

February 9, 1975

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National Security Decision Memorandum 287

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Administrator, Energy Research and
Development Administration

SUBJECT: Instructions for U.S. Delegation to the
TTB/PNE Negotiations, Moscow,
February 10, 1975

The President has decided that the following will be the U.S. position for the next phase of the negotiations on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs), beginning in Moscow on February 10, 1975:

1. The basic purpose of the negotiations is to develop a PNE agreement as called for in Article III of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT).
2. To insure that contained PNEs do not provide weapons-related benefits otherwise precluded or limited by the TTBT, such PNE events could be no higher than 100 KT. There would be provision for observers, whose rights would include verifying geology, depth-of-burial, and purpose.
3. The President has decided that, in an otherwise acceptable agreement providing for contained PNEs to be limited to 100 KT, the U.S. would forego observers of contained PNEs. Alternatively, if adequate provision is made for observers, contained PNEs could be permitted up to a yield of 150 KT. However, the Delegation should not propose either of these positions to the Soviets unless authorized by Washington.
4. The PNE agreement must be consistent with existing treaty obligations, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). The Delegation is not authorized to negotiate or discuss any changes in the LTBT or to discuss possible radioactivity criteria under the LTBT.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NSC Letter, 4/16/96

By WJ NLF Date 4/7/97

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Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

5. The U.S. Delegation should present the following proposal for excavation PNEs. These provisions are intended to insure that such PNEs do not provide weapons-related benefits otherwise precluded or limited by the TTBT:

a. Each excavation PNE device must have a total fission yield below an agreed maximum, but no greater than 0.5 KT.

b. To preclude atmospheric effects testing, each device must be emplaced at a depth not less than $30 W^{1/3}$ meters, where W is the yield in KT.


c. Observers should have rights which include verifying geology and depth-of-burial, taking radiochemistry samples to measure the fission yield, deploying temporary instruments to detect simultaneous and nearby contained explosions, and access to relevant areas as needed.

d. There should be agreed limits on the yields of excavation PNEs. In particular, the yield of any one salvo could not exceed 500 KT and a limit on the maximum individual yield of each excavation device would be agreed.

6. The President has decided that, provided there was adequate provision for observers, the U.S. could in principle accept alternative formulations of the yield and verification requirements set forth in paragraph 5. However, the U.S. Delegation should not propose to the Soviets any such alternative formulations unless authorized by Washington.

7. Timely information should be provided about each PNE event. This information should include purpose, location, schedule, depths-of-burial, geophysical properties, expected results, and actual results.

8. The U.S. has no objection in principle to PNE cooperation. However, verification requirements for a PNE agreement pursuant to Article III of the TTBT must be worked out before proceeding to discuss the nature of US/USSR PNE cooperation.



9. The Delegation should refrain from discussing the relationship of PNEs to achieving non-proliferation objectives.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

