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DECEMBER 4, 1975

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Peking, China)

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

8:37 A.M. EST

MR. NESSEN: Secretary Kissinger is here to give you substantive information about the meetings. I don't know whether you really need to talk to the Secretary tonight. But to fill in any small details you haven't gotten over the past couple of days, we have the Secretary of State.

I think Henry will have a few things to say to you in summary of the meetings and then we will respond to your questions.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me summarize what has gone on and let me draw some conclusions.

There are three aspects of our relationship. There is the attitude of both the People's Republic and the United States towards international affairs.

Secondly, there is the problem of the normalization of relations.

Thirdly, there are the various bilateral arrangements that exist in such fields as trade, culture and scientific exchanges.

As has been pointed out in all of the toasts and all of the public statements, the basic concern of both sides, what has brought us together and what has sustained the relationship is the perception of the international environment and the greater part of our conversations here concerned the international situation.

With respect to normalization, the Shanghai Communique committed the United States to complete the process of normalization. This has been reaffirmed by the President here, both in public statements and towards the leaders of China.

With respect to the bilateral relationships, we have agreed to pursue them and we will be improving them and they will be improved steadily in the channels appropriate for them -- that is to say, trade channels and the others that are appropriate.

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There has been a great deal of speculation that relations between the People's Republic and the United States have cooled. This is not the perception of the United States and I am confident it is not the perception of the Chinese leaders. We believe that the relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China are good, and we are confident that they will be improved steadily in the months and years ahead.

We reviewed the global situation in considerable detail, both in the talks between the President and the Vice Premier, as well as in the talks, the rather searching and detailed talks that took place between Chairman Mao and the President.

While obviously there are some differences, there are also many common approaches, and the talks were extremely useful in enabling the leaders of both sides to understand the perceptions of the other and to see where parallel policies can be pursued.

With respect to the process of normalization, there is really little to add to what has already been said in the Shanghai Communique and to the fundamental statements which were made there, except to confirm that direction again.

As for trade exchanges, as I have said, they will be continued and developed in the forums that are appropriate for them. We are very satisfied with the visit. We think the talks have been constructive, the atmosphere has been excellent.

I was sometimes shaken when I read some accounts of the local residents, but I was reassured again when I went to the meetings, though the atmosphere was good and the talks were, as I said, extremely useful, and I think with this I would rather get to your questions and see what I can say that is more specific.

I would like to mention one thing. During the course of the day today the Vice Premier, in the conversation with the President this morning, responded to some requests we had made to the People's Republic over a period of months with respect to individuals that have been missing in action in or near China over the last decade, and we received some detailed information with respect to some of the requests that have been made, and also information about the remains of two missing in action. Obviously, we will want to notify the next of kin but we appreciate very much this gesture by the People's Republic.

Q Will any of them turn up alive, Dr. Kissinger? Can you tell us?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, we are talking about two parties and information about several others.

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Q How many others?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the information concerned about -- I think it was eight people altogether. But as soon as all the families are notified we will relay that information.

Q How soon will they be notified?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Within the next 48 hours.

Q Mr. Secretary, if the 1972 visit by President Nixon was the week that changed the world, how would you characterize this one?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In 1972 we established a new relationship and in 1975 the problem was to fit that relationship and to elaborate that relationship in an existing architecture. It therefore, obviously, by definition, could not have the character of a new departure. But it is now a more mature relationship in which one now does not discuss how to begin but how in the present international environment the United States and the People's Republic of China can pursue parallel policies where their interests converge.

Q Can you, Dr. Kissinger, give us any examples to itemize this very last remark you made, sir?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question is whether I could give examples of where we have parallel policies.

I would think that the United States' perception and the Chinese perception of the importance of European unity and European cooperation and the European cooperation with the United States would be one. I think the perception of both countries about their relationship with Japan would be very similar and in many other parts of the world there would be, as I said, parallel conventions.

Q Mr. Secretary, will you reject the suggestion that the parallel policies seem to be based primarily on a mutual fear of what the Soviet Union might be doing?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would say that the parallel policies, or the parallel views consist of the perceptions of what is needed to maintain world peace and equilibrium.

Q Mr. Secretary, how much of the time did you spend negotiating with the Chinese leaders, let's say, on the subject of U.S.-Soviet detente, and could you give us some consideration about what the Chinese were requesting of the United States and how the United States responded?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, the Chinese did not request anything of the United States with respect to detente, and we didn't request anything of the People's Republic of China.

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The Chinese, as is known from their public statements -- actually cannot be avoided in the public statement -- has some very firm views of the nature of the threat that they believe that the world faces. We are not as convinced of the inevitability of war. But should the Chinese interpretation be correct, and should there be military expansion, I believe that the United States would see the problem quite similarly.

The United States is opposed to military expansion and were it to happen the United States, as a whole record in the post-war period makes clear for 30 years, would resist it. We believe that we have an obligation to our people, to our allies to seek to improve international relations, but we have always made clear that we will not do so at the cost of vital interests or that we will not buy time by sacrificing other countries. So I think we can let the future determine whose prediction was right.

Not much time was spent on this. The statements of both sides have spoken for themselves. But it is not a contingent issue and it is not one in which either side is trying to convince the other to adopt its preferred policy.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you specify what other subjects the Chinese were interested in besides impressing upon us the unwisdom of detente?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would have to say that in the conversations that took place -- you all heard the toast of the Vice Premier the first night. Beyond that statement, there was no other formal statement of this point of view.

There were obviously discussions -- there had to be discussions when you talk about the world situation -- about the Soviet role in various parts of the world. There was a great deal of discussion, as I said, on Europe and indeed on each area of the world, but the debate about detente was not a central feature of the discussions.

Q Did they discuss the new U.S. grain deal with the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It was mentioned in passing.

Q Were they critical of it?

Q Question, please.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question was whether the Chinese were critical of the grain deal with the Soviet Union.

I would suppose that if they were requested to sell grain they might make a different decision, but since we are not telling the Chinese how to conduct their relations with the Soviet Union -- you should not believe that the major thrust of these discussions is for either side to tell the other how they should conduct their relations with some third party -- so this was mentioned in passing as an illustration but it was not a central feature.

Q How much time was spent on Angola?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It was discussed.

Q To what extent?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was an analysis of the situation.

Q Mr. Secretary, would that be an area that this (inaudible) from parallel interests to be included in?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think it is not appropriate for me to speak for the Chinese side but I think Angola is a question and also a concern, yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, how much of the time was spent in discussion of the Taiwan issue?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was a review of the Taiwan issue. The Chinese side explained again its well-known position with respect to normalization. We made clear that we remain committed to the principles of the Shanghai Communique and it is clear that some time will be needed to bring the process of normalization to a final conclusion, but also that the problem will be continued to a final conclusion.

Q Mr. Secretary, we were told that you had expected progress toward normalization. Just on this specific point, particularly what progress was made, if any, toward normalization and with particular reference to Taiwan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, until normalization is completed there is always some progress still to be made. As I have said, I expect over the months to come our relations will be improved in a number of areas. That improvement, by definition, will be a step towards normalization.

The United States -- if you read the Shanghai Communique in which we have stated certain expectations about our actions in the area and tensions diminished with respect to our troop levels, for example -- we will continue that process. So I believe that the process of normalization can be said to continue.

Q To what extent do the diplomatic positions of the Chinese as expressed to you coincide with their public published propaganda?

Q Question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question is, to what extent do the private positions of the Chinese coincide with their public propaganda? Of course, I don't follow the public propaganda as much as those of you who are here and I am more familiar with the private comments and, therefore, I am not a good witness on this subject.

Q You are speaking in code words on the subject of Taiwan. What does normalization mean? What do the Chinese expect us to do? And what is necessary before that issue can be normalized?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think the Chinese have made clear that the general model that they want is something similar to the Japanese model. I think we also made clear that it will take time for this process to mature and for certain circumstances to exist. We have pointed out our interests in an ultimately peaceful solution to the problem. We made that clear in the Shanghai Communique already.

Q Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion with the Chinese about the possibility of possible U.S. assistance to the Chinese in development of their off-shore isles?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Questions like this would be discussed in the trade channels.

Q Mr. Secretary, did Korea come up at all?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Korea was discussed.

Q Can you tell us something about that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I would say our views on that subject are not identical but they are understood and we hope that both sides will exercise restraint in the Korean Peninsula.

Q Mr. Secretary, were there policies before these meetings (inaudible) converging that are now back on what you call parallel tracks with the Soviet talks?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that even prior to this meeting there was a perhaps excessive emphasis on certain parallel statements so I have never subscribed to some of the interpretations that were made even prior to the meeting.

But I would say whatever may have been the situation prior to the meeting I maintain my position, and it is my firm impression that this is shared by our Chinese hosts; that our relations are good and that in certain areas we will be pursuing parallel courses.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you sense any concern on the part of the Chinese about the ability of the American Executive Branch to carry out its foreign policy as planned by you?

Q Question.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question is whether I noticed any concern on the part of our Chinese hosts in our ability to carry out our policy, or our declared policy.

I think you all will agree with me that our Chinese hosts are extremely polite and they wouldn't express such thoughts.

Q Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that so little seems to have happened here, could you explain the secretiveness over the past four days?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Peter, it depends on your definition of "little."

Q Even if a good deal happened, could you explain the secretiveness on our part over the past four days?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Being as it is, they are our Chinese hosts, and we have intended to follow these matters with the practices of the hosts -- that the briefing should take place only at the end of the visit and this was appropriate because the discussions were in great detail and on a rather broad scope, and we couldn't have said more at the end of every day than I am saying tonight, and I think tonight we are in a better position to draw the results of it.

Q Mr. Secretary, were there any agreements reached with the Chinese or positive actions in any deal on trade or international policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think when the leaders of two countries review the international situation and approach a clearer understanding of what parallel interests they have, that this is bound to have practical results.

With respect to the specific issues like trade, as I pointed out there was agreement reached to pursue possible intensification in the existing channels.

Q If you could clarify one point, please. When you talked about the Chinese making clear the Japanese position via-a-vis Taiwan, you said we made it clear that possibly detente (inaudible)

Would that suggest that there was some sort of a calendar when the United States would link diplomatic relations with Taiwan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, there is no agreed calendar.

Q Mr. Secretary, did our side, the American side, say anything about the fact that domestic politics and the developments over the next year may have some delaying effect on this process?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course, all of these matters have domestic components on both sides and both sides have to be sensitive to the necessities of the other.

Q This is the end of the fourth five-year plan. Did they speak about the next five-year plan and what it would consist of?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not in my hearing.

Q Can you tell us, when the decision was taken not to have a communique, was it there or in Washington?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The decision was taken in a preliminary way at the end of my last visit, and it was confirmed on the first day in my discussions with the Foreign Minister.

Q (Inaudible)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, we had both said it in the various toasts. Secondly --

Q We can't hear.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question is, why was it decided to have no communique?

One reason, not necessarily in order of importance, was that the substance of what I have said here has already been said in various public statements. Secondly, we did not want to spend the time that is needed to prepare such a communique but, most importantly, since on the basic principles, especially on Taiwan, there really isn't much that can be added to what was said in the Shanghai Communique as to the direction, it did not seem appropriate or worthwhile to try to find some new answers on that particular issue.

Q Secretary Kissinger, when you decided you needed to prepare some change on the Taiwan issue, how can you say that there is hope that the relationships will in fact be fully normalized?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have said that this is our intention which we have repeatedly reaffirmed in public statements and that we will work out the modalities over time.

Q Are you saying that you would advise we are willing to change?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I said we will want to work this out over time.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did President Ford extend any invitation to the Chinese leaders in talking with them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They have a standing invitation and they have reaffirmed a standing obstacle.

Q What is the obstacle?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is the obstacle? That they don't want to visit Washington until full normalization has been achieved.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you elaborate on the Korean question? Was there any implicit request that the United States withdraw forces from South Korea?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that the Chinese position on Korea has been stated repeatedly. I think it is clear that in the present international context any exacerbation of the situation by either side would not serve common purposes, and we think that this is understood by both sides.

Q In discussing the Korean question, was there a suggestion that China and the United States had a cooperative role in perhaps restraining their respective friends in the North and the South?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think I have pointed it out that our perceptions on Korea are not identical. What conclusion each side should draw from the need for restraint I think is for each side to determine.

Q Dr. Kissinger, no matter how valuable and what an exchange of the views might mean, would you say that this meeting amounted to an exchange of views and nothing more than that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I would say that this meeting amounted to a very detailed, to a very substantial and, in many areas, very concrete discussions that went beyond an exchange of views but, given the scope of it, it is not necessarily something that can be encompassed in one document.

Q Mr. Secretary, has the decision in fact been made now that when there will be normalization between Peking and Washington, they will be conducted on the basis of the Japanese model?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that will have to be decided when the normalization in fact takes place.

MORE

Q You suggested that before.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I suggested that it is the Chinese position, which we understand.

Q What do we do about the defense treaties?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think China has made clear its view and, obviously, if we were prepared to answer all these questions now we could have settled the issue right now.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did the President indicate to the Chinese leaders if he is still in office in 1977 that the timing would be better toward making specific progress toward normalization?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The discussion did not reach that degree of concern with specific events in our domestic calendar. But, as I said, both sides have to be sensitive to the domestic requirements of the other.

Q Why did the United States disagree with the Chinese position on the inevitability of war?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because we believe that war can be avoided by a combination of firmness, preparedness and willingness to settle outstanding issues, and that is our policy.

Q What is the date on which you are going to Moscow?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The decision about going to Moscow has not yet finally been made, but it will be decided within the next week or so. There is a good chance that I will go.

Q (Inaudible)

but some improvement in the relations between the two countries in the months to come, and you mentioned broad areas like trade and cultural exchanges. Can you be a little more specific as to what kind of things can we expect?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Those things will still have to be worked out in detail.

Q Mr. Secretary, (Inaudible)

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, for those who understand the entire Chinese context, requirements of the Chinese situation and their method of expressing themselves, I believe it expressed what I have stated of the Chinese commitment to good relations to the United States, and I am confident that our Chinese hosts, if you are in contact with them, will confirm this.

Q (Inaudible)

There is only one sentence in that toast in which he devoted himself to the talk, and that was --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I hadn't counted the number of sentences that the President devoted to the talks, and I haven't analyzed what Mr. Teng said with that care. I can only tell you what our impression is -- an impression which we took obviously since we are briefing here in China.

We took some care to check with our Chinese hosts and I am confident in that what I have said here reflects a view that will not be disputed.

MR. NESSEN: Let's have the last question from Bob.

Q Before the trip you said that Soviet-American relations were not a bar to better relations with China. Do you still feel that way?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I still feel that way, yes.

When we are in Moscow we do not discuss our relations with China, but I would maintain what I have said.

Q Is there anything more that you can tell us about the friendly Ford meeting with Chairman Mao that has been of substance, and do you know whether he, himself, made any expression of China's position on detente?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This was the fifth meeting with Chairman Mao that I have had an opportunity to attend. I would describe the atmosphere as friendly and cordial. The discussions did not concern detente except in a very minimal way -- in a really minimal way. Of course, I had had the benefit of the Chairman's thinking on that subject a few weeks earlier.

The overwhelming part of the conversation concerned a review of the world situation but not of American detente policy which played a very minimal role in the discussions.

Q Can you give us an idea of what the substantive areas were discussed in that meeting?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It was a general review of the world situation in almost every part of the world.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 9:13 A.M. EST)