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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
William E. Colby, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Maj. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Wednesday - October 31, 1973
1:32 - 2:29 p.m. -- Luncheon Meeting

PLACE:
The Map Room
The White House

Kissinger: I think we may get a negotiating process started in the Middle East.

Colby: This guy thought so.

Kissinger: The Israelis always are positive about what is not yet possible.

Schlesinger: It is okay for them to keep the Third Army as a hostage, but to destroy it would compromise American honor.

Kissinger: How about the 22 October line?

Schlesinger: We shouldn't force them. We paid that price.

Kissinger: How about the UN?

Colby: We can talk about something else. Say leave it up to the parties.
Kissinger: I haven't made up my mind. We could support it but leave it to the parties to define.

The Egyptians have agreed to let UN inspection of resupply.

Schlesinger: You should wait until you get to Cairo.

Kissinger: Where is the Hancock?

Moorer: It is south of Sri Lanka, heading for the Persian Gulf.

Kissinger: Where is it going?

Moorer: It doesn't have to go anywhere.

Kissinger: Don't go into Karachi.

You would keep this in abeyance until next week?

Schlesinger: Yes, this is a hostage card for you.

Kissinger: The Soviets are driving me crazy. They are sending us notes designed for showing in Cairo. Now they want a joint team to enforce the ceasefire. I got Egypt to throw out 38 or their observers, out of their 70.

My strategy is as follows: The best idea is to tell Fahmy we will get a certain number of cargoes through on the roads. I'll tell Sadat that we will press Israel for a return to the 22 October lines in exchange for lifting of the oil embargo.

Colby: Or mutual withdrawal of enclaves.

Kissinger: Sadat won't agree.

Moorer: We have proof of SCUD in Egypt and a rumor of Soviet troops in Syria. There are 100 ships in the Mediterranean. The Soviets may be up to something and planning action. We should fly an SR-71 day after tomorrow.

Kissinger: Yes.
Colby: Should we hold up on the SR-71 films? We have given them all the previous ones.

Kissinger: Could they have put nukes in Egypt?

Schlesinger: They have.

Colby: Not necessarily. They may be desperate to the point they may want to rattle missiles.

Kissinger: Were we wrong on the ceasefire?

All: No. It was essential.

Kissinger: Can the SR-71 see Soviet troops?

Colby: No.

Moorer: On POW’s -- if a lot of them have been killed, we have a problem.

Colby: This is a serious political problem in Israel.

Kissinger: I have good excuse for Fahmy. I have to wait for Golda and all I can do is alleviate the situation.

When are you going to Europe?

Schlesinger: On Sunday. I will be in The Hague through Tuesday.

Kissinger: You should go to Germany.

Schlesinger: Lovestone and Kraemer say no. I can take care of Leber without going there and giving him the kiss of death.

Kissinger: That is persuasive.

Schlesinger: I can make the excuses okay. I must be here while you are away.

Kissinger: It proves Defense is taking over State!

Schlesinger: On the Hussein letter...
Kissinger: I never saw it. I didn't know about it.

Back to your trip. You could say we both can't be away at once.

Moorer: We need to talk about Cambodia. We must get rice and ammunition in while the river is high.

Kissinger: Let's get it moving. At the WSAG, bring in all the State complaints you have.

Moorer: How about a bilateral with Carrington?

Kissinger: I wouldn't.

Moorer: How about the NPC? Should we just tread water?

Kissinger: We shouldn't join the onslaught. Play it cool.

Schlesinger: They will complain about no consultation. Bill, will you get me some non-THATCH material?

Kissinger: What we have done in the Middle East is to put ourselves in the best position vis-a-vis the Arabs in ten years.

Schlesinger: The Europeans are being very narrow on oil.

Schlesinger: How about the Germans? The CDU are supporting us.

Kissinger: Brandt is a weakling; Bahr is a stool pigeon; Scheel is weak but okay. We have to put pressure to get Brandt and Scheel in line.

I would be nice to the German military. Tell them we are just trying to get some NATO spirit reinstilled into the American people.

Colby: What this crisis shows is we should rethink NATO in the real world.

Kissinger: Can we meet on Saturday and talk about China?

Schlesinger: On the Hancock, should we send it into the Gulf?

Kissinger: I would go into the entrance and into the Red Sea entrance, up to the blockade.
Schlesinger: Should it steam into the Gulf?

Kissinger: Okay. What do you think?

Scowcroft: It's a question of the timing with your visit.

Kissinger: Let's hold off until I get through with the Saudis.

Schlesinger: Should I see Golda?

Kissinger: Tell her what we are doing in the military field but we can't keep on doing it except if there is movement in the political field. You should both see her.

Moorer: We have five of thirteen ships underway.

Kissinger: I want to sell to the Arabs what we want to do anyway. If they get the sense that we won't help in another war, they will withdraw.

Schlesinger: Did you talk to Dobrynin about Soviet forces in the Mediterranean?

Kissinger: I told him, and he didn't deny that Soviet forces were in Syria. He downplayed it.

Colby: You could leave the Syrian thing open and then leave the Soviet Union something to save face on.

Kissinger: If not for Israel, I think we could get something like the old interim solution.

Tell Leber you'll do anything for him, but don't go to Germany.

[The meeting ended.]
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