

**The original documents are located in Box 123, folder “Middle East (3)” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

### **Copyright Notice**

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Ron Nessen donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

August 8 1975

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Flexibility

Q. During the President's PBS interview, he said that Israel has to be more flexible. How does he think Israel can be more flexible?

A. If you read the President's response in its entirety you will see that he is expressing his frequently stated conviction that there must be movement on both sides toward compromise if there is to be an interim agreement in the Middle East. Ultimately, of course, the responsibility for progress toward a settlement rests with the parties themselves. The President underscored the importance of this responsibility in his statement that the potential for war is increased significantly if there isn't movement in the Middle East at this time.

U. S. -Soviet Conflict

Q. The President talked about a potential U. S. -Soviet confrontation in the event of another Middle East war. Would the United States commit troops?

A. I am not going to address such a hypothetical question, but I will remind you of the President's remarks stated yesterday, and on other occasions, that "a war in the Middle East has broader

potential ramification than at any time in the past," and that such a conflict could ultimately involve not only the countries in the Middle East, but also the superpowers.

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Flexibility

- Q. During the President's PBS interview, he said that Israel has to be more flexible. How does he think Israel can be more flexible?
- A. If you read the President's response in its entirety you will see that he is expressing his frequently stated conviction that there must be movement on both sides toward compromise if there is to be an interim agreement in the Middle East. Ultimately, of course, the responsibility for progress toward a settlement rests with the parties themselves. The President underscored the importance of this responsibility in his statement that the potential for war is increased significantly if there isn't movement in the Middle East at this time.

U. S. - Soviet Conflict

- Q. The President talked about a potential U. S. - Soviet confrontation in the event of another Middle East war. Would the United States commit troops?
- A. I am not going to address such a hypothetical question, but I will remind you of the President's remarks stated yesterday, and on other occasions, that "a war in the Middle East has broader

potential ramification than at any time in the past," and that such a conflict could ultimately involve not only the countries in the Middle East, but also the superpowers.

Kissinger Attracts Saudi Praise for Mideast Pact

Secretary Kissinger briefed Arab leaders in Saudi Arabia and Jordan Tuesday on the new Mideast peace agreement and assured Saudi King Khaled that the U.S. will not relax its drive for a final settlement.

"Oil was the principal subject of Kissinger's talks in Saudi Arabia especially since the producers' cartel is meeting later this month. The U.S. is trying to stave off another price increase. Before leaving, Kissinger also reassured the Saudis about continuing weapons sales despite the Congressional curb on the sale of Hawk missiles to Jordan. American officials said later that the Saudis had solidly endorsed the new Egyptian Israeli agreement which will help support it throughout the Arab world," Richard Valeriani (NBC) reported.

Shortly after arriving in Jordan, Kissinger made it clear that an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank of the Jordan River is not in the immediate offing, AP reported.

"Kissinger evidently did a good job selling (the agreement), at least to the Arabians," Harry Reasoner (ABC) said. "After hearing Kissinger, their foreign minister (Saud Faisal) called the accord an important and significant step for peace." -- AP;UPI;Networks (9/2/75)

Herzog Says U.S. Presence in Sinai is Crucial

Israeli Ambassador to the U.N. Chaim Herzog said Tuesday it is significant that Israel was willing to sign an agreement renouncing the use of force as a problem-solving means. But, he added, U.S. presence in the Sinai is essential to the success of the Mideast peace agreement.

"You've got to snap out of this Vietnam psychosis. No one is talking about Vietnam here," Herzog said in an interview. "Both sides have said we can't quite trust each other but we do trust the U.S. I don't think a greater compliment could be payed to a nation in the world today and we want the U.S. to help us supervise."

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

9-2-75

Ron:

Attached are some questions that occurred to me about the use of American civilians in the buffer zone that may come up at mx today's briefing.

JWH

## QUESTIONS REGARDING U.S. CIVILIANS IN MIDEAST

1. Why didn't the United States push to have the American civilians operate under the UN flag?
2. Is it true that many of the U.S. technicians will be former CIA agents or employees?
3. These technicians will carry small arms. Will they be permitted to defend themselves?
4. What will the U.S. reaction be, for instance, if the PLO or some other terrorist organization attacks one of the listening posts and kills the Americans manning it?
5. Whose idea was it to put American technicians into the buffer zone? Israel, Egypt or the United States?
6. Is the U.S. committing itself to having a "presence" in the Middle East and can we look for an even larger "civilian force" within a year?
7. There are already members of Congress who are saying they will oppose the emplacement of Americans in the buffer zone. How does the President expect to overcome this opposition?
8. Don't you think there should have been greater consultation between the President and members of Congress before we agreed to having [REDACTED] American civilians actively involved in maintaining the peace in the Middle East?



9. Do you have any kind of ballpark figure as to how long the technicians will be required to stay in the area?
10. Considering the way Congress has tried to run foreign policy lately, wouldn't it have been better to have gotten Congress' consent before committing Americans to the buffer zone?
11. Did the President receive any kind of unofficial consensus from Congressional leaders before deciding to put Americans into the buffer zone?

September 2, 1975

Middle East

Telephone count

4 con

1 pro

1 comment

Telegram count

16 comments (Monday, Sept. 1)

10 comments (Tuesday, Sept. 2)

All in reference to no troops in the Sinai

September 2, 1975

MIDDLE EAST PEACE AGREEMENT

TO ANNOUNCE: For those of you who picked up copies of the documents relating to the Middle East agreement, I have an addition to give you on the Proposal:

On Page 2, paragraphs 2A and B, the word civilian should precede the word personnel in the second line of each paragraph.

With the rapid and considerable exchange of information, texts and messages yesterday between Washington and the Middle East, this word was inadvertently omitted in each case.

\* \* \*

Q. Will the Middle East agreement be signed soon?

A. Yes. The agreement will be signed in Geneva on Thursday in accordance with its terms. A U. S. official, *will be present as a witness* to be named, ~~will sign for the United States.~~

FYI ONLY: It looks now like Roy Atherton, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs will sign for us. He will be in Geneva then.

\* \* \*

On any and all specific questions on the agreement you may wish to respond along the lines you and General Scowcroft discussed, making the points that:

- (1) The documents have been released to the press and they should be read carefully.
- (2) The President expressed his views on the agreement yesterday in his remarks and in response to questions.
- (3) Secretary Kissinger will be returning to Washington Wednesday and will provide a full briefing shortly thereafter.
- (4) In conclusion, I think it best not to get into a lengthy, in depth discussion of the agreement at this time.

PROPOSALS TO DECLASSIFY MATERIALS ON THE SINAI AGREEMENT

Background: Senators Case, Church and Helms have called for public disclosure of all secret documents and commitments related to Sinai II. We can expect increased demands for this as Congressional committees study the documents this week.

The GOP Leadership Meeting this morning focused on energy, the proposed Sinai Agreement, and pending legislation to partially lift the Turkish arms embargo. In the meeting, the President urged swift Congressional action on resolutions to approve American participation in the Early Warning System in the Sinai. Further delay could adversely affect the implementation of the agreement and erode the confidence of other states in the ability of the United States to conduct a coherent foreign policy. The President also urged swift House action on legislation to partially lift the Turkish arms embargo in the hope that this would stem a further deterioration of U.S. - Turkish bilateral relations and create a more stable situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in which a just negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem could be achieved.

(The Bipartisan Leadership Meeting set for Thursday, September 25, will address the same issues.)

Q. Several Senators have called for public disclosure of the secret documents relating to the Sinai Agreement. Does the Administration propose to make these agreements public?

A. The President discussed this issue with the Congressional GOP Leadership this morning. ~~The President.~~ The President is very concerned about proposals to declassify all of the materials related to the Egyptian/Israeli agreement ~~and not to approve the U.S. proposal to participate in the Early Warning System until such declassification takes place.~~ Such action would put the ~~Agreement~~ Agreement itself in jeopardy and would seriously undermine

our relations with the parties to the Agreement to whom we promised confidentiality. The President said he and Secretary Kissinger are working with the Congressional Committees to arrive at a satisfactory method ~~to meet~~ <sup>to address</sup> Congressional concerns.

September 25, 1975

DECLASSIFICATION OF MATERIALS ON SINAI AGREEMENT

Background: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday called for public disclosure of all secret documents and commitments related to Sinai II before any action will be taken on the 200-man US technical team for the Sinai.

During the Bipartisan Leadership breakfast this morning the President discussed energy, the proposed Sinai agreement, and pending legislation to partially lift the Turkish arms embargo. The President urged swift Congressional action on resolutions to approve American participation in the Early Warning System in the Sinai. Further delay could adversely affect the implementation of the agreement and erode the confidence of other states in the ability of the United States to conduct a coherent foreign policy. He proposed that he and Secretary Kissinger work with the Committees to provide an unclassified summary or outline of the secret documents and commitments for public release.

Q: Yesterday the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called for public disclosure of the secret documents and secret commitments relating to the Sinai Agreement. Does the Administration propose to make these agreements public so the Congress will immediately consider the legislation regarding the Early Warning System?

A: The President discussed this issue with the Congressional GOP leadership yesterday and with the Bipartisan Leadership this morning. The President is very concerned about proposals to declassify all of the materials related to the Egyptian/Israeli agreement. Such action could put the Agreement itself in jeopardy and would seriously undermine

our relations with the parties to the Agreement to whom we <sup>promised</sup> ~~proposed~~ confidentiality. The President said he and Secretary Kissinger would work with the Congressional Committees to arrive at a compromise which would satisfy Congressional concerns and ensure the confidentiality of the agreements with the parties.



2. UN Secretary General Waldheim ~~is on his way to the Middle East~~ in an attempt to get approval for the renewal of UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force). Do you have any comment on Waldheim's mission or on the likelihood of UNDOF renewal?

11/25/75  
Guidance: With regard to the Waldheim mission, this was undertaken at the Secretary General's initiative and ~~we would have no comment on this mission as such.~~ With regard to UNDOF renewal we would have nothing to add to our previous statements. We have nothing to announce on the basis of incomplete reports on the UNDOF renewal situation or on what might or might not happen in view of incomplete reports on the nature of the Middle East situation and prior to Secretary General Waldheim's return.

is what he feels necessary  
in carrying out his duties as  
Secretary General of the United Nations.

MIDDLE EAST

UNDOF RENEWAL

Q. News stores today report that UN Secretary Waldheim is all but certain that Syria will renew the observer force mandate on the Golan Heights which expires November 30. Is the U. S. optimistic that the UNDOF will be renewed?

A. We do, of course, hope that the observer force mandate will be renewed in the interests of all the parties in the area to achieve a durable peace in the Middle East. In keeping with the determination that there can be no stagnation or stalemate in the Middle East, the renewal of the UNDOF mandate keeps the peace process active and encourages further progress.

Q. How does your desire for progress in the Middle East square with wire reports asserting that the U. S. has secretly pledged not to pressure Israel for any more than cosmetic concessions in possible next steps on the Golan?

A. *I am not going to comment on every speculative story*  
*but* Our position remains that we are seeking ways to move *out of the*  
*M-E.*  
the peace process forward and are working with the parties to determine the most effective means for doing so.

MIDDLE EAST

UNDOF RENEWAL

- Q. News stores today report that UN Secretary Waldheim is all but certain that Syria will renew the observer force mandate on the Golan Heights which expires November 30. Is the U. S. optimistic that the UNDOF will be renewed?
- A. We do, of course, hope that the observer force mandate will be renewed in the interests of all the parties in the area to achieve a durable peace in the Middle East. In keeping with the determination that there can be no stagnation or stalemate in the Middle East, the renewal of the UNDOF mandate keeps the peace process active and encourages further progress.
- Q. How does your desire for progress in the Middle East square with wire reports asserting that the U. S. has secretly pledged not to pressure Israel for any more than cosmetic concessions in possible next steps on the Golan? *Not to comment on speculative stories but*
- A. Our position remains that we are seeking ways to move the peace process forward and are working with the parties to determine the most effective means for doing so.

MIDDLE EAST

SOVIET ARMS TO SYRIA

Q. You say you would welcome the renewal of UNDOF by Syria. At the same time, Syria is receiving from the Soviet Union military equipment and armaments, especially MIG-25s. Doesn't this influx of Soviet supplied hardware contribute to a destabilization in the area and increase tensions unnecessarily?

A. It is no secret that Syria has been supplied by the Soviet Union with sophisticated military equipment for quite some time (FYI: since at least the 1967 war). While we have indications that there has been a slight increase in supplies recently, we do not see any change in the strategic balance in the Middle East.

Q. But doesn't this constant supply of weapons by the Soviet Union and the U. S. into the Middle East contribute to an increase in tensions in the area?

A. The situation in the Middle East is, of course, extremely complex, and the steps to peace must be taken one at a time. The supply relationships continue because each party perceives individual defense needs in the face of the situation as it exists today. Hopefully, as progress toward peace is achieved and tensions in the area are reduced, the supply of sophisticated weaponry can be adjusted accordingly.

MIDDLE EAST

SYRIAN RENEWAL OF UNDOF

Q. We have seen and heard reports to the effect that U.N. Secretary Waldheim has successfully concluded talks with Syria on a 6 month renewal of UNDOF. Is the optimism justified, and do we expect an announcement to this effect soon?

A. Naturally, we encourage and support the efforts of the Secretary General to secure the renewal of the UN mandate on the Golan Heights and we are hopeful that UNDOF will be renewed. Such a step would constitute an essential contribution to progress toward peace in the Middle East. As the President has stated repeatedly, we are determined that there be no stagnation or stalemate in the progress toward an overall settlement.

November 28, , 1975

SINAI OBSERVATION TEAM

Q. John Finney has a story today (New York Times, p. 4) saying that a government survey team will be going to the Middle East next week to determine requirements for stationing American technicians in the Sinai. Can you tell us where this program stands right now?

A. The State Department has all the details on this, but essentially the President has approved plans for a Sinai support mission to be led by a Director who will serve as his special representative. The Mission's work will be coordinated by an Interagency Management Board which will report to the President through the National Security Advisor. Operationally, the Board will be similar to the Interagency Task Force on Indochina.

FYI: Refer all further questions to State.

January 7, 1976

FORD MEETING WITH U. S. AMBASSADORS

Four U. S. Ambassadors to Arab countries came in to see the President this morning for a brief review of the Middle East situation and the upcoming Security Council debate on the Middle East which begins January 12.

The four Ambassadors are:

Richard Murphy - U. S. Ambassador to Syria

Thomas Pickering - U. S. Ambassador to Jordan

William Porter - U. S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

Hermann Eilts - U. S. Ambassador to Egypt

The meeting began at 10:23 a. m. and ended at 10:45<sup>approx</sup>. Secretary  
*Secretary Rumsfeld +*  
Kissinger, ~~the~~ General Scowcroft also participated.



January 8, 1976

MIDDLE EAST

Attached is the read-out of the Kissinger/Allon meeting yesterday. You should not go beyond Kissinger's remarks, as spelled out on page 2. If asked, specifically whether the U.S. would favor the transfer of the Middle East debate from the Geneva Conference to the Security Council, you may say that we have publicly stated that we do not favor a transfer of the debate to the Security Council, (but we have stated we favor any of several other alternatives.)



MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

Q. The Security Council is preparing to convene to debate the situation in the Middle East with possible moves to change relevant UN resolutions. What will the U. S. approach be to the Security Council debate?

A. As the President and the Secretary have stated before, we consider U. N. Resolutions 242 and 338 the relevant resolutions for the Middle East.

Q. Would we veto any effort to change or to modify 242 or 338?

A. As Secretary Kissinger said the other day, we would have to see what resolutions emerge before we made a final decision, ~~(but that we would strongly oppose any attempt to~~

~~change them)~~

*109, as you may know, we would veto anything not helpful to the peace process*

Q. Have we informed the Arabs or Israelis that we are opposed to changing the forum for resolving the Middle East situation from the Geneva Conference to the Security Council?

A. We have been in touch with all the parties on a regular basis. Our position on the Geneva Conference as the preferred forum for resolving the Middle East situation has been stated publicly by Administration officials; we are opposed to the transfer of

(F-1F)  
the debate to the Security Council. (on the grounds that the  
~~Geneva Conference is limited to at most the parties directly~~  
~~involved in the conflict.~~)

*Geneva is more conducive to peace, proven  
Geneva established by UN resolution in 1973*  
FYI ONLY: To any questions that begin with "what if. . . ." and

then hypothesize some political strategem, you will want to say  
that we would not want to prejudice the debate outcome or speculate  
on what the U. S. may or may not do in a given circumstance.

\* See classified analysis on upcoming Security Council debate.



January 12, 1976

## MIDDLE EAST - UN

The debate on the Middle East, which will begin today, will probably reflect a low-keyed Arab attempt to maintain the diplomatic momentum that has resulted in increased international support for the Arabs and deepening isolation for Israel.

Despite some evidence of Arab dissension, Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, Syrian, and Palestinian leaders have agreed on a position most Arabs can support, according to the Saudi foreign minister. Reportedly, they will argue for a resolution calling for an Israeli withdrawal from territory occupied since 1967, a recognition of Palestinian rights, and a commitment by all concerned parties to work toward a peaceful settlement.

The term Palestinian "rights" is probably deliberately vague. The Palestinians intend to discuss this point in terms of their rights to exist as a people, to return to their homeland, and to establish a sovereign state. They are reportedly willing, however, to limit the resolution, in this respect, to a general recognition of Palestinian rights if they can thereby avoid a veto by the US.

Rather than use the Security Council as a forum to excoriate Israel, most Arabs seem intent on promoting a reasonable plan in order to maintain the diplomatic momentum that has produced recent international support for their objectives. Israel, which will not attend the debate out of fear that its presence would imply recognition of the Palestinians as a political body, will certainly condemn any resolution advocating recognition. The Arabs hope that any US refusal to veto such a resolution would place a severe strain on US-Israeli relations, thereby enhancing the Arab cause.

Despite the Arabs' commitment to a moderate approach, a number of developments could cause them to deviate from their plan. Among them would be an early Arab perception that the US plans to veto any reference to Palestinian rights, or that radical Arabs may attempt to inflame the debate, possibly by a major terrorist incident by radical fedayeen elements. ~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 94-83, #35; CIA letter 6/17/94

By lit NARA, Date 7/7/94

AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN - INTERVIEW IN NEWSWEEK

Q. Does the President agree with (any of) Ambassador Moynihan's comments on the Russians' role in Angola and its implications for U.S. - Soviet relations?

A. He didn't have any specific comments, but let me just say that Amb. Moynihan is the U.S. Representative to the U.N. and as such, is the President's representative to that body, but I don't think I am going to comment from here every time Amb. Moynihan, or any other Administration official has an interview or gives a speech.

MIDDLE EAST: GUIDELINES AND UPDATE

- I. Highlights of the Middle East Debate: Our Mission in New York reports the Arab drafting group is considering the introduction of two resolutions:

- A Syrian draft on Palestine which reportedly would provoke at least one veto and has therefore produced growing interest in.
- A three-part Egyptian resolution, considered "moderate" enough to pass.

The most significant element of the debate has been the six points described by Egyptian Ambassador Meguid as essential for a permanent peace:

- Achievement of Palestinian national rights.
- Creation of a Palestinian national entity in accordance with the principle of self-determination.
- Total Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967.
- Recognition that Geneva is the proper negotiating forum and the Security Council is no substitute.
- Resumption of the Geneva Conference with PLO participation.
- Security Council support in a call for reconvening at Geneva.

- II. Our position at the debate continues to be as follows:

- 1.) We consider Resolutions 242 and 338 the relevant resolutions for the Middle East.

- 2.) We will veto any resolutions not helpful to the peace process.
- 3.) We will not speculate on what we may or may not do prior to the introduction of a given resolution.
- 4.) We have stated publicly that we do not favor transferring the issues concerning the Middle East from the forum of the Geneva Conference.
- 5.) Additionally, the United States was unable to use its Security Council veto because a veto is possible only on substantive resolutions, not in procedural debates, such as those on agenda or participation.

III. Q. What are our long-range goals and objectives in the Middle East?

A. As we have stated before, we will continue to consult with the parties involved to determine the best way of moving the peace process toward a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East.. We are determined that there be no stagnation or stalemate in that process, and have indicated our willingness to try any approach agreeable to the parties which offers promise of real progress. Among the alternatives we have mentioned are:

- 1.) Reconvening the Geneva Conference.
- 2.) A preparatory conference to allow participants to discuss procedures, agenda and participants in a renewed Geneva conference.

III. (Continued)

- 3.) New negotiations (i. e., step-by-step diplomacy) between Syria and Israel which if those parties so desire we are prepared to promote.

In our publicly stated position we have always affirmed that in any final settlement, the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people must be taken into account; but we have also stated that we will not negotiate with the PLO or urge Israel to deal with the PLO, as long as the PLO does not recognize the existence of Israel or accept Resolutions 242 and 338.

- IV. For your reference, Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are attached.

## RESOLUTION 242 (1967)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1382nd meeting,  
on 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

*Expressing* its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

*Emphasizing* the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

*Emphasizing* further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
  - (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
  - (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. *Affirms* further the necessity
  - (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
  - (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
  - (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.



UNITED NATIONS  
SECURITY  
COUNCIL



Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/338 (1973)  
21 October 1973

RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1747th meeting,  
on 21/22 October 1973

The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

A NEW MIDDLE EAST POLICY?

Q. News reports in the Washington Post and the New York Times suggest that the Ford Administration intends to develop a new policy on how to proceed in the Middle East and that such initiatives will constitute a major foreign policy effort. Can you tell us if any new initiatives are planned, and if so, what might they be?

A. Our Middle East policy continues to be that we will continue to seek ways to keep the peace process moving. The President has stated that we will not tolerate stalemate or stagnation and that we will work with the parties to see how we can best assist them in ensuring continuing progress in the area. The President expects to discuss these issues with Prime Minister Rabin when he arrives for a visit tomorrow.

"What is needed, is that all the parties go on from here to work out the substance of the solutions, and that if any party feels there is a need to reconsider the framework in order to proceed further, that this emerge from negotiations among the parties in the Geneva context."

The Statement reaffirms that "there will be no permanent peace unless it includes arrangements that take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people. (pp. 6-7). The United States is prepared to work with all the parties toward a solution of all the issues yet remaining, including the issue of the Palestinian people."

The Secretary then states the suggestion of an informal preparatory conference of the present Geneva parties, "looking toward a convening of the Geneva Conference," and closes by emphasizing that what is important is to continue the process, that we believe we have an obligation "to keep open and intact the negotiating framework and to assist in developing a common understanding of the problems that remain before us." We are committed to assist in every way we can to facilitate such progress.

PLANS FOR A MIDDLE EAST TRIP

Q. News reports over the weekend seem to suggest that the President will be travelling to the Middle East this Spring. Can you tell us if the reports are true, and if so, to what extent is planning already underway?

A. You may recall that at the time of the Sadat visit, the President told a group of Egyptian editors that he had accepted, in principle, an invitation from President Sadat to visit the Middle East. At this time, however, we have no definite plans or timetable for such a visit.

Q. Will the President definitely go in 1976? What factors would affect his trip plans?

A. As you know, all visits of heads of states are arranged at the mutual convenience of the governments involved, so any travel schedule will be contingent on those conditions.

FYI: You may want to recall for the press that Under Secretary Sisco, in his briefing November 5, mentioned that the President had accepted an invitation, in principle, to visit the Middle East.

## Text of Resolution on Middle East in Security Council

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Jan. 26—Following is the text of the resolution on the Middle East vetoed in the Security Council tonight by the United States.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HAVING CONSIDERED the item entitled "The Middle East problem including the Palestinian question," in accordance with its Resolution 381 (1975) of November 30, 1975,

HAVING HEARD the representatives of parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian people,

CONVINCED that the question of Palestine is the core of the conflict in the Middle East,

EXPRESSING its concern over the continuing deterior-

ation of the situation in the Middle East, and deeply deploring Israel's persistence in its occupation of Arab territories and its refusal to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions,

REAFFIRMING the principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territories by the threat or use of force,

REAFFIRMING FURTHER the necessity of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region based on full respect for the Charter of the United Nations as well as for its resolutions concerning the problem of the Middle East including the question of Palestine,

### 1. AFFIRMS:

(a) That the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable national right of self-determination, including the right to

establish an independent state in Palestine in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) The right of Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors to do so and the right of those choosing not to return to receive compensation for their property;

(c) That Israel should withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967;

(d) That appropriate arrangements should be established to guarantee, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;

2. DECIDES that the provisions contained in Paragraph 1 should be taken fully into account in all international efforts and conferences organized within the framework of the United Nations for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

3. REQUESTS the Secretary General to take all the necessary steps as soon as possible for the implementation of the provisions of this resolution and to report to the Security Council on the progress achieved;

4. DECIDES to convene within a period of six months to consider the report by the Secretary General regarding the implementation of this resolution, and in order to pursue its responsibilities regarding such implementation.

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, U. S. VETO

Q. Now that the United States has vetoed the UN Resolution on the Middle East (text attached) what progress can we reasonably expect to achieve now in moving the peace process forward?

A. The U. S. position in vetoing the UN Middle East Resolution has been made clear by our Ambassador, Daniel Moynihan, and in a statement by Secretary Kissinger (text attached). To highlight some of those remarks for you, the Secretary began with a history of Resolutions 242 and 338 and the formation of the Geneva Conference as the forum for debating the issues relating to the Middle East. He outlined the step-by-step negotiations process, while emphasizing that an overall approach was "an alternative to which the parties could turn at any time, and there was no doubt that an overall settlement, whatever the approach, was the end goal of all concerned, including the U. S. "

The Secretary goes on to argue that the negotiating framework is "sufficiently flexible" so as to provide "the basis for negotiating fair and durable solutions to all the issues involved," and that the dismantling of the negotiating framework would end the chance for further progress.

3/4/76

SECRET AGREEMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Q: Yesterday the State Department seemed less than categorical in its statements on alleged secret agreements between the U.S. and Egypt. Can you be more specific on whether the U.S. has any secret agreements with the parties to the Sinai accord?

A: What the State Department said, and what we have always said is that everything relating to the Sinai agreement has been presented to the Congress.

---

FYI: [Indeed, in the Committee report on S. J. Resolution 138, page 9, the Committee comments include the following line ". . . the Committee is satisfied that it has been informed of all the relevant assurances and undertakings which are a part of the overall Sinai agreements." ] End FYI.

March 9, 1976

TELEGRAM FROM RABBI SCHINDLER:

Q--The New York Times reports that Rabbi \* Schindler has ~~sent a telegram~~

sent a telegram to the President protesting ~~the~~ the

Administration's plans to sell arms to Egypt. Has such a telegram been received.

A-- A telegram from Rabbi Schindler has arrived at the White House, and a reply is in the process of preparation.

Q---When will the reply be sent?

A--- I can't give you an exact time---as soon as the reply is completed.

Q--- Will you make that public?

A-- We do not expect it will be made public. ~~It will be made public.~~

~~It will be made public.~~

Q---Why not?

A--- We normally do not make ~~public such private exchanges of~~ public such private exchanges of messages.

*Just*



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 6, 1976

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In my letter of March 29, 1976 to the House and Senate Conferees, I stated my strong objections to the Senate action adding nearly \$800 million in program terms to the budget for Foreign Military Sales credits and Security Supporting Assistance for the Transition Quarter for Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria, since in my view these funds are not needed to meet the essential needs of the recipients. This position was only taken after the most careful review and analysis.

As you know, this Administration is firmly committed to the security of the State of Israel, and also to providing constructive economic assistance to Egypt, Jordan and Syria. However, the FY 76 and FY 77 budget levels were designed to meet these purposes on an austere basis without any funding in the Transition Quarter.


It is natural that the recipient governments would like to receive financial support at a higher level than provided in the Administration's request. I am aware also that it has been argued that the United States should fund through security assistance any budget deficit which governments might incur as the result in part of acquiring military equipment from the United States. However, it should be obvious that any such proposals are completely infeasible, since the United States is in no position to control every aspect of another government's budget spending. Security Assistance is intended to provide military and economic funding to ease the pressure on friendly governments in meeting their legitimate security needs. It never has been nor should be intended to meet every budgetary deficit or foreign exchange shortfall which another government may incur and no such commitment has been made.

Specifically in the case of Israel, my FY 76 and FY 77 budget requests provide sufficient levels of assistance to meet that nation's needs. Our most careful analysis indicates that the levels provided in the FY 76 and 77 requests for FMS are adequate to enable Israel to maintain its security. Our previous estimates of this need have been carefully rechecked and reaffirmed.

At a time when our own country's budget pressures are very great, when our nation faces many other urgent and pressing program needs and our own deficits for FY '76 and the Transition Quarter are already too large, I cannot justify more funds than have been included in my budget request.

Therefore, if I am presented with a final appropriation bill that includes additional funds for the Transition Quarter, I will be forced to exercise my veto -- an alternative which could seriously disrupt our efforts to assist our friends and allies in maintaining their security and development growth efforts. I naturally hope that the House will not make necessary such a course of action, but will instead reach the only responsible conclusion.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Gerald R. Ford". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style. The first name "Gerald" is written with a large, prominent "G". The middle initial "R." is written in a smaller, more compact script. The last name "Ford" is written with a large, sweeping "F" and a long, horizontal stroke extending to the right.

The Honorable  
The Speaker  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 1976  
(Budget Authority in \$ millions)<sup>1/</sup>

	1976			Transition Quarter			5-quarter Totals		
	<u>Request</u>	<u>House</u>	<u>Senate</u>	<u>Request</u>	<u>House</u>	<u>Senate</u>	<u>Request</u>	<u>House</u>	<u>Senate</u>
<u>Security Assistance</u>									
Supporting Assistance	1,873.3	1,712.5	1,712.5	40.2	25.2	417.1	1,913.5	1,737.7	2,129.6
Middle East Special Requirements	50.0	50.0	50.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	60.0	60.0	60.0
Military Assistance Program	394.5	225.0	225.0	42.2	27.2	27.2	433.7	252.2	252.2
Foreign Military Credit Sales	1,055.0	1,055.0	1,055.0	42.0	30.0	212.0	1,107.0	1,095.0	1,277.0
Military Training	30.0	25.0	23.0	9.0	6.3	5.3	39.0	31.3	28.2
Total	3,412.8	3,077.5	3,075.5	143.4	98.7	672.1	3,556.2	3,176.2	3,747.6
<u>Development Assistance</u>									
Bilateral Assistance	1,053.7	913.2	999.7	303.8	219.2	234.6	1,357.5	1,132.4	1,234.3
Multilateral Assistance	1,050.1	784.3	1,026.1	23.7	21.5	17.9	1,073.8	805.8	1,044.0
Total	2,103.8	1,697.5	2,025.8	327.5	240.7	252.5	2,431.3	1,938.2	2,278.3
Other Programs	273.0	225.5	227.3	63.3	49.0	53.6	335.3	275.5	280.9
Total Budget Authority	5,789.6	5,001.5	5,328.6	534.2	388.4	978.2	6,323.8	5,389.9	6,303.8

<sup>1/</sup> Senate levels adjusted for comparability with request and House levels



3/24/76

Table 2

Middle East Program Levels - Security Assistance  
(Program in \$ Millions)

	<u>1976</u>			<u>Transition Quarter</u>			<u>5-Quarter Total</u>		
	<u>Request</u>	<u>House</u>	<u>Senate</u>	<u>Request</u>	<u>House</u>	<u>Senate</u>	<u>Request</u>	<u>House</u>	<u>Senate</u>
<u>Israel</u>	2,255.0	2,200.0	2,200.0	-	-	550.0	2,255.0	2,200.0	2,750.0
Foreign Military Credit Sales	1,500.0	1,500.0	1,500.0	-	-	375.0	1,500.0	1,500.0	1,875.0
Supporting Assistance	755.0	700.0	700.0	-	-	175.0	755.0	700.0	875.0
<u>Egypt</u>	750.0	695.0	695.0	-	-	173.8	750.0	695.0	868.8
Supporting Assistance	750.0	695.0	695.0	-	-	173.8	750.0	695.0	868.8
<u>Jordan</u>	253.6	248.6	248.6	-	-	18.1	253.6	248.6	266.7
Supporting Assistance	77.5	72.5	72.5	-	-	18.1	77.5	72.5	90.6
MAP <u>1/</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	100.0	100.0	100.0
Training <u>1/</u>	.8	.8	.8	-	-	-	.8	.8	.8
Foreign Military Credit Sales <u>1/</u>	75.0	75.0	75.0	-	-	-	75.0	75.0	75.0
Excess Defense Articles <u>1/</u>	.3	.3	.3	-	-	-	.3	.3	.3
<u>Syria</u>	90.0	80.0	80.0	-	-	20.0	90.0	80.0	100.0
Supporting Assistance	90.0	80.0	80.0	-	-	20.0	90.0	80.0	100.0

1/ The Appropriations Committees did not indicate these amounts for Jordan. OMR assumes that the request levels will be maintained.



Table 2

Middle East Program Levels - Security Assistance  
(Program in \$ Millions)

	<u>Request</u>	<u>1976</u>		<u>Transition Quarter</u>			<u>5-Quarter Total</u>		
		<u>House</u>	<u>Senate</u>	<u>Request</u>	<u>House</u>	<u>Senate</u>	<u>Request</u>	<u>House</u>	<u>Senate</u>
<u>Israel</u>	<u>2,255.0</u>	<u>2,200.0</u>	<u>2,200.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>550.0</u>	<u>2,255.0</u>	<u>2,200.0</u>	<u>2,750.0</u>
Foreign Military Credit Sales	1,500.0	1,500.0	1,500.0	-	-	375.0	1,500.0	1,500.0	1,875.0
Supporting Assistance	755.0	700.0	700.0	-	-	175.0	755.0	700.0	875.0
<u>Egypt</u>	<u>750.0</u>	<u>695.0</u>	<u>695.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>173.8</u>	<u>750.0</u>	<u>695.0</u>	<u>868.8</u>
Supporting Assistance	750.0	695.0	695.0	-	-	173.8	750.0	695.0	868.8
<u>Jordan</u>	<u>253.6</u>	<u>248.6</u>	<u>248.6</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>18.1</u>	<u>253.6</u>	<u>248.6</u>	<u>266.7</u>
Supporting Assistance	77.5	72.5	72.5	-	-	18.1	77.5	72.5	90.6
MAP <u>1/</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	100.0	100.0	100.0
Training <u>1/</u>	.8	.8	.8	-	-	-	.8	.8	.8
Foreign Military Credit Sales <u>1/</u>	75.0	75.0	75.0	-	-	-	75.0	75.0	75.0
Excess Defense Articles <u>1/</u>	.3	.3	.3	-	-	-	.3	.3	.3
<u>Syria</u>	<u>90.0</u>	<u>80.0</u>	<u>80.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>90.0</u>	<u>80.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>
Supporting Assistance	90.0	80.0	80.0	-	-	20.0	90.0	80.0	100.0

1/ The Appropriations Committees did not indicate these amounts for Jordan. OMB assumes that the request levels will be maintained.

Table 3

Percentage of Aid to the Middle East  
Going to Each Recipient  
 (program in \$ millions)

	<u>Administration</u>		<u>House</u>		<u>Senate</u>	
	<u>5-Quarter</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>5-Quarter</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>5-Quarter</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Israel	2,255.0	67.3	2,200.0	68.2	2,750.0	69.0
Egypt	750.0	22.4	695.0	21.6	868.8	21.8
Jordan	253.6	7.6	248.6	7.7	266.7	6.7
Syria	<u>90.0</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>80.0</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>2.5</u>
TOTAL	3,348.6	100.0	3,223.6	100.0	3,985.5	100.0

BI-PARTISAN MEETING ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION

Q. Can you fill us in on the Bi-Partisan Leadership Meeting this morning. What did the President indicate was his view on Transition Quarter funding for the Middle East, especially Israel?

A. I think probably the most accurate summation of the President's views is contained in a letter to the Speaker. In the letter the President asserts that the Administration is firmly committed to the security of Israel as well as to providing constructive economic aid to other Middle East countries. He states that his FY '76 and '77 budget requests provide sufficient levels of assistance to meet the countries' needs. He argues that when our own budget pressures are very great, he cannot justify more funds than have been included in his request. He concludes by saying that if presented with a final appropriation bill that includes additional funds for the Transition Quarter, he will be forced to exercise his veto, but closes by saying that he hopes the House will not make necessary such a course of action.

WEST BANK ELECTIONS

- Q. What is your reaction to the success of PLO supporters and other Palestinian nationalists in the West Bank elections?
- A. Those elections took place peacefully and apparently reflected the will of the local population. But I would have no comment on the results of the election.
- FYI: It is important that you not refer to the election as an "internal affair" of Israel or the West Bank since we do not recognize Israel claims to the West Bank nor West Bank claims to their autonomy.



---

TRANSITION QUARTER FUNDING FOR THE MIDDLE EAST  
(contained in H. R. 12203 as sent to the President)

	(in millions)	
	Program	NOA
ISRAEL		
FMS Credits (50% forgiveness)	\$ 200.0	\$ 110.0 *
Supporting Assistance	75.0	75.0
EGYPT <del>600.</del>		
Supporting Assistance	100.0	100.0
JORDAN <del>600.</del>		
Supporting Assistance	60.0	60.0
SYRIA <del>600.</del>		
Supporting Assistance	15.0	15.0
TOTALS	\$ 450.0	\$ 370.0

\* The FMS credit program does not require dollar-for-dollar budget outlays. One dollar of credit (budget outlay) will support a program of Ten dollars. Since Israel receives 50% forgiveness -- in this case \$100 million -- new obligational authority of that amount is required. For the remaining \$100 million only \$10 million in NOA is required (\$10 million to support a program of \$100 million) -- hence a total of \$110 million.

Acceptance by the President of the compromise levels for Transition Quarter funding of Middle East programs does not mean the legislation as a whole exceeds the President's budget requests. Cuts made in the FY76 requests can accommodate the increased levels in the Transition Quarter without resulting in an appropriation which exceeds the budget requests for the full fifteen month period. This does not mean, however, that the funds were allocated for the purposes or programs the President desired.

August 12, 1976

US STRATEGY ON MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT

Q: Has the Administration's policy on the Middle East fizzled out? Nothing seems to be going on. Or is further progress on a Mid East settlement linked to a resolution of the Lebanese crisis?

A: It is important to keep this matter in perspective: There has been significant progress on a problem which has been with us for three decades. The Sinai Agreement concluded in September 1975 represented a significant further step towards an eventual overall settlement. We have also strengthened our ties with Israel and with a number of our Arab friends in the area. We have made clear our willingness to continue to assist the parties in finding ways of bringing further progress on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338.

At the same time, we must recognize the realities of tensions and contradictions caused by the Lebanese situation which have deflected attention and concern from the overall peace process. Thus, we have been active diplomatically to help encourage a peaceful settlement in Lebanon, as well as to avoid a broadening of that conflict.

Nonetheless, we stand ready to assist the parties in bringing about further progress on a Mid East settlement. This has

always been a top priority and is in our interests. We have no preconceived course of action, but will be guided by what the parties want. We are open-minded on resuming the Geneva conference.

Q: Is Geneva likely this year?

A: More likely in 1977. This is a matter that the parties must agree upon.

September 17, 1976

Q: What was discussed on the Middle East and Lebanon? Are there any new initiatives under way in either case to help bring about an early resolution of the problems?

A: The President assured the Prince of the importance we attach to finding further ways to bring progress in the Middle East and also to encouraging a peaceful settlement in Lebanon. We stand ready to be helpful, as we have been in the past. The meeting afforded the President and His Royal Highness to exchange views on these important issues, ~~but no initiatives were discussed.~~

Q: Was the Arab boycott discussed? Did the President tell Saud that the boycott must end or did he take the position that he opposes boycott legislation? What did Saud say on the boycott matter?

A: [In answer to all questions on the boycott:] The discussion was wide-ranging on ways in which our two countries can work to solve problems of special interest, key among them being the achievement of a final peace settlement in the Middle East. But I am not going to get into the details of their discussion. The President's position on the boycott of friendly countries is well known.

June 2, 1976

A NEW U.S. PEACE INITIATIVE

Q: Yesterday you were quoted as saying that the U.S. plans a major new peace initiative in the Middle East looking toward the convening of the Geneva Conference. Can you be more specific as to timetable or plans?

A: For those of you who did not see another report in which I denied that a new initiative has been ordered, I refer you to it (A 279, AP, 6-176, attached).

Our position on the Middle East is as we have stated it. We are continuing consultations with the parties in an effort to move the peace process forward. We are ready to help the parties in whatever forum or by whatever means they themselves deem realistic and acceptable, and among these is the Geneva Conference.

(Guidance on Kissinger CENTO remarks attached)

444A279

R W BYLEEVQYV

FAM-U.S.-LEBANON; 1ST ADD: A259; 130

WASHINGTON; INTERVENTION.''

MEANWHILE TUESDAY; WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY RON NESSEN DENIED A PUBLISHED REPORT THAT PRESIDENT FORD HAS ORDERED A NEW INITIATIVE FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS.

'WE WILL HELP THE PARTIES TO ARRANGE WHATEVER THEY WANT TO ARRANGE'' IN THE WAY OF TAKING FURTHER STEPS TOWARD PEACE; NESSEN SAID. BUT HE SAID THERE WAS NO STEPUP IN TEMPO 'BEYOND ONGOING CONTACTS.''

OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS; THE UNITED STATES HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT IT IS READY TO HELP THE PARTIES FIND A FORUM; A GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE OR OTHERWISE.

AVI PAZNER; SPOKESMAN FOR THE ISRAELI EMBASSY; SAID HE KNEW OF NO NEW AMERICAN INITIATIVE.

'WE HAVE CHECKED WITH THE ADMINISTRATION AND THERE IS NO SUCH THING IN THE WIND;' PAZNER SAID.

1945PED 06-01

KISSINGER AT CENTO MEETING  
PRESS GUIDANCE

Q: At the Cento Ministerial in London today Secretary Kissinger said that time is approaching when new moves are necessary in peace negotiations in Middle East? Is the United States planning some new initiative?

A: The Secretary's statement emphasizes the President's consistent policy on the need to maintain momentum towards an overall peace in the Middle East. We are determined to remain active in this endeavor and, as the Secretary said, we are continuing to explore possibilities for renewing the negotiating process.

December 10, 1976

UN RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Q: Why did the U. S. oppose the Resolution on the Middle East proposed by Egypt and accepted by the UN General Assembly yesterday?

A: I think Ambassador Scranton's statement in connection with the U. S. vote made our position clear. As he indicated, there were certain aspects of the resolution which we could not support -- specifically language setting an "artificial deadline" for reconvening the Geneva Conference which might unnecessarily tie the hands of the incoming administration. At the same time I think Ambassador Scranton stated that a good deal of the resolution was consistent with our view of the <sup>desirability</sup> ~~urgency~~ of resuming the negotiating process.