

Scowcroft

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED

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MR 07-113, #5; OSMK JAW. 3/8/04

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

BY dal NARA DATE 11/6/08

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, January 8, 1974
8:00 a.m. - Breakfast meeting

PLACE: The Pentagon

Schlesinger: I may skip the dinner for the Aussie Defense Minister.

Kissinger: Why is Gayler going there? But Rush and Ingersoll are going through.

Schlesinger: Maybe I am too tough.

Kissinger: We can allow ourselves to be knocked around.

Schlesinger: The European press has been favorable to you recently. Adelbert Weinstein said it.

Kissinger: He is a leading military commentator. We are sending a Presidential letter tonight on oil consultation - to the consuming countries. And one to the producers on Thursday. For the energy conference.

Schlesinger: You know about our deal with Saudi Arabia for the 6th and 7th Fleet? 200,000 barrels per day. That is more than enough.

I am getting sick of the Arabs, lording it over their former bosses.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS



~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Kissinger: They are behaving badly. Your people told Dinitz that all supplies are a political position. We have got to give Israel some security for a withdrawal. We can easier give them things now rather than if there's a deadlock.

Schlesinger: We must get some things from production. But we are getting a \$200 million package moving.

Kissinger: That is not their impression.

Schlesinger: We will move. I agree with you.

Kissinger: Dayan has now given us a plan for a disengagement.

[He describes the proposal.] It has soft spots. (1) They'll allow only two battalions on the East Bank. (2) The restrictions west of the Canal. (3) The Israeli line west of the passes. We have problems: introducing the proposal into Geneva, and the Russians getting in.

My fear is if the Soviet Union wants to play rough, they can demand 20 more kilometers, etc. The Israelis are giving up almost everything, without reciprocity. No one knows of the plan -- except Israeli leaking. I may go out this week and try to settle it. I think we are within reach of success. We have managed it fairly well.

Schlesinger: We will get the equipment moving.

Kissinger: Give them the sense of movement, we can always slow up on delivery.

Schlesinger: But they ask for things like 2,000 Condors, etc. We are giving them 1500 tanks, etc.

Dayan is not very smart.

Kissinger: Rabin is their smart general.

Schlesinger: Diego Garcia. We have mentioned to Great Britain access to Diego and enriched uranium, but we will sit until we get access.

Kissinger: We now have a formal request for Super Antelope. They have a continuing record of stupidity.



Schlesinger: It's a dumb decision. It is only a hardened warhead, and we can control their testing for the next six years. They will need Polaris too.

Kissinger: Talk them out of Poseidon.

Schlesinger: I suggested they test in Australia, and they were very upset. The Aussies won't let them.

Kissinger: Heath is basically anti-American and doesn't like the President. It is a tragedy what is happening in Europe. Look at what they have done since before World War I. Two wars for crappy pieces of territory.

The Japanese I understand -- they know they have no alternative to us. They told me the Europeans send them a note every two weeks, warning them away from the U. S.

But having said all this, I would like to start up with Galley. He is one we can work with, and then at some time all of them can say you bastards, you talk about unity and then you go this bilateral route with us.

Schlesinger: The French are the worst bastards.

Kissinger: Rose writes the same kind of reports as Kosciusco-Morizet does from here -- you know they have to write all the same way to keep their jobs.

The French are unadulterated bastards. They haven't had a sensible Foreign Policy since Talleyrand. France's advantage was they were the only great unified country vis-a-vis Germany and Italy. Napoleon III sent troops to Italy to unite it; and then he backed Prussia against Austria. They pissed away 300 years of French diplomacy for nothing.

Schlesinger: Germany is like in the 30 years war.

Kissinger: Jobert is trapped between Pompidou, with no sense for foreign policy, and his foreign office. Let us send Foster to talk to Galley about doing something moderate.

Schlesinger: I want to lean on Belgium and the Dutch not to buy the French plane for replacement for F-104.

How about Ethiopian bases?



Kissinger: I told them to move out. I agree on the Dutch and Belgians.

The Europeans are tawdry. DeGaulle had to give up the French Empire, but he decided he would overcome the frustrations by focusing on Europe.

Schlesinger: Cromer is coming to say goodbye today.

Kissinger: I would lay it in to him, and hard. So he can take it back home.

Schlesinger: NSDM 169.

Kissinger: It is with the President. On acquisition, we must formally keep control, although we won't press you on it.

Schlesinger: We put a number of strategic items in the budget, but the targeting is the intellectual problem.

Kissinger: This sets our strategic policy for years. The President must read it thoroughly.

Schlesinger: I will take the flak. On operational launch.

Kissinger: You may make Defense something more than a logistics boor.

SALT. The JCS thank we gave something away in SALT I. That is nuts. We gave up nothing.

Schlesinger: There's no problem defending SALT I.

Kissinger: There is an obsession with equal aggregates.

Schlesinger: Congress' attitude on the Defense budget is changing.

Kissinger: The Chiefs oppose a MIRV ban.

Schlesinger: We don't want a partial agreement which militates against long-run essential equivalence. Gimmicks are okay.

Kissinger: What I think is attainable -- I don't understand the obsession with reduction of launchers. That compounds vulnerability.



Schlesinger: I agree.

Kissinger: They say get rid of MLBM's. I agree, but we can't do it without giving up something.

Schlesinger: You must convince them that they can't be better than we are.

Kissinger: What I think attainable is an equal MIRV throw weight agreement and an interim agreement for five more years. That would finesse FBS and total numbers.

I do not believe the SS-16 idea is feasible.

Schlesinger: That is going in position.

Kissinger: I know something about the Soviet Union. It is conceivable they would forego MIRV on the SS-18 and equal MIRV throwweight. I do not think they would give up the 17, 18, and 19.

Schlesinger: We must confine their missiles to specific fields. Otherwise we can't monitor as well.

Kissinger: That I haven't thought of. That is a verification variable. What makes me sick is the way people gab about what we would like. They want the Soviet Union to give up 30% of their force while we stick to our program.

Schlesinger: You tell the Soviets that unless they come along, we will build up.

Kissinger: You get a sensible buildup program and you can do that.

Schlesinger: The Soviet press is taking off on me as a disturber of the peace.

Kissinger: Good. You should go to Moscow. Be tough to Dobrynin. Why not go between March and the summit, or after the summit?

On Dobrynin, wait until the Defense budget is out.

Schlesinger: I would tell him that if they won't come down in SALT, we will go up and risk a growth of anti-Soviet sentiment.



Let me complain about your press conferences on "nuclear plenty" and "nuclear holocaust." Where you talk, you must talk in terms of specific targets. I can't sell Trident with your talking like that.

Kissinger: Trident is a monster.

Schlesinger: I have a program. The Norwall boat plus Trident. Trident with a hard-target kill, or Norwall with a normal capability.

Kissinger: What worries me about our procurement policies is our services are procurement agencies, not strategic planners. There is a tendency toward gigantism. The B-1 is lousy.

Schlesinger: Brown is good. The Air Force needs him.

Kissinger: The Air Force needs cleaning up. The army is a disaster. It's too bad Haig left. Can you get him back at some point?

[There was discussion about moving into the Middle East. Dahrn, Bahrein.]

Kissinger: I will be careful about my quotations on nuclear matters.

H-Schlesinger Brief

1974

8 Jan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8:00 AM
Breakfast
at Pentagon

S - I may skip a dinner for a Council
Dep Min.

K - Why is Gaylor going there?
But Rusk & DeLoach are going there.

S - Maybe I can't do that

K - We can allow ourselves to be knocked
around.

S - Evans press has been favorable to you
recently - Weinstein said it.

K - He is a leading oil commentator.

We are sending a oil consultant
Pres letter tonight to numerous countries
to purchase oil Thursday

S - You know about our deal w/ Saudi
for 6 + 7 Feb. 200,000/day. That is
more than enough.

S - I am getting a lot of Arabs, looking
at our third French bases

K - They are behaving badly.

Yemeni people told I want all
supplies put into port. We got
to give I some security for w/ demand.

We can't easily give them things
now without them in a black

S - We must get some things for

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AUTHORITY per me 07-113, 85 + 08-03, #14

BY Da NARA, DATE 8/14/09



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- production. But we are getting a
& 200 mil per page moving.
H. That's not their impression
S - We will move. I agree w/you.
K - Described Day on plan

Soft spots:

- (1) Only 2 tanks on E bank
- (2) Restrictions on west of canal
- (3) I west of passes

Problems:

- (1) Introducing pupal into Cuba
- (2) Russians getting in

My fear is if SO wants to play rough, they
can demand 20 more km, etc. I am
giving up almost everything, w/o reciprocity
no one knows of plan - except I making.


I may go out this week to try to settle it. I
think we are w/in 1000 of success. We
have managed it ~~very~~ pretty well.

S - We will get a equipment covering

K - Given them a sense of movement, we
can always slow up on delivery

S - Best thing able for things like 2000 Cordas, etc.
We giving them 15 or tanks, etc.
Day on west city street.

K - Rabin their street general



{ Was on Diego Garcia -
had studying Super Antitox - write
deadline found as super antitox

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S - Diego Garcia. We have mentioned KAB
access to Diego + limited mission, but
we will not until we get access.

K - we have found support for Super Antitox.
They continuing need of study.

S - Deak discussion. It is only handful
workhead, & we can control their testing
for next 6 yrs. They will need policies.


K - Take them out of Poseidon

S - Paul. I suggested they test in Australia,
& they why reject. Assessors want hit them.

K - Heats is basically anti American &
desire like P. It is a tragedy what
is happening in E. we look at what
they have done since before WWI. 2 cases
for crappy pieces of territory

The Japs & understand - they know
they have no alternative to us. They
told our E. we said them a while ago
2 weeks, warning them away from U.S.

But having said this, I would like to start
up w/ Gally. He is one we can work w/
& then at some time we can say
you bastards, you talk about unity



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When you get this bilateral note
w/ us.

S - The French are the worst bastards.

K - Rose writes a some kind of reports
as K-M from here - you know they
have to write all some way to help their
jobs.

The French are unadmitted bastards.
They haven't had smooth F & since
Tollgram. France's advantage was
they were only great imperial country
since Germany & Italy. ~~But~~ ^{Germany} ~~didn't~~ ^{didn't} ~~try~~ ^{try}
to study to work it, he looked Russia
against Austria. They pushed away
the eyes of French diplomats for working.

S - Germany is like in a 30 yrs war.

K - Let's let try get but foreignness out
do some for F & his foreign office
out from ~~let~~ ~~send~~ ~~F~~ ~~star~~ ~~to~~ ~~talk~~
* to Galley about doing something in London.

S - I want to learn on Bely & Dutch out
to the French plane as replacement
for F-104



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→ How about Ethiopian loans?

K - I told them to work out. Loans
on Dutch + Belg.

The Eures are tough. De Gaulle
hard to give eye for Empire, but he
decided he would overcome frustration
by focusing on Eures.

S - Comm coming to say goodbye today

K - I would lay it in to him - hand.
So he can take it back home.

S - NSBIM 169

K - It's/ Pres. On a question, we
must formally help control, all the
we want press you on it.

S - We put a # of short items in a
budget, but a targeting is
an intellectual problem.

R - ~~but~~ this sets our short policy for
years. Pres must read it thoroughly

S - I will take - pack. MR good lunch

K - You may make Defense something
more than log is over



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- K - SALT. JCS think we have something
going on SALT. That is not
beyond my writing
- S - No problem depending SALT I
- K - There is obsession of export agreements.
~~It's walking to hell~~
- S - Congress attitude on def budget is
changing.
- K - Chiefs appeal MILROB.
- S - We don't want partial agreement which
enables against long run essential
experience. Commitments are okay.
- K - What I think is attainable —
I don't understand obsession of reduction
of launchers. That program is
~~unworkable~~
- S - Dague
- K - They say get rid of MILROB, Dague
but we can't do it w/o giving
up something.
- S - You must convince them that they
can't be better than we are.



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R - What I think attainable is equal
MIRV thermonuclear agreement &
entire agreement for 5 more
years. That would freeze F&S,
total #s.

I do not believe a SS-16 side is
feasible.

S - That is going in picture.

R - I know something about SS. It
is essential that they would freeze MIRV
on SS-18 & equal MIRV thermonuclear.
I do not think they would give up
17, 18, 19

S - We must confine their missiles to
specific fields. Otherwise we can't
handle as well

R - That I heard thought for that is
a configuration available. What
makes me sick is a very people
government what you ~~can~~ could take
they want a ~~20~~²⁰ to give up 30%
of their force while we stick



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To our press.

S- You tell S U unless they come along, we will build up.

R- You get a desirable building prog. + you can do that.

S- See press is taking off our one as disturber of peace.

R- Good, you should go to Moscow. Be tough to Doan. Why not go bet March + summit or after summit.

On Doan, want ~~work~~ until 2/ budget is out.

S- I would tell him if they want come down in SALT, we will go up + not growth of critic see summit.

S- Get me copy here about your press conference on "nuclear plants" "nuclear holocaust" when you talk, - you must talk in terms



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- of specific targets. I can't sell
Trident w/ you talking like that.
- K - Trident a monster.
- S - I have a prog. The howall that
plus Trident. Trident w/ hard
target kill, a howall w/ normal
capability.
- K - what worries me about our present
policy is our services our present
agencies, not strategic planners.
There is tendency toward organization.
B-1 is lousy.
- S - Brown is good. AF needs him.
- K - AF needs clearing up. Army is
drastic. Too bad they left. Can
you get him to be at some point?
- S - ~~that~~
Discussion about moving into
ME. (Dobson, Baker - S)
- K - I will be careful about my
qualifications on some matters.

