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GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 1-81)
1. Do you know why the Chinese "postpone" the scheduled press preview of the Chinese Archaeological Exhibition scheduled for this morning?

Guidance: I am not aware of this report, and would have no comment to give you.

FYI only: The PRC representatives have been in consultations with the State Department and had insisted that the US prohibit press members from South Korea, Israel, Republic of China (Taiwan), and South Africa from attending. The State Department could not make such a promise. Therefore, the Chinese have decided to "postpone" the press preview which probably means they will cancel it.

If there is any US comment at all, it will have to come from the State Department. However, you should not refer the questions to State. Just claim that you are unaware of the reports.

End FYI.
1. Do you have any comment on the PRC cancellation of contracts for 600,000 tons of wheat? How will this affect crop availabilities for PL 480? Can you comment on the New York Times report today that the Administration has decided on a figure of $1.4 Billion for FY '75 food aid?

GUIDANCE: I would suggest that you check with the Department of Agriculture for any assessment of the impact of PRC contract cancellations on grain supplies and prices. I have nothing to announce today on a decision on the 1975 food aid program. Let me assure you that the President will do the maximum amount possible to meet world food needs within U.S. crop availabilities and without adversely impacting U.S. domestic grain prices. As he said last week, the improved U.S. crop situation will permit the President to approve a program toward the higher options of consideration.
2. Can you confirm reports that the President sent a letter to Chou En Lai recently?

Guidance: The President has sent a congratulatory letter to Chou En Lai on the occasion of his again being designated as the Prime Minister of the PRC.
3. **Press Announcement - Albert-Rhodes Visit to China** - Qs & As attached.

Speaker of the House of Representatives Carl Albert and House Minority Leader John Rhodes will visit the People’s Republic of China during the Congressional spring recess (March 26-April 9) at the invitation of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs. They will be accompanied by their wives and a small support staff.

The trip was arranged through discussions initiated by Secretary of State Kissinger. Details are now being worked out by officials of the White House and the State Department, in consultation with the Liaison Office of the People’s Republic of China in Washington.

This will be the seventh visit by members of Congress to the People’s Republic of China.
4. The Washington Post today carries a report of Sen. Mansfield's concern over the state of US/PRC relations. Do you have any comment on his warning that the U.S. should move faster on the normalization process?

GUIDANCE: I would have no specific comments on the views of Sen. Mansfield. We believe that our basic relationship with the PRC remains sound and the Administration's policies toward China will continue to follow the course set by the Shanghai Communiqué.

FYI ONLY: The President's trip to China later this year can be seen as part of the normalization process. There has been no discussion, as yet, of a precise date, but we expect it to be in the latter part of this year.
Q: But doesn't Peking want you to break relations with Taiwan as a price for normalization?

A: I see no useful purpose served by my speculating about issues that are properly handled through confidential discussions between two governments.

All I want to say is that the President looks forward to holding wide-ranging discussions with senior leaders in Peking later this year on a broad range of issues, but that there are no preconditions for his trip to the PRC, nor prior commitments about the outcome of his visit.
Q: Where do we stand in our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan? Has Chiang Kai-shek's death altered our commitments to Taiwan?

A: The Administration retains diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. We remain concerned about the stability and security of the island. We have friendly and cooperative relations with the government of the Republic of China, and the recent passing of Chiang Kai-shek has not altered that relationship.

Q: But what about our defense treaty with Taiwan?

A: As I said, we maintain all of our commitments to Taiwan.
Q: Can you clarify where the Administration stands on China policy?

A: It is a cardinal element of the Administration's foreign policy to seek the further normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China. The Shanghai Communique details the basic perspectives which the Administration brings to the normalization process. We remain committed to the Shanghai Communique despite occasional difficulties in our relations with the PRC [a reference to the dispute last December over press coverage of the archaeological exhibition, and the flap over the politically objectionable song in the repertoire of the performing arts troupe in early April]; and as the President said in his April 10th speech to Congress, he looks forward to visiting Peking later this year to seek ways of accelerating the normalization process.
Q: But doesn't Peking want you to break relations with Taiwan as a price for normalization?

A: I see no useful purpose served by speculation now about this and other questions that may come up in the future.

I look forward to holding wide-ranging discussions with senior leaders in Peking later this year on a broad range of issues, but there are no preconditions for my trip to the PRC and no prior commitments about the outcome of my visit.
Q: Where do we stand in our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan? Has Chiang Kai-shek's death altered our commitments to Taiwan?

A: The Administration retains diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. We remain concerned about the security of the island. We have friendly and cooperative relations with the government of the Republic of China, and the recent passing of Chiang Kai-shek has not altered that relationship.

Q: But what about our defense treaty with Taiwan?

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VISIT BY CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Q: Can you give us added details about itinerary, what Chinese leaders the group will meet, and what their activities will be during their tour?

A: These details are now being worked out between White House and State officials, and the PRC Liaison Office. As details become available they will be released by the delegation.

Q: Do you know anything about another Congressional delegation which might visit China this summer?

A: (On an "if asked" basis only:) I understand that another Congressional group may be going, but this is something the Chinese are working out directly with the Congress. As there has been no announcement from the Chinese or the Congressmen involved, I have no information to give you. I assume the organizers of the group will make details public when they have firmed up their plans.

[FYI: Senators Percy and Javits have been asked by the PRC Liaison Office to organize a Congressional visit during the first half of August.]
The Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China has invited a bipartisan Congressional delegation to visit China for about ten days beginning August 20. The delegation will be headed by Representative John B. Anderson (R - Illinois), with Senator Robert C. Byrd (D - West Virginia) as deputy leader. Members of the group include Representative John Slack (D - West Virginia), Representative Edward J. Derwinski (R - Illinois), Senator James B. Pearson (R - Kansas), and Senator Sam Nunn (D - Georgia).

Details of the trip, which was agreed to in principle during Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's November, 1974 trip to Peking, are now being worked out between officials of the White House and the State Department in consultation with the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China in Washington.

This will be the ninth delegation of American officials to visit China since the Administration initiated efforts to normalize U.S.-PRC relations in 1971 -- apart from President Nixon's visit in February, 1972 and Secretary Kissinger's seven trips to Peking. The eight previous groups included seven Congressional delegations. These were led by:

-- Senators Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott in April, 1972.
-- Representatives Halé Boggs and Gerald Ford in June of that same year (1972).

-- A visit by Senator Henry M. Jackson in July of 1974.

-- A second trip by Senator Mansfield in December, 1974.

-- A delegation headed by Senator J. William Fulbright and Representative Peter Frelinghuysen in September of last year (1974).

-- And a visit by Representatives Carl Albert and John Rhodes this April (1975).

There was also a visit by a delegation of six state governors, led by Governor Daniel Evans of Washington, in May of 1974.
IV. MEETING WITH THE OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO CHINA

Monday, September 8, 1975
4:00 p.m.

The purpose of the meeting is to receive a report from the delegation to the People's Republic of China on their recent trip to that nation.

MAYORS TRIP TO THE PRC

Q. UPI ran a story yesterday to the effect that the U.S. Conference of Mayors canceled a visit by 14 mayors to China next week charging Peking with introducing a "political element" by objecting to the inclusion of the Mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico. Is the story true, and will the U.S. Government make a representation to the PRC on the issue?

A. The story is essentially correct. The Chinese did seek to exclude Major Carlos Romero Barcelo of San Juan from the delegation. The mayors objected to this specification and we supported them on their position.

For details of the incident, however, I would advise you to check with the State Department.

FYI ONLY: The rather complicated background on this incident has to do with USSR and PRC support for the independence movement in Puerto Rico and a move to have the movement granted observer status at the U.N.
FYI: The Chinese Scientific and Technical Association Delegation headed by Chou pei-yuan will play a courtesy call on the President Saturday morning at 9:45. Some background information is attached for your information.

Q: What is the President seeing the Chinese Scientific and Technical Delegation Saturday?

A: The Chinese Scientific and Technical Association Delegation, headed by Chou pei-yuan [Jo ba yu-an], will play a courtesy call on the President tomorrow morning at 9:45. The Chinese Delegation will be touring the White House and the President wants to meet them as an expression of his personal interest in our relations with the People's Republic.
Q. Sunday evening Secretary Kissinger hosted a dinner for the Chinese. Did he discuss the anticipated China trip by the President with Foreign Minister Ch’iao Kuan-Hua? Does Secretary Kissinger himself expect to travel to China soon on an advance trip?

A. I understand that the State Department has a read-out of the dinner (attached) and you may wish to check with them. As you know, the President still plans to travel to the People’s Republic of China this year, but neither his travel plans nor Secretary Kissinger’s have been firmed up as yet.
The State Department will announce today that Secretary Kissinger will travel to the PRC this month in advance of the President's trip later this year. We should say NOTHING in advance of the Department's announcement on the Kissinger trip.

If asked about the President's plans following the State Department announcement, you might want to say:

"As you know, the President has publicly expressed his anticipation of a trip to China sometime this year. As yet, no dates have been fixed for the trip, but such scheduling will undoubtedly be discussed during the course of the Secretary's visit there."

STATE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT ATTACHED.
NOTE: This Announcement to be made at Dept. of State

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S TRIP TO CHINA

The following announcement should be made at the noon briefing, October 6. (This is the text agreed upon with the PRC, who will also be releasing it about noon (Washington time).)

'It has been agreed upon through consultation that Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, United States Secretary of State and Assistant to the United States President for National Security Affairs will visit the PRC from October 19 through October 23, 1975.

Q: What is the purpose of the trip?
A: It is part of the preparation for the President's trip.

Q: When is the President going?
A: Later this year; a final decision on dates will probably be made during the Secretary's trip.

Q: What will the Secretary be discussing with the Chinese?
A: He will discuss a broad range of matters of mutual interest. As you know there are no preconditions set for the subjects to be discussed.

Q: Will he talk about the Taiwan question?
A: I am not going to get into details as to what may be discussed.

Q: Does he expect to see Chairman Mao or Chou En-lai?
A: I cannot speculate about that.

Q: Will he visit other countries?
A: He will stop off briefly in Japan going and coming and will meet with some senior Japanese officials.

Q: When will he leave Washington?
A: On October 17 with one overnight stop in Japan enroute to China.

Q: Where did these consultations take place?
A: They took place through our normal official channels.
ANNOUNCEMENT ON KISSINGER TRIP TO CHINA

BACKGROUND:

The State Department will announce today that Secretary Kissinger will travel to the PRC this month in advance of the President's trip later this year. We should say NOTHING in advance of the Department's announcement on the Kissinger trip.

IF ASKED about the President's plans following the State announcement, you might want to say:

"As you know, the President has publicly expressed his anticipation of a trip to China sometime this year. As yet, no dates have been fixed for the trip, but such scheduling will undoubtedly be discussed during the course of the Secretary's visit there."

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Q: When will he leave Washington?
A: On October 17 with one overnight stop in Japan en route to China.

Q: Where did these consultations take place?
A: They took place through our normal official channels.
Q. Secretary Kissinger departs today for a trip to the PRC and the President will be visiting China later this year. What do we expect from these trips and what can we hope to gain?

A. The main purposes of Secretary Kissinger's trip are:

1.) To sustain our official dialogue with the PRC which has taken the form of an annual review of international events.

2.) To lay the groundwork for the President's trip later this year.

3.) And in a larger sense to sustain and strengthen our relations with the Peoples Republic which as Secretary Kissinger said in his UN speech is a cardinal element of our foreign policy. The President's visit later this year emphasizes the importance we attach to this larger purpose.

Q. Do we expect as a result of these visits diplomatic recognition of the Peking government by the United States?

A. As the Secretary said Sunday, "the process of normalization between the People's Republic of China and the United States has been established in the Shanghai Communiqué." In other words, that Communiqué sets the direction of our policy, and we intend to continue the process of normalization to its ultimate conclusion.
FOR AMPLIFICATION:

The full response by the Secretary is as follows:

Secretary Kissinger: The basic purpose, the basic relationship between us and the People's Republic of China is the result of the congruence of some perceptions of the international environment and therefore on many of these visits a significant part of the discussion concerns a review of the international situation and to see what degree we agree and disagree.

The process of normalization of relations between the People's Republic and the United States has been established in the Shanghai communique. We intend to live up to this and we intend to continue the process of normalization to its ultimate conclusion.

I do not anticipate that it will be completed on the next visit, but I do not exclude that some progress would be made."

* * *

Q. Will Secretary Kissinger meet with Chou en-lai or Mao tse-tung?

A. The State Department, when asked yesterday whether the Secretary had been told whether he would meet with Chou and/or Mao indicated that they were unaware of plans at this time. (Normal not to know until into the week.)
Q: What are the implications of the remarks made by Foreign Minister Ch'iao and Secretary Kissinger in Peking Sunday? Are the Chinese trying to discourage the process of detente between ourselves and the Soviet Union?

A: I read the stories on the toasts and I think that they merit a reading in a fuller context:

"As I said in my speech to the United Nations, there is no relationship to which the United States assigns greater significance than its ties with the People's Republic of China. The differences between us are apparent. Our task is not to intensify those differences. Our task is to advance our relationship on the basis of our mutual interests. Such a relationship would strengthen each of us. It would threaten no one and it would contribute to the wellbeing of all peoples. It is a relationship which we intend to be a durable feature of the world scene. Each country must pursue a policy suitable to its own circumstances. The United States will resist hegemony as we have already stated in the Shanghai Communique. But the United States will also make every effort to avoid needless confrontations when it can do so without threatening the security of third countries. In this policy we will be guided by actions and realities and not rhetoric." (END QUOTE)
KISSINGER VISIT TO CHINA

Q. Does the "chilly" toast at the conclusion of Secretary Kissinger's visit to China indicate that progress in our relations with the People's Republic of China has suffered a setback?

A. Without commenting on or characterizing the toast (I would say that the purpose of the Secretary's trip to China was to have an annual review of the major issues and to lay the groundwork for the President's trip). Both of those objectives were accomplished. The Secretary himself said, I believe, that he was satisfied with the exchanges.

Q. Do we have a date now for the President's trip to China?

A. The Secretary will be returning this weekend and will, of course, be briefing the President on all aspects of his trip, but until the President has heard from the Secretary I will have nothing to give you.
CHINESE NUCLEAR BLAST

Q. The New China News Agency announced that China has conducted its second underground nuclear test. Would you comment on the announcement, and its impact on our relations with China?

A. I have seen the reports you mention, but I would have nothing to add.

Q. Have we verified that the test did, in fact, take place?

A. As I said, I would have no comment.

FYI ONLY: See Attached.
This form marks the file location of item number 14 as listed on the pink form (GSA form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet) at the front of the folder.
PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

Q. What can you tell us today about the President's trip to China?

A. As I told you yesterday, and as the President said in his press conference, he still expects to visit China this year. As for details on scheduling and other aspects of the trip, these are, as I said, being worked out and when we have something to announce, we'll let you know.

Q. Have the Chinese signed off on this trip?

A. We are working with the Chinese government on the details of the visit.
PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

Q. What can you tell us today about the President's trip to China?

A. As I told you yesterday, and as the President said in his press conference, he still expects to visit China this year. As for details on scheduling and other aspects of the trip, these are, as I said, being worked out and when we have something to announce, we'll let you know.

Q. Have the Chinese signed off on this trip?

A. We are working with the Chinese government on the details of the visit.
NIXON TRIP TO THE PRC

Q: We understand that there may be some legal problems connected with landing the PRC plane for former President Nixon in the United States. Is it true that alternative arrangements are being made to fly Nixon to China?

A: I do not have that information. I suggest you check with the former President for any information on his travel plans. As to possible legal problems connected with a PRC plane landing here, you will want to check with State. Their legal counsel's office may be able to help you.
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CHINA

The demonstrations on April 5, which seemed designed to put pressure on the party's left wing to ease up on its campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping, instead precipitated his removal from office.

The Central Committee announcement that Teng Hsiao-ping has been dismissed from all his positions inside and outside the party specifically links this move to the demonstrations on April 5. The left successfully seized this opportunity to bring more serious charges against Teng.

The announcement indicated that the events of Monday had changed the situation—Teng's case "turned into" one requiring punishment rather than persuasion. In contrast to this unequivocal indictment, a party directive issued in late February or early March indicated that Teng was at that time in a relatively good position to survive the attacks on him. It reportedly stated that Teng was not to be "struck down", and that his case was different from those of party leaders purged in the recent past.

The wide international coverage of Monday's events clearly angered and embarrased Mao and the left, and may have enabled them to win the support of moderates on the Politburo for the removal of Teng.

Teng is obviously completely out of the succession sweepstakes, but he retains his party membership and has been given a chance to make amends for his errors.

Teng's removal does not appear to be an unqualified victory for the party's left wing. Although the decision on his case was "unanimous," indicating his supporters abandoned him, concessions from the left may have been involved. One such concession could be that the announcement on Teng is to mark the end of the current political campaign. Indeed, the editorial published Tuesday seemed more sharply focused on Teng alone than any previous articles, and the reappearance on April 7 of Politburo member Li Hsien-nien, one of Teng's staunchest supporters who had been absent from public view since mid-January, suggests that other supporters of Teng will not suffer.

The appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as premier and as first vice chairman of the party may also be part of a compromise solution. Hua is not in the leftist camp and was attacked by leftists in 1974. There is also some evidence that he may have been subject to indirect attacks from the left during the campaign against Teng. In any event, his elevation to first vice chairman of the party, a spot left vacant with the death of Chou En-lai, suggests that the removal of Teng will not necessarily allow the left to increase their influence significantly in the top leadership. Hua was promoted over Wang Hung-wen, a young party leftist who had been next in line for the first vice chairmanship.
The appointment of Hua to the premiership, together with the reappearance of Li Hsien-hien, the party's leading economic specialist, suggests that the government will continue to pursue with little change the ambitious economic policies set by the moderates in recent years. Indeed, the preservation of moderate policies on a broad range of issues has undoubtedly been foremost in the minds of moderates in the leadership.

Teng's backers may have agreed to drop their support of him once they were assured that the relatively moderate Hua would become premier and would be promoted to a position in the party of sufficient stature to give him a major say in policy issues. Hua's new party position, leaving him second only to Mao, gives him that stature.

Hua is closely identified with the effort to modernize agriculture and, when he was acting premier, he frequently indicated there would be no change in China's foreign policy. Others in the leadership, who may have opposed the abrasive Teng for personal reasons but did not differ with him over policy issues, may now close ranks with those who personally supported Teng, thus giving the moderates a major voice in policy matters.

Apart from the factional opportunities and disabilities arising out of Monday's disturbances, the leadership as a whole was probably considerably shaken by the demonstrations. Although they may have been encouraged by some officials, the demonstrations revealed a depth of popular feeling about the late premier Chou En-lai and the policies he stood for that has no real precedent since the communists took power. Large-scale demonstrations apparently were confined to the capital, but pro-Chou manifestations also took place in the past week elsewhere in China.

To some extent, this outpouring of feeling was made possible by the continuing uncertainty about authority in Peking: Hua Kun-feng were merely an "interim" acting premier, Teng Hsiao-ping remained under attack but was not out of the picture, and the leftists had not been able to impart momentum to their campaign of denigration. Most leaders may have believed that a decisive display of authority, indicating the upper levels of the regime could contain their differences, was in order. All were also undoubtedly acutely concerned about the image of confusion and unabated rivalry that was being presented to foreign observers, particularly in the Soviet Union.

The decisions of April 7, however, certainly do not provide a long-term solution to China's leadership problems. The People's Daily editorial of April 6 acknowledged—for the second time—that the Central Committee of the party remains split. Given the depth of public sentiment revealed on Monday and the relatively powerful position of the moderates in positions of authority throughout the country, a "clash" against the left is still a real possibility. Another round of struggle is almost certain in the cards—perhaps even before Mao dies.
The current situation is still fluid, and further changes in the leadership may be decided at the leadership meetings now under way in Peking. Further indications of the present pecking order may be available in a few days, but a new leadership lineup may not be fully revealed until May 1.
Q. What did the President mean when he mentioned parallel action and cooperation between the U.S. and the PRC?

A. The President and Secretary Kissinger have mentioned this concept before; that is, that we and the PRC have some common aims and goals in foreign policy, although we are not actively coordinating our policies. Both we and the PRC pursue our individual foreign policies independently, but on some occasions we have similar perceptions of what is needed to maintain world peace and equilibrium.

Q. Was this new phrase of cooperation and parallel action meant as a signal of some sort to Moscow?

A. There was nothing new in the President's remarks at Amb. Cafer's swearing-in. This concept has been described before. I believe Secretary Kissinger first mentioned this in December 1975 in a press conference in Peking.
Q: CIA official Roger G. Brown, writing in Foreign Policy has suggested that the U.S. consider recognizing the PRC before Mao Tse-tung dies to forestall a shift by China toward the Soviet Union. Does this position have any Administration blessing or direction? Is it a trial balloon.

A: The views expressed in the article are personal views; they do not reflect the attitude of the CIA or the policy of this government. The article is not a trial balloon; it was not even seen in advance of publication.

Q: Just what is the President's policy with regard to normalization of relations with the PRC?

A: The policy is as the President stated it in his speech December 7 -- That it is important to the future well being of this country that we establish a normal relationship with the People's Republic of China. The future security of Asia, and the evolution of a stable balance among the world powers in a nuclear age, require that we not slip back into the sterile confrontation we had in the past with a nation embodying nearly a quarter of mankind. Nor should we give up lightly the greater flexibility in our foreign policy which has come with our new dialogue with Peking. But let me add that there is no timetable nor even an understanding regarding the modality by which the United States will establish normal relations with the People's Republic of China.
CHINESE EARTHQUAKE

Q: Is the United States planning to offer relief and assistance to victims of the Chinese earthquake?

I would assume so, but

A: This is being looked into on an urgent basis. Let me check and get back to you.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY: State is currently working on instructions to Ambassador Gates to offer the PRC whatever assistance they deem appropriate.
US CHINA POLICY

[If asked about Reagan's China Policy, refuse to get drawn into a debate on our policy versus Reagan's. The following is a paragraph from Kissinger's July 22 Speech in Seattle which sums up our China policy.]

"The United States, in concert with its allies, seeks to establish better relations based on strict reciprocity and principle with former or potential adversaries. No nation is more important to this process than the People's Republic of China. . . . Our shared concern that the world remain free from domination by military force or blackmail or 'hegemony' provided the strategic foundation for our new relationship. This mutual interest continues and is the basis for durable and growing ties. Both sides derive benefits from constructive relations, improved prospects for maintaining a stable equilibrium, reduced dangers of conflict in Asia, mutually beneficial trade and cultural exchanges and expanded possibilities for cooperative or parallel action on specific global issues. We have made significant progress in improving relations with China over the past several years. We have established liaison offices in each other's capitals. We have increased trade and promoted exchanges. Frequent and wide ranging talks with Chinese leaders - including visits by two Presidents and many Congressional delegations - have deepened our mutual understanding. On some international issues there is substantial compatibility in our perspective and, where our interests diverge, we are diminishing the risks of miscalculation. . . . We must deal with each other on the basis of equality and mutual benefit - and a continuing recognition that our evolving relationship is important for global stability and progress.

"The new relationship between the US and PRC is an enduring and important feature of the international scene, and we are determined to work to improve it further. While difficult issues remain, we intend to continue to move toward the normalization of our relationship in keeping with the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué."
OVERSEAS TROOP REDUCTIONS

Q: How many U.S. troops have been withdrawn from foreign countries since President Ford took office?

A: Over the past two years, there have been a number of significant redeployments, increases, and reductions of U.S. troops overseas. Most of the reductions resulted from our drawdown in Southeast Asia; the largest increases occurred in Western Europe. For example, as of March 31, 1976, the U.S. military strength in Thailand was reduced, at the request of the Thai Government, to approximately 4,000 -- down from 26,000 on September 30, 1974. During the same period, troop strengths in Taiwan went from 5,000 to 2,000 as Vietnam related activities were terminated. According to the latest available figures on both reductions and increases, the worldwide net reduction is approximately 28,000.

FYI: It might be also noted these troop reductions and redeployments took place during a period of cutbacks in Defense budgets and in overall U.S. military manpower; the total number of active duty military personnel was reduced by 67,000 during this time period.
Q's and A's On Death of Mao

Q: What was the President's personal reaction to Mao's death?
A: You have the statement we released this morning. The President was of course saddened to learn this morning the passing of Chairman Mao. He was privileged to meet with him during his visit to Peking last year and considered him to be one of the remarkable men of this age.

Q: When was the President informed of Mao's death? Why wasn't he awakened immediately when the news became known?
A: Shortly after 7 a.m. by General Scowcroft. The President was not awakened immediately because there was no action required or any need for a Presidential decision. He was briefed on this news first thing in the morning as he is on all important National Security matters.

Q: What are the President's thoughts as to the future of relations between the U.S. and China, now that Mao is dead? Will Mao's death affect the 1972 Shanghai Communique goal of "normalization"? Certainly there will be some changes to expect -- what is the President looking for? The President can't really believe that there will be no change at all can he? That isn't very realistic, is it?
A: The policies of the Shanghai Communique reflect the national interests of both countries. We have no reason to expect any change.

Q: Will the President send a personal representative to Mao's funeral? Is there any possibility the President himself might go? Wouldn't it be a good idea for the President to attend Mao's funeral?
A: The PRC has announced that no foreign delegations will be invited to the memorial ceremonies.

Q: Has Ambassador Gates returned to China as yet? Did he receive any new instruction from the President in their meeting earlier this week? Is it likely that Gates will be called back to confer with the President again before leaving for China, as a result of Mao's death?

A: Ambassador Gates is still in the U.S. I have nothing to announce on his return plans at this time.

Q: Will the U.S. send an official expression of regret? Will it be a personal communication from the President? Will we get a copy of the message?

A: Yes. The President is sending letters of condolence to Premier Hua Kuo-feng and to Madame Mao Tse-tung. We do not plan to release the texts.

Q: What effect will Mao's death have on the U.S. political campaign? Won't this damage the President's attempt to laud his efforts at improving relations with China?

A: We foresee no effect on the election campaign or on Sino-American relations.

Q: What changes does the U.S. expect in Chinese internal politics? Who will replace Mao?

A: It would not be appropriate for us to comment or speculate on PRC internal affairs.
Q: We see reports that there has been a second nuclear test by the Chinese. Can you confirm this and will there be any fallout as was the case with the late September test?

A: The Chinese did make a second nuclear test yesterday at the LOP NOR test site. This was an underground rather than atmospheric explosion and accordingly we would not expect any fallout.

Q: Will the United States contact the Chinese in respect to this test?

A: I do not believe so. The test yesterday was an underground explosion, consistent with the obligations the U.S., Soviets and many other countries have assumed under the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere.

Refer to DOS.
Q. Do you have any additional comment on the radioactive fall-out from the earlier Chinese test?

A. I understand a cloud of radioactive fall-out has passed over the United States on two occasions. EPA officials have monitored this fall-out very closely and have concluded that no health hazard has resulted.

Q. Will there be more pass-overs the United States?

A. I understand there may be, but the degree of radioactivity dissipates over time. I repeat EPA officials have concluded no health hazard exists.
Q. What is the U.S. position on atmospheric nuclear testing?

A. The United States has long opposed atmospheric testing of nuclear devices. We have encouraged all countries, including the Chinese, to observe the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere. We regret the Chinese have not yet chosen to observe this ban.

Q. Did we, in fact, contact the Chinese to express our concern over the September test?

A. The State Department has indicated that it would make our position on atmospheric nuclear testing again clear to the Chinese. I would refer you to the State Department for any further details on this.
Control Data Corporation (CDC) Computer Sale to the PRC

Background (* Only)

Control Data Corporation (CDC) has been negotiating sale of two computers to the People's Republic of China (PRC) for use in processing seismic data in connection with the PRC's oil and gas exploration program. All agencies of the Export Administration Review Board reviewed the proposed sale. Although ERDA raised certain objections to the sale on grounds that the computers could be diverted to other uses, the Department of Defense, which is responsible for determining any potential harm to national security from such sales, determined that the proposed CDC sale, if consummated under certain conditions regarding supplier access to the machines, etc., would not be able to be diverted in such a manner and that concerns about the effect on U.S. national security were thus met. On this basis, and on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, the President approved the sale.

Aviation Week, in its October 18 issue, carries a version of this matter apparently leaked while it was still pending among the Executive agencies. The article currently portrays ERDA's objections, but inaccurately pictures DOD as also opposed. At the State Department noon press briefing October 18, the spokesman was asked about the story. He took the question. State is now working up guidance which will note that this sale was carefully considered and that the Export Administration Review Board (including Defense) was satisfied that national security concerns would be met by the terms of the proposed sale. (Note: Because of restrictions contained in the Export Administration Act, the U.S. Government may not comment on specific commercially sensitive transactions.) While White House involvement may not become known immediately, it will eventually, and the following Q and A's are presented for use in that contingency.

Q: Aviation Week recently revealed consideration was being given to sale of two Data computers to the People's Republic of China, even though ERDA and Defense objected on grounds they could be diverted to military use. We have since learned that the White House approved the sale. Could you comment on this particularly in light of the President's recent statement that we would never sell weapons-related systems to China?
A: We are aware an American company has been discussing the sale of computers to the PRC. While we cannot comment on the details because of the commercially sensitive nature of such transactions, this case has been handled in the same way as others of this nature. There is a governmental mechanism for considering the national security ramifications of industrial exports. This case was considered by the Export Administration Review Board, including the Department of Defense, which was satisfied that the national security concerns would be met by the terms of the proposed sale. On the basis of the Review Board's recommendation, the company concerned has been informed that the sale would be approved as proposed.

Q: Is that Control Data?
A: I can't comment on specifics because of the commercially sensitive nature of the transaction.

Q: Doesn't this violate the President's statement that he would never sell militarily valuable equipment to the PRC?
A: This is not militarily related.
Q: According to Aviation Week Magazine, Control Data Corporation is negotiating the sale of highly advanced computers to the PRC. This sale is reported to be favored by the State Department but opposed by DOD and ERDA. Can you confirm that report?

A: A number of American companies have been discussing the sale of oil exploration equipment, including computers for the processing of seismic data, with the PRC. It would be inappropriate to comment on the details of any specific license application. Businesses provide such information to the government in confidence. Any export license application will be handled in accordance with the provisions of the Export Administration regulations, as continued in force by Executive Order. Under these laws and regulations, such proposed exports are subject to extensive inter-agency review designed to assure that no exports occur which would be detrimental to the national security of the US. The views of all the agencies affected, including the Department of Defense, ERDA as well as State are reflected in this review.
Q: Why did the U.S. veto the resolution on Namibia in the UN Security Council on October 19?

A: As Governor Scranton said in his explanation of the American vote, the U.S. concern with the Namibia problem has been demonstrated dramatically by our continuing efforts to assist the parties involved in finding a peaceful solution. Negotiations are currently actively under way. While the sensitive process of consultation is going on I did not believe it would serve a useful purpose for the Security Council to take new initiatives on the Namibian question. After many years of frustration in trying to bring about independence for Namibia, the prospect for results exists now for the first time. The proposed resolution risked upsetting the progress already made.

It is important to note however that the U.S. has continued to enforce its own arms embargo towards South Africa since 1962, a year before the UN Security Council called for a voluntary embargo.

[The Security Council-vote was 10 in favor; 3 opposed (U.S., U.K., and France) and 2 abstentions (Italy and Japan). The three opposing votes are all vetos since they were all by permanent members of the UN Security Council.]
Q: Senator Proxmire has accused the administration of wasting the taxpayers' money on a new strategic stockpile policy. What is the basis for our new policy, and have we consulted with the Congress in making these changes?

A: Our strategic materials stockpile provides an important source of critical materials needed in the production of military equipment and other key items in a wartime economy. Because of U.S. dependence upon overseas suppliers for many new materials, wartime availability can be curtailed or cut off completely. Even though foreign suppliers may be friendly nations, it may be impossible to move materials to the U.S. during actual hostilities.

The President's revised stockpile policy has included a comprehensive review of the basic materials needed in the construction of today's complex military weaponry and those materials needed to insure the continued health of the civilian economy during wartime. Our new stockpile goals are based upon a complex analysis of industry requirements, processing plant capabilities, reliability of foreign supply, and degree of substitutability by other materials. Because these many variables can change, the President has directed that stockpile purchases and sales be reviewed annually, and that a comprehensive policy review be conducted every four years. In conducting this past year's interagency stockpile study, the administration has consulted closely with the appropriate Congressional committees (including Senator Proxmire's).

FYI: General Leslie Bray, Federal Preparedness Agency Director, will testify before Proxmire next month on the stockpile. This session has been planned for some time.
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U. S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA

Q: Senator Mike Mansfield has advocated that the U. S. complete normalization of relations with mainland China without delay even though it would sever our Defense Treaty commitments to Taiwan. Do you have any comment?

A: Senator Mansfield, of course, was expressing his personal viewpoint. Others, most recently a delegation just returning from the PRC led by Senator Curtis, do not agree with this statement.

As I have said on several occasions, we are committed to completion of the normalization process under the terms of the Shanghai Communique. We have no illusions about the complexity of issues and think the important thing will be to reach an agreement which both sides can live with, however long that takes, rather than to focus on some artificial deadline.

So far as Taiwan is concerned, in the Shanghai Communique we expressed our interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. I do not think it would be helpful to speculate on specific ways we could deal with our concern for Taiwan's future. However, we have in the past acted responsibly on matters affecting Taiwan.
Will the President be sending Huang Hua, the newly designated Foreign Minister of the PRC, a message of congratulations on his promotion?

I am sure that any appropriate message of congratulations will be sent. In this case, I believe the normal procedure would be for the Secretary of State, rather than the President, to send such a message to a Foreign Minister.

Does the President perceive a shift in PRC foreign policy reflected in Mr. Huang's promotion?

We have no reason to believe this indicates a change in PRC foreign Policy.