

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY MR 10-041 #6: ISCAP Panel 2009-018: #4

BY dee NARA DATE 11/5/11

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence
Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff
Amb. Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of State
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE: Thursday, November 29, 1973

PLACE: The Map Room

Kissinger: I have been telling the President that we should say to the
Arabs that we will make progress when you lift the embargo -- not that
the embargo will be lifted as we make progress.

Schlesinger: We have been talking about using the Marines.

Kissinger: We should have a plan before we move troops. It is ridiculous
that the civilized world is held up by 8 million savages. I spent three hours
with Faisal. His problem is he is a friend of the United States, but he is
pressured by radicals. So he is leapfrogging the radicals so he isn't
embarrassed by his U.S. relationship.

We have had two letters from Yamani. I told them that we couldn't
operate under pressure.

I get the impression they are blinking.



~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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Colby: Yes, they are looking for ways to get us oil.

Schlesinger: They are turning up the screws on Aramco.

Rush: I don't know how it could be done without being found out.

Colby: If it was antitrust, they could keep it quiet. The oil companies don't have the incentive.

Kissinger: They seem to be looking for a way out. They told me if they could have announced the six-point deal, they could have lifted the embargo.

The opening of negotiations might do it.

Rush: If we could get a withdrawal to the passes....

Kissinger: Ken, we can't yield to blackmail. We can't tie ourselves to any scheme. We have to show our muscle now or the Russians will take extreme positions and drive us right out of the Middle East.

We will have to pressure Israel, but if it looks like we do it under pressure, we won't even get credit for it. We must pressure Israel, but at the right time; don't nickle them on petty issues.

I was impressed with Sadat. He showed statesmanship. I told him if he insisted on the 22 October line, he could get it, but with great agony and it would stop there. The same agony later would get us something more.

I think he doesn't like the Soviet Union.

An announcement of the Conference has a 50-50 chance of getting action on the oil.

If I support 242, that will get us something.

We won't make the oil conditional on progress in the substance of the talks. We have to be prepared to stop the negotiations if we get pressure -- otherwise the Russians will make extreme demands. The Arabs like us. I am going to Syria after the NATO meeting.



Sadat has several schemes. I told him to make more extreme demands so I could back him off it.

Rush: Dobrynin told me if we could just settle the Middle East, we could make real progress.

Kissinger: If we get the settlement we want, we will never get MFN. The Jews will be mad.

Our strategy has to be that when the Soviet Union, the British and French press, we stall -- so all of them know only we can deliver. That will help Sadat and the moderate Arabs. All the Arabs are coming to us. We will commence on the 16th. (That is closer to the Israeli elections).

Then we have to move for a disengagement. But only after the lines are set and everyone is screaming, then we will go to Egypt and say: "This is what we will do."

The British and French are being complete shits.

On the ceasefire, Whitehall never let the British Ambassador ask the right question: Would they accept a ceasefire, not would they seek it.

Schlesinger: I get the impression the British are just incompetent. They are floundering.

Rush: I disagree. They are competent. They have a plan but no power.

Colby: Their policy for years has been to make up for lack of power by close association with us.

Kissinger: Let me summarize.

Hassan, Hussein, and Bourguiba are with us.

Faisal, I think, is in a dilemma. He gave me a hard line and I told him bull shit. I said you tell me about the World Wide Jewish conspiracy and you want me to take it on without preparation. These Jewish groups will say we are yielding to the Arabs' blackmail. That is impossible. He agreed and said, "Can't you help me? Can't you give me Jerusalem?" I said: "That's the last. Our enemies would like to



hang us up on a tough point like that. Give us time and we will do it." He asked me to do something, and I said I would see what I could do. Then Fahd and Saqqaf came to me and said they would do what they could. They bled about some Navy deal where we keep raising the price.

Moorer: I know about that.

Kissinger: If we could give on that -- but let me do it.

[Read Yamani letter.]

I have already done some -- when I said in Peking that Israel would have to do some withdrawal. We have shaken the Saudis. They are saying they trust me. If we keep discipline, we have a chance. But we can't put out that the oil embargo will be lifted as we make progress.

Sadat has a six-point plan for withdrawal. I told him Israel had to hold the passes. If we could get a withdrawal of Israel for the Third Army, a thinning out of the Egyptian Army. He even had a plan for Sharm el-Sheikh.

I told him Egyptian policy was made in Tel Aviv, cause if I were Israel, I would want extreme positions put forth.

We have to use Israel in this game, to show that we are the only ones who can deliver.

Colby: Won't Syria be tougher?

Kissinger: If we could get a zone between the Syrians and Israelis, and put UN in between, then Syria couldn't move without crossing UN troops and moving out from under their SAM belt.

In the first phase, we would have Syria, Egypt, Jordan. In the second phase, add Lebanon and the Palestinians. Sadat's scheme is to turn the West Bank over to the UN for five years or so. Hussein has a similar idea, with a plebiscite to see whether they want to be independent or stay with Jordan. The only thing I don't have a clue to is Jerusalem.

But we must be tough. If we get pressure from the Soviet Union, Britain, France and Japan, we just sit on our hands. The British and French are terrible. The British sabotaged the French because they would have been playing an American game.

On China: They were crazy about the alert. They admire courage. It is a stylish policy they are conducting. Huang lectured me about the Arabs. They are calling him back home to brainwash him a bit.

Schlesinger: Are they scared of the Soviet Union?

Kissinger: Very. If anything, they are worse. Chou seems to have been downgraded a little. Usually we exchanged philosophical statements, but this time Chou filibustered. Usually Mao gives Delphic speeches -- this time he got very specific.

Colby: The Soviet Union has been going around telling how the Chinese have a lot of missiles.

Kissinger: It is good for us to have the Chinese scared. We have a good understanding.

Schlesinger: Does that include Southeast Asia?

Kissinger: Yes, in their mind.

[Explained the UNCURK thing.]

On Vietnam, Chou called in Le Duan and Grap to tell them there shouldn't be an offensive this dry season.

Moorer: They are pouring equipment in.

Colby: Do they control North Vietnam?

Kissinger: I don't know.

Schlesinger: But even if they don't, it causes North Vietnam additional problems. It might keep them from a real offensive.

Kissinger: Give me data for Huang.

Colby: How about Sihanouk?

Kissinger: They thought it best to let the present situation cook along. I think they have given up on Sihanouk. They pointed out that the Soviet Union had marched out to Sihanouk. We maybe could think about bringing Sihanouk in against the GRUNK.



On the communique, the Chairman said: What's new in it?

- the hegemony clause
- the authoritative consultations
- and Taiwan

Now, on Taiwan, it is up to us to make a proposal. This is the way they work -- make a philosophical statement and leave us to work out the details. Maybe the same on Sihanouk.

Moorer: Two or three things -

The Soviets are relaxing in the Med. Can we take the Kennedy out?

Kissinger: Yes, but keep the amphibs out.

Moorer: I'd like to send a plane in now and then.

Kissinger: Yes.

Moorer: I'd like to move the short flights to normal patterns.

There'll be an SR-71 over North Vietnam Sunday.

The Hancock.

Kissinger: The Shah, the Pakistanis, the Chinese love it. Put it off the Red Sea.

Schlesinger: And we'll send two destroyers into Ethiopia on a visit.

Kissinger: Bill [Colby], give me an idea how the Chinese might help in the Emirates.

Schlesinger: Let's have the Hancock go into Kenya and Mozambique.

Kissinger: Not Mozambique.

Moorer: Will we have a DAO in Cairo?

Kissinger: Not yet, but soon.

Schlesinger: Clements wants to talk with the Kuwaiti Ambassador.

Kissinger: About what? What we must not have is everyone conducting his own policy.

Rush: I question Bill talking with Kuwait.

Kissinger: Now that it's set up, he must go through with it.

Schlesinger: You have a problem with Sisco in Kuwait.

Kissinger: I will move Sisco. He has a problem in the whole Middle East.

Schlesinger: We need the U. S. presence in the Gulf.

Kissinger: The key is the timing.

Schlesinger: We want to coapt the Kuwaiti ruling family.

Kissinger: The only thing we have going for us is our strength. We should not be overeager.

Moorer: The bahreinis are beginning to change their minds.

Schlesinger: You have problems with the European Bureau.

Kissinger: What?

(I explained.)

Schlesinger: The Greeks and Turks were O. K.

Kissinger: I will straighten out the European Bureau.

Sisco's European briefings are a screaming disaster. He bared his breast. He offered them [the Europeans] a deal in April which asked nothing of them. They stalled for months and then decided to use it to unify themselves. Now they won't mention consultations and partnership in the declaration. In the Middle East, when we told them what we were



doing with the Soviet Union, they said don't interfere with their detente with them.

Kissinger: Ken, I won't take this sniping at the 7th Floor.

Rush: Europe hasn't gotten the message.

Kissinger: That's no excuse.



Schlesinger-Culley / Moore / Knisk

THE WHITE HOUSE
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29 Nov 73
(?)

^{I know how}
K - Brian Tully says that ~~we~~ should say to Arabs ~~we~~ will make progress when you lift embargos - not that embargos will be lifted as we make progress.

S - we been talking about buying Marines

K - Should have a floor before we move troops. Richard says that Comizil would hold up by 8 mil savings.

I spent 3 hours at Fairfax it is ~~not~~ that is the CIA friend of US, but possessed by rebels. So he buying cars rebels so he is not embarrassed by his US relationship.

~~I told them~~
We have had 2 letters from Yomoni.

I told them that we couldn't oppose under pressure.

I get pressure they are blinking

P - Yes, they are looking for way to get us out

S - They turning up screens on Abenec

R - Don't know how could be done w/o being found out

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BY del NARA, DATE 11/5/11

THE WHITE HOUSE

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C. If it was anti-trust, they could
bring it point. Our arguments don't
have substance.

K. They seem to be looking for way out.
Told me if they could transcend
the point deal, they could have effort
to unleash
The opening of negotiation might
be it.

R. If we could get w/ demand to pass ...

K. How, we can't yield to blackmail
G's can't be involved to any extent.
We have to show our muscle
now as the Russians will take
extreme positions & drive us right
out of M.F.

We will have to pressure, but
if it looks like we do it under
pressure, we won't even get credit
for it. We must pressure I, but at
the right time, don't include them on
policy issues.



THE WHITE HOUSE

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I was impressed w/ Sadat's personal
statements. I told him if he
insisted on a 22 cut line, he would,
but w/ great agony & it would delay
things. Some agency later would get
us something more.

I think he doesn't like S.C.

An announcement of a conference
has a 50-50 chance of getting out
action.

If I support a 22, that will get us
something.

We can't make our contribution
or progress in substance talks.
We have to be prepared to stop
now. If we get pressure - other
- Russians will make extreme
demands, Arabs like us. Syria
& Syria after NATO's entry.

Sadat has several schemes. I told him
to make more general demands as
I could back him off it.



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R- Don't tell me if we could just
settle CME, we could make real
progress

K- If we get settlement we want, we
will want get Viet. Jemo will
be made.

~~to ME~~
~~for~~

Our strategy has to be when
SO, Brits & French pros, are still -
to all know only we can liberate.
That will help Sadat & moderate
Arabs. All are coming to us.
We will convene on 16 (that there to
it elections).

There are limits more for
disengagement, but only after C lines
are set, everyone screaming, then
we will go to E & say, this is what
we will do.

The Brits & Fr are being complete
shits.



THE WHITE HOUSE

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On case file, which will never
let Be. own. ask a right position -
would they accept CF, not would
they seek it.

S - I get impression & Brits are just
unconcerned. They floundering.

R - I doubt if they are urgent. They
have a plan but no power.

C - Their ~~the~~ policy for years has been
to make up ~~them~~ for lack of power
by class action w/ us.

K Let me summarize
Hassan, Hossain, Bongelidon are
w/ us.

Faisal I think is in dilemma. He
gave me a hard line & I told him
hard shit. I said you tell me
about C W W finish ~~arrangement~~
you want me to take it as W/O
preparation. That ~~is~~ finish ~~things~~
will say we are yielding &



Got Ford over here.

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Arabs blackmail. That's impossible.
He asked & said can't you help
me. Can't you give me Jerusalem?
I said that is best. Some enemies
would like to hang us up on a trumpet
point like that - have no time & we
will do it. He asked me to do
something, & I said I would see what
I could do.

Then Ford & Sec prof came to me
& said they'd do what they could.

They bleed about some navy deal
where we're giving a piece.

M - I know about that

R - If we could get on that - ~~but~~ ^{but}
~~let~~ let me do it.

(Read Yarnick letter)

I have already done some - when I
said in Peterson that I would have
to do some of demand.



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We have Shakeri Samir, & they
are saying they trust me. If we
help do anything, we have a chance.
But we can't put out that out will
be lifted so we make progress.

Soudat has a six point plan for withdrawal.
I told him I had to hold a pass.
If we could get withdrawal of I for 3 weeks,
thinning out of E army. He was hard
to explain for Sharon.

I told him E policy was made in Tel
Aviv, sense of Israel, I would want
extreme positions put forth.

We have to use Israel in this game,
to show that we are the only ones
who can deliver.

C - want Syria to belong

K - If we could get a zone bet C & I,
put UN in between. Then I would
move w/o crossing UN lines & moving
from under SAM belt.



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In first phase, we would have
S, E, J. In 2nd phase, add L +
Pakistanis. Sadat theme is
taken to bank over to UN for 5 yrs
or so. Hussein has similar
idea, w/ placate to see whether
they be subject w/ Jordan.

Only thing I don't have clue to is
Jerusalem.

But we must be tough. If we get
pressure from SO, Brit, Fr, + Japan,
we just sit on our hands.

Brits + Fr are trouble.

Brits subverted & so because they
would have been playing a Communist
game.

On China.

They were crazy about alert. They
achieve courage. It is a stylish
thing you are conducting. ~~but~~
Have by learned me about clubs



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- M - They pouring equipment
- C - Do they control NVN
- R - Delimit border
- S - Best way if they don't, it causes NVN additional probs. It might keep them from a real offensive
- K - Give me data for Henry
- C - How about Schumaker
- H - They thought it was a UT experiment set. to work along. I think they have got their eye on Schumaker - They found out SV had reached out to Schumaker. We maybe could think about bringing Schumaker in against G. R. Ford.

~~the~~
On comm-joint, Chmn sur d'adviser

- Hager
- Administrative consultants
- Turner



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Now, on television it is up to us
to make a proposal. This is the way
they work - make a philosophical
statement & leave us to work out
details. They do a sum on Schwarzkopf

M - Two or 3 things.

Some are working in Wood. Can we
take Kennedy out?

K - yes, but keep amphibio out.

M - like to send a plane in some
action

K - yes.

M - like to make direct flights
around patterns.

SR-71 New Sunday.

Hancock.

K - The Shah, a Parks, the Minister
see it.

Put it off a Real see

S - And will send 2 destroyers into



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Ethiopia on visit.

K - Daddy, give me idea how
Chinese might help

S - ^{in Ethiopia} ~~in Ethiopia~~ ^{with Kenya & Mozambique}
K - ^{with Kenya & Mozambique} ~~with Kenya & Mozambique~~
M - DAO in Caro

K - not yet, but soon.

S - Cleverly wants to talk w/ Kermit
Amb

K - about what

S - what we must not know is
every one else doing his own thing.

R - I question Bill talking w/ Kermit

K - how it set up, must go thru w/ it.

S - you have prob w/ Sisco's involvement

K - I will move Sisco. He has a
problem in whole M E

S - we need US presence in Caro

K - The key is timing

S - we want to co-op Kermit
making policy



THE WHITE HOUSE

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K The only thing we have going
for us is our strength. We
should not in our eyes.

M - Baker is beginning to
change their minds.

S - You have problems w/ Euro because

K - What?

(I explained)

S - Groves & T. Baker were ok

K - I will strengthen our Existence
Sixers E in buying a security
diaster. He bared his breast.

We offered them a deal in April
which asked nothing of them

They stalled months & then
decided to use it to unify. Now
they want mention resurrection
& in dilemma -

For M. E. ~~what~~ when we told
them what we doing w/ SV, they said.
don't interfere w/ their clerical w/ them



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K-Hm, I would take this singing
at - 7th Floor.

R- Ever hasn't gotten a way.

K- No expense.

