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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS

March 31, 1976

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

National Security Decision Memorandum 323

NSC Ltr: 9/15/00 E97-157

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The US Commissioner, Standing Consultative Commission

SUBJECT: Instructions for US Commissioner, Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), Geneva

The President has approved the following instructions for the SCC session beginning on March 29, 1976, in Geneva:

1. Launch Control Facilities and Minuteman Shelters. Concerning the Soviet complaint over our use of shelters over Minuteman silos, the US Commissioner is authorized to make the following presentation:
 - a. In the US view, resolution of both the Minuteman shelters and the Soviet new large silo launch control facility issues should proceed simultaneously.
 - b. As a result of previous exchanges in the SCC and continued monitoring through national technical means of verification, the US can accept that these silos are currently used only as launch control facilities. Similarly, we hope that the Soviet side is substantially certain that our use of Minuteman shelters is for purposes of environmental protection.
 - c. As both sides recognize, however, uncertainties remain as to the precise nature of the construction and utilization of these facilities that can cause continuing concern as to their potential utilization for

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for other purposes. Consequently, the US proposes that the Soviet government permit a US representative to visit and examine one of these new large silo launch control facilities. At the same time, the US would welcome a Soviet representative to one of our Minuteman complexes of his choice where he would be invited to observe that silo modification is the activity occurring under the environmental shelter.

d. In the US view, such an exchange of representatives would resolve both sides' remaining concern over these launch facilities, contribute to confidence building between the sides, and more importantly, strongly reaffirm the mutual determination of the US and Soviet governments to maintain the viability of the SALT agreements.

In support of the above objective, the US Commissioner should adduce other arguments as appropriate; however, if the Soviets reject this initiative, he should ask for further instructions from Washington, but he should press the Soviets for their views on how to resolve these issues.

2. Kamchatka ABM Radar. The US Commissioner should discuss this issue with the Soviets with the principal objectives of establishing that:

a. Kamchatka is an ABM test range and attempting to get Soviet acknowledgement that the Flat Twin (developed as part of the ABM X-3 system at Sary Shagan) is an ABM radar.


b. Sary Shagan and Kamchatka are, as of now, the only ABM test ranges in the USSR.

c. Article IV of the ABM Treaty requires agreement on additional test ranges before they can be deployed outside the ABM deployment site and currently existing test ranges.

3. Dismantling or Destruction. Following an evaluation of the dismantling report to be submitted by the Soviets at this SCC session and of available US intelligence information, the US Commissioner should inform the Soviet Commissioner, at an appropriate time after

the foregoing evaluations have been completed, that our NTM indicates that the Soviets did not complete dismantling or destruction of certain old ICBM launchers within the four-months period required by SCC procedures. He should also note that, while we are aware that the Soviets were in the process of dismantling or destroying a sufficient number of launchers at that time, we expect that in the future such work will be completed on schedule in accordance with SCC procedures.

4. Air Defense Radars at ABM Test Ranges. Near the end of the forthcoming SCC session, the US Commissioner should, upon authorization from Washington, inform the Soviets that the US wishes to place the subject of utilization of air defense radars at ABM test ranges on the agenda for discussion in the Fall 1976 SCC session.



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cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence