REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum of Conversation
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Kissinger/Schlesinger/Colby/Moorer/Scowcroft
CREATION DATE . . . . . . 11/29/1973
VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . 7 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . . 036600062
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS
BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . 2
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . November 29, 1973 - Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 01/31/2000
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . ELT
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
William E. Colby, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Maj. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Thursday - November 29, 1973
1:20 - 2:38 p.m. [Luncheon Meeting]

PLACE: The Map Room
The White House

Schlesinger: We have no fuel for the B-52s in Southeast Asia.

Kissinger: Is Singapore denying us the fuel?

Moorer: The companies are.

Schlesinger: Shell says to ship it through the SEATO terminal.

Colby: [Redacted]

Kissinger: We had a message from the Saudis that a Presidential letter would help them get off the embargo.

Schlesinger: We should establish their bona fides.
Kissinger: No. There are two letters. One was through the State channel direct to me. The two reinforce each other. The leaking is terrible.

Colby: I propose we have a memo on this.

[There was a discussion on the NSC meeting of 24 October.]

Kissinger: The Saudis are blinking. It would kill the Europeans if they lifted the embargo on us before then.

Schlesinger: They think we knocked off Idris.

Kissinger: They have never played in this league before. They are scared.

Schlesinger: We need to build a presence in the Middle East.

Kissinger: It is essential.

Is the Oriskany an attack carrier?

Schlesinger: Yes. Did you see the Moynihan cable?

Kissinger: I will be glad to rename the ocean if it will solve this problem. He is not out there to express his views on our naval deployment in an ocean named after... It was named after the American Indians -- that is why we're sending the Oriskany.

Schlesinger: There are other base possibilities -- Durban, Lorenzo Marques. This might be a good time to do it as a reaction to the Middle East. Now it can be interpreted as shoring up our Middle East policy.

Colby: Do we get anything out of the Africans?

Kissinger: Can't we overthrow one of the sheikhs just to show that we can do it?

Colby: We need a base in more than one place so that we aren't completely dependent.
Schlesinger: How about Ethiopia?

Kissinger: Great. I objected to... Will they let us?

The Paks want us to build a naval base. They would give us the facilities.

Schlesinger: We should start in Bahrein.

Kissinger: I will look into it. It would be a good signal to Faisal.

We gave Hassan an escort. We asked "Why not use your own boat?" They said it was busy -- the implication that it was being used against Libya.

Schlesinger: If we want to go to Lorencó Marques, now is the time.

Colby: That influences everyone else.

Schlesinger: It will help the Portuguese.

Kissinger: I am sympathetic to arms for Portugal.

Scowcroft: The Hawks are defensive only.

Schlesinger: They want the Redeye also. That is a problem.

Providing weapons to Africa is against a Presidential policy since 1961.

Kissinger: I lean toward giving them the Hawks.

What does it take?

Schlesinger: The question is, do we do it directly or through Israel?

Kissinger: My inclination is to let Israel do it to get the Jews like Ribicoff off our back.

We have trouble getting a supplemental through the House.
Schlesinger: We could get by with $1.7 billion. It is as easily justifiable as $2.2 billion.

Kissinger: We will be doing so much to Israel that I hate to start it this way.

Schlesinger: We won't get a bill without a cut. They will just sit unless we compromise. Mahon does not like Israel and there is considerable such sentiment in the House.

Kissinger: Have they broken off on Kilometer 101?

Schlesinger: Mahon wants an answer today.

Kissinger: How did we get the figure of $2.2?

Scowcroft: Out of the air.

Kissinger: I am concerned on two things. The signal to Israel and the possible need for another supplemental. Will $1.9 billion cover everything they need?

Moore: All they need, not all they want.

Kissinger: It may require more weapons to get Israel to withdraw.

Schlesinger: I can't tell Mahon that.

Kissinger: Passman proposes $1.7 plus $300 million. Will Mahon buy that? I start from $2.2 only because it exists.

Is it better to get the appropriation now or when we need it for the settlement?

Colby: Now is best.

Kissinger: We will be in a crunch with Israel soon.

Schlesinger: We should show Israel that there is resistance in the House.

Kissinger: Israel has to show they will get additional arms for the security they are giving up by withdrawal.
Colby: They will need a security guarantee.

Schlesinger: If this money is appropriated now, Israel will consider it theirs and you will have no leverage.

Moorer: They will want line items.

Colby: Henry needs all the flexibility going into the negotiation, without having to worry about Congress.

Schlesinger: Israel will consider it theirs and Congress will raise hell if it isn’t spent. We won’t be able not to spend it.

How about this: They give us $1.7 now and $2.2 on a contingency basis dependent on a Presidential determination?

Kissinger: Okay. $1.7 billion plus $300 in supporting assistance.

Schlesinger: That will put pressure on the President.

Kissinger: The Israelis will try to split the President off from me anyway.

Schlesinger: Mahon wants to use your letter.

Kissinger: I would rather not. I am going to the Middle East. It is the same as before, plus Damascus and Beirut.

Schlesinger: The Syrians are nuts. They are crazy enough to embarrass you.

Kissinger: The Saudis want me to go there?

Colby: Can you take a Saudi with you?

Kissinger: Yes. I am going to Riyadh first.

What makes a Syrian a Syrian?

Schlesinger: [Mandates]

Kissinger: [How Egypt got the Sinai]
Colby: How about overflights?

Kissinger: Okay on the Middle East.

Colby: Would you like a meeting with the Nine?

Kissinger: If they request it.

Colby: They would respond to the suggestion.

Kissinger: What do we get by building up the Nine? They have a good game. They get what they want in consultations in NATO, then the more sensitive issues they put into the EC and lock us out.

Schlesinger: I had Keat (?) of CDU in this morning.

UK nuclear cooperation: I suggest we hold up until after the NAC meetings.

Kissinger: I agree. Then we will discuss it. If we need to talk in Brussels, you could stay over until Sunday.

Colby: I am getting our intelligence package ready.

Kissinger: It should be based on reciprocity.

Colby: I plan to put them on the same basis as everyone else. But raise the level of material to NATO.

Kissinger: These are separate issues.

Colby: It would solve some of your intelligence problems in NATO.

Kissinger: But don't raise the NATO level so you don't have to cut the British.

Colby: No.

Kissinger: Look at Shultz: He goes over there and babbles his heart out and the Europeans think they can kick us around and we will still be buddies.

I will be tough, speak near the end and talk reciprocity.
Moorer: One point. There is more security with the British than with the rest of NATO.

Schlesinger: The French nuclear cooperation -- NSSM 103 -- comes up in two months.

Kissinger: Hold it until after the NAC.

Colby: The withdrawal of their battalions.

Schlesinger: On Cambodia. We can give them more but we have to do it now.

Kissinger: Why not do it?

Schlesinger: Some of the deals are not what was contemplated under the Foreign Assistance Act.

Kissinger: I may meet Ducky on the way back from Paris.

Colby: Scare him.

Kissinger: Is there any damage from meeting him? I'll do it, one, for domestic politics and two, to warn him.
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