MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
General John Wickham, Military Assistant to Secretary Schlesinger

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, August 2, 1973
8:00 a.m. (Breakfast)

Schlesinger: These, I see it, are the key aspects. One, what are the prospects for control of escalation? What are the constraints? In Europe, for example, we could warn them we will hit within 10 miles of the FEBA.

Wickham: The planners have not had any national-level objectives against which to plan.

Schlesinger: Second, what is the effect of changes in employment policy on deterrence? -- We decided that flexibility strengthened deterrence. -- We tried to codify the target system -- to hit things which destroyed the regime; to get military forces, including conventional forces which could attack after a nuclear exchange.

We do not target the industry of friends.

We want to look at the political details. For example, Russians are less than 50% of the population of the USSR. Should we say we will hit Russians and let the "Golden Horde" take over? Targeting is against the Party, economics, the Army.

Third, what is the anticipated Soviet/Chinese reaction?
Damage limitation by force of arms is not likely, given the possibility of secure second strikes. Therefore there is an inducement toward this method of limiting damage.

Soviet declaratory policy would probably oppose on this.

We have broken the targets into packages to play with. There is no practical way to get complete flexibility.

If the policy is approved, it will take two years to complete the change in plans.

Fourth, allied reaction. They will be concerned about any possible decoupling.

The Europeans think an attack on Soviet cities is not a very credible option for an attack on Europe. Therefore they would support broadened options which are credible.

Kissinger: What we need are options which the President has beforehand. When a crisis comes, there is not time to figure these things out. We can't wait two years either.

Schlesinger: There is the big problem with the troops that executing the options will degrade the SIOP.

Kissinger: I am impressed with your work. What we need is the details.

Our declaratory policy is now ahead of our ability to execute.

I am comfortable for the moment with what the Secretary has said as declaratory policy.

Schlesinger: We myst leave uncertainty in the Soviets' mind that we might be willing to use nuclear weapons for something less than direct defense of the United States.

Kissinger: We need a meeting next week on current plans.

Schlesinger: We need a couple of European packages -- an interdiction strike in East Poland, a strike within 10 miles of FEBA.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
King Credits

1. Prospects for Central Education
   Constraints:
   - In Europe, for example, we have
   - Planned with Red China's influence,
   - Have not had very much definitive against what's plan.

2. Effect of changes in Employment
   Political determinants
   - Is decided flexibly; temporary
   - We tried to reach a target segment to
   - But, we have engaged in regions,
   - To get and pressure some practical fulse which would attacks get on our
   - We do not need immediate gains.
   - We want to look at political details

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AUTHORITY on 03.25.1973

BY NARA DATE 6/28/73
For example, Kissinianae vs. Kiss Rapportation. Say war will hit c Kissinianae & hit c "Golden Sink." 3.

Targeting war against party, economic, any

3. Contingent USSR/PRC reaction:

b. If peace remains in Africa, we should blanket the world & push toward this method of

ending enemy property. USSR/PLS/Central property would benefit from the

peace.

we have here our target will be 3 property to plan war. There is no question as

4. All war in Africa

They will see no war but this accompanying peace.
S: Europeans think an attack on Iran is not an acceptable option from an American European. If they would support a mutual option who can rule?

K: What we need are options which can be a safer. Within a given range. There is no time to figure these things out with everyone's egos.

S: There is a big problem with trips that are not going to hurt us.

K: I am impressed with your ideas. Whatever we need is I think.

Declaration Policy - It is now ahead of our ability to execute.

K: Can we point this out with moments of what is being said as declaration policy?

S: We must have uncertainty in our ideas and 1972 in America.
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1. Use more aggressive for reaching
   less than direct defense or US.
2. Nuclear strike next week in direct
   areas.
3. Use nuclear strike of Europe —
   participation states
   in East Poland — strike if in
   30 mi. of EPA.