MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence
Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Amb. Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of State
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE: Thursday, November 29, 1973
PLACE: The Map Room

Kissinger: I have been telling the President that we should say to the Arabs that we will make progress when you lift the embargo -- not that the embargo will be lifted as we make progress.

Schlesinger: We have been talking about using the Marines.

Kissinger: We should have a plan before we move troops. It is ridiculous that the civilized world is held up by 8 million savages. I spent three hours with Faisal. His problem is he is a friend of the United States, but he is pressured by radicals. So he is leapingfrogging the radicals so he isn't embarrassed by his U.S. relationship.

We have had two letters from Yamani. I told them that we couldn't operate under pressure.

I get the impression they are blinking.
Colby: Yes, they are looking for ways to get us oil.

Schlesinger: They are turning up the screws on Aramco.

Rush: I don't know how it could be done without being found out.

Colby: If it was antitrust, they could keep it quiet. The oil companies don't have the incentive.

Kissinger: They seem to be looking for a way out. They told me if they could have announced the six-point deal, they could have lifted the embargo.

The opening of negotiations might do it.

Rush: If we could get a withdrawal to the passes....

Kissinger: Ken, we can't yield to blackmail. We can't tie ourselves to any scheme. We have to show our muscle now or the Russians will take extreme positions and drive us right out of the Middle East.

We will have to pressure Israel, but if it looks like we do it under pressure, we won't even get credit for it. We must pressure Israel, but at the right time; don't nickle them on petty issues.

I was impressed with Sadat. He showed statesmanship. I told him if he insisted on the 22 October line, he could get it, but with great agony and it would stop there. The same agony later would get us something more.

I think he doesn't like the Soviet Union.

An announcement of the Conference has a 50-50 chance of getting action on the oil.

If I support 242, that will get us something.

We won't make the oil conditional on progress in the substance of the talks. We have to be prepared to stop the negotiations if we get pressure -- otherwise the Russians will make extreme demands. The Arabs like us. I am going to Syria after the NATO meeting.
Sadat has several schemes. I told him to make more extreme demands so I could back him off it.

Rush: Dobrynin told me if we could just settle the Middle East, we could make real progress.

Kissinger: If we get the settlement we want, we will never get MFN. The Jews will be mad.

Our strategy has to be that when the Soviet Union, the British and French press, we stall -- so all of them know only we can deliver. That will help Sadat and the moderate Arabs. All the Arabs are coming to us. We will commence on the 16th. (That is closer to the Israeli elections).

Then we have to move for a disengagement. But only after the lines are set and everyone is screaming, then we will go to Egypt and say: "This is what we will do."

The British and French are being complete shits.

On the ceasefire, Whitehall never let the British Ambassador ask the right question: Would they accept a ceasefire, not would they seek it.

Schlesinger: I get the impression the British are just incompetent. They are floundering.

Rush: I disagree. They are competent. They have a plan but no power.

Colby: Their policy for years has been to make up for lack of power by close association with us.

Kissinger: Let me summarize.

Hassan, Hussein, and Bourguiba are with us.

Faisal, I think, is in a dilemma. He gave me a hard line and I told him bull shit. I said you tell me about the World Wide Jewish conspiracy and you want me to take it on without preparation. These Jewish groups will say we are yielding to the Arabs' blackmail. That is impossible. He agreed and said, "Can't you help me? Can't you give me Jerusalem?" I said: "That's the last. Our enemies would like to
hang us up on a tough point like that. Give us time and we will do it." He asked me to do something, and I said I would see what I could do. Then Fahd and Saqqaf came to me and said they would do what they could. They bled about some Navy deal where we keep raising the price.

Moorer: I know about that.

Kissinger: If we could give on that -- but let me do it.

[Read Yamani letter.]

I have already done some -- when I said in Peking that Israel would have to do some withdrawal. We have shaken the Saudis. They are saying they trust me. If we keep discipline, we have a chance. But we can't put out that the oil embargo will be lifted as we make progress.

Sadat has a six-point plan for withdrawal. I told him Israel had to hold the passes. If we could get a withdrawal of Israel for the Third Army, a thinning out of the Egyptian Army. He even had a plan for Sharm el-Sheikh.

I told him Egyptian policy was made in Tel Aviv, cause if I were Israel, I would want extreme positions put forth.

We have to use Israel in this game, to show that we are the only ones who can deliver.

Colby: Won't Syria be tougher?

Kissinger: If we could get a zone between the Syrians and Israelis, and put UN in between, then Syria couldn't move without crossing UN troops and moving out from under their SAM belt.

In the first phase, we would have Syria, Egypt, Jordan. In the second phase, add Lebanon and the Palestinians. Sadat's scheme is to turn the West Bank over to the UN for five years or so. Hussein has a similar idea, with a plebiscite to see whether they want to be independent or stay with Jordan. The only thing I don't have a clue to is Jerusalem.

But we must be tough. If we get pressure from the Soviet Union, Britain, France and Japan, we just sit on our hands. The British and French are terrible. The British sabotaged the French because they would have been playing an American game.
On China: They were crazy about the alert. They admire courage. It is a stylish policy they are conducting. Huang lectured me about the Arabs. They are calling him back home to brainwash him a bit.

Schlesinger: Are they scared of the Soviet Union?

Kissinger: Very. If anything, they are worse. Chou seems to have been downgraded a little. Usually we exchanged philosophical statements, but this time Chou filibustered. Usually Mao gives Delphi speeches -- this time he got very specific.

Colby: The Soviet Union has been going around telling how the Chinese have a lot of missiles.

Kissinger: It is good for us to have the Chinese scared. We have a good understanding.

Schlesinger: Does that include Southeast Asia?

Kissinger: Yes, in their mind.

[Explained the UNCURK thing.]

On Vietnam, Chou called in Le Duan and Grap to tell them there shouldn't be an offensive this dry season.

Moore: They are pouring equipment in.

Colby: Do they control North Vietnam?

Kissinger: I don't know.

Schlesinger: But even if they don't, it causes North Vietnam additional problems. It might keep them from a real offensive.

Kissinger: Give me data for Huang.

Colby: How about Sihanouk?

Kissinger: They thought it best to let the present situation cook along. I think they have given up on Sihanouk. They pointed out that the Soviet Union had marched out to Sihanouk. We maybe could think about bringing Sihanouk in against the GRUNK.
On the communiqué, the Chairman said: What's new in it?

-- the hegemony clause
-- the authoritative consultations
-- and Taiwan

Now, on Taiwan, it is up to us to make a proposal. This is the way they work -- make a philosophical statement and leave us to work out the details. Maybe the same on Sihanouk.

Moorer: Two or three things -

The Soviets are relaxing in the Med. Can we take the Kennedy out?

Kissinger: Yes, but keep the amphibs out.

Moorer: I'd like to send a plane in now and then.

Kissinger: Yes.

Moorer: I'd like to move the short flights to normal patterns.

There'll be an SR-71 over North Vietnam Sunday.

The Hancock.

Kissinger: The Shah, the Pakistanis, the Chinese love it. Put it off the Red Sea.

Schlesinger: And we'll send two destroyers into Ethiopia on a visit.

Kissinger: Bill [Colby], give me an idea how the Chinese might help in the Emirates.

Schlesinger: Let's have the Hancock go into Kenya and Mozambique.

Kissinger: Not Mozambique.

Moorer: Will we have a DAO in Cairo?
Kissinger: Not yet, but soon.
Schlesinger: Clements wants to talk with the Kuwaiti Ambassador.
Kissinger: About what? What we must not have is everyone conducting his own policy.
Rush: I question Bill talking with Kuwait.
Kissinger: Now that it's set up, he must go through with it.
Schlesinger: You have a problem with Sisco in Kuwait.
Kissinger: I will move Sisco. He has a problem in the whole Middle East.
Schlesinger: We need the U.S. presence in the Gulf.
Kissinger: The key is the timing.
Schlesinger: We want to coapt the Kuwaiti ruling family.
Kissinger: The only thing we have going for us is our strength. We should not be overeager.
Moorer: The bahreinis are beginning to change their minds.
Schlesinger: You have problems with the European Bureau.
Kissinger: What?
(I explained.)
Schlesinger: The Greeks and Turks were O.K.
Kissinger: I will straighten out the European Bureau.

Sisco's European briefings are a screaming disaster. He bared his breast. He offered them [the Europeans] a deal in April which asked nothing of them. They stalled for months and then decided to use it to unify themselves. Now they won't mention consultations and partnership in the declaration. In the Middle East, when we told them what we were
doing with the Soviet Union, they said don't interfere with their detente with them.

Kissinger: Ken, I won't take this sniping at the 7th Floor.

Rush: Europe hasn't gotten the message.

Kissinger: That's no excuse.
K - Been talking about how to make this world safe for our children.
S - Our main priority.
K - Should keep a firm hand on those belligerent neighbors.
S - Especially Vietnam.
K - How do we proceed?
S - I think it's time to show the world what America is really all about.

We have had 2 letters from Japan.

Good thing that we ended up with

I put presses they are alarming

but they are looking for way to get us all

They turned up across an Advance

Don't know how could be done.
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C. If we can get them to trust, they could bring it forward. And we can't get them to trust now.

K. They have to be looking favorably toward, if they could transmogrify 100% of the effort of the 1.5 billion.

The process of negotiation might be difficult.

K. We could get them to listen...

K. I don't want to make this a demand.

We want to give them some room so the Russians will take the initiative positively. They are right.

We will have to proceed, but if it looks like we'll go in wrong, we won't even get what we've got. We must proceed, but at the right time, don't make them too nervous.
I was impressed as I saw Shrem. A statement I did. I told him we would be in control, that I would not say what I was going to say again. It would be that, some may have heard me say it.

I think the answer is 50. An announcement of a campaign: 50-50. A theme of putting oil and action.

If I support you, that will put us somewhere.

We can't make oil available for progress in substantial yields, we cannot stop it. If you get patience - otherwise, people will put into those demands. Arabo-like we are doing it. Supposed answer.

And if you demand otherwise, I will not make more foreign demands as so, will have to do it.
R - Doty told me if we could just meet in ME, we could make real progress.

K - If you get something we can't they will learn to support.

ME

R - We might have to be careful.

K - But if we play our cards right -

R - That will help.

K - And we can.

R - We will learn on 16 (that there is a difference).

K - There is some more for development but only after a joke.

R - Then we will go to E to try, this is what we will do.

The fact that one thing can be done.
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On your feet, Whitehall never
let be, and on a very point
would they accept C; not would
they name it.

S - I ad impedions c Burke one first
something. They something.

R - I do not. They are urgent. They
have a plan but we have.

A - Their plan for years has been
to make up for lack of power
by close action of.

K - Not much running

Harass, harass, harass him one

Friend I think is in below. He
ought not to know how I tell him.

I told them it. I told them it
about C. We judged the point
upon and not me. I take it as W.

Submission. That go in, going,
while stay we our yielding.
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...
I...

I...

I...

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We have discussed some of the
and considering they trust me a great
deal of thought, we have a chance.
But we can't put out much of it well.

I think it's a very important principle.
I told him I had to hold a pass on.

If we could get something like a
Thurmond and if I was the

I told him E. John was made in the
Army, because I was not

I think it's like the

I saw that it was the only case when

C. W. is a great example.

K. If we could get a good but not a

put UN on the Nations' Front. We

who enter in the special form with the SAM field.
In first phase, we would have S, E, J. In 2nd phase, add H + Palestinians. Saudi Arabia is
very much behind UN for S, i.e., for S, yes or no. Palestinian has stronger
role, as does Egypt. To see whether
they can help on S of Jordan.

But we must be tough. If we get
government from S0, Badd, Fr, & Egypt,
we must act on our hands.

But Fr & Egypt,
that's natural & it becomes they
would have been jumping on American
game.

In China,

They were one of the first to call for
Adams removed. It is a simplistic
game, and we can make it

Thusly directed me about to 

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They called him back home to
Washington during Sept.

S - One thing is clear.
K - Very far thing, the one thing. Chances seem to have been damaged
d in a fight. Usually we learned
photographed statements from this time. Then after translation, usually, they give
Delphi speeches - the third to go:
very specific.

K - Like towards the way so has been put
around telling them PACE have a lot
of missions.

K - It is good for me to have PACE around,
so a time good something.

S - Does that much, Sir.

K - Yes, the other around.

(Exclaimed: NO WAY, thing."

On UN, CCC called me in a big cozy
to talk things, time shouldn't be
even offensive this big season.)
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My- They going compin
C- Do they control NUN
K- Schmidt misses
S- But don't get them out of caneas
NUN additional parts. It's major
symptom from a real person
K- Can we date for Kenny
C- How about Schmidt
K- They thought it was K & W
present but it wasn't along.
C- What about a new lodge on
Schmidt? They formally cut in
had Martha and K Schmidt.
W- May I could check about
being Schmidt for against
C- Robert?

On sometime now. Chin to John
- Regret
- Construction twenty
- Town
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Turn on tweens. I except us. A minute - proposed. This is the way. They must - make a philosophy statement + listen to. The word. May be some ear. Schuvalov. 

M. Turn on 3 things. 

Sure we will copy them. Can we take Kennedy out? 

K. Yes, but they can't do it. 

M. Have a word at plane in morning. 

K. Yes. 

M. Have a word with those to personal patterns. 

K. 22 noon Sunday. 

Homework, 

K. The Senate, c. Rules, the House. 

But it won't c. Red 22. 

S. And we'll end. Rothschild with.
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K - Next week, China will be here in town.
S - Several things might help. (Agreed)
K - We should try to keep Kwek on board.
S - What we want to talk to Kwek about.
K - What we want to talk about is
S - Our new China in this tig tig job.
K - I don't believe in talking with Kwek.
S - I am having part w/ Sino & French.
K - I will meet with him. He's a
S - I am not sure of this but
K - This is turning.
S - We want to 90% Kwek's
with family
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K - The only thing we found going
for was our strength, our
checkpoint on our larger
M - But we're on high
S - Some problems w/E on floor
K - What?
S - Crack + Timing was ok
K - I will with Steegman and Eisenhower
S - I think E is going to do a stemming
dispatch. He's back to his usual.
K - We offered them a deal in April
which noted nothing of the
They talked about the then
which was a very + to any
they went with "another condition"
for M. E. whom we told
thing we're doing w/sbut they said
Don't interfere w/this condition.
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K. Mr. H. Jones has taken the Senate:
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