Dayan then came over with a plan -- this was done willingly. We kept both sides fully informed.
The present Israeli political situation is bad. Her coalition must include parties opposed to each other and to withdrawal. The Geneva talks were working themselves into a deadlock. The President decided we needed to get things moving. Dayan said he had two problems: to get the plan approved by the Cabinet and to get it considered at a level in Egypt where it wouldn't be rejected as a test of manhood.

There was a big risk in my going; we didn't know it would work. The original plan was to get a plan first and present it to Egypt and finalize it at Geneva. But Sadat said: "Why not finish it now so it won't bog down?" He said he was willing to give more to get it done faster.

I won't go into the details, but at some point the negotiations they stopped being enemies and became collaborators in a common objective. One other point was that when political leaders agreed on a point, they asked me to take these points to their respective military. They exploded in each case, and were overruled by Golda and Sadat.

There was no way this agreement could have been reached bilaterally. Each could say things to us to pass that they couldn't say directly.

[Secretary Kissinger went to the map on the easel and described the agreement.]

There is a zone of limited armaments. Each side refused to discuss its deployments with the other side. We decided that the United States would make a proposal to each, which they would sign. Neither of them had to say they had accepted limitations proposed by the other. The legal status of this is not that we are guarantors; we just generated the paper and it is attached to the agreement. It should be kept secret for the moment. The key is that the limitations remove any offensive capability -- please do not reveal this -- but neither can reach the other side with weapons. So, neither one can attack the other without warning, and each war in this area has started with a surprise attack.

Next, both wanted assurances they were reluctant to get directly. We have, however, made each party aware of the understandings with the other. None of these are obligations of the United States. For example: Bab el Mandeb [he described how it went.] Another was on how the UN would inspect. Each side wanted the UN forces to have liaison officers of the side being inspected. We also said we opposed any unilateral...
removal of UN forces. Another was: informal assurances of no howitzers which could reach Port Said. Another -- please keep this secret -- we told both of them we would give them reconnaissance photos of the lines. Flights will be made with the acquiescence of each.

One could almost feel the change in attitude between the sides as the talks went on. For example, Kabrit, and the Israeli dead. Five days were set aside for technical discussions -- they were all settled yesterday. This mood is very significant.

The next moves relate to Syria and Jordan. The Syrians were beside themselves that Egypt would make a separate agreement, and appealed to other Arabs. They said this would freeze the situation. Sadat asked to let him go to Syria before me. There was an enormous difference between my first and second visits. It was a painful meeting, but they did produce a plan -- it was unacceptable, but at least it was a plan. We also worked out a face-saving way they could start talks with Israel. Asad asked me to stop in Israel to give them the plan. It is a start. I believe if we can get disengagement schemes worked out, the sides can't get at each other, and we will have changed the psychological climate. After this is done, we will go to Egypt to move toward a final settlement and let them be the pacesetters. We must be careful not to push out the Soviet Union -- we will use Geneva to get their involvement and we have kept them partially informed.

An overall settlement will be a painful process -- with much emotion, but this is a start. Both the Israeli and Egyptian press have been positive.

Now on energy -- we should say nothing publicly. That would prevent movement. The problem now is that Arab disunity makes it hard to get an agreement among them to lift the embargo. But Sadat is on a trip now to get the lifting. We hope he will succeed but we don't know when. We are optimistic but we must not predict it. It can't be lifted as a favor to the U.S. but for their own motives.

President: Without the disengagement, there is no chance of lifting of the embargo. With it, there is a chance, but we can make no prediction as to when and how. The Arabs must make the decision -- and not as the result of an American pressure ploy. The embargo has been on our minds in these negotiations. The disengagement is more important in the long term, but I know the concerns of your constituents. We have removed the major impediment, and we are in contact with all of them, but we have no predictions.
Albert: Is the problem an objection because we provided arms to Israel?

Kissinger: That is now overcome.

President: The fact that we brought about the disengagement tends to wash out the arms thing. The radical Arabs could say there can be no lifting of the embargo before a final settlement is reached, or at least until further movement. That was a major point.

Kissinger: That is no longer a major point. The President's position was that we wanted to move in the Middle East but not in a way to give in to Arab blackmail. The difference between the U.S. and others, is that they can only give arms and only we can deliver.

Fulbright: It's a remarkable job.

President: I want to leave you with no illusions about anything. This is a big step. I knew the fact that three months ago that Syria would receive Kissinger was unthinkable -- only Iraq is more radical.

Kissinger: Asad jokes about pursuing an anti-Soviet policy.

President: On energy, we hope we have made constructive progress, but there is nothing to predict. On the long-term settlement -- it will involve Jerusalem, the question of the '67 lines, etc. The U.S. will use its constructive influence toward a long-term settlement. We will continue to use our influence with all the states in the area.

Kissinger: I would not use the word "interim agreement," "Separation of forces," "okay, "preliminary" -- just not "interim," because it has special connotation.

President: Another point regards the Soviet Union. It is not useful to brag about the Soviet Union being cut out. Had the Soviet Union moved to prevent this agreement, we would have had a problem. The line is the Soviet Union has been kept informed. We think their interest as well as ours is served by this.

One other point -- not only will peace take time but the American presence, and capability, are of great substance. Lots of people have ideas for a settlement, but only we can do it -- so our strength and diplomacy is very important.
Peace doesn’t come because men of goodwill want it, but only when both sides have more to gain by moving peacefully than by war. We have demonstrated that another war would be dangerous to world peace -- both sides know they suffered badly. We also demonstrated that the U.S. wants nothing in the way of territory and domination over any one. We are respected and we amount to something. That is why we got what we now have. I look forward to good relations with every Arab state. The Middle East is the Balkans for the 1970s and very dangerous. We need a constructive relationship with all of the parties. But we don’t want to irritate the Soviet Union; we just want to play a constructive role.

Kissinger: If the Soviet Union wants peace, peace in the Middle East is not directed against the Soviet Union -- only if they want turmoil in the Middle East.

President: We have had long talks with the Soviet Union on the Middle East. Both of us know it is important to each, but neither side wants a confrontation there.
2. Inadequate fact base is most important. Welcome back, Senji.

4. I made the mistake of assuming that once the
   operation was under way, it could not be
   stopped. Even though the situation had been
   substantially changed, the outcome was not
   inevitable. We could not
   control events in a comprehensive
   manner.

5. We could have done better with
   Senji. He
   would have been a better
   choice. But he
   didn't have the
   experience.

6. Senji was not the right person to
   lead. He
   needed someone
   else.
There are 3 kinds of Arab problems: the problematic
the immediate political situation in each country,
and relations to other Arab countries.

For example, Arab读后感s in response to Arab
motions in the UN. Of course, the War in
is a factor having spread, this cannot be no
because

In War I told Sadat to be wanted & implement
of 389 he would get it w/pain, but if he would
feel this, we thought we could get a much
more w/some objection and disagreement.

Sadat at least he didn't know whether to read
st & if justify to 2. Other have been tough
here - 2 men more

I scarcely doesn't mind that

John about God making his other things
I tell Sadat that we wanted to get this kind
of agreement w/Saudi, but by saying the
stuff could be done from T & Egypt. We needed
them to conv. in & if the 2 countries can be
for 2 who we engaged in a strange kind of work.
I said - they would come another way cold
head, even so, what are you? And going at
a dead end street, we finally rumored them
to they of their own. They then come
with as a plan - time of less willingness &
what they will fully expected.

By what I political at War, then coalition must
and that failed to be fully expected.

Consul taken this morning, understand
P因素 in the Middle get things wrong. By end
and he had 2 reports; got plans not approved by him
at get it considered at that in E while it wouldn't
be rejected as too much. Thus writing
with in my going, we didn't know it would
work. One plan was to get plan present +
present at the finish & at once. So at said
when we finish at hour on it didn't by then.
Said the was nothing to your move it get it
soon faster.
I wrote into details, but at time joint in
recognition they stayed being because we became
collaborators in a common objective. Another
point was that when put under pressure no
point them asked me to tell them points to vary
nothing. They exploded to more extended by
General Shank.
There was no way this agreement could have
turned decided substantially. Each could say things
To see If not that they couldn't stop clearly,
(Gin the same). (Describe - settlement).
Suggested I discuss to Ed
could joint accomplish. Each joint it shows
sign to final announcement to. Ed enough it shows
sign to final announcement to. We claimed that GS
would move prepared to which they would sign.

"In the days that they had accepted declaration
prepared by written "Legal declaration of time it cost
that we are人民政府, we just generate"
"fear of it is attached to" agreement should
not kept public for a moment. The key is that
a declaration cannot offensive capability. Peace
should access, but within can much other thing
at all. So, neither can attack a moment
which was been has started of surprise attack.
With, other counted announcement they were confident
to go directly. We been known, malicious
pity am:ous of understanding. We've been doing this over the years. For example: Bob and Mark (two of the crew) would put together a list of things they could make. Then, they would go out and buy everything they needed. Each would also bring a tool box to make sure they had everything they needed.

Another trick was to have a list of potential tools that could be used in the project. They would then work together to make sure they had everything they needed. This would ensure that they could complete the project with ease.

In conclusion, by following these tips, you can ensure that you have everything you need to complete a project successfully.
An even smaller settlement will be painful press-wise, but this is a start. Both I and E have been fighting.

War on many— we should say nothing publicly. That would prevent movement. I think it will take 2 1/2-3 days to get agreement to lift embargoes. We told Soviet we are in a hurry, we want lifting. We hope we will succeed but don't know. We optimistically hope we won't, but can't pretend it. Can't be judged as favor of US but for their own interests.

B A very important— we can't have lifting. Object, in the event of a change, but no judgment to do this. The Arabs want to make a decision — not as result of US pressure. Embracing has been in our minds in this situation. Disengagement more important in long term, but a firm cause of Greece, etc. We have removed major element that we in contact with, but no judgment.

A problem on settlement demanded and provided

Download a remarkable job.
From this point on, I must be clear again of my
intention about anything. This is a very slight
limitation. Egypt would receive $2 billion in loans.

We have a very strong relationship.

Regarding the redid., I am not keeping any new
information. I am keeping the Suez Canal.

The US will use economic influence to
continue the war efforts. We will continue to work
cooperatively.

I would not use a word in news agreements.

This is to prevent any Pakistani - meaning the
Eagles will not be discussing.

This is not to bring about
any thing out. Had any would permit this
agreement we would have had a problem line is
US kept informed. We think the United States
will see this. The

This point - nothing will price Cuba. First our
U.S. presence, capability. We are not discussing
how to have influence for settlement, but only
we can do it - to even strength a diplomacy
is very important.

Peace doesn't come because we are at
peace. Good will want it, but it won't work.

We have never been by reducing your position
by now. We have demonstrated another
way and the dangers we would persist to whole peace. Both
states know they suffered badly. We are determined
to U.S. entire settling in ways of limiting
elements and anyone. We are expected to our
accord to something that is only our thought.
We have been long friends in good relations. We are in a balance of 1920's & 70's dynamics. The need for our relationship is/with all of parties. But we don’t want to initiate SC; we just want to play a constructive role.

If SC were to preclude us in MI, we must direct action against SC—only if the move threatens MC.

We have had long talks SC, on SC. Both novel in an important reach, but within reach, we understand there.