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Nessen/Greener

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 10, 1975

No. 560 #73

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
INTERNTATIONAL CONFERENCE ROOM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOVEMBER 10, 1975

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a two-part question.

Do you accept President Sadat's position that there can be no final peace settlement on the Middle East without a solution of the Palestinian problem, and if so, given the U.S. and Israeli refusal to deal with the PLO, what steps are you taking to handle the problem of the Palestinian refugees and their representation at Geneva?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We agree with the proposition

that any final peace settlement must include the interests of the Palestinians and a solution to the Palestinian problem. Our position with respect to the PLO has been that we cannot make a decision on how to deal with them until they have accepted the State of Israel and until they have accepted the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, particularly 242 and 338.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the President said yesterday that growing tensions in the Cabinet led to the dismissal of Secretary Schlesinger and the other shake-ups. Can you explain what led to those tensions and what was your responsibility for the shake-up?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President has pointed out repeatedly that he made the decision for the shake-up and that the decision was his. There were differences between Secretary Schlesinger and myself, as you would expect between two individuals of strong minds. I consider Secretary Schlesinger a man of outstanding ability and one of the best analysts of defense matters with whom I have dealt and whom I have known for over a decade. The differences are partly due to the difference in perspective between the Department of Defense and the Department of



State, and they will always exist. Some concern certain technical matters, usually having to do with the SALT negotiations. None were as sweeping as I have seen described in the press. And, no question, there were some personality disputes which neither of us handled with the elegance and wisdom that perhaps was necessary.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, where does the shake-up and the Soviet rejection of the latest American SALT proposal leave the negotiations now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, as far as the shake-up is concerned, and its impact on foreign policy, SALT and otherwise, the foreign policy of the United States is not conducted on the basis of personality. It is related to the permanent interests and values of the United States. And while it is absolutely inevitable that senior advisors of the President will disagree from time to time, we have the machinery by which decisions can be made, and those decisions should not be seen in terms of the prevalence of a particular individual or be conducted in terms of personalities. Therefore, our SALT position will reflect the best judgment of the President and of his advisors of what is in the long-term national interest of the United

States. We believe that a SALT agreement, if it is balanced and reciprocal, is in the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union and in the interests of world peace. And we will continue to pursue a SALT agreement.

QUESTION: Is it now up to the United States to come up with a new proposal to present to the Soviets?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We don't believe that the mere fact that the Soviet Union has rejected an American proposal requires us to come forward with another one. We still are expecting some sort of reasoned response to our last proposal, and we cannot make a new decision until we see some modification in the Soviet position.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in terms of the foreign policy you are talking about -- the President's trip to China appears to be in some trouble; at least it is not going smoothly.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I read that in the press. It is not the case, but I don't want to contradict such a distinguished group.

QUESTION: Well, it appears at least arrangements are not going smoothly. Your trip to China did not apparently go all that well. The summit with Mr. Brezhnev

appears deferred until next year at least. And in an election year there is some doubt about getting an arms control agreement at all with the Russians. Where does that leave the whole structure of foreign policy today?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I cannot accept your premises. I don't accept the premise that my trip to China did not go well within the framework of what was possible, and compared to other trips that other leaders of other countries have taken to China.

Secondly, the trip by the President to China is on schedule and the appropriate announcements will be made in due time.

With respect to arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, I do not believe that they should be accelerated because of elections, nor should they be delayed because of elections. We will make those agreements that we consider in the national interest of the United States and without regard to the electoral process.

So I believe that the basic structure of American foreign policy is sound, that the essential elements are in place, and will be continued to be pursued in the months ahead.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, will you discuss with us in some detail the nature and volume of the involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola, which unexpectedly got its independence a day early? You mentioned this at a hearing the other day, and I would like to know if it is in manpower, dollars, etc -- what you can tell us about it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I don't have the figures here, and I cannot go much beyond what I stated the other day, which is that the Soviet Union earlier this year introduced a substantial amount of military equipment into Angola -- substantial in relation to the balance of forces that then existed; that Cuba has also participated in the form of advisors and of military equipment. We consider both of these steps by extra-continental powers a serious matter and really, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, not compatible with the spirit of relaxation of tensions.

QUESTION: Sir, we are also an extra-territorial power. What are we doing there?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our interest in Angola, which is related to the fact that the access to the sea of the surrounding countries goes through Angola, was basically generated by the intervention of other countries.

The United States has no other interest except the territorial integrity and independence of Angola. We strongly support the call of the Organization of African Unity for a cease-fire and for negotiation among the three factions that are involved there to form a coalition government, and we have no United States interest to pursue in Angola.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have expressed your admiration this morning for Secretary Schlesinger and you have also said that foreign policy is not made on the basis of personalities. Since you think so highly of Secretary Schlesinger, why in fact was he then let go if it was not due to personalities?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have pointed out that I have very high regard for Secretary Schlesinger. I have also pointed out that there were differences. He was not let go by me, so this is a question that you must address elsewhere.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you ever ask or tell anyone that the President would have to choose between you and Mr. Schlesinger, including the President?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Absolutely not.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the President has said that you will be giving up your post as Special Advisor on National Security Affairs. How will this affect the way you do your job?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My job, as I understand it, is to help the President make decisions on foreign policy. This mustbe organized in a way with which the President is comfortable and within which the President can operate. It means that I will do my job, obviously, primarily from the Department of State. But I have never believed--and I have said so when I held the two jobs and I continue to hold this view--that foreign policy making depends so crucially on a particular bureaucratic structure. I am confident that I have sufficient access to the President so that my views are heard, and that is all that a Cabinet member has a right to ask for.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there are informed reports that you were upset by the timing of these changes in the government and that this might upset your own foreign policy timetable. (a) Were you consulted on this change; and (b) is it true, as these reports say, that you gave some consideration to resigning because of

the timing ?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was informed about the change. I do not believe that the changes will influence the conduct of our foreign policy for the reasons that I have given here. And I cannot comment every two weeks about stories about my resignation.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you still confident that a SALT agreement can be reached before the political pressure of the conventions?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have every reason to believe, on the basis of extensive conversations with the President, that we will proceed in negotiations towards SALT regardless of the political circumstances next year, influenced only by whether it is possible to work out a compromise with the Soviet Union that the President considers in the national interest.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what are your priorities for the European summit later this week in Paris?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am making a speech tomorrow in which I will deal with the European summit at greater length. But basically there are two aspects to the European summit. One is to deal with the problem of the economic well-being of the industrial democracies. The second is a more fundamental problem. That is to bring about a degree of cooperation among the industrial democracies that gives their people a sense that they are masters of their destiny and not subject to blind economic or other forces. And, therefore, the President considers this economic summit of very considerable importance. We do not expect that any major announcements will necessarily flow from the summit. The summit is designed to start a process by which the

industrial democracies, which have been talking to each other on a bilateral basis over the last year in terms of their economic, political, and defense future, can now talk about their economic prospects, but also about some of their political prospects as a group. And it reflects what we had originally proposed in 1973, a greater degree of coordination among these countries, above all to enable them to set some goals and some directions that give them a sense of mastering the very complicated problems that they now face.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have known Don Rumsfeld for some period of time now, worked with him. What do you think his particular strengths are, relative to dealing with you and with defense matters? What specific qualifications does he have, in addition to being an aviation specialist?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You want me -- we haven't had a brawl in this town for all of three days. (Laughter)

I have known Mr. Rumsfeld for many years. I think he is a man who is very well attuned to the political process, very intelligent, very concerned with issues of national security; and I think he will do a good job as Secretary of Defense, and I intend to cooperate closely with him.

QUESTION: Do you feel that there will be a better cooperation than there has been with Schlesinger? Do you have any special reason for the feeling?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't believe that -- well, I certainly hope that some of the difficulties that may have existed, that some of those difficulties, can be eased and that everybody has learned, including myself, from recent events. But I repeat I stand on what I said previously about Secretary Schlesinger.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, does that mean you will have to share the President's time on defense matters with Rumsfeld and with Mr. Bush if he is confirmed?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Two years after we all leave town, no one will care who spent what amount of time in the President's office. The only amount of time that one needs in the President's office is the amount of time that is necessary to conduct the nation's business. That amount of time I am certain will be available. If the President wants others present when that is being discussed, that is his privilege and no derogation of anybody's position.

I have read all these stories. No one has yet told me about them. But it is quite possible that it will happen. If so, it is a triviality.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, your responses on SALT suggest that there is a large chasm between our position and the Soviets', so large, in fact, that we can't make another proposal

until they modify their rejection. Could you elaborate for us exactly what went wrong? And wouldn't you agree that detente and SALT is in some crisis now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. I have said previously that I believe that ninety percent of the SALT agreement is substantially-- or of the SALT negotiation -- is substantially agreed to. The remaining ten percent is, of course, of considerable significance. Now, it doesn't mean that the chasm is very wide or is unbridgeable. What it does mean is that when we make a serious proposal without getting a substantive response, we cannot establish the principle that all the other side has to do is to reject an American proposal in order to elicit another proposal.

I believe that the differences between us and the Soviet Union on SALT are bridgeable. I believe that an agreement on strategic arms limitations is in the national interest and is in the world interest, especially if you compare it with the alternatives that the nation will face and that the world will face if an arms race continues unchecked. So I am confident that, with a serious effort on both sides, these differences can be bridged.

As far as detente is concerned, I can only emphasize again what I have said repeatedly in public statements. Detente is not a favor we grant to the Soviet Union. Detente reflects an

assessment of the basic national positions, in which strategic arsenals exist on both sides capable of destroying humanity, in which the United States must be able to demonstrate to its own people that if a confrontation occurs we will have done everything on our side to preserve the peace, in which if we look ahead at the problem historically, we do not want to be in a position where millions of people get killed in a war and afterwards no one will be able to explain exactly what produced it except mock rhetoric.

If the Soviet Union threatens our national interests or the national interests of any of our allies, the United States will resist. The United States will not hold still for any hegemonial aspirations, but the United States will also make an effort to transcend the conflicts and the controversies of the Cold War in order to build a better future for the people of this country and for the people of the world. That policy will continue.

As it stands now, on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks there is the stagnation that I have described. It is a stagnation which we are prepared to break. We are prepared to look for an honorable compromise; but it is up to the Soviet Union to be prepared also to make a compromise.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, had you ever considered resigning from your office as Secretary of State because of the

differences that occurred that have been alluded to by both the President and yourself this morning?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Never.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if I may follow back that point, the President yesterday seemed to be hinting that he might be prepared to accept some sort of a compromise involving the Russian Backfire bomber. Would you discuss that, please?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The issue of the Backfire is a rather complicated technical issue which raises a number of questions. There is no dispute that the Backfire on one-way missions, flying subsonicly, can reach the United States from the Soviet Union. It is also a fact that the United States possesses many planes, that are not being counted, that on one-way missions can reach the Soviet Union. And, therefore, the problem concerns what categories -- it falls into the issue of what categories of weapons should be counted, especially when we get into what one really has to call hybrid systems that are designed for one mission but are also capable of carrying out another mission.

That is an important subject that has existed in the negotiations in which we are trying to find a solution and are prepared to listen to reasonable proposals.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that it would require a meeting either between yourself and Mr. Gromyko or Brezhnev and Ford to overcome the impasse itself. Is that under consideration; and would you conceive of a summit without a SALT agreement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We do not conceive right now of a summit without a SALT agreement; certainly not a visit by Mr. Brezhnev to the United States without a SALT agreement.

QUESTION: Would that mean that Mr. Ford would meet him somewhere else?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is no such plan. But a meeting between Gromyko and me when either side has something important to say we are, of course, prepared to do.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that Great Britain will now play a role in Mideast negotiations. If that is true, will you work with them, or do you have any plans to relinquish your role in pressing for an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Those of you who have been on shuttles with me will know that anyone who wants to take over will have my enthusiastic cooperation.

If Great Britain were to play a more active role in negotiations, we would strongly support its efforts. We

don't claim any exclusive right to conduct these negotiations, and we would support any promising effort, no matter who conducts it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could I just ask a question? You've said that, and the Soviets seem to agree, there should not be a summit without a SALT agreement in sight. On the other hand, President Ford is apparently going to China without any real substantive matters to be decided. Can you discuss why the President is going to China, and why not have a less dramatic summit agreement between Brezhnev and Ford just to discuss world issues?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we have -- by mutual agreement incidentally -- both sides have linked a visit by Brezhnev to the United States to an imminent SALT agreement, partly because one did not want to have it associated with the failure of a specific negotiation.

If a meeting between the General Secretary and the President would appear desirable, we are not going to make an issue of principle out of this at some point. It has not been discussed, and there is no such plan -- no such plan exists at the moment--but I don't want to exclude it for all time.

With respect to our relationships with the People's Republic of China, those relationships have really concerned

basically the orientation of both countries towards international affairs. We do not have that much bilateral business with the People's Republic of China that we must link visits or high-level meetings with the People's Republic of China to specific progress on specific issues. It is important for us, however, to exchange views on fundamental issues of international events in order to see where our national interest coincides and where a certain parallelism in our policies exists. This makes it necessary to have occasional meetings at a very high level with Chinese leaders. This is why once a year I have gone to the People's Republic of China and why the President is visiting--for the first time in four years that an American President has been in Peking.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is it possible under any circumstances to have diplomatic relations simultaneously with the governments of Taipei and Peking?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there are some moves now for the early reunification of the two Viet-Nam states. What are your views on the subject, and would that be one of the points discussed in Peking?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have only seen press reports, and we were not consulted before these discussions took place. It is my impression that if this unification should take place,

it will make de jure what already exists de facto. I don't think it will change the real situation in Viet-Nam. I think it is a matter for the existing Vietnamese governments to decide. It will not affect our attitude particularly, and it is not a matter that we plan to raise in Peking, but, if somebody asked our opinion, we might be prepared to give it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you expect to last out President Ford's term?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I don't answer my telephones on Sunday.

(Laughter)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two questions on the Middle East. First of all, what is your estimate of what Syria will do when the mandate for the United Nations emergency force expires at the end of this month?

And secondly, what is being done to get the Sinai task force, or monitor volunteer force, in place?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our Ambassador to Damascus is in Washington right now for consultation, and we will send him back with our full considerations, not only about the renewal of UNDOF but about the diplomatic evolution in the Middle East. We have not been told what the Syrian intentions are. And that

is not unusual. They have in the past never told us until shortly before the decision was due. We hope that Syria will agree to renew UNDOF because we believe, first, that Syria must participate in the diplomatic process leading towards a final settlement, and we are prepared to be helpful in this process.

And, secondly, we do not believe that an exacerbation of tensions in the Middle East will serve anybody's purposes -- and will produce a situation that is extremely dangerous for all concerned. So we hope that when Syria weighs its alternatives and when it looks at the considerations we will put before, it that it will decide to renew UNDOF.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a question about the task force--

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, excuse me, the second question about the task force. We have completed an interagency study which is now before the President for his final decision on the organization of the observers in the Sinai. We expect that the President will make his decision within the next week or two, and we are certain that this force will be in place when it must be, on February 22, when the Israeli withdrawal from the passes will be completed.

Q Mr. Secretary, Congressman Pike a week ago commented on the much-criticized covert activities of the CIA. He said it was not a rogue elephant operating on its own, but that all of its activities had been approved by the Special Assistant to the President of the United States. That happened to be you during the last seven years. What do you comment relative to his accusation that you have, in fact, approved all of these criticized activities?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, I don't consider it an accusation. I believe that the covert operations of the CIA with which I am familiar were decided upon by serious people in the national interest, in a world in which there is a gray area between overt diplomatic activity and military activity. And except for the fact that it is difficult to do internationally, I am prepared to justify every covert operation that the United States has engaged in, with which I am familiar, was in the national interest.

Secondly, the Special Assistant of the President acts for the President. I have testified that the covert operations were approved by the President. I chaired, when I was in my capacity as Special Assistant, the Forty Committee, and in that capacity I transmitted the recommendations of the Forty Committee to the President.

I, myself, had no authority by myself to authorize covert operations. So it is quite true, as long as I have been in Washington, the Central Intelligence Agency, to the best of my knowledge, was under Presidential control. I see no reason to apologize for that.

Q Congressman Pike made the statement further that in some instances the CIA did not want to engage in some of these activities, and that orders, at least channelled through you, resulted in them carrying out activities that have since been criticized quite broadly.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They have since been criticized by Congressman Pike. That doesn't necessarily mean broadly.

The fact is that the Forty Committee exists in order to permit the views of the various agencies to reach the President. It is therefore very rarely possible that the President will disapprove recommendations from various agencies, and go ahead with a covert operation, even if the agencies concerned -- even if one or two of the agencies opposed it.

In the particular instance to which you refer, the basis for the opposition was not a substantive opposition,

it was the belief of the CIA that the operation could not be kept secret. And President Nixon decided that he was prepared to run that risk. It was not a substantive opposition, it was an opposition only based on the belief that it could not be kept secret, and it is entirely within the Presidential prerogative to make these decisions -- even if -- and I know of only one such case in the seven years that I have been in Washington. I know of no other case.

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been a number of press reports that you do not favor counting the Backfire bomber as a strategic weapon because it needs to be refuelled in order to make a six-thousand-mile run. Do you favor placing limits above the 2,400 that were placed at Vladivostok on strategic delivery systems on both the U.S. cruise missile and the Soviet Backfire bomber?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have read a number of reports about the alleged positions of both myself and Secretary Schlesinger, and I have seen, I would say, almost none that is accurate.

The last position that has been put before the Soviet Union, which included a provision regarding Backfires, was jointly worked out by Secretary Schlesinger and myself.

It represented our joint position, and that is the only governmental position that exists, to which of course I subscribed, and I have every reason to believe that Secretary Schlesinger subscribed.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you giving up in addition, as you acknowledged, your chairmanship of the Forty Committee, your other chairmanship of the other NSC subcommittees to General Scowcroft? And will you have some continuing role, though, as Secretary of State in the operations? I am thinking of such things as the WSAG.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have discussed this with the President, after I have seen all these news stories. I believe that the chairmanship of all of these committees has been assigned by the President to the Assistant for National Security Affairs, but has been assigned by the President years ago when these committees were set up.

I believe also that I will maintain some special relationship with the Verification Panel and the Special Action Group that deals with crises. But we will work out the precise nature of that within the next week.

I repeat, committees do not determine policy, and chairmanships of committees do not determine necessarily

influence. Whatever arrangements are agreeable to the President, I will accept.

Q Mr. Secretary, whenever you are asked about -- or anyone else in authority -- is asked about the PLO, there is usually a very short answer, which is, until they change their position on Israel -- and then it trails off. I wonder if you go could beyond that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: After they have changed their position on Israel, we will consider what to do.

Q No, the question I am putting badly is, are we edging toward dealing with the PLO? Will it take any more than a simple statement by the PLO that there is a state called Israel, and then we are willing to negotiate with them to bring them into the Geneva Conference? And, if I may ask a second part, are we setting up now, is the public being set up for, an Administration request for arms for Egypt at some foreseeable date?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Two closely related questions. [Laughter.]

Q Well, Middle East and Israel is security.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to the first question, I don't know what more we can say until the PLO

has declared its intentions, because a great deal would depend on the manner in which they declare their intentions, and what they say with respect to their acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242 and their acceptance of the State of Israel as a fact.

With respect to arms for Egypt, we have stated that we have had general discussions. We have also stated that we have not before us a specific list, or a specific request from Egypt for individual items.

When that is reached, then we will make a decision. That decision would have to be discussed in great detail with the Congress, and, of course, Congress would have a veto over it under the Nelson Amendment.

So, the public is being told exactly what the situation is as of this moment.

Q Mr. Secretary, in your view, what political role, if any, should a Secretary of State play in a Presidential election?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Secretary of State should play no political role in a Presidential election. I intend to stay out of the election completely. I consider the foreign policy of the United States, as I have

said earlier, to reflect the permanent interests of the United States. It is not a partisan matter. I am asking for support for it on a non-partisan basis, and I will conduct myself in a non-partisan way.

Q Mr. Secretary, the United Nations General Assembly this afternoon may take up a resolution under which Zionism is considered to be a form of racism. If that resolution is passed, what would your assessment of its significance be?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President, myself -- and I have the impression our Ambassador to the United Nations--have expressed our views on this subject. We think that this is an example of the bloc-voting, of the one-way morality, that has weakened the public support in the United States for the United Nations. We consider it an inappropriate resolution. We are opposing it. And it cannot help the attitude of the American public towards the United Nations.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you clear up the reports of a distortion in -- that there is a difference between the State Department and the Pentagon on Soviet strength and of Soviet compliance with the arms control agreement? You have alluded a couple of times to

differences.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is no disagreement between the State Department and the Defense Department about estimates with respect to Soviet strength. All of those are developed on an interagency basis, and a common position exists with all of them.

With respect to compliance issues, the only minor difference that existed months ago was the manner in which they should be brought to the Soviet attention. That has been resolved for nearly a year. There has been a united position in which the compliance issues have been brought to the attention of the Soviet Union in the Standing Consultative Committee. Many of the issues have been resolved. Some of the issues still remain to be resolved, but they do not exist between the State and the Defense Departments; they exist between the United States Government and the Soviet Union.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you see any changes in the U.S. relations with post Franco Spain, and will you push harder for Spain's admission into NATO?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, of course, it depends

on the evolution of post Franco Spain, and I want to point out we are not in the period of post Franco Spain. So it depends on the evolution of Spanish policy. But the United States has believed that it would be in the interest of the West for Spain, as soon as possible, to be more closely linked to Western Europe and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And we hope that the evolution in Spain will be such as to make that easier.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[The briefing terminated at 12:12 p.m.]

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE NOVEMBER 17, 1975

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
WILLIAM E. SIMON
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The overall purpose of the meeting was to bring together the leaders of the industrial democracies at a time when their economies were in various states of recession.

When it was proposed, it was suggested that these leaders ought to meet to give confidence to their peoples and to convey to their peoples the sense that they were in control of their future and were not simply waiting for blind forces to play themselves out.

So we thought it was a matter of great importance, one, because for two years we have been maintaining that the political and economic cohesion of the industrial democracies was central to the structure of the non-Communist world; secondly, because we believed that the interdependence of these economies makes isolated solutions impossible; and, thirdly, because we believed that there were a number of concrete issues on which work had to begin and in which common action was important.

We spent a great amount of effort within our Government to prepare for this meeting and there are always many stories when there are disagreements in the Government, but this has been an unusual occasion, an unusual way in which all the departments working together worked out common positions, common philosophies,and achieved the basic proposals that were put before the other leaders.

When this conference was called, I think it is safe to say that some of our friends wanted to use it as an occasion to blame us or at least to imply that their economic difficulties could be solved primarily by American efforts,and others may have had the idea that especially in the monetary field it could be used to bring about rapid solutions in which the heads of Government overruled the long negotiations that had gone on.

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But as the preparation developed, I think a more sober spirit grew also and one of our themes was that economic recovery was meaningless if it started another spurt of inflation and that what we had to aim for was stable growth.

The second theme we had to get across is that the American economy was doing well and that, therefore, the concerns of other countries that our recovery was too slow for their own was unjustified.

Thirdly, we had a number of areas,specific ideas, on how the interdependence of these countries could be carried out in the field of trade, in the field of economic relations with the Socialist countries, in the field of monetary affairs, in the field of energy and in the field of development.

The discussions took place in a really unusually harmonious spirit. The fears which some of us had that the others would bring pressure on us to accelerate what we think is a well-conceived economic program proved unfounded, and after the President made his extensive intervention of the first day, explaining our economic program, the other countries substantially accepted this and indeed seemed to be appreciative of it.

I think this was a very important event because it meant that they had more confidence that in looking ahead to their own future they could count on steady growth in the United States,and since everybody agreed that a substantial percentage of the recession was psychological, I had the sense that a consensus emerged that this confidence that developed in our ability to handle the economic problems was a very major factor.

In fact, the confidence of the leaders in this process was shown by the fact that they would talk about general principles and then turned over the drafting to either Ministers or experts and that the leaders only spent about an hour on the declaration.

At first we didn't want any declaration because we were afraid that we would spend our whole time drafting it and it didn't turn out that way, and that was important.

In the field of trade, there was an agreement first that the negotiations on the multilateral trade negotiations should be completed next year. Secondly, a commitment by all of the countries there to bring about a substantial reduction of trade barriers, including in the agricultural field, and no attempt to hide behind community mandates or other obstacles.

There was also an agreement to accelerate or to foster negotiations concerning export credits. Bill will talk about the agreements in the monetary field which put an end to a debate of years about the nature of the floating system and the relation between floating and stability which should end in January in an agreement that should at least put the field of international finance on a more stable basis than it has been in a long time.

In the field of energy, there has been an agreement to cooperate closely or actively on the alternative sources and on conservation, and I believe this will show up in the program of the International Energy Agency which is in the process of being negotiated, and which we hope to conclude by December 15.

In the field of development, we identified the balance of payments deficits of the developing countries or their current account deficits as one of the major problems on which we would work jointly, but we also pointed out that there is a close relationship between that and the action that is taken with respect to oil prices. So we believe that the consuming countries are in an excellent position for the beginning of the talks on international economic cooperation that are beginning in the middle of December. And we agreed to work together in all existing institutions.

To sum up, this unusual meeting of the heads of Government of the countries that between them produce 70 percent of the world trade represented a commitment to the conception that our economic problems were long-term, that there were no quick fixes to them, that they required a steady cooperative effort, that their political relationship affected their economic relationship and that their economic relationship in turn assisted their political cooperation.

And so the free countries vindicated the concept of their interdependence and laid out a program and a method for cooperation which we hope will accelerate the recovery of all of the peoples as well as their cooperation with the less-developed countries for the benefit of everybody.

But I think Bill ought to explain the monetary agreement because that is perhaps the single-most significant thing that happened there.

SECRETARY SIMON: There is no doubt that it was a significant agreement reached between the French and the United States which, I believe and most everyone believes, is going to pave the way for agreement at the Interim Committee on Overall Monetary Reform in January. I think that the agreements that we have reached are a fair and balanced compromise. Neither side won nor neither side lost.

Each has protected its very critical national interests in a spirit of cooperation. We have sought to bring a convergence of views and this is important. What we are trying to do is build and expand on these areas of convergence, and as we succeed in doing this, the whole world community at large is going to benefit from this.

Now I think that the disparity of views of the past few years between the French and the United States in particular on various amendments to the articles of agreement have obscured the deep mutuality of interest to return to stable economic and financial conditions in the world and more orderly and stable exchange rates and that is very significant because this instability that we have had contributed as well as resulted from tremendous institutional financial strains.

Also, the instability created great problems for many of the countries in the world in taking care of the erratic price movements and setting economic policies and restoring stable growth in their own economies.

Now having said this, because one must look at the fundamental cause of the problem before we can begin to look for any of the solutions,which is important, it has been clear that the French and the United States share some fundamental agreements on the monetary system, there is no doubt about that. We both agree that the diversity of financial arrangements, the floating system, if you will, has served us well under the present circumstances. It is actually necessary to take care of the stresses and the strains that have been brought about by the severe inflation, recession and, of course, the extraordinary oil increase.

So having identified the causes, we then must set about in curing the fundamental problems of this economic instability and, therefore, the Communique, as it said, dealt with two aspects of the monetary issue: one, the operational and, two, the reform of the system.

On the operational side we have reached an understanding that to achieve durable and meaningful stability in the underlying economic and financial conditions, we have to provide for mutually cooperative and conciliatory policies among ourselves, but that national domestic economic policies must indeed be compatible. The world economy has suffered from all of the ills that I have spoken about and the underlying problem remains with the severe inflation and, of course, the recession which was caused by this inflation.

On exchange markets,we are going to deal with erratic movements in exchange rates which, of course, create, again, an instability. Erratic movements can be defined as movements that have no underlying economic reason. Ours is not an attempt to peg any of the currency rates at artificial levels, but there are erratic movements in financial markets on occasion that are not directly attributable to fundamental economic events, and at this point intervention policies will become mutually cooperative and compatible to smooth out these unstable periods.

Q How is that stability going to be brought about? That is,how is this operation going to work?

SECRETARY SIMON: Well, in two ways. One, I think a session that was heavily devoted, as Secretary Kissinger said, to the economic aspects of the world's problems today, the needed policies -- cooperative as well as individual -- that are required for a return to stable economic and financial conditions are at the foundation of the answer to your question.

As far as the consultations and the mechanisms that are going to be established for smoothing out, there is going to be greatly expanded consultative mechanisms throughout the world done on a more orderly basis, on a more daily basis, if you will, by both the central banks, of course, who do this today, as well as the deputies to the Finance Ministers and the Finance Ministers themselves.

There will be more constructive meetings of the Finance Ministers to deal specifically with this issue.

Q Will there be a standing committee of some kind to advise intervention at a given point?

SECRETARY SIMON: No, the make-up of this committee has not been set yet but we have many standing committees. We have the Interim Committee, which is the old group of 20 and the group of 10 which will meet and direct itself right to this issue in December in Paris.

Q The mechanism has not been set up yet, I mean the mechanism has not been designed as to how this consultative process will go forward?

SECRETARY SIMON: The mechanism has been designed in the Memorandum of Understanding that the French and the United States initialed today and that the other Ministers who attended this session and were briefed fully on this are in general agreement, but until we bring all of the interested and affected parties together,we cannot say that this is going to be totally acceptable,although I believe it will be.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is safe to say that there will be a much expanded discussion or consultation among the Finance Ministers and their deputies as a result of this.

Q Mr. Secretary, as long as we have still got some video tape left, let me ask you in realistic terms what you think this conference means to the average American. Does it mean more jobs or lower prices, and if so, how?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, if this conference contributes to an acceleration of economic recovery worldwide, which it is intended to do; if it contributes to a lowering of trade barriers, as it is intended to do; and to greater financial stability, then it will mean more jobs, perhaps lower prices, better control over inflation and a degree of cooperation among the industrialized nations,that will benefit every American.

Q When is this millennium going to come about? How fast will this process take effect?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have made clear that it is a long-term process and we are not ever going to be able to say that on the next day a dramatic change occurred, but I think that the hopeful processes that are already going on can be accelerated by the results that occurred here. The major theme of this meeting was that we have got a long-term problem, that we are not trying to make quick fixes but that we can get a stable, steady growth on the long-term basis.

Q This mechanism that you speak of and that you can't tell us about, does it have to do with the Federal Reserve Board and the central banks?

SECRETARY SIMON: Certainly the central banks are the intervention mechanism and will continue to be, yes, but it is also going to involve, as it always has, the Finance Ministers of the various countries, but a formal mechanism of where the deputies will also be used in this formal consultative process and the consultative process is going to be broader than it ever was before, bringing in more nations, more affected,interested nations into the process.

Q Mr. Secretary, early this year the dollar had quite a plunge. Had this system you envisage been in effect then, would the dollar have plunged in relation to other currencies the way it did?

SECRETARY SIMON: Well, our dollar declined, as it often does, in response to several factors: one, an outlook for lower interest rates which is a fundamental factor in a country always, and, of course, the New York City problem and the fears of some potential international problem related to it as well. I would consider factors like this of a temporary nature and not of a fundamental nature.

Q Speaking of New York City, what did you tell the European leaders about President Ford's --

SECRETARY SIMON: I was not asked by any of my counterparts. I asked them questions as to what they thought if indeed they had any reason to believe there would be a problem that I had not thought of before and basically briefed them on the whole situation because I felt that they were interested, which indeed they were, but they didn't cite any significant problem.

Q Did they seem to be somewhat reassured by the presentation that you and the President made on the problem of New York City?

SECRETARY SIMON: Well, as I spoke to them, they seemed to be reassured that the situation was indeed well in hand at this point.

Q You believe it is well in hand then?

SECRETARY SIMON: Well, I have been away for several days, as you know, so I have to wait and get back. I still have not seen the total agreement and been able to study it. I have been too busy doing what I have been doing.

Q Do you think that the Federal Government is going to have to do anything to guarantee the short-term bond roll-over problem?

SECRETARY SIMON: I don't think that anything that comes under the heading of a bail out as far as the present bondholders are concerned or the note holders is in the cards, no. But then, again, the City-State program that has been put up restructures and restructures all the notes that are held so that would not be required.

You know, you asked Henry a question about the process we went through here at the economic summit and it reminded me of the perhaps overused word these days of interdependence, and it was brought up and very forcefully brought up in this meeting that the world communities indivisible, recognizing that national economic policies are certainly important, yes, but today this inter-relationship in the world communities and in the economic and financial area in particular must be better understood by each of us. Our policies must be mutually supportive where indeed they are compatible and meetings like this bring about better understanding of what our policies are in the United States and indeed what the policies are in the European community and in Japan and these are major, these are significant steps to agreeing about the permanent durable prosperity that we wish to provide for all of our peoples.

MORE

SECRETARY KISSINGER: A good example is that at all of our previous meetings this year with European leaders, as I said earlier, there was an undertone that we were not doing enough. I think that after our presentation on Saturday that topic never emerged again and everyone was more discussing how we could support each other's efforts.

Q What is the compromise since I understand that the central bank has been intervening on the floating dollar? I mean what compromise did we actually make? Is it on the basis of his consultation?

SECRETARY SIMON: Yes, indeed. You know there is a danger and there are those -- of course one never knows how people view agreements but there are those who believe that designed intervention policies mean a zone or a ban or fixed rates of some kind and that is not the case, but it is going to be a formal mechanism that is aimed not at setting any currency at an artificial rate that would contravene the market forces but one that moves in erratic fashion not related to underlying economic activity.

Q Mr. Secretary, Mr. Cormier has asked you before about what would have happened back in the spring of this year when the dollar first declined and then recovered under this new mechanism. Would those swings have been reduced?

SECRETARY SIMON: I think it is difficult at this point for me to recall any way, Paul, all of the conditions that were extant at that time and suggest what would have occured as far as this consultation method because this is not only the United States that is going to be reporting and giving their judgments on the market conditions but all of the countries involved in this process.

Q So this would be a process much like the open market committee of the Federal Reserve when it determines how to intervene in U.S. monetary markets; that is, they take an ad hoc view of the economy and make some judgments in private?

SECRETARY SIMON: No, I would not say there is anything ad hoc about this operation at all. As a matter of fact, it is designed so it will not be ad hoc in nature, that it is going to be daily monitoring of all of these markets with an exchange of information that is going to give the officials in the United States a greater fundamental knowledge about what is going on in all of the currencies of the world.

Q There will be no automatic criteria for decision?

SECRETARY SIMON: No, absolutely not. That will be done on the judgments of the Finance Ministers and the central bankers, the ultimate judges of this issue,of the fundamental aspects of the issue at that time.

Q Okay. Will they take a vote and the vote will be binding or will each country retain sovereignty?

SECRETARY SIMON: No, no, no. There is no vote or binding in these areas whatsoever. That would really be impossible and indeed unfair and unworkable. This will be done just the way that the central bank and ourselves and the Treasury decide there should be intervention now. We work together and we usually can agree when indeed it is needed.

Q But if the U.S. Government, for example, does not believe it is appropriate to intervene, it believes that fundamental forces are at work and let us say the French Government or some combination of other Governments believes that these are erratic fluctuations, then there is a stand-off and the United States would not intervene?

SECRETARY SIMON: If that occasion arose, you are correct, we would not intervene.

Q What response did you find to your offer -- the U.S. offer -- for other countries to invest in our energy projects, including OPEC?

SECRETARY SIMON: Well, I think it is too early to tell.

Henry.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think the other leaders considered that one of the most interesting parts of the President's presentation and they asked a number of questions about how it would work and what we had in mind, and I would say that they all agreed that that was one of the most significant proposals, but it has to be worked out by experts.

Q You met with Mr. Callahan during the sessions and did you discuss the problem of seating at the energy meeting in December?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I also met with Sauvagnargues. You mean membership or seating?

Q Membership.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Only in the most general way. Mr. Callahan explained his point of view to me. As for that matter Sauvagnargues did explain his opposite point of view to me. Our position is that this is primarily a matter between the United Kingdom and the European community in which the United States will not play a principal role.

Q Do you see this causing any problem with the starting of that meeting or do you see a solution?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: A number of compromise solutions have been proposed. I don't want to put any one of them forward. There is going to be a European summit on December 2 and we hope that it will be worked out on that occasion.

Q Has there been any discussion on nuclear non-proliferation of the peaceful plans?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not as such, no.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the basis of your Pittsburgh speech and some other indications, I think some of us have the idea that the American delegation went to Rambouillet hoping that out of this would evolve some continuing machinery for consultation and the Communique speaks only of using the existing machinery. Did we abandon some idea here?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You have the machinery that was set up under the monetary arrangements in which the Finance Ministers will be in almost daily contact and there are many other organizations. There was an agreement that the Governments concerned would work cooperatively on all of these problems and so there was no formal machinery set up except the one that grows out of the monetary group and since the monetary arrangement is exactly the group we envisage to begin with, there wasn't any sense of setting up another one with a different hat.

Q Was there any talk about another meeting of this sort a year from now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, there was talk of another meeting and the leaders will stay in touch with each other depending on conditions. If the conditions get critical, they will meet earlier. If conditions take the form that are now predicted, then they will meet some time during the course of the next year -- within a year, roughly.

Q Could you gentlemen tell us what role Mr. Shultz and Dr. Burns played in the monetary agreement? We were told there were two months of negotiations behind the scenes on this point and they made a promise.

SECRETARY SIMON: Arthur Burns plays a very active role. Arthur attends all of the interim committee meetings with me, the G-10 meetings and the G-5 meetings that we hold so he is obviously actively involved in the mechanism,both in setting our policy back in the United States as well as in negotiations that I conduct. But Arthur is always, as I say, with me as far as --

Q He is?

SECRETARY SIMON: Of course he is. Yes, indeed.

Q What about Shultz?

SECRETARY SIMON: Well, as you remember George Shultz, I took over from George so this is a continuation really of the negotiations that George carried on when he was Secretary of State but other than the preparations of the meeting with the private citizen group that George Shultz worked on, he had no active area of involvement in the negotiations on the monetary --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But he was never Secretary of State. (Laughter)

SECRETARY SIMON: That is a freudian slip.

Q He had no contacts with his former Finance Minister colleagues who are now heads of state?

SECRETARY SIMON: Sure, George is very close on a personal basis to both Chancellor Schmidt and President d-Estaing and he sees them and talks to them frequently.

Q Did he talk to them as part of this meeting?

SECRETARY SIMON: I doubt --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the correct explanation -- there was a group of private experts connected with their Governments that meet actually less on the monetary question than on the other issues. The reason we did it on that basis was because one didn't want to bring the heads of Government together if there was not some sense that something significant would be achieved. So we designated George Shultz to attend these informal meetings that gave us a sense where the other Governments were going. I repeat, the monetary matters were really negotiated primarily by the Treasury Department and by Ed Yeo, but the other issues were in a preliminary way explored by a group which George Shultz attended in a private capacity but still in close touch with Bill and myself and the President.

Q But did he meet or talk with Mr. Giscard and --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The process went like this. The idea of this summit came up first in a vague way at a meeting that I had with Giscard in May. It was then put forward in a more formal way at Helsinki by Giscard to the President. At that point we decided that we would send somebody around, not quite an official, to give us his judgment of whether it would be worthwhile and George Shultz went around to see Giscard, Schmidt, Wilson, and reported to us afterwards that he thought there was a good basis for a summit and only after we had that report did we make the decision to go ahead.

We wanted to avoid a situation in which the summit would deal with only one problem, say, exchange rates, and only a set of demands made on the United States by the others and when George Shultz was reassured by that, then the President decided to go ahead and removed it into formal governmental channels.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

They considered that the treaty of August 30, 1951 enhanced the defense of both countries, strengthened the security of the Pacific region, and contributed to the maintenance of world peace. They agreed that the military bases used by the United States in the Philippines remain important in maintaining an effective United States presence in the Western Pacific in support of these mutual objectives.

They agreed that negotiations on the subject of United States use of Philippine military bases should be conducted in the clear recognition of Philippine sovereignty. The two Presidents agreed that there should be an early review of the steps necessary to conclude the negotiations through the two panels already organized for that purpose.

President Marcos explained his efforts to attain self-reliance for the Philippines and his policy not to allow introduction of foreign ground troops into the Philippines for its defense except as a last resort. President Ford expressed support for these realistic policies and to this end indicated that the United States intended to continue to provide assistance to the Philippines within the framework of available resources.

The two Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to continue close association on all matters of mutual concern. They concluded that the ties between the Philippines and the United States remain strong and mutually beneficial.

President Ford thanked President Marcos for the magnificent hospitality extended to him and Mrs. Ford. President Marcos accepted President Ford's invitation to make a return visit to the United States at a mutually convenient time.

MANILA, *December 7, 1975.*

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Peking December 4

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 15

Secretary Kissinger: Let me summarize what has gone on, and let me draw some conclusions.

There are three aspects of our relationship. There is the attitude of both the People's Republic and the United States toward international affairs. Secondly, there is the problem of the normalization of relations, and thirdly, there are the various bilateral arrangements that exist in such fields as trade, culture, and scientific exchanges.

As has been pointed out in all of the toasts and all of the public statements, the basic concern of both sides—what has brought us together and what has sustained the relationship—is the perception of the international environment, and the greater part of our conversations here concerned the international situation.

With respect to normalization, the Shanghai communique committed the United States to complete the process of normalization. This has been reaffirmed by the President here, both in public statements and toward the leaders of China.

With respect to the bilateral relationships, we have agreed to pursue them, and we will be improving them, and they will be improved steadily in the channels appropriate for them; that is to say, trade in the trade channels and the others in the channels that are appropriate.

There has been a great deal of speculation that relations between the People's Republic and the United States have cooled. This is not the perception of the United States, and I am confident it is not the perception of the Chinese leaders. We believe that the relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China are good, and we are confident that they will be improved steadily in the months and years ahead.

We reviewed the global situation in considerable detail, both in the talks between the President and the Vice Premier as well as in the rather searching and detailed talks that took place between Chairman Mao and the President.

While obviously there are some differences, there are also many common approaches, and the talks were extremely useful in enabling the leaders of both sides to under-

stand the perceptions of the other and to see where parallel policies can be pursued.

With respect to the process of normalization, there is really little to add to what has already been said in the Shanghai communique and to the fundamental statements which were made there, except to confirm that direction again.

As for trade exchanges, as I have said, they will be continued and developed in the forums that are appropriate for them.

We are very satisfied with the visit. We think the talks have been constructive. The atmosphere has been excellent. I was sometimes shaken when I read some accounts of the "local residents," but I was reassured again when I went to the meetings. So the atmosphere was good and the talks were, as I said, extremely useful.

I think with this, I would rather get to your questions and see what more I can say that is more specific.

I would like to mention one thing. During the course of today the Vice Premier, in conversation with the President this morning, responded to some requests we had made to the People's Republic over a period of months with respect to individuals that have been missing in action in or near China over the last decade, and we received some detailed information with respect to some of the requests that have been made and also information about the remains of two missing in action.[1]

Obviously we will want to notify the next of kin, but we appreciate very much this gesture by the People's Republic.

Q. Will any of them turn up alive, Dr. Kissinger?

Secretary Kissinger: No. We are talking about two bodies and information about several others. The bodies will be returned.

Q. How many others?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the information concerned eight people all together.

Q. You will release information on the two dead?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. As soon as the families are notified, we will release that information.

Q. How soon will they be notified?

Secretary Kissinger: Within the next 48 hours.

Q. What was the total?

Secretary Kissinger: Seven—two dead, five missing.

Q. If the 1972 visit by President Nixon was the week that changed the world, how would you characterize this one?

Secretary Kissinger: In 1972 we established a new relationship, and in 1975 the problem was to fit that relationship and to elaborate that relationship in an existing architecture. It therefore obviously, by definition, could not have the character of a new departure; but it is now a more mature relationship in which one now does not discuss how to begin, but how in the present international environment the United States and the People's Republic of China can pursue parallel policies where their interests converge.

Q. Can you, Dr. Kissinger, give us any examples to itemize this very last remark you have made, sir?

Q. May we have the question again, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: The question is, whether I could give examples of where we have parallel policies.

I would think that the U.S. perception and the Chinese perception of the importance of European unity and European cooperation and European cooperation with the United States would be one. I think the perception of both countries about their relationship with Japan would be very similar, and in many other parts of the world, there would be, as I said, parallel conceptions.

I just wanted to give some examples.

Q. Would you reject the suggestion that the parallel policies seem to converge primarily on a mutual fear of what the Soviet Union might be doing?

[1] See p. 933.

Secretary Kissinger: I would say that the parallel policies consist, or the parallel views consist, of the perceptions of what is needed to maintain world peace and equilibrium.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how much of the time that you spent negotiating with Chinese leaders was spent on the subject of U.S.-Soviet détente, and could you give us some information about what the Chinese were requesting of the United States and how the United States responded?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not interpret—first of all, the Chinese did not request anything of the United States with respect to détente, and we did not request anything of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese, as is known from their public statement—actually it cannot be avoided in their public statements—have some very firm views of the nature of the threat that they believe the world faces.

We are not as convinced of the inevitability of war. But should the Chinese interpretation be correct, and should there be military expansion, I believe that the United States would see the problem quite similarly.

The United States is opposed to military expansion, and were it to happen, the United States—as our whole record in the postwar period makes clear for 30 years—would resist it. We believe that we have an obligation to our people, to our allies, to seek to improve international relations.

But we have always made clear that we will not do so at the cost of vital interests or that we will not buy time by sacrificing other countries. So I think we can let the future determine whose prediction was right.

Not much time was spent on this. The statements of both sides have spoken for themselves; but it is not a contentious issue, and it is not one in which either side is trying to convince the other to adopt its preferred policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you specify what other subjects the Chinese were interested in, besides impressing upon us the unwisdom of détente?

Secretary Kissinger: I would have to say that in the conversations that took place—you all heard the toast of the Vice Premier the first night. Beyond that statement, there was no other formal statement of this point of view.

There were obviously discussions—there have to be discussions when you talk about the world situation—about the Soviet role in various parts of the world. There was a great deal of discussion, as I said, on Europe, and indeed on each area of the world, but the debate about détente was not a central feature of the discussions.

Q. Did the Chinese discuss the new U.S. grain deal with the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: It was mentioned in passing.

Q. Were they critical of it?
Q. Question, please?

Secretary Kissinger: The question was whether the Chinese were critical of the grain deal with the Soviet Union.

I would suppose that if they were requested to sell grain, they might make a different decision; but since we are not telling the Chinese how to conduct their relations with the Soviet Union, you should not believe that the major thrust of these discussions is for either side to tell the other how they should conduct their relations with some third party.

So this was mentioned in passing as an illustration, but it was not a central feature.

Q. How much time was spent on Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: It was discussed.

Q. How much time, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: There was an analysis of the situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would that be an area this process of parallel interest could be included in?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is not appropriate for me to speak for the Chinese side, but I think Angola is a question also of concern here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how much of the time was spent in discussion of the Taiwan issue?

Secretary Kissinger: There was a review of the Taiwan issue. The Chinese side explained again its well-known position with respect to normalization. We made clear that we remain committed to the principles of the Shanghai communique and it is clear that some time will be needed to bring the process of normalization to a final conclusion but also that the process will be continued to a final conclusion.

Q. To follow that, we were told that you expected progress toward normalization, and you just mentioned this specific point. Specifically what progress was made, if any, toward normalization and with particular reference to Taiwan?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course until normalization is completed, there is always some progress still to be made. As I have said, I expect that over the months to come our relations will be improved in a number of areas. That improvement, by definition, will be a step toward normalization.

The United States—if you read the Shanghai communique, in which we stated certain expectations about our actions in the area, as tensions diminish, with respect to our troop levels, for example, we will continue that process. So I believe that the process of normalization can be said to continue.

Q. To what extent does the diplomatic position of the Chinese coincide with their public propaganda?

Secretary Kissinger: On what subject?

Q. On all subjects.

Secretary Kissinger: The question is, to what extent do the private positions coincide with their public propaganda?

Of course I do not follow the public propaganda as much as those of you who are here, and I am more familiar with the private comments; and therefore I am not a good witness on this subject.

Q. Sir, you are speaking in code words on the subject of Taiwan. What does normalization mean? What do the Chinese expect us to do, and what is necessary before that issue can be normalized?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Chinese have made clear that the general model that they want is something similar to the Japanese model. I think we have also made clear that it will take time for this process to mature and for certain circumstances to exist. We have pointed out our interests in a peaceful solution, in an ultimately peaceful solution to the problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you have any discussion—

Secretary Kissinger: We made that clear in the Shanghai communique.

Q. —about possible U.S. assistance to the Chinese in development of their offshore oil?

Secretary Kissinger: Questions like that would be discussed in the trade channels.

Q. Did Korea come up at all?

Secretary Kissinger: Korea was discussed; but I would say our views on that subject are not identical but they are understood and we hope that both sides will exercise restraint in the Korean Peninsula.

Q. Were there policies before these meetings that seemed to be converging that are now back on what you call parallel tracks as a result of these talks, and if there were, can you be specific which ones?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that even prior to this meeting there was a perhaps excessive emphasis on certain partial public statements, so I have never subscribed to some of the interpretations that were made, even prior to the meeting, but I would say whatever may have been the situation prior to the meeting, I maintain my position.

It is my firm impression that this is shared by our Chinese hosts, that our relations are good, and that in certain areas we will be pursuing parallel courses.

Q. Did you sense any concern on the part of the Chinese about the ability of the

American executive branch to carry out its foreign policy as planned by you and the President?

Q. Question, please?

Secretary Kissinger: The question is whether I noticed any concern on the part of our Chinese hosts in our ability to carry out our policy, or our declared policy.

I think you all will agree with me our Chinese hosts are extremely polite and they would not express such thoughts.

Q. In view of the fact so little seems to have happened here, could you explain the secretiveness over the past four days?

Secretary Kissinger: It depends on your definition of "little."

Q. Even if a good deal happened, could you explain the secretiveness on our part over the past four days?

Secretary Kissinger: We had agreed with our Chinese hosts, and we tend to follow in these matters the practices of our hosts, that the briefing should take place only at the end of the visit.

And this was appropriate because the discussions were in great detail and on a rather broad scope, and we could not have said more at the end of every day than I am saying tonight, and I think tonight we are in a better position to draw the results of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were there any agreements reached with the Chinese for positive actions in any field, on trade or international policy?

Secretary Kissinger: I think when the leaders of two countries review the international situation and approach a clearer understanding of what parallel interests they have, that this is bound to have practical results.

With respect to the specific issues like trade, as I pointed out, there was agreement reached to pursue those, to pursue possible intensification in the existing channels.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I wonder if you could clarify one point, please. You talked about the Chinese making clear the Japanese position vis-a-vis Taiwan. You said we made it clear it will take time for this process. Is that to suggest that there is some sort of calendar when the United States will break diplomatic relations with Taiwan?

Secretary Kissinger: No, there is no agreed calendar.

Q. In that respect, did our side, the American side, say anything about the fact that domestic politics, as developing over the next year, may have some delaying effect on this process?

Secretary Kissinger: Obviously all of these matters have domestic components on both sides, and both sides have to be sensitive to the—each side has to be sensitive to the necessities of the other.

Q. This is the end of the—

Q. Please finish that answer.

Secretary Kissinger: I have finished that answer.

Q. This is the end of the five-year plan. Did they speak about the next five-year plan or what it would concern?

Secretary Kissinger: Not in my hearing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us when the decision was taken not to have a communique? Was it here or in Washington before you left?

Secretary Kissinger: The decision was taken in a preliminary way at the end of my last visit, and it was confirmed on the first day in my discussions with the Foreign Minister.

Q. Why was it decided there would be no communique?

Q. Question?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, we have both said it in the various toasts.

Q. What was the question?

Secretary Kissinger: The question is, why was it decided to have no communique?

One reason, not necessarily in order of importance, was that the substance of what

I said here has already been said in various public statements. Secondly, we did not want to spend the time that is needed to prepare such a communique. But most importantly, since on the basic principles, especially on Taiwan, there really isn't much that can be added to what was said in the Shanghai communique as to the direction, it did not seem appropriate or worthwhile to try to find some nuances on that particular issue.

Q. Neither side seems prepared to change on the Taiwan issue. How can you say that there is hope that the relationship will in fact peacefully normalize in the future?

Secretary Kissinger: I have said this is our intention, which we have repeatedly reaffirmed in public statements, and that we will work out the modalities over time.

Q. Is there indication that either side is willing to change at all?

Secretary Kissinger: I said we will want to work this out over time.

Q. Did President Ford extend any invitation to the Chinese leaders you talked to to visit the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: They have a standing invitation, and they have reaffirmed a standing obstacle.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the subject of Korea—

Q. What is the obstacle?

Secretary Kissinger: What is the obstacle? That they don't want to visit Washington until full normalization has been achieved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you elaborate on the Korean question? Was there any explicit request that the United States withdraw forces from South Korea?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Chinese position on Korea has been stated repeatedly. I think it is clear that in the present international context, any exacerbation of the situation by either side would not serve common purposes, and we think that this is understood by both sides.

Q. Sir, in discussing the Korean question, was there a suggestion that China and the United States had a cooperative role in perhaps restraining their respective friends in the North and South?

Secretary Kissinger: I think I have pointed it cut that our perceptions in Korea are not identical. What conclusion each side should draw from the need for restraint I think is for each side to determine.

If you don't let me out of here soon, I am going to be declared persona non grata. I hope you realize that.

Q. By whom?

Q. No matter how valuable an exchange of views might be, would you say this meeting amounted to an exchange of views and nothing more than that?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I would say this meeting amounted to a very detailed, to a very substantial, and in many areas very concrete discussions that went beyond an exchange of views, but given the scope of it, it is not necessarily something that can be encompassed in one document.

Q. Has the decision in fact been made now that when there will be normalization with Taiwan—I mean, normalization between Peking and Washington—that it will be conducted on the basis of the Japanese model?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that will have to be decided when the normalization in fact takes place.

Q. You suggested that before.

Secretary Kissinger: I suggested this is the Chinese position, which we understand.

Q. What do we do about the defense treaty?

Secretary Kissinger: I think China has made clear its view, and obviously, if we were prepared to answer all these questions now, we could have settled the issue right now.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, did the President indicate to the Chinese leaders that if he is still

in office in 1977, that the timing would be better toward making specific progress toward normalization?

Secretary Kissinger: The discussion did not reach that degree of concern with specific events on our domestic calendar. But as I said, both sides have to be sensitive to the domestic requirements of the other.

Q. Why does the United States disagree with the Chinese position on the inevitability of war?

Secretary Kissinger: Because we believe that war can be avoided by a combination of firmness, preparedness, and willingness to settle outstanding issues; and that is our policy.

Q. What is the date on which you are going to Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: The decision about going to Moscow has not yet finally been made, but it will be decided within the next week or so. But there is a good chance that I will go.

Q. You said there will be some improvement—not toward normalization but some improvement in the relations between the two countries in the months to come. You mentioned broad areas like trade and cultural exchanges. Can you be a little bit more specific about what kinds of things can we expect?

Secretary Kissinger: That will still have to be worked out in detail.

Q. You said there was no coolness in the meetings. Did you discover any warmness in the speech of Mr. Teng Hsiao-p'ing tonight?

Secretary Kissinger: I think for those who understand the entire Chinese context, the requirements of the Chinese situation, and their method of expressing themselves, I believe it expressed what I have stated: the Chinese commitment to good relations to the United States.

I am confident our Chinese hosts, if you are in contact with them, will confirm this.

Q. Mr. Teng devoted only one sentence of his toast to the talks. There is only one sentence in that toast in which he devoted himself to the talks.

Secretary Kissinger: I have not counted the number of sentences that the President devoted to the talks, and I have not analyzed what Mr. Teng said with that care. I can only tell you what our impression is, an impression which we took—obviously, since we are briefing here in China—we took some care to check with our Chinese hosts, and I am confident what I have said here reflects a view that will not be disputed.

Q. Before the trip you said Soviet-American relations were not a bar to better relations with China. Do you still feel that way?

Secretary Kissinger: I still feel that way, yes. Any more than we will permit—when we are in Moscow, we do not discuss our relations with China. But I would maintain what I have said.

Q. Is there anything more you can tell us about President Ford's meeting with Chairman Mao—that is, both as to attitude and substance—and can you tell us whether he himself made any expression on the Chinese position on détente?

Secretary Kissinger: The atmosphere—this was the fifth meeting with Chairman Mao that I have had an opportunity to attend. I would describe the atmosphere as friendly and cordial. The discussions did not concern détente except in a very minimal way, in a really minimal way.

Of course I had had the benefit of the Chairman's thinking on that subject a few weeks earlier. The overwhelming part of the conversation concerned a review of the world situation, but not of American détente policy, which played a very minimal role in the discussions.

Q. Can you give us an idea of what substantive areas were discussed in that meeting?

Secretary Kissinger: It was a general review of the world situation in almost every part of the world.

The press: Thank you.

Information on Americans Missing or Presumed Dead Given by P.R.C.

Following is a statement concerning information given to President Ford on Americans missing or presumed dead in or near the People's Republic of China, which was read to news correspondents on December 5 by John H. Trattner, Deputy Director, Office of Press Relations, at Washington.

The information was given by Vice Premier Teng to President Ford on December 4. Some of you may recall that during Secretary Kissinger's visit to the People's Republic of China in November 1973, the Chinese told us that they had been carrying out investigations and searches based on the information that we had provided them up to that time, that they were continuing their investigations, and that they would let us know if they discovered anything more. Secretary Kissinger said that the Chinese have now done so and offered to return the remains of two persons. The Chinese said that procedures for the transfer are to be handled by the Chinese and American Red Cross societies at the Hong Kong-Kwangtung border. The American Red Cross has cabled the Chinese Red Cross to confirm its readiness to cooperate in such arrangements.

The information covers a total of 27 persons, 23 of whom are U.S. military personnel. The Defense Department will brief on the military personnel, which includes the two whose ashes are to be returned.

The civilians are Norman A. Schwartz and Robert C. Snoddy. They were copilot and pilot of a C–47 aircraft which crashed in the People's Republic on November 29, 1952. Mr. John Downey and George Fecteau survived this crash and were released from China March 12, 1973, and December 13, 1971, respectively.

The information from the P.R.C. indicates that Schwartz and Snoddy were found dead and burned in the crash and that their bodies were buried on the spot. The Chinese said that owing to passage of time it is impossible to locate the bodies now.

Mr. Snoddy's home town was Roseburg, Oreg., and Mr. Schwartz's home town was Louisville, Ky.

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and Week

A PROCLAMATION[1]

As the United States of America looks forward to the two hundredth anniversary of our Nation's independence next July, it is appropriate that we pause and reflect on the principles of self-government that underlie our society and continue to nourish it.

Embodied in our great national documents—the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights—are the imperishable ideas that all men are created equal, that they are endowed with unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that it is the people of the United States themselves who have ordained and established the government which serves us all.

The Founding Fathers could not foresee in detail the threats to liberty that might arise as the Republic grew, but they had the wisdom to know that threats would appear and that the people must be protected against them. When the new Constitution was being discussed in 1787, Thomas Jefferson complained in a letter to James Madison of the absence of a Bill of Rights, saying: "Let me add that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular; and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inferences."

Madison became convinced of the need for a Bill of Rights and wrote Jefferson: "The political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free government, and as they become incorporated with the National sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion." In the First Congress, Madison, the principal proponent of those amendments to the Constitution known as the Bill of Rights, defended them in these words: "If they are incorporated into the

The Secretary of State

Press Conference

January 14, 1976
Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

MAJOR TOPICS: Angola, SALT Negotiations, Trip to U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have two statements, a brief one and a somewhat lengthier one.

I was grieved to learn this morning of the death of Prime Minister [Tun Abdul] Razak of Malaysia. He was a good friend of the United States, a most effective leader of his country, and the voice of peace and moderation in Southeast Asia. We are extending our condolences to his widow and to the Government of Malaysia.

The second statement deals with the United States attitude toward Soviet actions in Angola and toward the SALT negotiations.

The United States holds the view that the essence of the United States-Soviet relationship, if it is to proceed toward a genuine easing of tensions, is that neither side will seek to obtain unilateral advantage vis-a-vis the other, that restraint will govern our respective policies, and that nothing will be done that could escalate tense situations into confrontation between our two countries.

It is the United States view that these principles of mutual relations are not simply a matter of abstract good will; they are at the very heart of how two responsible great powers must conduct their relations in the nuclear era. It must be clear that when one great power attempts to obtain a special position of influence based on military intervention and irrespective of original motives, the other power will sooner or later act to offset this advantage. But this will inevitably lead to a chain of action and reaction typical of other historic eras, in which great powers maneuvered for advantage, only to find themselves sooner or later embroiled in major crises and indeed in open conflict.

It is precisely this pattern that must be broken if a lasting easing of tensions is to be achieved.

Whatever justification in real or alleged requests for assistance the Soviet Union may consider to have had in intervening and in actively supporting the totally unwarranted Cuban introduction of an expeditionary force into Angola, the fact remains that there has never been any historic Soviet or Russian interest in that part of the world. It is precisely because the United States is prepared to accept principles of restraint for itself that it considers the Soviet move in Angola as running counter to the crucial principles of avoidance of unilateral advantage and scrupulous concern for the interests of others which we have jointly enunciated.

The United States considers such actions incompatible with a genuine relaxation of tensions. We believe that this is a wholly unnecessary setback to the constructive trends in U.S.-Soviet relations which we cannot believe is ultimately in the Soviet or the world interest.

The question arises whether, in the light of Angola and its implications for Soviet-American relations, it is consistent with our policy to go to Moscow and to negotiate on SALT. There are two points that need to be made in this context.

First, we have never considered the limitation of strategic arms as a favor we grant to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off according to the

ebb and flow of our relations. It is clear that the continuation of an unrestrained strategic arms race will lead to neither a strategic nor a political advantage. If this race continues, it will have profound consequences for the well-being of all of humanity.

Limitation of strategic arms is, therefore, a permanent and global problem that cannot be subordinated to the day-to-day changes in Soviet-American relations.

At the same time, it must be understood on both sides that if tensions increase over a period of time, the general relationship will deteriorate and, therefore, the SALT negotiations will also be affected.

Second, we must consider the long-term consequences of a failure of the SALT negotiations. If the interim agreement lapses, the Soviets will be free of several severe restraints. They can add heavy ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] without restrictions. They can build more submarines without dismantling old ICBMs. There will be no equal ceiling of 2,400. The immediate impact would be that the numerical gap frozen in SALT I, and equalized in Vladivostok, would again become a factor, facing us with the choice of either large expenditures in a strategically and politically unproductive area or a perceived inequality with its political implications.

Of course we will not negotiate any agreement that does not achieve strategic equality for the United States and that we cannot defend as being in the national interest. Nor does it mean that Angola, or similar situations, will, if continued, not impinge on SALT as well as the general relationship. But it does mean that the general objective of a more orderly and stable nuclear relationship is in the interests of the United States and in the interests of the world and cannot be easily abandoned. This is why the President has decided that I should go to Moscow to negotiate on SALT, and we expect that the talks will be conducted in the same spirit by the Soviet side.

Now I will go to your questions.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, does the fact that you are going to Moscow now mean that you have forwarded a new proposal to the Kremlin on SALT?

A: We have not yet forwarded a new proposal to Moscow on SALT, but we expect to do so before I go there, within the next day or two.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what is standing in the way of a compromise that would point the way to a treaty at this point?

A: The obstacle to an agreement results primarily from issues that could not be considered fully at Vladivostok, because the technology was not yet developed at that time. Primarily the issues concern how to deal with the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber and how to deal with the American cruise missiles; whether and how to count them; whether and what restraints to accept. These are fundamentally the outstanding issues. Most other issues have either been settled in principle or in detail.

Q: Excuse me, if I may follow up. But that was the case several months ago and you didn't go to Moscow. Now you are going. Does this mean that at least these two outstanding issues are pretty much settled?

A: There has been no discussion with the Soviets except that the Soviets have assured us that they are prepared to modify their last position and, on that basis, we hope to be able to work out some solution.

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you saying that you are making Soviet restraint in Angola a quid pro quo *for any successful conclusion to the SALT treaty, or are you not saying that?*

A: I am saying two things: I am saying that Soviet actions in Angola, if continued, are bound to affect the general relationship with the United States; that a substantial deterioration of that relationship can also, over time, affect the strategic arms talks.

At this point, however, I would also maintain that the limitation of strategic arms is not a concession we make to the Soviet Union, but it is an objective that is in our interest and it is in the world interest and it is in the interest of world peace. So we will pursue the negotiations in the present framework.

Q: To follow up, if there is no change in the Soviet position on Angola, would you then expect that there could be a successful SALT II negotiation later on?

A: We would have to face this in the light of the circumstances that may exist later.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you have been sending this message—you and the President have been sending this message to Moscow now for several weeks. Have you had any indication whatsoever that the Soviets might be interested in a diplomatic solution to Angola, and secondly, are you willing to discuss this with the Soviets when you go Moscow?

A: It is a close race between the messages we send and the deterioration of our domestic position. And messages that are not backed up at home lose a fair amount of their credibility.

We are prepared to discuss Angola, and we have had some exchanges with the Soviet Union on Angola in recent weeks which we will have to clarify.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is the fact that you are going to Moscow—can that be taken as a sure thing that you will reach an agreement, or is there still the possibility of failure?

A: There is the possibility of failure. We do not know the details of the Soviet position, and on the other hand we assume that the Soviet Union would not invite the Secretary of State to negotiate with Mr. Brezhnev [General Secretary, Communist Party], unless a major effort would be made to come to an agreement.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is it your expectation that if things go as you anticipate that you will be able to conclude an agreement in Moscow? Will you set out for us what you are aiming at—are you aiming at an agreement in principle?

A. No, there cannot be a final agreement in Moscow. The most that is achievable in Moscow is an agreement in principle similar to the Vladivostok agreement, but covering the outstanding issues such as BACKFIRE and cruise missiles, and to relate them to Vladivostok. And then there will have to be technical discussions at Geneva to work out the detailed provisions. And that, under the best of circumstances, would take another 2 to 3 months.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I am curious as to how you are going to conduct these parallel negotiations with the Soviets. On the one hand, you are indicating that the success of SALT may hinge on Soviet activities in Angola. On the other hand, you are going to Moscow in a few days presumably to conclude an agreement in principle. How can you do that without knowing what the Soviet reaction in Angola is?

A: I have made clear in my statement that the regulation of nuclear arms in the strategic field between the United States and the Soviet Union is not a benefit we confer on the Soviet Union. It is a generic problem of world order that must be settled at some point and for which conditions are propitious now because of a long record of negotiation, and because technology is at a point where it is possible to accept certain restraints now which might then have to wait for another cycle of technology before they can be made effective.

The point I am making is that if there is a general deterioration in our relationship, it could affect SALT. In any event, whatever is agreed in Moscow will take several months to negotiate in greater detail.

Q: If I could just follow up for a second, please. In other words, you are not saying, then, that if there is not some Soviet pull-back in Angola before the termination of your trip to Moscow, that that is going to have an adverse effect on SALT.

A: That is correct.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said that messages not backed up at home lose certain credibility, I think. We are now entering a presidential election year. Isn't it likely that those messages will continue not to be backed up; and what impact will that have on foreign policy in general?

A: I have always believed very strongly that the foreign policy of the United States must reflect the permanent values and interests of the United States. It is not a partisan foreign policy. And to the best of my ability, I have attempted to conduct this office in a manner that can make it achieve bipartisan support.

It would, therefore, be a tragedy if during this election year we did not find some means to put some restraint on our domestic debates in the field of foreign policy and to find some means of common action.

As soon as the Congress returns, I will talk to several of the leaders to see what cooperation is possible to put at least some restraint on partisan controversy, because the penalties we will pay for lack of unity will have to be paid for for many years.

But it is a problem. I agree with you.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what exactly is it that you are asking the Soviets to do in Angola? Are you asking them to totally cease arms shipments to the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]? Are you asking them to get the Cubans out of there? Or would you be satisfied with something less than that—that they, for example, moderate the amount of arms that they are sending and take some of the Cubans out?

A: First of all, let us get some idea of the

dimensions of what the Soviet Union has done.

The Soviet Union has sent close to $200 million worth of military equipment to Angola in the last 9 months, which equals the total amount of all military equipment sent to all the rest of sub-Saharan Africa by all other countries. So that is not a minor infusion of military force. In addition to that, between 5,000 and 7,000 Cuban military forces are in Cuba—are in Angola—in fact, they seem to be everywhere except in Cuba. The fighting in the northern front in Angola is conducted almost entirely by Cuban forces and without even a pretense of any significant MPLA participation. Now, that is a significant international event for which there are no clever explanations and from which other countries must draw certain conclusions.

As far as the United States is concerned, our position is that there should be a cease-fire; that all foreign forces should be withdrawn. We are even prepared to discuss a phasing by which South African forces are withdrawn first, if there is a stated, brief interval after which all other forces are withdrawn; that there should be negotiations between the main factions; that all outside powers, including, of course, the United States, cease their military intervention. And we are prepared to agree to the end of all military shipments.

If the issue comes down to nominal shipments for a normal government by African standards, this is something about which we are prepared to negotiate.

We want to get the great powers out of Angola. We want to return it as an African problem. And we are prepared to accept any solution that emerges out of African efforts.

Our concern about Angola is the demonstration of a Soviet willingness to intervene with what, for those conditions, is a very substantial military infusion of military force—plus an expeditionary force—while the United States paralyzes itself by declaring a fraction of this as a massive involvement of the United States, when we have declared that there is no possibility of any American military forces or advisers going there. And that is an event of considerable international significance—both the Soviet action and the American reaction.

Q: Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, you spoke of the need to break the pattern of action and reaction that could build toward crisis. Isn't that what the Senate was trying to do, to break that pattern?

A: Well, you can always break the pattern of action and reaction by yielding. Our idea is to maintain the international equilibrium—not to give temptation for aggressive and irresponsible action—and at the same time to establish principles of mutual restraint. Certainly it is always possible to solve these problems in the short term by declaring that they do not exist.

Q: Mr. Secretary, two questions. I am not sure I have this exactly right, but didn't you say at a previous press conference that the United States would not table another SALT proposal unless the Russians tabled another one first? And secondly, have all the members of the NSC [National Security Council] and the Verification Panel signed off on this new proposal that we plan to offer in Moscow?

A: With respect to the first question, I said that the United States cannot table a new proposal simply because the Soviets had rejected the old one. We have been given a clear promise that there would be a significant modification in the Soviet position. Under these conditions, we are prepared to put forward a modification of our position, because we would prefer to negotiate from our position rather than from some other.

We have made clear—and I can repeat it here—that if the Soviets do not modify their last position, there can be no agreement. And the position which we will forward to them will be substantially different from the last Soviet position. So it will require—

Q: Substantially different from their last position?

A: It will also be somewhat different from our position. It is an honest attempt to find a solution that takes into account the real concerns of all sides.

With respect to our internal discussions, I will not have a clear picture until I have read all the newspaper articles that will emerge over the next few weeks, which are invariably more dramatic than the discussions which in fact take place. But my impression is that there is unanimity on the course that we are pursuing. We have had very good meetings. We have had two Verification Panel meetings, two NSC meetings. There will probably be another NSC meeting before I go just to review the bidding. And I would say that the Government is operating, until the Sunday editions, with complete unanimity.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff don't provide much drama for you, but are they signing on to this proposal?

A: The Joint Chiefs of Staff are signing on to this proposal, yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you recommend conclusion of a new SALT agreement with the Soviets if Soviet and Cuban forces are still in Angola?

A: I am going to Moscow in order to see whether the deadlock in these negotiations can be broken. We should not play with the strategic arms limitation negotiations. It is a matter that is of profound concern for the long-term future. It is in an area in which no significant advantages can be achieved by either side but in which the momentum of events can lead to consequences that could be very serious. And therefore we will not use it lightly for bargaining purposes in other areas. On the other hand, obviously if the general relationship deteriorates, then it could over a period of time even affect the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. But I think we should make every effort to avoid that.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you and your people have been talking to the Soviet Union about what they are doing in Angola. How would you describe, or what are your impressions of, the Soviet attitude toward a lessening or a decrease of their role there that would be satisfactory to us?

A: We are exploring with the Soviet Union now what steps can be taken in the wake of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] meeting, and we have had some exploratory talks, some of which would offer the possibility of progress. But we would have to be sure that we understand the meaning that the Soviets attach to some of their ideas.

Q: One follow-up. If the Soviet Union wants the Cuban expeditionary force out, would that bring about its departure?

A: That's their problem.

Q: But you must have an opinion.

A: I think major powers have a responsibility to think about the consequences they will face when they engage their troops or troops of their friends. It is a lesson we have had to learn; it may be a lesson that the Soviet Union should learn.

Q: Mr. Secretary, two additional points on Angola. There have been totally contradictory reports from the United States and from the Soviet Union about the presence of Soviet vessels off Angola. U.S. officials say they are there. The Soviet Union says this is a total fabrication.

Secondly, the outcome of the OAU meeting—what is the U.S. perception of whether that has enhanced or retarded the prospect of a diplomatic movement from here on?

A: There is no question that there are some Soviet vessels off Angola—or at least they were yesterday. I haven't seen today's report. There was a cruiser heading south, which is now in port in Guinea. So we don't know whether it will continue to head south or whether it will move to another destination. That would be the largest Soviet vessel that has been off southern Africa in many years. But we are not sure yet whether it will continue to move south. When the original announcements were made, it was heading south. It has since put in at the port in Guinea.

What was your other question?

Q: The Soviet Union has denied that it has any ships there. Where do you go from that kind of a stand-off?

A: Well, if there are no ships there, and if we should wake up one morning and find there are no ships there, we will agree with them. And that will end the debate. We are not going to pursue—it's a good way to make the ships disappear.

Q: The second point was your perception of the outcome of the OAU meeting. Has that advanced or retarded the diplomatic prospects?

A: I think, considering events in this country in recent weeks and the difficulty we have had to give a clear indication of what the United States could do, considering the massive Cuban and Soviet lobbying effort that went on at the OAU meeting, it is remarkable that half of the members of the OAU substantially agreed with our perception of the problem, which is to say, not to recognize any of the factions and to bring about an end of foreign intervention.

We think, moreover, that a vast majority of the OAU members favor an end of foreign intervention, if one can separate that problem from some of the local issues.

So we think that there is a considerable African support for the main lines of our policy

which is, after all, to leave African problems to the African nations and to insulate Africa from great power confrontation.

We do not want anything for the United States. We are not opposed to the MPLA as an African movement. We are opposed to the massive foreign intervention by which a victory of the MPLA is attempted to be achieved.

So I believe that this position, which in its totality is supported by, after all, half of the African states in the face of much discouraging news from here, is in its major elements supported by more than half of the African states. And we hope that a diplomatic solution can be built on that.

Q: Mr. Secretary, given the Congressional attitudes on foreign affairs in general, do you intend to talk to any leaders of Congress before you go to Moscow to negotiate further, and is there any danger that a repudiation by Congress of a SALT agreement might be counterproductive to the very objectives you're seeking for the long term?

A: I have been briefing Congressional leaders on SALT negotiations consistently. There has been no significant new development in the negotiating process, but I will no doubt be in touch with some of the senior members of the Senate.

As far as repudiation of an agreement is concerned, it would of course be a very serious matter since, in any event, one of the biggest foreign policy problems we now face is the question from other countries of who speaks for the United States. Somebody has to speak for the United States, and there can be no foreign policy without authority.

So if an agreement were repudiated, it would accelerate this very dangerous tendency, but we do not have an agreement yet.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in your assessment, how will the death of Prime Minister Chou En-lai affect relations between the United States and China and between China and the Soviet Union, and how do you view the return of the helicopter pilots by the Chinese to the Soviet Union?

A: The relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China is based on the permanent interests of both countries; and even though my admiration for Prime Minister Chou En-lai is well known, I do not believe that it was his personality, alone or principally, that was the basis of that relationship. So I would think that the main lines of our relationship to the People's Republic of China can continue along well-established lines. And, certainly, as far as the United States is concerned, as I said in my speech to the General Assembly [September 22, 1975], there is no relationship to which we attach greater importance than the relationship with the People's Republic of China.

On the other hand, we should have no illusions on what that relationship is based. There is no question that the interest the People's Republic of China has in a relationship with the United States depends on its assessment of the relevance of the United States to problems of concern to the People's Republic of China. And to the degree that the United States seems less able to play a major international role, for whatever reason, to that extent, the leaders in Peking, who are extremely sophisticated, will draw conclusions from it.

And it is this, and not the issue of personalities, that will affect the final judgments that will be made.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on that last point then, how can there be no movement on Taiwan, as there has been none over the last couple of years—how is that relationship then relevant for China?

A: Well, first of all, I am not saying there has been no movement over recent years.

Secondly, one would have to say that there are other issues that are considered more important by the People's Republic of China, in the present phase of its relationship with the United States, than Taiwan.

Q: Can you give us some examples?

A: Well, the overall performance of the United States with respect to the world equilibrium.

Q: Do you see any chance that in the U.N. Security Council debate that is now going on on the Middle East—that anything constructive could come out, either for Israel or for the United States; and would you say that the polarization that seems to be occurring as a result of that debate between Israel and the Palestinians—the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]—has hastened the need for a reconvening of the Geneva conference?

A: Well, the United States supports the reconvening of the Geneva conference, or of a preparatory conference to discuss the reconvening of the Geneva conference.

I do not want to prejudge the outcome of a debate which is still going on, but, from what we have seen, the resolutions that are at this moment being talked about seem not too promising.

On the other hand, the United States strongly supports progress toward peace in the Middle East and will make efforts, when this debate is concluded, to begin the negotiating process in whatever forum can be arranged.

Q: Mr. Secretary, how do you see the possibilities now of either Syrian or Israeli intervention in Lebanon?

A: Well, we have stated repeatedly that we support the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and the right of the communities within Lebanon to lead their own lives. We would believe that any outside military intervention, from whatever quarter, would involve the gravest threat to peace and stability in the Middle East; and we have left the parties concerned in no doubt that the United States would oppose any military intervention from whatever quarter.

Q: Mr. Secretary, earlier you said that the United States would favor a South African withdrawal even in advance of withdrawal by the other foreign forces. Can we infer from this that there's been some sort of work on a timetable or some coordination with South Africa about its presence there?

A: No. The United States favors the withdrawal unconditionally of all foreign forces—South African, Cuban, Soviet, and whatever other foreign forces could be there.

The United States in a general negotiation might even—could even support a phased withdrawal, as long as the interval were sufficiently short and it is not just an excuse to permit the Cubans to take over all of Angola, which is what the military fighting is now coming down to in Angola. But this refers to diplomatic possibilities; it does not refer to any understanding between us and South Africa.

Q: Mr. Secretary, this being the first news conference for 1976, I wonder if I could walk you out on the limb a bit. What do you think will happen insofar as a Syrian disengagement? Do you think, in fact, there will be a SALT agreement in '76? And how do you think the Angola crisis will eventually end? [Laughter.]

A: This is an absolutely no-win question.

I think we have the possibility of a SALT agreement that is in the national interest and that, with a rational debate in which the alternatives are clearly put, can be sold to the American public and to the American Congress. At any rate, as far as the United States is concerned, we will be working in that direction. I cannot speak until I have seen the Soviet position; I cannot make a flat prediction.

With respect to Angola, I think the major powers have a responsibility to show great restraint, and I think the African countries have a great opportunity to keep great power rivalries out of their continent and have an opportunity also not to permit outside expeditionary forces to become the dominant event. A greater degree of unity in this country would help us achieve this objective. And under present conditions we have severe difficulties due to our domestic situation.

With respect to a disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, we of course support negotiations between Syria and Israel on this subject. Syria has declared so repeatedly that it would not negotiate alone, and only in an Arab context, that I would think that a separate agreement between Syria and Israel, without involving some other parties, is now less likely than would have seemed the case a few months ago.

THE PRESS: Thank you very much.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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January 14, 1976

No. 13 #82

PRESS CONFERENCE OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JANUARY 14, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have two statements, a brief one and a somewhat lengthier one.

I was grieved to learn this morning of the death of Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia. He was a good friend of the United States, a most effective leader of his country, and the voice of peace and moderation in Southeast Asia.

We are extending our condolences to his widow and to the Government of Malaysia.

The second statement deals with the United States attitude toward Soviet actions in Angola and toward the SALT negotiations.

The United States holds the view that the essence of the United States-Soviet relationship, if it is to proceed towards a genuine easing of tensions, is that

neither side will seek to obtain unilateral advantage vis-a-vis the other, that restraint will govern our respective policies, and that nothing will be done that could escalate tense situations into confrontation between our two countries.

It is the United States view that these principles of mutual relations are not simply a matter of abstract good will. They are at the very heart of how two responsible great powers must conduct their relations in the nuclear era.

It must be clear that when one great power attempts to obtain a special position of influence based on military intervention and irrespective of original motives, the other power will sooner or later act to offset this advantage. But this will inevitably lead to a chain of action and reaction typical of other historic eras in which great powers maneuvered for advantage, only to find themselves sooner or later embroiled in major crises and indeed in open conflict.

It is precisely this pattern that must be broken if a lasting easing of tensions is to be achieved.

Whatever justification in real or alleged requests for assistance the Soviet Union may consider to have had in intervening and in actively supporting the totally unwarranted Cuban introduction of an expeditionary force into Angola, the fact remains that there has never been any historic Soviet or Russian interest in that part of the world. It is precisely because the United States is prepared to accept principles of restraint for itself that it considers the Soviet move in Angola as running counter to the crucial principles of avoidance of unilateral advantage and scrupulous concern for the interests of others which we have jointly enunciated.

The United States considers such actions incompatible with a genuine relaxation of tensions. We believe that this is a wholly unnecessary setback to the constructive trends in U.S.-Soviet relations which we cannot believe is ultimately in the Soviet or the world interest.

The question arises whether, in the light of Angola and its implications for Soviet-American relations, it is consistent with our policy to go to Moscow and to negotiate on SALT. There are two points that need to be made in this context.

First, we have never considered the limitation of strategic arms as a favor we grant to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off according to the ebb and flow of our relations. It is clear that the continuation of an unrestrained strategic arms race will lead to neither a strategic nor a political advantage. If this race continues, it will have profound consequences for the well-being of all of humanity.

Limitation of strategic arms is therefore a permanent and global problem that cannot be subordinated to the day-to-day changes in Soviet-American relations.

At the same time, it must be understood on both sides that if tensions increase over a period of time, the general relationship will deteriorate, and therefore the SALT negotiations will also be affected.

Second, we must consider the long-term consequences of a failure of the SALT negotiations. If the interim agreement lapses, the Soviets will be free of several severe restraints. They can add heavy ICBMs without restrictions. They can build more submarines without dismantling old ICBMs. There will be no equal ceiling of 2,400. The immediate impact would be that the numerical

gap frozen in SALT I, and equalized in Vladivostok, would again become a factor, facing us with the choice of either large expenditures in a strategically and politically unproductive area or a perceived inequality with its political implications.

Of course we will not negotiate any agreement that does not achieve strategic equality for the United States and that we cannot defend as being in the national interest. Nor does it mean that Angola, or similar situations, will, if continued, not impinge on SALT as well as the general relationship. But it does mean that the general objective of a more orderly and stable nuclear relationship is in the interests of the United States and in the interests of the world, and cannot be easily abandoned. This is why the President has decided that I should go to Moscow to negotiate on SALT, and we expect that the talks will be conducted in the same spirit by the Soviet side.

Now I will go to your questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, does the fact that you are going to Moscow now mean that you have forwarded a new proposal to the Kremlin on SALT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have not yet forwarded a new proposal to Moscow on SALT, but we expect to do so before I go there, within the next day or two.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what is standing in the way of a compromise that would point the way to a treaty at this point?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The obstacle to an agreement results primarily from issues that could not be considered fully at Vladivostok, because the technology was not yet developed at that time. Primarily the issues concern how to deal with the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber and how to deal with the American cruise missiles; whether and how to count them; whether and what restraints to accept. These are fundamentally the outstanding issues. Most other issues have either been settled in principle or in detail.

QUESTION: Excuse me, if I may follow up. But that was the case several months ago and you didn't go to Moscow. Now you are going. Does this mean that at least these two oustanding issues are pretty much settled?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There has been no discussion with the Soviets except that the Soviets have

assured us that they are prepared to modify their last position, and on,that basis, we hope to be able to work out some solution.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you saying that you are making Soviet restraint in Angola a quid pro quo for any successful conclusion to the SALT treaty, or are you not saying that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am saying two things: I am saying that Soviet actions in Angola, if continued, are bound to affect the general relationship with the United States; that a substantial deterioration of that relationship can also over time affect the strategic arms talks.

At this point, however, I would also maintain that the limitation of strategic arms is not a concession we make to the Soviet Union, but it is an objective that is in our interest,and it is in the world interest,and it is in the interest of world peace. So we will pursue the negotiations in the present framework.

QUESTION: To follow up, if there is no change in the Soviet position on Angola, would you then expect that there could be a successful SALT II negotiation later on?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We would have to face this in the light of the circumstances that may exist later.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have been sending this message, you and the President have been sending this message to Moscow now for several weeks. Have you had any indication whatsoever that the Soviets might be interested in a diplomatic solution to Angola, and secondly, are you willing to discuss this with the Soviets when you go to Moscow?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is a close race between the messages we send and the deterioration of our domestic position. And messages that are not backed up at home lose a fair amount of their credibility.

We are prepared to discuss Angola, and we have had some exchanges with the Soviet Union on Angola in recent weeks which we will have to clarify.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is the fact that you are going to Moscow -- can that be taken as a sure thing that you will reach an agreement, or is there still the possibility of failure?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is the possibility of failure. We do not know the details of the Soviet

position, and on the other hand we assume that the Soviet Union would not invite the Secretary of State to negotiate with Mr. Brezhnev, unless a major effort would be made to come to an agreement.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is it your expectation that if things go as you anticipate that you will be able to conclude an agreement in Moscow? Will you set out for us what you are aiming at -- are you aiming at an agreement in principle?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, there cannot be a final agreement in Moscow. The most that is achievable in Moscow is an agreement in principle similar to the Vladivostok agreement, but covering the outstanding issues such as BACKFIRE and cruise missiles, and to relate them to Vladivostok. And then there will have to be technical discussions at Geneva to work out the detailed provisions. And that, under the best of circumstances, would take another two to three months.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I am curious as to how you are going to conduct these parallel negotiations with the Soviets. On the one hand, you are indicating that the success of SALT may hinge on Soviet activities in

Angola. On the other hand, you are going to Moscow in a few days presumably to conclude an agreement in principle. How can you do that without knowing what the Soviet reaction in Angola is?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have made clear in my statement that the regulation of nuclear arms in the strategic field between the United States and the Soviet Union is not a benefit we confer on the Soviet Union. It is a generic problem of world order that must be settled at some point and for which conditions are propitious now because of a long record of negotiation, and because technology is at a point where it is possible to accept certain restraints now which might then have to wait for another cycle of technology before they can be made effective.

The point I am making is that if there is a general deterioration in our relationship, it could affect SALT. In any event, whatever is agreed in Moscow will take several months to negotiate in greater detail.

QUESTION: If I could just follow up for a second, please -- in other words, you are not saying, then, that if there is not some Soviet pull-back in Angola before the termination of your trip to Moscow, that that is going to have an adverse effect on SALT.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is correct.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said that messages

not backed up at home lose certain credibility, I think. We are now entering a presidential election year. Isn't it likely that those messages will continue not to be backed up; and what impact will that have on foreign policy in general?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have always believed very strongly that the foreign policy of the United States must reflect the permanent values and interests of the United States. It is not a partisan foreign policy. And to the best of my ability, I have attempted to conduct this office in a manner that can make it achieve bipartisan support.

It would therefore be a tragedy if during this election year we did not find some means to put some restraint on our domestic debates in the field of foreign policy and to find some means of common action.

As soon as the Congress returns, I will talk to several of the leaders to see what cooperation is possible to put at least some restraint on partisan controversy, because the penalties we will pay for lack of unity will have to be paid for for many years.

But it is a problem. I agree with you.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what exactly is it that you are asking the Soviets to do in Angola? Are you asking them to totally cease arms shipments to the MPLA? Are you asking them to get the Cubans out of there? Or would you be satisfied with something less than that -- that they, for example, moderate the amount of arms that they are sending and take some of the Cubans out?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, let us get some idea of the dimensions of what the Soviet Union has done.

The Soviet Union has sent close to $200 million worth of military equipment to Angola in the last nine months, which equals the total amount of all military equipment sent to all the rest of sub-Saharan Africa by all other countries. So that is not a minor infusion of military force. In addition to that, between 5,000 and 7,000 Cuban military forces are in Cuba -- are in Angola -- in fact, they seem to be everywhere except in Cuba. The fighting in the northern front in Angola is conducted almost entirely by Cuban forces and without even a pretense of any significant MPLA participation. Now, that is a significant

international event for which there are no clever explanations and from which other countries must draw certain conclusions.

As far as the United States is concerned, our position is that there should be a cease-fire; that all foreign forces should be withdrawn. We are even prepared to discuss a phasing by which South African forces are withdrawn first, if there is a stated, brief interval after which all other forces are withdrawn; that there should be negotiations between the main factions; that all outside powers, including, of course, the United States, cease their military intervention. And we are prepared to agree to the end of all military shipments.

If the issue comes down to nominal shipments for a normal government by African standards, this is something about which we are prepared to negotiate.

We want to get the great powers out of Angola. We want to return it as an African problem. And we are prepared to accept any solution that emerges out of African efforts.

Our concern about Angola is the demonstration

of a Soviet willingness to intervene with what for those conditions is a very substantial military infusion of military force -- plus an expeditionary force -- while the United States paralyzes itself by declaring a fraction of this as a massive involvement of the United States, when we have declared that there is no possibility of any American military forces or advisers going there. And that is an event of considerable international significance both the Soviet action and the American reaction.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, you spoke of the need to break the pattern of action and reaction that could build towards crisis. Isn't that what the Senate was trying to do, to break that pattern?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, you can always break the pattern of action and reaction by yielding. Our idea is to maintain the international equilibrium -- not to give temptation for aggressive and irresponsible action -- and at the same time to establish principles of mutual restraint. Certainly it is always possible to solve these problems in the short term by declaring that they do not exist.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two questions. I am not sure I have this exactly right, but didn't you say at a

previous press conference that the United States would not table another SALT proposal unless the Russians tabled another one first? And secondly, have all the members of the NSC and the Verification Panel signed off on this new proposal that we plan to offer in Moscow?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to the first question, I said that the United States cannot table a new proposal simply because the Soviets had rejected the old one. We have been given a clear promise that there would be a significant modification in the Soviet position. Under these conditions, we are prepared to put forward a modification of our position, because we would prefer to negotiate from our position rather than from some other.

We have made clear --- and I can repeat it here -- that if the Soviets do not modify their last position, there can be no agreement. And the position which we will forward to them will be substantially different from the last Soviet position. So it will require --

QUESTION: Substantially different from their last position?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It will also be somewhat different from our position. It is an honest attempt to

find a solution that takes into account the real concerns of all sides.

With respect to our internal discussions, I will not have a clear picture until I have read all the newspaper articles that will emerge over the next few weeks, which are invariably more dramatic than the discussions which in fact take place. But my impression is that there is unanimity on the course that we are pursuing. We have had very good meetings. We have had two Verification Panel meetings, two NSC meetings. There will probably be another NSC meeting before I go just to review the bidding. And I would say that the government is operating, until the Sunday editions, with complete unanimity.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff don't provide much drama for you, but are they signing on to this proposal?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Joint Chiefs of Staff are signing on to this proposal, yes.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, would you recommend conclusion of a new SALT agreement with the Soviets if Soviet and Cuban forces are still in Angola?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am going to Moscow in order to see whether the deadlock in these negotiations can

be broken. We should not play with the Strategic Arms Limitation negotiations. It is a matter that is of profound concern for the long-term future. It is in an area in which no significant advantages can be achieved by either side but in which the momentum of events can lead to consequences that could be very serious. And therefore we will not use it lightly for bargaining purposes in other areas. On the other hand, obviously if the general relationship deteriorates, then it could over a period of time even affect the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. But I think we should make every effort to avoid that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you and your people have been talking to the Soviet Union about what they are doing in Angola. How would you describe, or what are your impressions of, the Soviet attitude towards a lessening or a decrease of their role there that would be satisfactory to us?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are exploring with the Soviet Union now what steps can be taken in the wake of the OAU meeting, and we have had some exploratory talks, some of which would offer the possibility of progress. But we would have to be sure that we understand the meaning that the Soviets attach to some of their ideas.

QUESTION: One follow-up. If the Soviet Union wants the Cuban expeditionary force out, would that bring about its departure?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's their problem.

QUESTION: But you must have an opinion.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think major powers have a responsibility to think about the consequences they will face when they engage their troops or troops of their friends. It is a lesson we have had to learn; it may be a lesson that the Soviet Union should learn.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two additional points on Angola. There have been totally contradictory reports from the United States and from the Soviet Union about the presence of Soviet vessels off Angola. U.S. officials say they are there. The Soviet Union says this is a total fabrication.

Secondly, the outcome of the OAU meeting -- what is the U.S. perception of whether that has enhanced or retarded the prospect of a diplomatic movement from here on?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is no question that there are some Soviet vessels off Angola -- or at least they were yesterday. I haven't seen today's report.

There was a cruiser heading south, which is now in port in Guinea. So we don't know whether it will continue to head south, or whether it will move to another destination. That would be the largest Soviet vessel that has been off Southern Africa in many years. But we are not sure yet whether it will continue to move south.

When the original announcements were made, it was heading south. It has since put in at the port in Guinea.

What was your other question?

QUESTION: The Soviet Union has denied that it has any ships there. Where do you go from that kind of a stand-off?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, if there are no ships there, and if we should wake up one morning and find there are no ships there, we will agree with them. And that will end the debate. We are not going to pursue -- it's a good way to make the ships disappear.

QUESTION: The second point was your perception of the outcome of the OAU meeting. Has that advanced or retarded the diplomatic prospects?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think, considering events in this country in recent weeks and the difficulty

we have had to give a clear indication of what the United States could do, considering the massive Cuban and Soviet lobbying effort that went on at the OAU meeting, it is remarkable that half of the members of the OAU substantially agreed with our perception of the problem, which is to say, not to recognize any of the factions and to bring about an end of foreign intervention.

We think, moreover, that a vast majority of the OAU members favor an end of foreign intervention, if one can separate that problem from some of the local issues.

So we think that there is a considerable African support for the main lines of our policy, which is, after all, to leave African problems to the African nations, and to insulate Africa from great power confrontation.

We do not want anything for the United States. We are not opposed to the MPLA as an African movement. We are opposed to the massive foreign intervention by which a victory of the MPLA is attempted to be achieved.

So I believe that this position, which in its totalit is supported by, after all, half of the African states in the face of much discouraging news from here, is in its major elements supported by more than half of the African states. And we hope that a diplomatic solution can be built on that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East -- could you take a question on the Middle East now?

QUESTION: Well, more like Angola.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All right. Let me get somebody there. Henry?

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, given the Congressional attitudes on foreign affairs in general, do you intend to talk to any leaders of Congress before you go to Moscow to negotiate further, and is there any danger that a repudiation by Congress of a SALT agreement might be counter-productive to the very objectives you're seeking for the long term?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have been briefing Congressional leaders on SALT negotiations consistently. There has been no significant new development in the negotiating process, but I will no doubt be in touch with some of the senior members of the Senate.

As far as repudiation of an agreement is concerned, it would of course be a very serious matter since in any event, one of the biggest foreign policy problems we now face is the question from other countries, of who speaks

for the United States. Somebody has to speak for the United States, and there can be no foreign policy without authority.

So if an agreement were repudiated, it would accelerate this very dangerous tendency, but we do not have an agreement yet.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in your assessment, how will the death of Prime Minister Chou En-lai affect relations between the United States and China and between China and the Soviet Union, and how do you view the return of the helicopter pilots by the Chinese to the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China is based on the permanent interests of both countries; and even though my admiration for Prime Minister Chou En-lai is well known, I do not believe that it was his personality, alone or principally, that was the basis of that relationship. So I would think that the main lines of our relationship to the People's Republic of China can continue along well-established lines. And, certainly, as far as the United

States is concerned, as I said in my speech to the General Assembly, there is no relationship to which we attach greater importance than the relationship with the People's Republic of China.

On the other hand, we should have no illusions on what that relationship is based. There is no question that the interest the People's Republic of China has in a relationship with the United States depends on its assessment of the relevance of the United States to problems of concern to the People's Republic of China. And to the degree that the United States seems less able to play a major international role, for whatever reason, to that extent, the leaders in Peking, who are extremely sophisticated, will draw conclusions from it.

And it is this, and not the issue of personalities, that will affect the final judgments that will be made.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on that last point then, how can there be no movement on Taiwan, as there has been none over the last couple of years -- how is that relationship then relevant for China?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, first of all, I am not saying there has been no movement over recent years.

Secondly, one would have to say that there are other issues that are considered more important by the People's Republic of China, in the present phase of its relationship with the United States, than Taiwan.

QUESTION: Can you give us some examples?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the overall performance of the United States with respect to the world equilibrium.

QUESTION: Do you see any chance that in the UN Security Council debate that is now going on in the Middle East that anything constructive could come out, either for Israel or for the United States; and would you say that the polarization that seems to be occurring as a result of that debate between Israel and the Palestinians, the PLO, has hastened the need for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the United States supports the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, or of a preparatory conference to discuss the reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

I do not want to prejudge the outcome of a debate which is still going on, but, from what we have seen, the resolutions that are at this moment being talked about

seem not too promising.

On the other hand, the United States strongly supports progress towards peace in the Middle East and will make efforts, when this debate is concluded, to begin the negotiating process in whatever forum can be arranged.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how do you see the possibilities now of either Syrian or Israeli intervention in Lebanon?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we have stated repeatedly that we support the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and the right of the communities within Lebanon to lead their own lives. We would believe that any outside military intervention, from whatever quarter, would involve the gravest threat to peace and stability in the Middle East; and we have left the parties concerned in no doubt that the United States would oppose any military intervention from whatever quarter.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, earlier you said that the United States would favor a South African withdrawal even in advance of withdrawal by the other foreign forces. Can we infer from this that there's been some sort of work on

a timetable or some coordination with South Africa about its presence there?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. The United States favors the withdrawal unconditionally of all foreign forces -- South African, Cuban, Soviet, and whatever other foreign forces could be there.

The United States in a general negotiation might even -- could even support a phased withdrawal, as long as the interval were sufficiently short and it is not just an excuse to permit the Cubans to take over all of Angola, which is what the military fighting is now coming down to in Angola. But this refers to diplomatic possibilities; it does not refer to any understanding between us and South Africa.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, this being the first news conference for 1975, I wonder if I could walk you out on the limb a bit. What do you think will happen in --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is '76.

QUESTION: '76. What do you think will happen in '76 insofar as a Syrian disengagement? Do you think in fact

there will be a SALT agreement in '76? And how do you think the Angola crisis will eventually end? (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is an absolutely no-win question.

I think we have the possibility of a SALT agreement that is in the national interest and that, with a rational debate in which the alternatives are clearly put, can be sold to the American public and to the American Congress.

At any rate, as far as the United States is concerned, we will be working in that direction.

I cannot speak until I have seen the Soviet position; I cannot make a flat prediction.

With respect to Angola, I think the major powers have a responsibility to show great restraint, and I think the African countries have a great opportunity to keep great power rivalries out of their continent and have an opportunity also not to permit outside expeditionary forces to become the dominant event. A greater degree of unity in this country would help us achieve this objective. And under present conditions we have severe

difficulties due to our domestic situation.

With respect to a disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, we of course support negotiations between Syria and Israel on this subject. Syria has declared so repeatedly that it would not negotiate alone, and only in an Arab context, that I would think that a separate agreement between Syria and Israel, without involving some other parties, is now less likely than would have seemed the case a few months ago.

Do you still say "Thank you" ?

QUESTION: I do again. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon at 12:43 p.m., the Secretary's Press Conference was concluded.)

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The Secretary of State

Press Conference

January 14, 1976
Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

MAJOR TOPICS: Angola, SALT Negotiations, Trip to U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have two statements, a brief one and a somewhat lengthier one.

I was grieved to learn this morning of the death of Prime Minister [Tun Abdul] Razak of Malaysia. He was a good friend of the United States, a most effective leader of his country, and the voice of peace and moderation in Southeast Asia. We are extending our condolences to his widow and to the Government of Malaysia.

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It is the United States view that these principles of mutual relations are not simply a matter of abstract good will; they are at the very heart of how two responsible great powers must conduct their relations in the nuclear era. It must be clear that when one great power attempts to obtain a special position of influence based on military intervention and irrespective of original motives, the other power will sooner or later act to offset this advantage. But this will inevitably lead to a chain of action and reaction typical of other historic eras, in which great powers maneuvered for advantage, only to find themselves sooner or later embroiled in major crises and indeed in open conflict.

It is precisely this pattern that must be broken if a lasting easing of tensions is to be achieved.

Whatever justification in real or alleged requests for assistance the Soviet Union may consider to have had in intervening and in actively supporting the totally unwarranted Cuban introduction of an expeditionary force into Angola, the fact remains that there has never been any historic Soviet or Russian interest in that part of the world. It is precisely because the United States is prepared to accept principles of restraint for itself that it considers the Soviet move in Angola as running counter to the crucial principles of avoidance of unilateral advantage and scrupulous concern for the interests of others which we have jointly enunciated.

The United States considers such actions incompatible with a genuine relaxation of tensions. We believe that this is a wholly unnecessary setback to the constructive trends in U.S.-Soviet relations which we cannot believe is ultimately in the Soviet or the world interest.

The question arises whether, in the light of Angola and its implications for Soviet-American relations, it is consistent with our policy to go to Moscow and to negotiate on SALT. There are two points that need to be made in this context.

First, we have never considered the limitation of strategic arms as a favor we grant to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off according to the

ebb and flow of our relations. It is clear that the continuation of an unrestrained strategic arms race will lead to neither a strategic nor a political advantage. If this race continues, it will have profound consequences for the well-being of all of humanity.

Limitation of strategic arms is, therefore, a permanent and global problem that cannot be subordinated to the day-to-day changes in Soviet-American relations.

At the same time, it must be understood on both sides that if tensions increase over a period of time, the general relationship will deteriorate and, therefore, the SALT negotiations will also be affected.

Second, we must consider the long-term consequences of a failure of the SALT negotiations. If the interim agreement lapses, the Soviets will be free of several severe restraints. They can add heavy ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] without restrictions. They can build more submarines without dismantling old ICBMs. There will be no equal ceiling of 2,400. The immediate impact would be that the numerical gap frozen in SALT I, and equalized in Vladivostok, would again become a factor, facing us with the choice of either large expenditures in a strategically and politically unproductive area or a perceived inequality with its political implications.

Of course we will not negotiate any agreement that does not achieve strategic equality for the United States and that we cannot defend as being in the national interest. Nor does it mean that Angola, or similar situations, will, if continued, not impinge on SALT as well as the general relationship. But it does mean that the general objective of a more orderly and stable nuclear relationship is in the interests of the United States and in the interests of the world and cannot be easily abandoned. This is why the President has decided that I should go to Moscow to negotiate on SALT, and we expect that the talks will be conducted in the same spirit by the Soviet side.

Now I will go to your questions.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, does the fact that you are going to Moscow now mean that you have forwarded a new proposal to the Kremlin on SALT?

A: We have not yet forwarded a new proposal to Moscow on SALT, but we expect to do so before I go there, within the next day or two.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what is standing in the way of a compromise that would point the way to a treaty at this point?

A: The obstacle to an agreement results primarily from issues that could not be considered fully at Vladivostok, because the technology was not yet developed at that time. Primarily the issues concern how to deal with the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber and how to deal with the American cruise missiles; whether and how to count them; whether and what restraints to accept. These are fundamentally the outstanding issues. Most other issues have either been settled in principle or in detail.

Q: Excuse me, if I may follow up. But that was the case several months ago and you didn't go to Moscow. Now you are going. Does this mean that at least these two outstanding issues are pretty much settled?

A: There has been no discussion with the Soviets except that the Soviets have assured us that they are prepared to modify their last position and, on that basis, we hope to be able to work out some solution.

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you saying that you are making Soviet restraint in Angola a quid pro quo *for any successful conclusion to the SALT treaty, or are you not saying that?*

A: I am saying two things: I am saying that Soviet actions in Angola, if continued, are bound to affect the general relationship with the United States; that a substantial deterioration of that relationship can also, over time, affect the strategic arms talks.

At this point, however, I would also maintain that the limitation of strategic arms is not a concession we make to the Soviet Union, but it is an objective that is in our interest and it is in the world interest and it is in the interest of world peace. So we will pursue the negotiations in the present framework.

Q: To follow up, if there is no change in the Soviet position on Angola, would you then expect that there could be a successful SALT II negotiation later on?

A: We would have to face this in the light of the circumstances that may exist later.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you have been sending this message—you and the President have been sending this message to Moscow now for several weeks. Have you had any indication whatsoever that the Soviets might be interested in a diplomatic solution to Angola, and secondly, are you willing to discuss this with the Soviets when you go Moscow?

A: It is a close race between the messages we send and the deterioration of our domestic position. And messages that are not backed up at home lose a fair amount of their credibility.

We are prepared to discuss Angola, and we have had some exchanges with the Soviet Union on Angola in recent weeks which we will have to clarify.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is the fact that you are going to Moscow—can that be taken as a sure thing that you will reach an agreement, or is there still the possibility of failure?

A: There is the possibility of failure. We do not know the details of the Soviet position, and on the other hand we assume that the Soviet Union would not invite the Secretary of State to negotiate with Mr. Brezhnev [General Secretary, Communist Party], unless a major effort would be made to come to an agreement.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is it your expectation that if things go as you anticipate that you will be able to conclude an agreement in Moscow? Will you set out for us what you are aiming at—are you aiming at an agreement in principle?

A. No, there cannot be a final agreement in Moscow. The most that is achievable in Moscow is an agreement in principle similar to the Vladivostok agreement, but covering the outstanding issues such as BACKFIRE and cruise missiles, and to relate them to Vladivostok. And then there will have to be technical discussions at Geneva to work out the detailed provisions. And that, under the best of circumstances, would take another 2 to 3 months.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I am curious as to how you are going to conduct these parallel negotiations with the Soviets. On the one hand, you are indicating that the success of SALT may hinge on Soviet activities in Angola. On the other hand, you are going to Moscow in a few days presumably to conclude an agreement in principle. How can you do that without knowing what the Soviet reaction in Angola is?

A: I have made clear in my statement that the regulation of nuclear arms in the strategic field between the United States and the Soviet Union is not a benefit we confer on the Soviet Union. It is a generic problem of world order that must be settled at some point and for which conditions are propitious now because of a long record of negotiation, and because technology is at a point where it is possible to accept certain restraints now which might then have to wait for another cycle of technology before they can be made effective.

The point I am making is that if there is a general deterioration in our relationship, it could affect SALT. In any event, whatever is agreed in Moscow will take several months to negotiate in greater detail.

Q: If I could just follow up for a second, please. In other words, you are not saying, then, that if there is not some Soviet pull-back in Angola before the termination of your trip to Moscow, that that is going to have an adverse effect on SALT.

A: That is correct.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said that messages not backed up at home lose certain credibility, I think. We are now entering a presidential election year. Isn't it likely that those messages will continue not to be backed up; and what impact will that have on foreign policy in general?

A: I have always believed very strongly that the foreign policy of the United States must reflect the permanent values and interests of the United States. It is not a partisan foreign policy. And to the best of my ability, I have attempted to conduct this office in a manner that can make it achieve bipartisan support.

It would, therefore, be a tragedy if during this election year we did not find some means to put some restraint on our domestic debates in the field of foreign policy and to find some means of common action.

As soon as the Congress returns, I will talk to several of the leaders to see what cooperation is possible to put at least some restraint on partisan controversy, because the penalties we will pay for lack of unity will have to be paid for for many years.

But it is a problem. I agree with you.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what exactly is it that you are asking the Soviets to do in Angola? Are you asking them to totally cease arms shipments to the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]? Are you asking them to get the Cubans out of there? Or would you be satisfied with something less than that—that they, for example, moderate the amount of arms that they are sending and take some of the Cubans out?

A: First of all, let us get some idea of the

dimensions of what the Soviet Union has done.

The Soviet Union has sent close to $200 million worth of military equipment to Angola in the last 9 months, which equals the total amount of all military equipment sent to all the rest of sub-Saharan Africa by all other countries. So that is not a minor infusion of military force. In addition to that, between 5,000 and 7,000 Cuban military forces are in Cuba—are in Angola—in fact, they seem to be everywhere except in Cuba. The fighting in the northern front in Angola is conducted almost entirely by Cuban forces and without even a pretense of any significant MPLA participation. Now, that is a significant international event for which there are no clever explanations and from which other countries must draw certain conclusions.

As far as the United States is concerned, our position is that there should be a cease-fire; that all foreign forces should be withdrawn. We are even prepared to discuss a phasing by which South African forces are withdrawn first, if there is a stated, brief interval after which all other forces are withdrawn; that there should be negotiations between the main factions; that all outside powers, including, of course, the United States, cease their military intervention. And we are prepared to agree to the end of all military shipments.

If the issue comes down to nominal shipments for a normal government by African standards, this is something about which we are prepared to negotiate.

We want to get the great powers out of Angola. We want to return it as an African problem. And we are prepared to accept any solution that emerges out of African efforts.

Our concern about Angola is the demonstration of a Soviet willingness to intervene with what, for those conditions, is a very substantial military infusion of military force—plus an expeditionary force—while the United States paralyzes itself by declaring a fraction of this as a massive involvement of the United States, when we have declared that there is no possibility of any American military forces or advisers going there. And that is an event of considerable international significance—both the Soviet action and the American reaction.

Q: Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, you spoke of the need to break the pattern of action and reaction that could build toward crisis. Isn't that what the Senate was trying to do, to break that pattern?

A: Well, you can always break the pattern of action and reaction by yielding. Our idea is to maintain the international equilibrium—not to give temptation for aggressive and irresponsible action—and at the same time to establish principles of mutual restraint. Certainly it is always possible to solve these problems in the short term by declaring that they do not exist.

Q: Mr. Secretary, two questions. I am not sure I have this exactly right, but didn't you say at a previous press conference that the United States would not table another SALT proposal unless the Russians tabled another one first? And secondly, have all the members of the NSC [National Security Council] and the Verification Panel signed off on this new proposal that we plan to offer in Moscow?

A: With respect to the first question, I said that the United States cannot table a new proposal simply because the Soviets had rejected the old one. We have been given a clear promise that there would be a significant modification in the Soviet position. Under these conditions, we are prepared to put forward a modification of our position, because we would prefer to negotiate from our position rather than from some other.

We have made clear—and I can repeat it here—that if the Soviets do not modify their last position, there can be no agreement. And the position which we will forward to them will be substantially different from the last Soviet position. So it will require—

Q: Substantially different from their last position?

A: It will also be somewhat different from our position. It is an honest attempt to find a solution that takes into account the real concerns of all sides.

With respect to our internal discussions, I will not have a clear picture until I have read all the newspaper articles that will emerge over the next few weeks, which are invariably more dramatic than the discussions which in fact take place. But my impression is that there is unanimity on the course that we are pursuing. We have had very good meetings. We have had two Verification Panel meetings, two NSC meetings. There will probably be another NSC meeting before I go just to review the bidding. And I would say that the Government is operating, until the Sunday editions, with complete unanimity.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff don't provide much drama for you, but are they signing on to this proposal?

A: The Joint Chiefs of Staff are signing on to this proposal, yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you recommend conclusion of a new SALT agreement with the Soviets if Soviet and Cuban forces are still in Angola?

A: I am going to Moscow in order to see whether the deadlock in these negotiations can be broken. We should not play with the strategic arms limitation negotiations. It is a matter that is of profound concern for the long-term future. It is in an area in which no significant advantages can be achieved by either side but in which the momentum of events can lead to consequences that could be very serious. And therefore we will not use it lightly for bargaining purposes in other areas. On the other hand, obviously if the general relationship deteriorates, then it could over a period of time even affect the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. But I think we should make every effort to avoid that.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you and your people have been talking to the Soviet Union about what they are doing in Angola. How would you describe, or what are your impressions of, the Soviet attitude toward a lessening or a decrease of their role there that would be satisfactory to us?

A: We are exploring with the Soviet Union now what steps can be taken in the wake of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] meeting, and we have had some exploratory talks, some of which would offer the possibility of progress. But we would have to be sure that we understand the meaning that the Soviets attach to some of their ideas.

Q: One follow-up. If the Soviet Union wants the Cuban expeditionary force out, would that bring about its departure?

A: That's their problem.

Q: But you must have an opinion.

A: I think major powers have a responsibility to think about the consequences they will face when they engage their troops or troops of their friends. It is a lesson we have had to learn; it may be a lesson that the Soviet Union should learn.

Q: Mr. Secretary, two additional points on Angola. There have been totally contradictory reports from the United States and from the Soviet Union about the presence of Soviet vessels off Angola. U.S. officials say they are there. The Soviet Union says this is a total fabrication.

Secondly, the outcome of the OAU meeting—what is the U.S. perception of whether that has enhanced or retarded the prospect of a diplomatic movement from here on?

A: There is no question that there are some Soviet vessels off Angola—or at least they were yesterday. I haven't seen today's report. There was a cruiser heading south, which is now in port in Guinea. So we don't know whether it will continue to head south or whether it will move to another destination. That would be the largest Soviet vessel that has been off southern Africa in many years. But we are not sure yet whether it will continue to move south. When the original announcements were made, it was heading south. It has since put in at the port in Guinea.

What was your other question?

Q: The Soviet Union has denied that it has any ships there. Where do you go from that kind of a stand-off?

A: Well, if there are no ships there, and if we should wake up one morning and find there are no ships there, we will agree with them. And that will end the debate. We are not going to pursue—it's a good way to make the ships disappear.

Q: The second point was your perception of the outcome of the OAU meeting. Has that advanced or retarded the diplomatic prospects?

A: I think, considering events in this country in recent weeks and the difficulty we have had to give a clear indication of what the United States could do, considering the massive Cuban and Soviet lobbying effort that went on at the OAU meeting, it is remarkable that half of the members of the OAU substantially agreed with our perception of the problem, which is to say, not to recognize any of the factions and to bring about an end of foreign intervention.

We think, moreover, that a vast majority of the OAU members favor an end of foreign intervention, if one can separate that problem from some of the local issues.

So we think that there is a considerable African support for the main lines of our policy

which is, after all, to leave African problems to the African nations and to insulate Africa from great power confrontation.

We do not want anything for the United States. We are not opposed to the MPLA as an African movement. We are opposed to the massive foreign intervention by which a victory of the MPLA is attempted to be achieved.

So I believe that this position, which in its totality is supported by, after all, half of the African states in the face of much discouraging news from here, is in its major elements supported by more than half of the African states. And we hope that a diplomatic solution can be built on that.

Q: Mr. Secretary, given the Congressional attitudes on foreign affairs in general, do you intend to talk to any leaders of Congress before you go to Moscow to negotiate further, and is there any danger that a repudiation by Congress of a SALT agreement might be counterproductive to the very objectives you're seeking for the long term?

A: I have been briefing Congressional leaders on SALT negotiations consistently. There has been no significant new development in the negotiating process, but I will no doubt be in touch with some of the senior members of the Senate.

As far as repudiation of an agreement is concerned, it would of course be a very serious matter since, in any event, one of the biggest foreign policy problems we now face is the question from other countries of who speaks for the United States. Somebody has to speak for the United States, and there can be no foreign policy without authority.

So if an agreement were repudiated, it would accelerate this very dangerous tendency, but we do not have an agreement yet.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in your assessment, how will the death of Prime Minister Chou En-lai affect relations between the United States and China and between China and the Soviet Union, and how do you view the return of the helicopter pilots by the Chinese to the Soviet Union?

A: The relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China is based on the permanent interests of both countries; and even though my admiration for Prime Minister Chou En-lai is well known, I do not believe that it was his personality, alone or principally, that was the basis of that relationship. So I would think that the main lines of our relationship to the People's Republic of China can continue along well-established lines. And, certainly, as far as the United States is concerned, as I said in my speech to the General Assembly [September 22, 1975], there is no relationship to which we attach greater importance than the relationship with the People's Republic of China.

On the other hand, we should have no illusions on what that relationship is based. There is no question that the interest the People's Republic of China has in a relationship with the United States depends on its assessment of the relevance of the United States to problems of concern to the People's Republic of China. And to the degree that the United States seems less able to play a major international role, for whatever reason, to that extent, the leaders in Peking, who are extremely sophisticated, will draw conclusions from it.

And it is this, and not the issue of personalities, that will affect the final judgments that will be made.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on that last point then, how can there be no movement on Taiwan, as there has been none over the last couple of years—how is that relationship then relevant for China?

A: Well, first of all, I am not saying there has been no movement over recent years.

Secondly, one would have to say that there are other issues that are considered more important by the People's Republic of China, in the present phase of its relationship with the United States, than Taiwan.

Q: Can you give us some examples?

A: Well, the overall performance of the United States with respect to the world equilibrium.

Q: Do you see any chance that in the U.N. Security Council debate that is now going on on the Middle East—that anything constructive could come out, either for Israel or for the United States; and would you say that the polarization that seems to be occurring as a result of that debate between Israel and the Palestinians—the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]—has hastened the need for a reconvening of the Geneva conference?

A: Well, the United States supports the reconvening of the Geneva conference, or of a preparatory conference to discuss the reconvening of the Geneva conference.

I do not want to prejudge the outcome of a debate which is still going on, but, from what we have seen, the resolutions that are at this moment being talked about seem not too promising.

On the other hand, the United States strongly supports progress toward peace in the Middle East and will make efforts, when this debate is concluded, to begin the negotiating process in whatever forum can be arranged.

Q: Mr. Secretary, how do you see the possibilities now of either Syrian or Israeli intervention in Lebanon?

A: Well, we have stated repeatedly that we support the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and the right of the communities within Lebanon to lead their own lives. We would believe that any outside military intervention, from whatever quarter, would involve the gravest threat to peace and stability in the Middle East; and we have left the parties concerned in no doubt that the United States would oppose any military intervention from whatever quarter.

Q: Mr. Secretary, earlier you said that the United States would favor a South African withdrawal even in advance of withdrawal by the other foreign forces. Can we infer from this that there's been some sort of work on a timetable or some coordination with South Africa about its presence there?

A: No. The United States favors the withdrawal unconditionally of all foreign forces—South African, Cuban, Soviet, and whatever other foreign forces could be there.

The United States in a general negotiation might even—could even support a phased withdrawal, as long as the interval were sufficiently short and it is not just an excuse to permit the Cubans to take over all of Angola, which is what the military fighting is now coming down to in Angola. But this refers to diplomatic possibilities; it does not refer to any understanding between us and South Africa.

Q: Mr. Secretary, this being the first news conference for 1976, I wonder if I could walk you out on the limb a bit. What do you think will happen insofar as a Syrian disengagement? Do you think, in fact, there will be a SALT agreement in '76? And how do you think the Angola crisis will eventually end? [Laughter.]

A: This is an absolutely no-win question.

I think we have the possibility of a SALT agreement that is in the national interest and that, with a rational debate in which the alternatives are clearly put, can be sold to the American public and to the American Congress. At any rate, as far as the United States is concerned, we will be working in that direction. I cannot speak until I have seen the Soviet position; I cannot make a flat prediction.

With respect to Angola, I think the major powers have a responsibility to show great restraint, and I think the African countries have a great opportunity to keep great power rivalries out of their continent and have an opportunity also not to permit outside expeditionary forces to become the dominant event. A greater degree of unity in this country would help us achieve this objective. And under present conditions we have severe difficulties due to our domestic situation.

With respect to a disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, we of course support negotiations between Syria and Israel on this subject. Syria has declared so repeatedly that it would not negotiate alone, and only in an Arab context, that I would think that a separate agreement between Syria and Israel, without involving some other parties, is now less likely than would have seemed the case a few months ago.

THE PRESS: Thank you very much.

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