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Gen. Secrecy

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS

March 26, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 290

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The US Commissioner, Standing Consultative Commission

SUBJECT: Instructions for US Commissioner, SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), Geneva, March 24, 1975

The President has approved the following instructions for the Standing Consultative Commission session beginning on March 24, 1975, in Geneva.

Compliance Issues

The following instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 283:

1. Possible Testing of an Air Defense Radar in an ABM Mode.
The US Commissioner should seek Soviet clarification of this activity. If the Soviet side claims that the information which has been provided is inadequate to identify the testing activities which concern the US side, the US Commissioner should rebut this contention on the basis that the information provided is adequate to identify the activity. If the Soviets persist in claiming that further information is needed, the US Commissioner, after obtaining approval from Washington, may explain that the US has already identified the radar in question as an SA-5 radar, and that, as is well known by both sides, the SA-5 radar has a continuous-wave signal and can operate over a range of frequencies including frequencies in the vicinity of 6700 megahertz.

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2. Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBMs). In discussing the issue of the definition of a "heavy" ICBM, the US side should use the term "non-heavy" ICBM as opposed to light ICBM in describing those ICBMs which would not be classed as heavy ICBMs.

3. Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges. At an appropriate time during this session of the SCC, the US Commissioner should formally indicate that the US believes that excess Soviet ABM launchers at test ranges were not all dismantled in accordance with the SCC-agreed Procedures. The US side is aware that these launchers were deactivated prior to entry into force of the SCC Procedures. However, the US believes that these launchers should have been dismantled in accordance with the agreed Procedures. The US expects that, in the future, notification and dismantling or destruction will be in accordance with the agreed Procedures. The US Commissioner may provide additional information regarding these Soviet dismantling inadequacies which provided the basis for this concern.

4. Concealment Measures. The proposed US solution to this issue, as provided in NSDM 283, is that the Soviet side should cease these concealment activities. If the Soviets seek clarification of the meaning of the term "cease", the US Commissioner should state that it is not the US intention to require that the sides change practices that were in use prior to entry into force of the Interim Agreement. However, the expanding pattern of concealment activities initiated since that time should be halted.

~~5. US Use of Shelters Over Minuteman Silos and ABM Silos at Grand Forks.~~

a. The US Commissioner should deny that the US has engaged in any deliberate concealment activities.

b. The US Commissioner should reaffirm to the Soviets that, in the context of arrangements to eliminate those compliance ambiguities of concern to the US side, the US is prepared to modify its use of Minuteman shelters. The US Commissioner is authorized to state that "modify", in this context, includes our willingness to eliminate the use of the present type of shelters which impede Soviet verification by national technical means.

c. The US Commissioner is also authorized to indicate that, in the context of arrangements to eliminate those compliance ambiguities of concern to the US side, the US is prepared to forego further use



of the shelters over ABM silos at Grand Forks which concern the Soviet side. In this context, the US Commissioner should point out that these shelters are not currently in use.

d. If the Soviet side reopens the subject of prior US assurances that the use of shelters over Minuteman and ABM silos would cease, the US Commissioner should state that the Soviet side must have misinterpreted or misunderstood past US responses on this subject, and that the US side is unaware of any such assurances. However, the US Commissioner should emphasize US willingness to modify its use of these types of shelters in view of Soviet concerns, assuming that the Soviet side will take similar actions to alleviate US concerns.

6. Soviet Claim of US Violations of the Principle of Confidentiality. If the Soviets reopen this issue, the US Commissioner should respond in a low key manner and continue to emphasize that the information of concern to the Soviets was made public as a result of press leaks and not as a result of actions of US officials.

7. Inactive Atlas/Titan I ICBM Launchers. If the Soviets reopen this issue the US Commissioner should indicate that this matter was addressed in 1973, and on grounds of practicality it is not productive to discuss this matter further, since it has been years since we have operated or manufactured these systems. The US Commissioner may provide additional specific information regarding the status of these obsolete launchers.

ABM Replacement Procedures

The US Commissioner is authorized to work out, ad referendum to Governments, procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components in permitted ABM deployment areas along the lines set forth in the Verification Panel Working Group paper "SCC ABM Replacement Procedures," dated March 7, 1975.

Actions on "Measures Agreement"

1. The US Commissioner should continue consideration, ad referendum to Governments, of a system of pre-agreed messages in accordance with instructions contained in NSDM 272.



2. In response to the Soviet-proposed clarification of Article 4 tabled in the previous session of the SCC on February 5, 1975, the US Commissioner should respond along the following lines:

a. Acknowledge that the Soviet proposal is a constructive step towards clarifying the notification called for in Article 4.

b. State that the US does not see the need for further clarification, beyond that contained in Article 4, for planned missile launches.


c. Agree on the usefulness of a common understanding clarifying notification of "unsuccessful" missile launches, and propose the following specific language for an agreed clarification:

"Consistent with the obligations of the two Parties under the provisions of Article 4 of the Agreement on Measures, it is understood that each Party will notify the other Party immediately, if as a result of an unsuccessful missile launch, such launch will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of the other Party."

d. The US Commissioner may, if he deems it necessary, clarify the phrase "in the direction of the other Party" by indicating that it is the US interpretation that this phrase means "in the direction of the national territory of the other Party." In this context, the US Commissioner should point out that "national territory" includes possessions such as Midway and Guam for the US side.

Sensitivity of SCC Proceedings

The President wishes to emphasize that, because of the sensitivity of the compliance issues, every effort must be made to avoid unauthorized disclosures. Distribution of this NSDM should be limited to those with a clear need to know.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

