TO: The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of State  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The U. S. Commissioner, Standing Consultative Commission  


The President has approved the following instructions for the Standing Consultative Commission session beginning on September 22, 1975, in Geneva.

Compliance Issues

The U. S. Commissioner should inform the Soviets that we are continuing to review all the compliance issues of concern to both sides. However, the U. S. Commissioner should state that the U. S. position remains unchanged on the compliance issues discussed at the last SCC session and that the U. S. does not plan to make any further statements at this time on the issues we have raised. If the Soviets reopen any compliance issues which were discussed at the last SCC session, the U. S. Commissioner should rebut Soviet arguments on these issues along the lines he used in SCC VI.

The U. S. Commissioner may inform the Soviet side that the U. S. has no additional questions concerning compliance to raise at this time. If the Soviets raise any new compliance questions regarding U. S. activities, the U. S. Commissioner should listen to their concern, request additional clarification if appropriate, and state that the Soviet concern will be promptly reported to the U. S. Government and that a U. S. response will be provided as soon as practicable (the U. S. Commissioner should not engage in any discussion of such Soviet concerns, beyond seeking additional clarification, prior to receipt of additional instructions).
ABM Replacement Procedures

The U.S. Commissioner is authorized to work out, ad referendum to Governments, ABM replacement procedures along the lines recommended in the Verification Panel Working Group paper "Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components", dated September 11, 1975, with the following exceptions:

1. With respect to the issue of "replacement at the precise location", the U.S. Commissioner should make clear in presenting the U.S. position outlined in paragraph 5 on pp 7-8 that it is not necessary to arrive at separate definitions for modernization and for replacement in this context.

2. With respect to the definition of "initiation of construction", the U.S. Commissioner should await a Soviet response to the current U.S. approach rather than continue to seek agreement to this approach. At an appropriate time and in a manner of his choosing, the U.S. Commissioner is authorized to propose the alternative to the current U.S. position outlined in paragraph 9, p. 13.

3. On the issue of when replacement ABM launchers should first count, the U.S. Commissioner should initially maintain the present U.S. position for both above-ground and silo launchers. However, he is authorized to explore alternatives to the present U.S. position on above-ground launchers which more precisely describe events that occur early in the construction process and which could be used as the basis for determining when replacement ABM launchers first count.

4. Concerning the additional dismantling or destruction required for replaced ABM launchers, the U.S. Commissioner should continue to support the U.S. position for above-ground and silo launchers put forth in SCC-VI.

5. On the issue of additional dismantling or destruction required for replaced ABM radars, the U.S. Commissioner should continue to support the U.S. position in SCC-VI for radars whose antennas are built on top of a building or on a supporting framework, and for antennas mounted on prepared radar positions. However, for radars whose antennas are an integral part of a building, the U.S. Commissioner should indicate that the U.S. can modify its position along the lines of paragraph 5b, p. 32.
Actions on "Measures Agreement"

1. Clarification of Article 4. In continuing discussion of this issue, the U.S. Commissioner should respond along the following lines:
   a. Continue to maintain the U.S. position authorized in paragraph two of NSDM 290, implementing paragraph 2(d) if necessary.
   b. If the Soviets raise the issue of whether Article 4 should apply only to ballistic missile launches, the U.S. Commissioner should suggest that discussion of this issue be deferred to avoid prejudicing discussion of cruise missiles in SALT.

2. Pre-Agreed Messages. In continuing discussion of these messages, the U.S. Commissioner should respond along the following lines:
   a. On the issue of whether the use of pre-agreed messages should be mandatory, the U.S. position is that their use should be strongly encouraged, but not mandatory.
   b. With regard to whether the pre-agreed messages should state that they constitute initial notification, the word "initial" can be deleted if deemed appropriate by the U.S. Commissioner.
   c. The U.S. should maintain its position that Article 2 covers both nuclear detonations which may occur or which have occurred.
   d. Discussion of pre-agreed messages on missile launches should be deferred until the issue of clarification of Article 4 has been resolved.
   e. The U.S. component should avoid discussion of pre-agreed messages dealing with nuclear incidents involving third countries. If the Soviets raise this issue, the U.S. Commissioner should state that we have no proposal to make on this subject.
   f. With regard to the impact of pre-agreed messages on the Direct Communications Link (DCL) organization and procedures, the U.S. position is that no changes are required with respect to the DCL link between each country's terminal, but that each country should review and improve, if necessary, its organization and procedures for implementing pre-agreed messages.
3. **Form of Agreement.** Agreements on either the pre-agreed messages or clarification of Article 4 should be in the form of an exchange of letters of understanding between SCC Commissioners or, if the Soviets insist, a Statement of Common Understanding initialed or signed by the Commissioners.

**Other Instructions**

This session should last approximately four weeks. The U.S. Commissioner should place emphasis during this session in trying to reduce the differences in the ABM Replacement Procedures to the key substantive issues and to make as much progress as possible in resolving the differences associated with the Measures Agreement.

The President emphasizes that, because of the sensitivity of the SCC activities, particularly with regard to the compliance issues, every effort must be made to avoid unauthorized disclosures. Distribution of this NSDM should be limited to those with a clear need-to-know.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
    The Director of Central Intelligence