MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Military Assistant to Secretary Richardson

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, April 11, 1973
8:00 a.m. (Breakfast)

PLACE: The Pentagon

SUBJECT: SALT

Richardson: Dealing with the asymmetries over time could lead to a relative advantage for the USSR.

The asymmetries we face are in MLBM's and numbers; the asymmetries they face are our bombers, MIRV's, and accuracy.

There are three ways to strike a balance: (1) have them offset, (2) an actual balance (numerical equality) or (3) permit a catchup over time.

My conclusion is that a combination of the three is best. The offset would be for the SS-9. The offset of disparate elements could be the SS-9 and heavy bombers, plus a MIRV ban on the SS-9. With freedom to mix,

Then apply equality to all the other systems, separately, like 850 for SLBMs. The same for ICBMs.

Henry A. Kissinger
To catch up -- let them MIRV their ICBM's and SLBM's.

Then you have to deal with the instabilities introduced by increasing accuracy, MIRV, etc.

These are the problems in a MIRV.

Kissinger: I am now opposed to a MIRV test ban. I have come to similar conclusions.

Richardson: There is a good paper by Archie Wood. Things we could give up. The best thing to give up is the air-launched strategic missile. It scares the hell out of me.

Kissinger: Why give up something which scares them?

Richardson: You could put four Minuteman on a 747. I have asked Foster for a project to develop this and let it leak. I have looked over all the things we are doing in case we want to renounce them.

SCAD/SRAM we shouldn't give up. They are important to the bomber systems.

Kissinger: On SALT I am moving in the same direction.

Yours is an ingenious way of dealing with Jackson.

There are two points on which I may differ: Why not lump ICBM and SLBM together rather than have a separate ceiling?

And shouldn't we try to get our 550 ceiling on the ICBM?

Richardson: How do we verify?

Kissinger: Let's ask CIA.

Richardson: I don't see how we can verify.

Kissinger: Shouldn't we start by agreeing to unequal numbers if they won't MIRV their land-based missiles? They won't agree, but then we could move into your idea.
Their SALT decision-making apparatus is screwed up. They can only react to an outside input. I have found it best to give them a theory rather than a plan.

My position differs from yours only in limiting MIRVs on ICBM.

Let's hold this close. Wait until Alex Johnson gets back, have a small Verification Panel meeting, and then an NSC meeting.

Richardson: Forward based systems: Try to talk in terms of long range, medium range, etc., and we could agree to limit our medium range if they will limit their IRBMs, etc.

Make to the Soviets a distinction between long range and medium range, not where the weapon is based.

This ought to be dealt with by MBFR.

Just raise this with the Soviet Union, don't try to deal with it now.

Kissinger: Try to keep this tight. I will discuss it with the President. We need CIA to tell us whether there is a verification problem on a partial MIRV ban.

We could have a Verification Panel meeting confined to the principals next week. Or just an NSC meeting. Within three days of Johnson's return on the 19th.
SALT

R - Blocking w/p aggression

Area one more lead to relative advantage for USSR.

Agreements:

{US 50}

Aircraft US

Area

Area: Volume

1. Offset
2. Adjust (summers option)
3. Permit catch up
time

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY: SeeAppendix 512, NARA 7/8/10

BY: Date: NARA, DATE: 08/21/0
The White House
Washington

R conclusion is that an extension of 5 to 9 is that offset would be for 5.9.
offset of shipments 73Cneys would be 5.9 but remain constant for
MIRV increases 5.9. Further
t. Then apply day-by-day and
other situations separately
(under 5.0 for 9.0 and)
Some for Island
Catching like them MIRV increases
+600
Then you have to check on
1.835415E-12 weights introduced by
see in increasing accuracy MIRV.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Think one jurisdiction in my mind.

R: Some more opposed it in

R: Scared some to mention contain.

R: Then is a real paper Archie

R: This is a real paper. Archie

R: What give my somethy which

R: Some could put if not sure

Today the fact that I came down all is the reason we
are doing in case we want to embrace them.
THE WHITE HOUSE

R - Scale/Same are the only reversing gate esp. They are important to a similar grouping.

K - These in South are many in same direction. Your is supplementary & useful.

R - How well in with I may differ with not going 260 miles & 190 miles with 3.

K - Is there a way to test one 500 cubic yard in 2 days.

R - How reliable?

K - 6.25 cubic & A.

R - Don't see how can sink

K - Shouldn't we start by again
The White House
Washington

If we are going to go into an election, Mike Blair should.
They can't agree, but then we can't agree on any other.

- This is the main thrust of the opposition's argument. They
can only react to our initiatives.

I have found it best to give

than to simply be given a

plan.

My position type is going to be

and limiting MIRV's on

the SALT

- We both hold this view. Senator
Johnson gets both hands on SALT

and SALT IV, respectively.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

R. FBS. Any talk on items of N R. Mild Range, etc, paper of limit on a mild range. If they will limit any range, etc.

SIGHT 149-FBS

R. ToJK to R. R. Mild Range, not when I can see it.

This cannot be decided on by MFR.

Just write this up, S & D. don't be dead on it either.

R. Try to keep this tight. J wish...
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1960

Mail CDF & told no whether
reconciliation problem any present
with.

K- we are sending R. only
unofficial to Princeton Sept. 1st
or first or NSC unit.

[Signature]
(On 5th of Johnson)
(Atton 30.9.60)