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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
ON SALT ISSUES

Wednesday, September 17, 1975
3:30 p.m. (90 minutes)
The Cabinet Room

From: Henry A. Kissinger *BD*

I. PURPOSE

To review the major unresolved SALT issues in preparation for Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit on Thursday and Friday of this week and to give guidance with respect to the visit of Israeli Defense Minister Peres (Tab A).

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: Attached at Tab B is the memorandum on the major SALT issues which I sent to you earlier this week. That memorandum contains a full analysis of each of the major SALT issues on which there is not yet an agreed position within the national security community. There is no need to repeat that analysis in this paper.

On Monday, you asked Deputy Secretary Clements and General Brown to review their respective positions and extend themselves to the limit to come up with positions which protected the national interest but which had some chance of being negotiable with the Soviet Union. Clements and Brown assured you they would have the results of that review to present at the NSC meeting.

B. Participants: (List at Tab C)

C. Press Arrangements: The meeting but not the subject will be announced. There will be a White House photographer.


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III. TALKING POINTS (SALT)

At the Opening of the Meeting

1. The main purpose of this meeting is to review the work of the Verification Panel on the major outstanding SALT issues in preparation for the visit of Foreign Minister Gromyko.
2. I want each of you to know that I am firmly committed to obtaining a new SALT agreement. I think that an agreement fully in the national interest and still negotiable with the Soviets is within our grasp. I also think it is important that we have it nailed down before we go into the 1976 campaign. Unless we have some sort of breakthrough on the remaining issues by this November, I do not see how this will be possible.
3. It is clear that we are at a position in the negotiations where we must focus on the substance of our position and not on negotiating tactics. We need to concentrate on those aspects of our position that strategically are of greatest importance to us.
4. Bill (Colby), is there anything new in the intelligence area we should know?
5. Henry, will you describe where we stand with the Soviets and outline the major issues remaining to be resolved.
6. (Following Kissinger remarks) How can we resolve the points which are still at issue? Jim, what are Defense views?
7. (Invite comments from other members.)

At the Close of the Meeting

1. The discussion today has been very helpful in giving me a perspective on the major issues. I believe the alternatives for dealing with each of the issues are clear.
2. I want to reemphasize my determination to do everything possible to obtain a SALT agreement -- a good SALT agreement.



Also, the importance of time in achieving a SALT agreement should be obvious to us all. We need a breakthrough before the end of the year.

- 3. When I have made my decisions on the issues, I expect the fullest cooperation from each one of you in making a success of our efforts. I expect, and I am sure I will receive, your unstinting cooperation to that end. It is absolutely essential that we pull together and that we develop and maintain unanimity on this subject. We simply cannot afford bureaucratic infighting or leaks about who was tough and who was soft, who won and who lost.
- 4. We have a tough year ahead of us. I want us to go into it with a SALT agreement behind us, an agreement which represents a solid achievement and which has the unanimous support of the Executive Branch.

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TALKING POINTS FOR THE VISIT OF
ISRAELI MINISTER OF DEFENSE PERES

I. Background

Israeli Defense Minister Peres arrives on September 17 with a team of military experts for the first periodic consultation on Israel's long-term military needs called for in the US-Israel Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) of September 1st. We have received from Ambassador Dinitz the agenda suggested by Peres for his talks (Tab I). It is based on the ten year, 40 billion dollar Israeli military expansion plan, MATMON-B. In addition, Peres will wish to discuss the details of our FY 1976 military assistance program for Israel and he will probably press for either immediate release or specified delivery dates for the weaponry already on order which has been held up during the period of reassessment.

We met part of the first increment of MATMON-B in responding to Prime Minister Rabin's Urgent List of October 1974, but were obliged to draw upon DOD inventories and disrupt production schedules in order to provide prompt delivery of some items. In January of this year, you authorized Israel to submit to the Pentagon its 1975 MATMON-B request, on the understanding that there would be no discussion of this list until further progress had been made on negotiations. The Israeli's have updated and upgraded this list by adding more sophisticated weapons (e. g., F-16 and EA-6B aircraft, Pershing missiles, "Stinger" ground-to-air missiles). It contains a number of advanced-technology items which we have thus far refused to release to Israel (and in most cases to our NATO allies).

Dinitz has told us this updated MATMON-B list for 1975-76 will be formally submitted in the context of the periodic consultations called for in the MOA, and that Israel intends to submit a similar list each year. He has singled out for special attention 29 high-priority items.

The Department of Defense analysis of the high-priority items is at Tab II, broken down into three categories: I) no adverse impact on DOD, II) further study required, III) should not be released.

The CIA has also analyzed the intelligence-related items requested

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in the Dinitz letter, recommending against releasing any of them. The magnitude, sophistication and early delivery dates of Peres' expected requests would pose the following problems, should we agree to all or most of the requests as made:

- (1) the potential degradation of our own defense capabilities due to the premature release of sophisticated technology and the diversion from DOD inventories or disrupted production schedules to meet demands for rapid delivery (this is a particularly sore point with the Pentagon);
- (2) the potential strain on our budget and the potential negative public reaction caused by the need for annual credits to Israel of \$1.5 to \$2.0 billion to support MATMON-B (this especially troubles OMB).
- (3) the potentially damaging effect on the Arabs if the scale of our military support for Israel upsets the present strategic balance in the area to Arab detriment;
- (4) the potential stimulation of Arab demands on the US for still greater quantities of weapons and more sophisticated technology -- with greater Arab frustration if we are unable to comply; and
- (5) the potential danger of a greatly accelerated Middle East arms race, with the US and USSR as the principal suppliers.

On the other hand, we have a continuing commitment to Israel's survival; there would be a negative impact in both Israel and the Congress if we appeared to be weakening in our military support for Israel in the immediate aftermath of the Egypt-Israel Agreement. This could also cause the Arabs to harden their line toward Israel.

Given this complex situation, it is important that you set forth a strategy for all agencies to follow during the talks with Peres, and in preparing for talks next month with Rabin. We should be responsive in releasing the backlog of items held during the re-assessment, in promising an expeditious analysis of and reply to Israeli requests, and in scheduling further consultations, as agreed



in the MOA. We should avoid giving any definite replies at this time on the overall Israeli request, on specific new items included in the request, or on our aid levels past FY 1976.

II. Talking Points

1. Let me review briefly our past military relationship with Israel:

-- We have been Israel's almost exclusive source of arms since the Six-Day War and we are committed to respond sympathetically to Israel's needs.

-- We responded massively (\$2.2 billion) following the October 1973 war and we responded very positively to Rabin on the Urgent List in October 1974.

-- Both times our response caused degradation of our own military capabilities due to diversion from DOD inventories and disruption of set production schedules.

-- As a result of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, we are committed to \$1.5 billion in military assistance for Israel as part of the FY 1976 Middle East aid package, and we have agreed to periodic consultations on Israel's long-term military needs.

-- Peres' visit this week will be the first of these consultations. We understand he has a very long shopping list which could cause serious problems for the U.S. if not handled carefully.

2. Henry, do you have any thoughts, based on the recent negotiations?

3. We must coordinate closely in dealing with the Israeli requests and present a solid front in defending our decisions to the Israelis, the Arabs, the Congress and the press. There must be no divisions whatever within the Administration.

4. Peres should be treated very courteously and allowed to present his requests and their justification in full. However, we do not want to make any commitments on any aspect of his long shopping list.



5. Jim, you should promise to analyze rapidly Peres' requests but point out the very serious problems posed in the areas of advanced technology release and competing demands from other countries. He should be told that we will have to analyze the entire package before reaching decisions on any individual items and he should not be given any hope of accelerated delivery schedules such as Israel has had in the past.
6. Peres can be told that all of the items held up during the re-assessment have been released.



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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Minute
RECEIVER'S NAME Brent Scowcroft
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NOTE: no page 2

NSC excised in 2/10/99 letter
[32pp does not include CIA briefing
"imbedded" at p.2 see additional
pink sheet.]