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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ XGDS

February 6, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 285

TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, U. S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT: Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva,
January 31, 1975

The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on January 31, 1975, in Geneva:

1. The Delegation should state that, in the U. S. view, the basis for the new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms is contained in the provisions of the Aide Memoire initialed by the two sides on December 10, 1974.


2. The Delegation should call attention to the Aide Memoire provision which states that the Agreed Interpretation and Common Understanding dated May 26, 1972, relating to limitations on increases in the dimensions of land-based ICBM launchers will also be incorporated into the new agreement. The Delegation should indicate the need for additional agreements including inter alia:

-- Appropriate definitions such as those for ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy ICBMs, and ballistic missiles equipped with MIRVs.

-- An agreement on ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers similar to the Agreed Interpretation signed on May 26, 1972.

3. On the issue of defining a heavy ICBM, the U. S. Delegation should state that a heavy ICBM should be defined as an ICBM of volume or throw weight greater than the largest non-heavy ICBM deployed on either side on the date of signature of the agreement.

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Authority NSC 68a 4/10/96

By Lt NLF Date 4/9/97

4. Concerning the limitations in the Aide Memoire on air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), the Delegation should state that it is the U.S. understanding that the 600 km limitation on ASMs applies only to ballistic ASMs carried on bombers.

The President has also decided in principle that the U.S. could agree to further limitations on cruise missiles and ballistic ASMs. As a minimum the U.S. could agree to:

-- Count all cruise missiles of range greater than 3000 km in the aggregate.

-- Extend the ASM provisions of the agreement to cover ASMs launched from all aircraft, not just those launched from bombers.

However, the Delegation should not put forth this position until authorized by Washington.

5. The Delegation should emphasize that the parties must undertake not to interfere with or impede national technical means including means for verifying the limitations of the MIRV provisions of the agreement.

6. Concerning the limitation on the permitted number of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, the Delegation should emphasize the need for a frank mutual exchange on the problems which could arise in verifying such a limitation. In particular, the Delegation should describe and obtain Soviet views on the following problems:

5 -- Whether it is possible to verify which version of a particular missile is deployed when the missile has been tested with both single RV and MIRVed payloads. It is the U.S. view that any missile of a type tested with MIRVs should be counted as MIRVed when deployed.

-- Verifying which SLBM launchers in a particular SSBN class contain MIRVed missiles when there exist both MIRVed and unMIRVed missiles compatible with these launchers. It is the U.S. view that all SLBM launchers on a submarine should be counted as MIRVed if any SLBM launchers on submarines of the same class are MIRVed.



-- Verifying whether a particular ICBM or SLBM launcher contains a MIRVed missile if it has been modified, for example, through changes to length or diameter. It is the U.S. view that all ICBM and SLBM launchers of types modified for the purpose of permitting the deployment of MIRVed missiles should be counted under the MIRV limit. To illustrate this point the Delegation may cite for example that any SS-17, SS-18, or SS-19 type silos must be counted as containing MIRVed missiles.

-- Determining whether a launcher which once contained a MIRVed missile and has been converted to an unMIRVed launcher can be verified as no longer containing MIRVs. It is the U.S. view that the conversion of launchers which contain MIRVed missiles to unMIRVed launchers should be permitted only under procedures agreed in the SCC.

In making the above points and explaining each verification problem, the Delegation should emphasize that the U.S. welcomes Soviet proposals concerning how to solve these problems and that all such proposals will receive careful U.S. consideration.

7. The U.S. Delegation should not raise the issue of limitations on land-mobile and air-mobile ICBM systems. If the Soviets repeat their proposal to ban air-mobile ICBMs, the U.S. Delegation should state that the issue of banning air-launched ballistic missiles of ICBM range is complex and related not only to the broader issue of strategic aircraft and their armaments, but also to other types of mobile ICBMs. In this context, the U.S. would be willing to consider how provisions which include air-mobile ICBMs might be included in the final agreement and will study carefully any Soviet proposals in this regard.


8. On the issue of defining a heavy bomber, the U.S. Delegation should state that current heavy bombers include the B-52 and B-1 on the U.S. side, and the Bear, Bison, and Backfire on the Soviet side. If the Soviets claim that Backfire is not a heavy bomber, the U.S. Delegation should challenge this contention in the light of the technical capabilities and characteristics of the Backfire and methods of improvement in Backfire capability.

9. With respect to Paragraph 6 of the Aide Memoire, the Delegation should state that negotiations on further limitation and reduction of strategic arms should start as soon as possible after the new agreement is concluded, and that a provision to this effect should be included in the new agreement.



10. If the Soviets make proposals in areas other than those covered above, e. g., non-transfer, ballistic missile launchers on sea beds, ballistic missile ships or maneuvering reentry vehicles, the Delegation should not comment on these proposals and should seek guidance from Washington.

11. If the Soviets table a draft treaty early in the session, the Delegation should indicate that consideration of a draft treaty would be premature until the issues have been adequately discussed. After adequate discussion of U.S. and Soviet views, the Delegation should submit for Washington approval draft treaty provisions which could be proposed to the Soviets.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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February 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *FK*
SUBJECT: Instructions to the SALT Delegation

Attached for your approval at Tab A is a NSDM for the SALT negotiations which resume on January 31.

The NSDM takes the following positions on the four major issues which were discussed at Wednesday's NSC meeting:

1. Verification of MIRV Limits. The Delegation is instructed to take a problem-solving approach, citing several of the concerns we have in counting the number of MIRV missiles and drawing out the Soviets on their views. Specific counting rules are to be proposed only upon your further authorization.

2. Limitations on Cruise Missiles. The Delegation's initial position will be that the 600 km limit applies only to ballistic air-to-surface missiles on bombers, with no limitations on cruise missiles. The NSDM goes on to give the Delegation fall-back positions which would count cruise missiles above 3000 km in the 2400 aggregate limit and extend these limitations to aircraft other than bombers. However, the Delegation may propose these alternatives only with your prior authorization.

3. The Definition of a Heavy Bomber. The Delegation is instructed to name the Backfire as a heavy bomber. If, as expected, the Soviets reject this position, the Delegation is to ask the Soviets to identify criteria which would distinguish Backfire from an inter-continental heavy bomber.


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NLF Date 2/4/98



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4. A Possible Ban on Air and Land-Mobile ICBMs. The Delegation is instructed to let the Soviets take the lead on mobile ICBMs. If the Soviets repeat their proposal to ban air-mobile ICBMs, the Delegation is authorized to suggest a possible ban on both air and land-mobile missiles.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to sign the NSDM at Tab A providing instructions to the SALT Delegation.

MRJ

Approve

Disapprove

