

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
PFIAB
Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Friday, August 3, 1973
12:30 p.m. (Luncheon)

PLACE: The Sequoia

Kissinger: Jack Anderson writes implying that not everything the Board does goes to the President. Every report of the Board does go to the President. Don't judge your influence by the frequency of meeting with us.

* * * * *

I think what is going on is an unmitigated disaster in foreign policy. In April our foreign policy was in excellent shape. The Chinese-Soviet triangle was operating for us. Everyone wanted to be associated with us. Now people are holding off. It is nothing bad yet, but sometimes someone will make a run at us. We have established a reputation for hard and unpredictable action.

There are two choices -- use force or don't. If we use it, use enough to succeed. In the India crisis, we move things -- carriers -- around so people would say "If they do this over Bangladesh, what would they do over the Middle East?"

In 1970 we were to the brink of war over Jordan without a complaint from Congress.

It's in this way that Watergate is a disaster. Everything is a little harder now and takes a little longer now -- Europe, China, etc. All but the USSR. It is a national obligation to get Watergate behind us so we can be seen as an operating government. Nothing yet has really gone wrong -- I am talking about the potential.

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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BY MA NARA DATE 8/2/04 State Rev. 3/8/04

We must get over Watergate. I speak without prejudice to the facts of it.

Internationally, the big fact is the Sino-Soviet involvement. We have so far pushed the Chinese as a sentimental thing, but let's not kid ourselves: China wants us as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. It is a pleasure to do business with them. They are tough, they're our best NATO ally! But if they think we are going through our cultural resolution, they won't even run the ideological risk of being tied up with us. They are not sentimental.

A successful Soviet attack on China would overturn the world balance of power. If it is a disarming attack to which we don't respond, if they couple it with seizing Manchuria, the effect on Europe and Japan would be disastrous. We will try to avert this.

It is alleged we have antagonized Japan by neglect, etc. It would be easy if that were so, because we could correct it. They are hard to deal with. They leak everything. You must assume that a country which (through intelligence) fears the most diabolical things of others, must be capable of diabolical things themselves. The Japanese are a potentially corrosive role internationally. Take energy. They are international scavengers. It is a narrow, cold-blooded, etc. But they are tuned to survival, so as long as the international structure is favorable, they are okay. Only if things go wrong will they desert.

Europe: They accuse us of condominium, of hegemony, of weakening the deterrent, of asking for their buildup.

The danger is that relations with adversaries become easy and those with friends acrimonious.

Also the emergence of the EC is creating some problems. There is a danger they'll push themselves into confrontation with the US.

The Middle East: Israel is so much stronger that the dilemma is on the Arabs. Right now Israel is asking for their immediate surrender, and the Arabs are asking for a miracle. We want to help, but we will not put out a plan for both to shoot at. We are trying to get both sides, or one side, to put out something which will get negotiations going.

A : What is the Soviet attitude toward China?

Land: If we are out, would Japan jump to the Soviet Union or to China?

Kissinger: A year ago I would have said China, now perhaps the Soviet Union. It depends on the timing.

Teller: What will happen after August 15?

Kissinger: We had a negotiation going. The Chinese and Sihanouk must be as upset with the bombing halt as we are. (Gave pitch on the situation.)

I came out in January thinking we had won the war. In June, it was very different. We only had to keep Cambodia confused, so nothing could crystallize.

If China does nothing after a Soviet surgical strike, China is irrelevant; if they attack Russia, they will lose several armies.

I have given you the problems we face. On the other hand, we can make it tough on the Soviet Union and make them hesitate on China. We are pushing them in the Middle East; in Europe there may be confrontation but it will come out all right.

A _____: Why has Europe not supported us in the Middle East?

Kissinger: The maximum we can get out of Israel will be less than the radical Arabs want, so we should make Syria sign it. Don't bring Saudi Arabia in.

Call Reetan 8:30 NAK office
Case for next morning unless we hear

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NAK/PFIAB

Wed 3 Aug 73

K- Ambassador writes emphasizing that not
anything board does go to PWS.
Every report of board does go to PWS.
Don't judge influence by frequency of my
calls.

Attain what is going on is unmitigated
disaster in FP
In opaid FP was in excellent shape. PRC USSR
is was operating for us, everyone wanted
to be associated with us. Now people are
holding off - nothing had yet, but sometimes
someone will make some moves.

We have established a reputation for hard &
irreversible action. There are 2 choices - use
force or not, if use it, use enough.

In India crisis, we move things (earrings)
around so people would say if they do this case
B-D, what would they do over ME

In 1970 we were to think of war over Vietnam
w/o complaint from us.

It is in this way that we is disaster. Everything
is a little harder now & takes a little longer
now - Europe, China, etc. all but USSR.

It is with difficulty to get Watergate behind
us so we can be seen as operating govt.
Nothing yet has really gone wrong - I am
taking potential.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state rev. cw 3/8/04

BY W NARA DATE 4/3/04

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WASHINGTON

We must get our C.I.F. (not I speak w/o
preparation to a fact of it)

Finally, a big fact is Sino-Soviet rivalry.
We have so far pushed China as sentimental
thing, but don't kid - China wants us
as counterweight to SU

Pleasure to do business w/ them. They are
tough, one last NATO ally, etc.

But if they think we give them our
unilateral resolution, they don't want
a side risk of being tied up w/ us. They
are not sentimental.

A successful SU attack on PRC would
mean we'd B.P. If clearing attack
to which we don't respond, if they couple it
w/ seizing Manchuria, effect on Europe far more
disastrous. We will try to avert this.

It is alleged w/ have antagonized Japan by
neglect, etc. If that were so, course
we'd correct it.

They are hard to deal w/ - they take everything
you must assume that a country which (then
unintelligible) fears the most diabolical things
of others, must be capable of diabolical things
themselves.

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Jap more on a potentially excessive role
continually with.

Take energy - they are world scavengers. It
is narrow, cold blooded, etc.

Beats they are too tuned to survival, so as
long as with structure is favorable, Jap on OK.

Only if they go very well they desert.
Europe - They accuse of corruption, of
begging, of unmaking detest, of asking
for handouts.

Danger is that relations w/ adversaries become
easy + those w/ friends acrimonious.

also emergence of EC is creating new
problems - corporation danger w/ US

ME - Israel so much stronger that dilemma
is on Arabs.

Right now Israel asking for immediation
summit, + Arabs asking unilateral.

US want to help, but not put out a plan
for both to start at.

US trying to get both or one to put out something
which will get serious negotiations going

A. ^{what} US attitudes toward China

K.

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WASHINGTON

Line - If we out, would Japan jump to S or PRC

R - A year ago would have said PRC, now perhaps S. Depends on timing.

Teller - What will happen after Sany

R - We had a negotiation going. Chinese & S. must be as expert w/ Beijing talk as us.

(Goes patch on situation)

I came out in January thinking we had over a war. In June, very different. We only had to buy Communist weapons, so nothing would crystallize.

R - If China does nothing after surgical strike, China will wait, if they attack Russia they will lose several overseas armies.

Have given you problems we face. On other hand, we can make it tough on S & make them hesitate on China, we pushing them in M.E. in E world may be unprofitable, but will come out at night

Anders - Why E not support us in M.E.

R - More we can do for Israel will be less than radical Arabs want, so we should make Syria sign it, don't bring Soviet Arabian in.