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## THE WHITE HOUSE

## PRESS CONFERENCE OF HENRY A. KISSINGER SECRETARY OF STATE

FINLANDIA HALL

6:35 P.M. (Helsinki Time)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me make a few comments about today's events, and then I will open it for questions.

With respect to the Security Conference, you ladies and gentlemen can draw your own conclusions from the tone of the speeches that have so far been delivered.

It is our view that they reflect the attitude with which we, too, came to Helsinki, which is that in the progress towards easing tensions, the establishment of certain principles of conduct can play an extremely useful role.

We believe that the fate of human beings is more likely to be under conditions of relaxation of tension than under conditions of the Cold War. So, while we do not look at the Security Conference as' the end of the process, but rather as the beginning of a relationship in which these principles will have to be applied and will be tested to the degree to which they are applied, we believe that the Security Conference represents a useful step on the road towards easing tensions and towards prevention of war, which must be one of the cardinal goals of all contemporary statesmanship.

In addition to the Security Conference, the President met today with Prime Minister Wilson, with General Secretary Brezhnev and with Prime Minister Caramanlis. Our relationships with Great Britain have been close and based on very intimate confidence for decades.

Therefore, the President and the Prime Minister reviewed the international agenda, problems of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, of the economic conditions of the industrialized world, and exchanged ideas on what can be done jointly in these areas, or else to keep each other informed of them.

The meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev was the first of two that will take place. The next one will be Saturday morning at 9 o'clock. In any assessment of the contemporary period, as speaker after speaker from East and West pointed out this afternoon, and as we all believe, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is central for the maintenance of peace and the restraint with which they handle their relationships, the ability to deal with the problems of armaments, as well as of political conflict, will determine whether progress is being made on the present agenda.

Subjects that were discussed today were primarily SALT, the Middle East, and bilateral relations, including trade relations.

With respect to SALT, we have pointed out that the Soviet Union submitted to us, when Foreign Minister Gromyko and I met in Geneva some two weeks ago, its considerations on the issues outstanding in SALT, and we indicated that in our judgment progress was made at that meeting, especially in the area of verification.

We have conveyed our considerations in response to the Soviet ideas, and the discussions will be continued on Saturday, hopefully leading to an agreement to implement the Vladivostok decisions.

With respect to the Middle East, it is clear that no final settlement can be achieved by either of the countries by itself, and it is, therefore, natural that periodically we exchange ideas and also, as cochairman of the Geneva Conference, that we exchange ideas as to the appropriate time when that Conference might be reconvened and what procedures it might follow.

Of course, we have a long list of bilateral issues. These and other topics will be discussed again when the President and the General Secretary meet on Saturday.

The meeting with Prime Minister Caramanlis brought us together with one of the outstanding leaders of our period. We have the highest regard for what Prime Minister Caramanlis faces and what he has accomplished.

We wish the Democratic Government of Greece well, and we will do what we can to strengthen it. 0

We, of course, believe, as the President has repeatedly stated, that domestic developments in the United States have complicated our ability to play a useful role. However, within these constraints, to the best of our ability, we will respond to the wishes of the parties with respect to a Cyprus settlement.

Of course, we are prepared to be helpful to Greece's attempts to develop its economy and other areas of its natural life to the best of our abilities. It was a useful meeting which, as with the meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev, was conducted in a very friendly atmosphere.

We cannot assess what may be possible on Cyprus until we have also talked to the Turkish Prime Minister, which will take place at breakfast tomorrow.

Now, these are the major events of the day, and our assessment of them.

Now why don't I take your questions.

Helen?

Q Mr. Secretary, President Ford indicated there was progress today, and we assumed it was SALT, maybe even other subjects, and that further progress would be made on Saturday.

Specifically, what was that progress, and does that mean that President Ford and Brezhnev may reach some sort of agreement on Saturday, which would lead to a summit meeting in the fall, in Washington?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it would be incorrect to claim any particular achievement today. It was a very useful discussion, but it was not designed to lead to any specific conclusion. It was rather in the area of SALT, a further elaboration of our response to the Soviet ideas, which were given to me in Geneva.

It was more in the nature of a general assessment, and it had always been understood that the meeting today would be of a kind to put the positions, each side's position before the other, rather than one in which conclusions would be reached.

Secondly, I do not know whether the discussion of SALT now lends itself to a particular announcement even on Saturday from which one could deduce that an agreement will certainly be reached.

Progress has been made. If that progress continued, and we hope it will be, we think the chances are good that an agreement can be reached, but when I said progress has been made, I am speaking over the last months, not necessarily today.

The fact that I don't claim progress for today is not something from which you should draw conclusions because the discussion was not of a nature that would lend itself to a decision today.

Q Mr. Secretary, have you given up hope now of the House reversing its action on the Turkish aid problem?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think I have amply demonstrated my inability to predict the actions of the House. It is my understanding that there is an attempt being made today to see whether perhaps a modified version of the bill we submitted last week could be added on as an amendment to some other bill.

It would then have to pass the Senate, after which the House. I have not had a report as of the time that I left the office about where this stood. This was the plan last evening, and it seemed to be a rather chancy procedure because it required that certain rules be waived in both Houses, and that it would move through both Houses with a rather rush procedure, so I really don't know any more what is the situation.

Q Mr. Secretary, may I follow up on Helen's question about the possibility of Brezhnev's visit to Washington in October. Has that been finally decided on?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It has not yet been finally decided, but we are proceeding on the assumption that a visit by the General Secretary will take place this year and all the discussions this morning took place in that framework, but no specific date has been set.

Of course, it depends somewhat on how we are proceeding on the SALT discussions.

Peter?

Q Mr. Secretary, are the Russians content to allow the United States to continue its step-by-step effort?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My impression of the discussions this morning is that while the Soviet Union has indicated certain reservations about the possibility that the step-by-step approach can reach a final conclusion, that it is not actively opposing the efforts that are now going forward.

Q Mr. Secretary, on SALT you have repeated several times that progress was made in Geneva and other parts of the world. In that case, why was there no briefing at NATO after the last Geneva meeting with the explanation that there was not enough to brief about, as was usually the case?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have received certain Soviet ideas on how to proceed. These ideas had to be analyzed by us first. As soon as they are being negotiated in a concrete way in Geneva and before any positions are put forward in Geneva there will be a briefing of NATO, and there has been an informal briefing of several of our allies.

Q Mr. Secretary, how would you consider the chances of MBFR after the Helsinki Conference is over and the documents have been accepted?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States has always attached importance to success in the MBFR negotiations, how we considered both SALT and MBFR of great importance, and finally, getting under control the spiral of arms.

In deference to the views of several of our allies, we have not linked the CSCE and the MBFR negotiations, but now that the CSCE negotiations are out of the way we share the views of Prime Minister Wilson -that we should now make a very determined effort to make progress on MBFR.

I noted that in some of the speeches that were held from the Eastern side this afternoon that reference was made to MBFR as one of the important items on the agenda. It is too early to tell what progress will in fact be made.

We have, in my view, completed the stage of technical explorations and what is needed now is some political decisions to move it forward.

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Q Mr. Secretary, in view of your skepticism about the House vote, what appeal will you make to Mr. Demirel to not move in on the American bases?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I don't know whether skepticism is the right word. I just have no clear judgment of what the situation in the House is, but events last week proved that I didn't have a clear judgment of what the situation in the House was then so I don't think that judgment is decisive. All I have is a general account of what is going to be attempted, and I just don't want to claim anything for it.

Now what can we offer Prime Minister Demirel? As I have stated before, the security arrangements between the United States and another country are presumably ultimately in the mutual interest of both countries. I did not believe that it was wise to cut off arms to Turkey because it created the wrong impression about the nature of the relationship.

Equally, I believed that the closing of our bases in Turkey also gives the wrong impression as if the bases were there for the unilateral benefit of the United States, and the United States cannot be in a position of pleading to be able to defend its allies even if this or that base is in the general interest.

Nevertheless, we will discuss with the Prime Minister of Turkey what can be done to maintain the close relationship between Turkey and the United States, which is based on common interests, which is in the interests of the entire Eastern Mediterranean, and we will also make an effort to see whether we can be of any assistance in moving the Cyprus issue forward, keeping in mind that all these issues in some way affect each other.

So it is hard to predict what will come out of this meeting at this point. We have had no high level exchange with the Turkish leaders since their decision to close the bases. We hope that the fundamental common interests of both sides will be understood and we will see what we can do that will help Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

Q Mr. Secretary, I have a follow-up question. Will you offer Demirel anything, or will you explore with him a new plan which may then be submitted to the House?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I don't really think that the President of the United States should negotiate with a foreign leader as to how he should handle or how he should deal with the American Congress. What we can do is to talk about the common problems we have. From that, the President may distill an approach to the House, but we will not work out a joint approach with Turkey to the House.

At this moment, I do not expect that out of that meeting something will emerge in addition to what I have already told you that could be submitted to the House, but if I am wrong we will, of course, inform you of it.

Q Mr. Secretary, there has been different information about the nature of the four-power European meeting that is going to take place. Some have expressed concern that economic problems will be discussed and the possibility of the creation of a four or five-power economic directorate established.

Today, Italian spokesmen denied this. They said the United States has communicated to them that economic subjects will not be touched at all. Can you state what is the situation exactly?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The situation is that the four powers which have a special responsibility for Berlin that meet regularly at every NATO meeting decided to use their presence at the European Security Conference to meet on that issue. While they meet, it is, of course, possible that other issues will also be discussed, and I would consider it possible, in fact likely, that one of the several topics that will come up will concern economic matters, but basically it is an informal meeting of the four countries that have a special responsibility for Berlin and it was thought symbolicly and substantively important that these four countries meet.

I consider it extremely unlikely, in fact I consider it impossible, that there will be an announcement of a directorate that will be set up for economic matters and indeed there is no intention of setting up a directorate for economic matters.

Q Mr. Secretary, if I can go back to Turkey for a minute, is there anything specifically that you will be asking the Turkish Prime Minister to do? Will you, for example, be asking him to go back on their decision to close the bases, or will you be asking him to reach a compromise decision that would somehow allow us to continue to operate? What specifically can you tell us about what we are going to ask them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Turkish Government took the decision to close our bases knowing very well that we wanted to keep them open. Therefore, it was not our failure to ask them to keep the bases open that made them close it, but indeed on the day the decision was announced I, on behalf of the President, called Prime Minister Demirel urging restraint. So I think the issue of our bases in Turkey is not so simple as a formal American request to undo a decision that in itself had complicated causes both in our actions and in the domestic situation in Turkey.

What we would like to do is to discuss the sort of measures that might make it possible to put our relationship to Turkey on a new basis, and that in turn might make it easier for the Turkish Government to accede to what they know very well we are interested in in the common defense, namely, the reopening of all or at least some of our essential bases in Turkey, but that in turn requires that we look at all of the issues that led to this state of affairs to see whether we can bring about a radical solution rather than a stop-gap one.

Q Mr. Secretary, didn't Portugal come up in talks between President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev today, and is there any possibility of President Ford meeting Prime Minister Goncalves on Saturday?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The issue of Portugal did not come up directly in the talks but in a general way about the principles that each side should carry out.

Now as I have pointed out already in a press conference in Washington, I think we should keep in mind that detente cannot be used as a means of asking the Soviet Union to take care of all of our problems on our side of the line and a correct analysis of the situation in Portugal should emphasize or will emphasize that many of the problems in Portugal have indigenous routes and others have to do with Western countries.

But I repeat what I have said previously, that a substantial activity by any outside country in Portugal would be considered inconsistent with the spirit and indeed the letter of the CSCE declarations.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned a modification of the embargo legislation. What is that modification?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe it is substantially the same, Bill, as the one that was submitted last week with a proviso that a joint resolution of the Congress can veto sales above a certain figure. I believe it is \$25 million, but you have to check this. This is the compromise that was being talked about which would make it consistent with all the other new legislation about military sales, but it would give Congress the sense that it could get another crack at sales through a joint resolution.

MORF

Q Did you advise the Greek Prime Minister of that arrangement at your meeting today, and what was his reaction?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There have been a series of absolutely misleading reports that we are attempting to ask the approval of the Greek Government. It should be clear that the Greek Government cannot approve, nor should it be asked to approve, American domestic legislation, and it is clear, also, that for a Greek Prime Minister the question of selling arms to Turkey is not something that one can ask him for his approval.

At no time during the discussions, despite hany reports that have been printed, did the Administration nake this claim to any Congressman and, of course, at no time today did we ask Prime Minister Caramanlis to approve the lifting of the embargo on Turkey.

It is our view, the view of the United States Government -- not the view of the Greek Government, recessarily -- it is the view of the United States Government that the course we have recommended to the Congress is the best means of preserving the security in the Eastern Mediterranean in which both Greece and Lirkey should be interested, and to make progress on Cyprus.

We do not say that this judgment is necessarily shared by other governments, but we are responsible for giving our judgment to the Congress, and the Greek Government deals with the United States Government, not with the United States Congress.

Q Mr. Secretary, did Mr. Brezhnev indicate any interest in compromise on the issues of trade and immigration, and if so, what might be the general direction of such a compromise?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we reviewed the d.scussions that the group of Senators had had in the Siviet Union and we pointed out our judgment of what is required with respect to the trade legislation.

We have also had the view that progress in this field is more effective if it does not become a formal government-to-government matter but rather if it is understood by each side what the necessities are, and that then decisions are made independently on that basis. So I think the requirements of progress in the Congress have been made clear by our Senators and have been confirmed by us.

0 Mr. Secretary, if I could follow that up, the Senators, when they came back from Moscow, talked about a compromise under which the credit ceiling of \$300 million would be lifted, and there would be a period of several months under which Soviet behavior --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, my impression in talking to the Senators is that there is an understanding that both of these issues should be dealt with simultaneously, but there is no possibility of doing it now until Congress returns, and it will be the intention of the Administration to work at it not as a contest with the Congress but in a cooperative manner, and so there are several months in which each side can look at their -- did I hear somebody say thank you?

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 7:06 P.M. HELSINKI TIME)