MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:  Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
                Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
                Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
                Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
                William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense
                Carl Duckett, Central Intelligence Agency
                Mr. Roberge, JCS briefer
                Mr. Welch, JCS briefer

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, August 9, 1973
                8:00 a.m. - Breakfast meeting

PLACE: The Pentagon

Kissinger: Can't Stennis get control when he gets back?

Moorer: I think that is part of the game. Symington is not going to give up power easily.

Schlesinger: Symington's comments about CIA were an attack on Stennis.

            We will go after Hughes. Ask if he wants more men killed, etc.

            [Some talk about the progress of the Defense Appropriations.]

Moorer: We should not modify it in a way that we degrade the present SIOP.

Kissinger: Isn't that Catch 22?
Moorer: No, we can do it, it depends on how long we take. It depends on how quickly we can get a decision and how quickly we can retarget.

There is a clear distinction between operations on a third country and those on the USSR itself. The latter certainly risks a general war. The problem is not military - it's political and policy. It would be helpful if we could get the President involved in exercises, etc.

Kissinger: The President has to know in a crisis what options are available. Then we can get him involved in exercises.

Moorer: There's a difference between tactical and strategic weapons.

Kissinger: The President will not authorize their use in the blind, without knowing just what will happen.

Moorer: A quick decision is what I was referring to.

Kissinger: The President must know at least the categories of targets -- airfields, etc.

Clements: The NSDM is deceptive. We don't have the capability to do what the NSDM asked for. The forces aren't that flexible.

The President shouldn't think he will have these options if he approves them.

Schlesinger: It's a matter of time. We can't put the mechanical flexibility into the forces until we know what is wanted.

Kissinger: The Soviet Union is building forces for something. I want to avoid the military telling the President they can do anything he orders.

Moorer: We can do better in preemption than in retaliation.

Schlesinger: I am not sure a strike (very limited) on the Soviet Union is more hazardous than taking out all the airfields in Poland.

Roberge [begins briefing:] We are looking at the different options which would cover the whole range of possibilities. In outline, there are:
Regional options -- theater options.
Limited options.
Selected options.
Major options.

The prime change in target base was in army units and political and economic targets.

We identified five Soviet attack options.

(1) The Soviet nuclear threat to U.S. -- 7,000
(2) The Soviet nuclear threat to Europe -- 886
(3) The Soviet nuclear threat to forces in Asia
(4) The PRC nuclear threat to U.S.
(5) The PRC nuclear threat to U.S. forces in Asia

Kissinger: But the key is what it is we are trying to accomplish.

Schlesinger: For example, what are the political and military options?

Roberts: Those were our criteria for developing these options.

Kissinger: We would like to know what those are.

Schlesinger: We need to show the ultimate objective -- not that it is "the destruction of 11th Rocket Army."

Welch: We would like to have you look at the case studies and tell us if these are the kinds of things we need.

Kissinger: What is the next step?

Schlesinger: We are trying to convey a message to stop. "We are showing your vulnerability and demonstrating the hazards of further escalation."

Otherwise you would have to look over the whole 4,000 target list individually.

For example, we destroy the targets on the Chinese border, leaving the USSR open to Chinese attack; that could convey a signal of a US-PRC alliance, which may or may not exist.
You tell us what message you want to convey.

Kissinger: It's the chicken and the egg. We had done good contingency planning in Jordan and it went well in '70. We wouldn't have an idea what to do in case of an attack on Iran or Europe.

If the Soviets could make us back down anywhere in the world, the result would be disastrous.

Moorer: You are right about the chicken and the egg. That is why we need a dialogue.

Duckett: Should we include options where disengagement is easy? Air or sea attack?

Kissinger: There are several categories. A European incident; a Soviet move against third countries; a third country conflict which may involve the United States.

Take Jordan -- I think we scared the Soviets by pouring forces in at a reckless rate.

I think a serious crisis is almost inevitable with the world the way it is.

Schlesinger: Take Tito's death.

Kissinger: Yes. I've had a NSSM on this kicking around for a year.

Conceptually there are two theories: escalate slowly, or take a big jump at once.

Schlesinger: Computationally I lean to the second. Nuclear, I lean toward the first.

In Iran, for example, if we were to fly in some F-111s, we convey a message. Then maybe privately refer to Caspian oil fields.

Kissinger: We need to move this discussion from the theoretical to actual packages for actual areas. The most likely areas are not too legion. Let's meet after Labor Day.
K: Can & Jimmy get control before he gets back?
M: I think that is pretty much up to him. Jim, in my opinion, is not going to give up easily.
S: Seems reasonable that if we anonck in again, it will go with that since, if he wanted to and we talked, etc.

Some talk about progress of Am. job.
M: We should not worry, in a way, that we always have control.
K: What about that?
M: It may with us.
S: Some discussion of 4:15 for the dinner and a general discussion of what has happened so far.
The White House
Washington

There is clear distinction between
certainty in a real country versus in an O.E.S.R.
state. The latter cannot be made.

Action is constant. It is impossible to
be political.

Helpful: we will get more involved in
discussions.

K: PRC has a strong in a real world.

options are available. Then can get
involved in discussions.

M: OK but that is

K: PRC will not continue here in the

world. We know what will

happen.

M: A little clearer in what we are doing.

K: PRC must have to deal with
ties of Tangier—unfields, etc.

CJ: The I.S.O.M. is discussed. We need
to ensure that PRC does what the I.S.O.M.
asked for. The President asked that these
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Ce - The Five shouldn't think he will lose
those games if he doesn't win.

S - It's a matter of time. We want
put to mechanical flexibility into
the game until we them look as
limited.

K - So in bounds... He's not going
to... about conditioning today.

M - We can do better in Washington...in
term substitution.

S - I must agree (my friends) I hope
it more hazardous than taking out
a flight in Poland.

Roth (Roths) - We are looking at all
options which would seem a better
number of possibilities.

Roth (Roths) - Theater of war
a limited option...
Scheduled Options

Major Options

Prime Change in Target 

In any amount or position

We should Tackle 5-6 at a time together

(1) Sur-Note Thrust 1 (EE) 200
(2) " " " Europe 150
(3) " " " Frustration
(4) P&L " US
(5) " " " fars abroad

Regular Options

K - That C say is what it is we are trying

To accomplish.
S - F, E what are you willing

K-1 - Those who are willing for

Dealing Foe options
K - We would like K how what they are
5 - We need to flesh out this alternative not that it is "a distinction of
interest"

K - We would like to have you look at the thin lines and tell me if there are
any kinds of things we should

K - What is next step.

S - we're trying to lower a message to them - we are showing some
indiscreetly demonstrated beyond

of further escalation.

Otherwise you would have to
look an extra 4000 targets that

inclcluded, our ability to target

China's targets, meaning 8000

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Open to Chinese attack - should mean a signal for US/MC military, which may be ready at West
You tell me what message you want to telex
K - it is chicken egg. We stand firm, good continuing Allison in action.
If I walk on it 10, 100 would not alone - the what, the main the attacks in Europe, in world, - must. Walk not attacks.
M - you speak about chicken egg. That is why we talk dialogue.
China - should we make a decision after the special conference? (China can attack)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

K - SendColossus, a Europe
incident, a Ser message
and a Carter, of integrity
refuted by this very minute US
Public Health - I think we stand
so by joining forces in cut
a willing note.

I think using China is about
impossible we could carry it in.
S - Take this chart.

K - Yes. Ike had a N.S. on this
pm in Rome. for a year.

I am going: the 1st and 2 1/2 weeks:
and let slowly, we take a big
step at Rome.

S - Knew originally a 3 days, big to
and kind, I dean toward 13.
S. In Bem, for example, of air traffic to begin some F-111s, one causing a nuisance. They may prompt the rep' to resign and fields.
N. Vice versa, I name this division from theoretical to actual packages for actual issues. Unless filed, none are not too began.
Let it not upset Colon Day.