

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs  
Amb. Daniel Murphy, Military Assistant to  
Secretary Richardson

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, March 3, 1973  
8:30 a.m. - (Breakfast)

PLACE: The Pentagon

SUBJECTS: Richardson testimony; NSSM's; MBFR; SALT;  
China; Vietnam

Richardson: What about my testimony?

Kissinger: You don't have to orate on the State of the World. Just say  
you will review the DOD business.

You can put out a purely defense report.

Richardson: I have to testify March 20 to Mahon.

Kissinger: We will give you our views by the middle of next week.


Richardson: What about NSSM's? We do a lot of studies.

Kissinger: The fact that there is a DOD study can't preclude a NSC study.

Richardson: I just wanted to demonstrate that I was getting things going.

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EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B (3)  
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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6  
NSC MEMO, 11/2/73, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, STATE DEPT. 3/18/04  
BY: [Signature] NARA, DATE: 3/27/04

Kissinger: We are now free to put out NSSMs?

Richardson: We are not interested in Systems Acquisition and Manpower; but we will go on Security Assistance, etc.

Kissinger: I will show the draft NSSMs to Murphy. Keep it among the four of us.

The Europeans are sabotaging MBFR on the grounds that we have a private deal with the Soviet Union. Our deal was only on the timing.

I think it's better to have Hungary out than Italy in.

We need some DOD proposals on how to handle the substance.

The military's proposals will be formalistic. Symmetrical cuts all leave us weaker. Asymmetrical cuts are better, we in the areas they fear most and vice versa.

We need to develop some concrete proposals. We need a comprehensive study on what our alternatives area. Not a vague set of platitudes.

There are incongruities in NATO which we can't continue to live with-- for example, the level of supplies, both in US internal levels and within NATO.

(Long discussion)


We should use MBFR to educate the Europeans.

I will put high priority on MBFR . We must be careful in articulating to Europe. McNamara just scared them with raising doubts about using nuclear weapons.

Some of the SALT proposals are childish. The Soviet Union will demand a quid pro quo. We must be serious about what we are willing to give up.

We could go to a 2500 ceiling. That would just ratify the present -- which may be what we want.

Richardson: The big problem is what we want more.



The objective of forestalling MIRV might jeopardize a longer-range solution on numbers and throw weight which could include big missiles on our side.

One option is to freeze at the current equivalencies--our MIRV advantage and their throw weight advantage.

But from here it is harder to see how you would move from here to reductions on both sides.

Kissinger: The question is that with MIRV, a first strike has tremendous advantage.

You don't ease the problem by letting warheads run free and hoping for reductions. The real problem is the gap between first and second strike capability.

Richardson: The key question is where to move. What is it we most want restricted? It would be to our advantage if the Soviet big missiles were not MIRVed. But what could we realistically pay? Nothing except that ten years ago each side took its own path of development and we now are equivalent and should stop there.

This is the Rush position.

Kissinger: There are many possibilities. Rush wants a freeze while something else is being negotiated. The Soviet Union won't go that route-- we have to give up something. I can believe in a position which would balance off throw weight and MIRVs. The Soviet Union might do this, but they won't buy this plus unrestricted US technological development while they are frozen. We couldn't go on to Trident, etc., while they are frozen.

Richardson: There are two courses. This freeze, and one which would establish a limit on numbers and throw weight, with phased reductions over time.

The disadvantage is it ratifies the Soviet advantage in throw weight and permits them to MIRV. Congress wouldn't let us catch up.

But over the long term, it would keep the balance within limit, and let us over the long term determine which are the better systems.

Kissinger: I don't follow. Freedom to mix could go with any option. It is a separate question.

Richardson: But freedom to mix would permit us to retire one bomber and build a big missile.

Kissinger: This makes sense only if we have decided this switch is desirable on other grounds.

Even if we go this route, it could be dangerous because it could give a first strike advantage.

If both sides have one invulnerable element, what difference does it make if you have a vulnerable element?

We haven't even analyzed what it is about Minuteman vulnerability which bothers us.

Richardson: We must also consider what Congress would let us do.

Kissinger: Without ABM and MIRV we would be dead in SALT. The military told us they couldn't produce a new sub before 1979, so we had nothing but a bluff base.

Unless we have some programs to offer, we are at a big disadvantage.

It has become axiomatic that we must be calm, cool, and collected. It's true, perhaps with the Soviet Union, but it's not true about the Chinese.

In June I went to China and Chou started talking about Laird talking about force improvements. I started to apologize, and he said Laird was great in this respect. He said this last time that he was sorry Laird left because he understood.

If McGovern had won, the Chinese would have been wild opponents. Chou wanted me to take care of Japan, visit them on an equal basis for face, and not make them mad.

So remember when you make a defense statement, the Chinese have a vested interest in our strength.

They don't want us out of Asia. They will give us problems only if they think we are on the run. They can play with us or capture the left wing of the world Communist movement and force the Soviet Union into a contest against us.

The Chinese have a vested interest in a strong US defense posture.

Vietnam: (Discussion of infiltration and how to stop it.)

Richardson: You sent a draft State/Defense cable to me to protest some of the GVN violations.



Scip Richardson Breakfast 30 min

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8:30 AM  
Sat, 3 Mar 13

Reich Testimony

- He not have to omit on SOTU
- we will review DOD
- They can put out a purely defense report.
- 20 March Testimony - Makers
- we will give them views by middle of next week.

NSA

Fact that there is DOD study contrasted with a NSC study

R - We are now free to present NSA's?

R - I just wanted to demonstrate that I was getting things going

R - We not interested in Sys Acq + management, but we will go on Sec areas, etc.

R - I will work show draft NSA's to Murphy - Keep among c 4 of us

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY John, NARA, DATE 3/20/04

state review 3/8/04



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MBFR.

Emergencies are sabotaging MBFR  
our general one has appropriate deal w/SC.  
Our deal was only on timing.  
Better to have H. may get than  
study in.

(-Use and some DOS) proposals on how  
to handle substance, the  
and proposals will be persuasive  
Symmetrical cuts all leave us  
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
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R - There are inconsistencies in NATO  
which we can't continue to live w/  
E.g., level of supplies, both in  
US internal levels & w/in NATO

↳ Long talk

R We should use MBR & educate  
Europe

I will put high priority on MBR  
ONL must be careful in articulating  
to Europe - McNamara just  
learned there w/doubts about  
using mcs





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SALT

Some SA proposals which I think  
SU will demand and pursue.  
We must be serious about what we are  
willing to give up.  
We could go 2500 ceiling - that would just  
reify the present - which may be  
what we want

R - Big problem is what we want more.  
Objective of forestalling M.I.R.V. might be  
preference of longer range solution  
on # + other weight which could  
include big missile more side.

R - One option is to freeze at current  
equivalencies (one M.I.R.V. advantage +  
their heavier weight)  
But from here it is harder to see  
how you would move from here  
to restrictions on both sides



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R- Question is that w/ MIRV, a  
first strike has tremendous  
advantages.

Some don't see a problem by letting  
warheads run free & hoping for a  
the real problem is getting hit 1 or 2 strikes  
capability.

R- Key question is where to ~~invest~~ invest.  
What is it we most want restricted.  
Would we have any advantages if Sov big  
missiles were than not MIRVed. But  
what could we realistically pay?

Nothing except that 10 yrs ago each  
side took its own path of development &  
we now are equivalent & should  
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R - This is Rush position

K - There are many possibilities. Rush wants a freeze while something else being negotiated. So want to get that write - and have to find out something

you learn before in a position which would balance off the amount of AT + MIRV's

So might do this, but they won't buy this plus unrestricted US Tech deployment while they are frozen. We couldn't go on to Trident, etc, while they are frozen.

R - There are 2 courses. This  $\uparrow$  + one which would establish limit on # + throw weight w/ phased reductions over time



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R - The disadvantage is it satisfies  
our advantage in throw weight  
& permits them to receive Congress  
overhead but no catch up.  
But over the long term, it would  
keep a balance within limits & let  
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one is better system.

R - I don't follow. Freedom to mix  
could go w/ any option. It is a  
separate question.

R - But F-117 would permit us to  
retire one bomber & build a big  
missile

R - This makes sense only if we have  
decided this switch is  
desirable on other grounds.



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R - ~~Even~~ Even if we go this  
route, it could be dangerous, because  
it could give a ~~1st~~ <sup>1st</sup> strike advantage.

R - If both sides have one invaluable  
element, what difference does it  
make if you have one invaluable  
element?  
But ~~that~~ <sup>having</sup> men ~~talked~~ <sup>talked</sup> what it  
is about MNC vulnerability which  
it does so.

R - We must also consider what Congress  
would let us do.

R - W/o ABM + MIRV we would be  
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Military told us they couldn't produce  
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
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Chinese -

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we must be calm, cool, collected.  
True, perhaps w/ S.C., not true  
about Chinese.

For years I went to China & Chen  
started talking about kind talking  
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If Mc Govern had won, Chinese




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would have been wild of course.  
Chou wanted me to take care of  
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So remember when you make  
a defense statement, the Chinese  
do have a vested interest in our  
strength.

They don't want us out of Asia.  
They will give us problems only  
if they think we are on a run.  
They can play w/ us or capture  
a left wing of Great movement  
& force SU with criticism against  
us.



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Chomsky has a vested interest  
in a strong US defense posture.

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VN

- Discussion of injection + how  
to stop it.

R - sent a State/Def cabinet memo for to  
pursue some of the GOM violations

