

The original documents are located in Box 14, folder “Middle East (2)” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Ron Nessen donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

January 13, 1976

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSEEXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING THE UNITED STATES
SINAI SUPPORT MISSION

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including the Joint Resolution of October 13, 1975 (Public Law 94-110, 89 Stat. 572, 22 U.S.C. 2441 note), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), including but not limited to Sections 531, 621, 633, 901, and 903 thereof (22 U.S.C. 2346, 2381, 2393, 2441, 2443), and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. (a) In accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and notwithstanding the provisions of Part I of Executive Order No. 10973, as amended, there is hereby established the United States Sinai Support Mission, hereinafter referred to as the Mission.

(b) The Mission shall, in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Joint Resolution of October 13, 1975, and the provisions of this order, carry out the duties and responsibilities of the United States Government to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai" in connection with the Basic Agreement between Egypt and Israel, signed on September 4, 1975, and the Annex to the Basic Agreement, subject to broad policy guidance received through the Assistant to the President for national security affairs, and the continuous supervision and general direction of the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2382(c)).

(c) It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Mission to ensure that the United States role in the Early Warning System enhances the prospect of compliance in good faith with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and thereby promotes the cause of peace.

(d) At the head of the Mission there shall be a Director, who shall be appointed by the President. The Director shall be a Special Representative of the President. There shall also be a Deputy Director, who shall be appointed by the President. The Deputy Director shall perform such duties as the Director may direct, and shall serve as the Director in the case of a vacancy in the office of the Director, or during the absence or disability of the Director.

more



(e) The Director and Deputy Director shall receive such compensation, as permitted by law, as the President may specify.

Sec. 2. (a) The Director shall exercise immediate supervision and direction over the Mission.

(b) The Director may, to the extent permitted by law, employ such staff as may be necessary.

(c) The Director may, to the extent permitted by law and the provisions of this order, enter into such contracts as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order.

(d) The Director may procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants, in accordance with the provisions of Section 626 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2386), and section 3109 of title 5 of the United States Code.

(e) As requested by the Director, the agencies of the Executive branch shall, to the extent permitted by law and to the extent practicable, provide the Mission with such administrative services, information, advice, and facilities as may be necessary for the fulfillment of the Mission's functions under this order.

Sec. 3. (a) In accordance with the provisions of Section 633 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2393), it is hereby determined to be in furtherance of the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, that the functions authorized by that act and required by this order, may be performed, subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this Section, by the Director without regard to the following specified provisions of law and limitations of authority:

(1) Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 529).

(2) Section 3710 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 8).

(3) Section 2 of Title III of the Act of March 3, 1933 (47 Stat. 1520, 41 U.S.C. 10a).

(4) Section 3735 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 13).

(5) Section 3679 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 665), Section 3732 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (41 U.S.C. 11), and Section 9 of the Act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. 764, 31 U.S.C. 627), so as to permit the indemnification of contractors against unusually hazardous risks, as defined in Mission contracts, consistent, to the extent practicable, with regulations prescribed by the Department of Defense pursuant to the provisions of the Act of August 28, 1958, as amended (50 U.S.C. 1431 et seq.) and Executive Order No. 10789 of November 14, 1958, as amended.

more

(6) Section 302(a) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (41 U.S.C. 252(a)), so as to permit the Sinai Support Mission to utilize the procurement regulations promulgated by the Department of Defense pursuant to Section 2202 of Title 10 of the United States Code.

(7) Section 304(b) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (41 U.S.C. 254(b)), so as to permit the payment of fees in excess of the prescribed fee limitations but nothing herein contained shall be construed to constitute authorization hereunder for the use of the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting.

(8) Section 305 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (41 U.S.C. 255).

(9) Section 901(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (46 U.S.C. 1241(a)).

(b) It is directed that each specific use of the waivers of statutes and limitations of authority authorized by this Section shall be made only when determined in writing by the Director that such use is specifically necessary and in furtherance of the purposes of this Order and in the interests of the United States.

Sec. 4. (a) There is hereby established the Sinai Interagency Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board, which shall be composed of the following:

(1) The Secretary of State or his representative.

(2) The Secretary of Defense or his representative.

(3) The Administrator, Agency for International Development, or his representative.

(4) The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or his representative.

(5) The Director of Central Intelligence or his representative.

(6) The Director of the United States Sinai Support Mission or his representative.

(b) The Director of the United States Sinai Support Mission or his representative shall be Chairman of the Board.

(c) The President may from time to time designate others to serve on, or participate in the activities of, the Board. The Board may invite representatives of other departments and agencies to participate in its activities.

(d) The Board shall meet at the call of the Chairman to assist, coordinate, and advise concerning the activities of the United States Sinai Support Mission.

more

Sec. 5. The Secretary of State shall, pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 10973, as amended, including Part V thereof, and this order, provide from funds made available to the President the funds necessary for the activities of the United States Sinai Support Mission.

Sec. 6. All activities now being undertaken by the Secretary of State to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai" shall be continued until such time as the Mission has become operational and the Director requests the transfer of those activities to the Mission. The Secretary of State may exercise any of the authority or responsibility vested in the Director, by this order, in order to continue the performance of activities related to the Early Warning System until transferred to the Director. All such activities undertaken by the Secretary of State shall be deemed to have been taken by the Director.

GERALD R. FORD

THE WHITE HOUSE,
JANUARY 13, 1976

#

For Nelson



22 JAN 75Z - 05 57

004524

Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

N00833

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 015978 TOSEC 010121

12
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

COPY 1 JOF 15 COPIES

DRAFTED BY IO:JABAKER:OM
APPROVED BY IO:SNLEWIS
HEA:AATHERTON (SUBS)
S/S:FORTIZ (PHONE)

091638

O 220544Z JAN 76 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 015978 TOSEC 010121

NODIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PFOR, UNSC, XF

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM - POST VETO STATEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST (S/S 7601373)

REF: USUN 200 TOSEC 10118

1. AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN NOW ANTICIPATES THAT THE RESULT OF CURRENT ARAB NEGOTIATIONS WITH NON-ALIGNED AND EUROPEAN MEMBERS WILL PRODUCE RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE INTRODUCED MORNING OF JANUARY 23 AND BROUGHT TO VOTE ON JANUARY 23 OR 24. WHILE PRESENT TEXT (REFTEL) LIKELY TO BE SOMEWHAT MODERATED DURING NEGOTIATIONS, WE DO NOT EXPECT ANYTHING WE COULD ACCEPT AND THEREFORE ANTICIPATE USING VETO. AT PRESENT, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THERE WILL BE SECOND RESOLUTION INTRODUCED FOLLOWING VETO OF FIRST. WE WILL OF COURSE CABLE FINAL TEXT AS SOON AS IT IS INTRODUCED.

2. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE OUR EXPLANATION AS EARLY AS FRIDAY AFTERNOON. WE ARE PREPARING FOR MOYNIHAN A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF VOTE WHICH WOULD DRAW ON AND QUOTE A DEPARTMENT OF STATE STATEMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED 1

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 94-5, #27, State Hr. 4/4/94

By lit NARA Date 4/21/94

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 015978 T09EC 010121

ISSUED IN YOUR NAME WHICH WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY BE ISSUED
IN WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY AFTER VOTE.

3. RECOMMENDATION: THAT TEXT SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL
(S/S NO. 7600984) BE ISSUED (WITH APPROPRIATE CHANGES,

IF YOU DEEM NECESSARY).

4. FOR S/S: PLEASE PASS TO DAY.

5. APPROVED: IO-S.W.LEWIS. CLEARED: NEA-A.ATHERTON
(SUBS). SISCO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 26, 1976



No. 32

STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE JANUARY 26, 1976

At the conclusion of the Security Council's consideration of the Middle East problem, it is important to turn from the debates that have taken place in New York and look to the year ahead. In doing so we must ask ourselves, where has this debate left us in our search for a Middle East peace? The United States has perhaps a particular responsibility to do this because, in being faithful to its concept of the search for peace, it has felt obliged to veto a resolution that others believed mapped out a preferable route. We did not do so lightly, nor in a spirit of negation. We believed that with this resolution the Council would have blocked the surer and the tested way to a settlement in favor of one that would not have worked. It is important that it be understood why we believed this to be the case, and, more especially, how we see the process continuing within the framework that we have, with our vote, preserved.

There is surely no other problem of our time that has seen so much effort devoted to a solution, and where the successes and the failures are so evident as guides for our future endeavors. There has been no lack


For further information contact:



of resolutions, no lack of plans, but looking back over the years we can discern those few developments that have gradually constructed a basis -- a framework -- for whatever progress has been made in all this time.

In 1967 the Security Council devised Resolution 242, that contained the fundamental principles that should be applied in order to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, including withdrawal from occupied territories, termination of all claims and states of belligerency, acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area, and respect for the right of every state to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. The comprehensiveness, fairness, and balance of Resolution 242 have won it acceptance by all the Middle East states directly involved in the conflict in addition to approval by the outside world. One of the great values of the resolution is its wide acceptance, despite the differences each side has over its meaning.

In 1973, the Security Council approved a resolution that complemented Resolution 242 by establishing a negotiating process between the parties as the means of implementing the principles set forth in the earlier resolution. This was, of course, Resolution 338, which



also won wide acceptance and, with Resolution 242, formed a negotiating basis and framework that had been lacking since the early years of the Middle East problem.

The decision was then taken to provide a specific forum -- a concrete context -- for the negotiating process. The parties agreed to participate in a Conference at Geneva under the co-chairmanship of the United States and the Soviet Union. The nature of the conference reflected recognition of the fact that the negotiating process, if it was to have any chance of success, had to be based on the consent and voluntary participation of all the parties. The composition of the conference, accordingly, was itself a matter for agreement among all the parties.

Finally, as the parties confronted the substance of the problem, they decided to approach it in stages rather than all at once. The United States was pleased that, at the request of the parties, it could play a helpful role in this step-by-step negotiating process, keeping always in mind that each step was taken within the Geneva framework and with a view to ensuring the ultimate success of the Geneva conference. It was always

recognized that moving directly to an overall approach was an alternative to which the parties could turn at any time, and there was no doubt that an overall settlement, whatever the approach, was the end goal of all concerned, including the U.S.

And what was the result? For the first time in 25 or more years genuine progress was made toward a resolution of the immensely deep and complex problems that constitute the Middle East question. Through the courage and statesmanship of the Governments of Egypt, Israel, and Syria, and working within this common framework, agreements were reached, concessions made in return for other concessions; land was returned on the basis of binding agreements.

Less tangible, but perhaps more important, was the progress in the attitudes of the countries of the Middle East. In the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict it is a new and relatively recent development that opinion in the Arab world has begun to think in terms of recognizing a sovereign Israel and that Israel has begun to see peace as a tangible goal rather than a distant hope. We are fully aware that only a start has been made, that many problems remain to be dealt with and resolved. It was the nature of the process that the easier issues would be dealt with first and the more difficult and complex left

until later, when the momentum of the process itself would be working for us. The United States Government is committed to devote itself to the resolution of these remaining issues as it has to the issues that have already been resolved.

There would be no chance of further progress, however, if this negotiating framework, painfully erected over years of trial and error, were not left intact. Whatever its imperfections, however great the temptation to tamper with the resolutions and the Geneva formula that constitute it, if it were pulled apart now it could not be put back together, and the clock would have been turned back to the years of futility in which no basis existed for negotiation to take place.

The negotiating framework is sufficiently flexible that it can provide the basis for negotiating fair and durable solutions to all the issues involved. The issues of withdrawal, of borders, of the termination of states or claims of belligerency, of reciprocal obligations to peace, of the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, all these and more must be carefully considered. Reciprocity is a fundamental concept in this process. All of the principles must be clothed with substance

and given practical form. The nature of peace must be defined for all the peoples involved.

If there are limitations in the present framework, they result from the attitudes of the parties. What is needed is that all the parties go on from here to work out the substance of the solutions, and that if any party feels there is a need to reconsider the framework in order to proceed further, that this emerge from negotiations among the parties in the Geneva context.

It is evident from the debate that led to the convening of the Security Council that there is concern on the part of some of the parties to the dispute, shared by members of the Council, regarding those aspects of the Middle East problem that relate particularly to the Palestinian people and their future. It is important that we work to develop a common understanding of this particularly complex issue. The Palestinian question was for many years considered primarily a refugee problem. It is widely accepted today that this is only one aspect of a larger question. The United States has repeatedly affirmed its recognition that there will be no permanent peace unless it includes arrangements that take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people. The United States is prepared to work with all the parties toward a solution of all the issues yet remaining, including

the issue of the future of the Palestinian people. We have no preconceptions as to the nature of such a solution as it involves them, which can only be worked out as part of the negotiating process. But we recognize that a solution must take into account their aspirations within the framework of principles laid down in Resolutions 242 and 338.

This issue, as is the case with the other issues, can be successfully dealt with, however, only by maintaining the momentum of practical progress in the negotiating process. We look to this process to clarify issues and to help develop a reasonable and accepted definition of Palestinian interests, without which negotiation on this aspect of the overall problem cannot be successfully addressed. However, it is not realistic to expect one party to the dispute to agree to the participation of another in the negotiations, if the latter's policy is to seek the disappearance of the former as a state. As far as the U.S. is concerned, no negotiating framework is viable that calls the existence of the state of Israel into question.

We appreciate that, at this stage, the particular negotiating means that have been used so successfully

to date present difficulties to one or another of the parties. We have therefore suggested an informal preparatory conference of the present Geneva parties looking toward a convening of the Geneva Conference, in which the parties can discuss questions relating to the agenda, procedures and participants of the formal conference, without prejudice to their positions on the conference itself. What is important is to continue the process. The goals all want to achieve cannot be achieved without movement, but at the same time there is no short cut. They require the cooperation of both sides at every stage.

We understand also that the process appears at times to be unduly slow. When one looks at the issues that lie ahead one is tempted, indeed, to question whether we shall ever deal with them all. But when one looks back over the years, and sees how much more has been accomplished in the last two years than in the quarter of a century that came before, we are encouraged to hope that the process we are engaged in will in fact lead us where we all want to go. 1974 and 1975 were years of

signal accomplishment. The United States is firmly and irrevocably committed to progress in the negotiation of a settlement. In keeping with this commitment, it will do all it can to press ahead this year to consolidate what has been achieved and lay the groundwork for rapid progress. We believe that we have an obligation to keep open and intact the negotiating framework and to assist in developing a common understanding of the problems that remain before us. We are confident that progress leading to an eventual solution of all the issues is possible, utilizing -- and, in fact, only by utilizing -- the present framework, and we are committed to assist in every way we can to facilitate such progress. We will be active in the months ahead, and our efforts will be seen to speak for themselves.

A.M.

FOR RELEASE ON MARCH 7, 1976 ~~SECRET~~

NEW DISCLOSURES RELEASED ON KISSINGER'S MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY

Presidents Nixon and Ford, in 1974 and 1975, secretly assured Arab leaders that the United States favored an Israeli withdrawal to its 1967 frontiers, according to an article published in FOREIGN POLICY magazine today.

The article, entitled "How Kissinger Did It: Step-by-Step in the Middle East," by Edward R.F. Sheehan, discloses that in June, 1974 Nixon told Anwar el-Sadat that the American objective in the Sinai was to restore the old Egyptian international border. At other meetings, Sheehan reports, Nixon told President Assad and King Hussein that the United States "favored the substantial restitution of the 1967 frontiers on the Golan Heights and on the West Bank of Jordan." President Ford, according to Sheehan, reaffirmed those positions to Sadat in June of 1975.

Sheehan also provides the first comprehensive account of Henry Kissinger's diplomacy in the Middle East from the October War to the present, including transcripts of discussions with Arab and Israeli leaders never disclosed before. At a meeting with Sadat on November 7, 1973, for example, Kissinger overcame Sadat's insistence on immediate Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines in favor of a partial Israeli retreat in the Sinai desert. As a result of that meeting, according to Sheehan, the United States had its first Arab policy - a commitment that "so long as [the Arabs] understand the United States would not abandon Israel, Washington would... wield its power to regain Arab rights." It was at that moment, Sheehan concludes, "that Kissinger decided he was dealing not with a clown, but with a statesman."

Indeed, Sheehan's account, critical but often sympathetic toward Kissinger's diplomacy, suggests that Kissinger hoped to push Israel back to its 1967 borders but was frustrated by circumstance and his commitment to tactical success. In March, 1975 Kissinger complained to Arab leaders, "You can't believe what I'm going through... They're [the Israelis] trying to bring me down." At another point Kissinger described the Golan settlements to his aides as "the worst mistake the Jews have made in 2,500 years."

Sheehan's article, the longest ever published by FOREIGN POLICY (to be published this fall at greater length by Reader's Digest Press), reveals highlights of Kissinger's meetings with Arab and

-more-

Israeli leaders, including

- Anwar el-Sadat, whom Kissinger first underestimated, but later considered a statesman "with a fixed determination to overcome obstacles and move toward peace."
- Golda Meir, who was obstinate at stages in the negotiations, but for whom Kissinger had special affection.
- King Faisal, who berated Kissinger for supporting a "Communist" state in Israel, but who promised to do all he could to promote negotiations - particularly in Syria.
- President Assad, whose personality fascinated Kissinger despite his stubbornness.

Sheehan also details the near collapse of Kissinger's step-by-step method, including the celebrated Israeli-Syrian disengagement of 1974. On May 27, Sheehan reveals, "Assad and Kissinger composed a communique announcing the collapse of the negotiations... Two days later, the agreement was reached." At another dramatic meeting on March 22, 1975, Kissinger confronted the Israeli leaders with his fears. "Step-by-step has been throttled," he said, "first for Jordan, then for Egypt... we see a friend [Israel] damaging himself for reasons which will seem trivial five years from now.... It's tragic to see people dooming themselves to a course of unbelievable peril." Kissinger also had misgivings about supplying arms to Israel and stationing Americans in the Sinai, and he and Nixon told the Pentagon to "play tough" on deliveries of arms during the October War.

Despite Kissinger's misgivings, Sheehan writes, Israeli limitations often prevailed. The "five-zone" concept, for example, which was the basis of the breakthrough to the first Egyptian-Israeli disengagement, was Moshe Dayan's idea. But this interim step avoided the problem of including the Palestinians in an overall settlement. Kissinger recently warned the Israelis that eventually they would have to abandon their settlements and retreat substantially to the 1967 lines. Nevertheless, until now Israeli intransigence has prevailed. In fact, Kissinger honored Israel's wishes as early as December, 1973, when Ambassador Dinitz warned, "Golda cannot go into the elections if there's any doubt on the Palestinians at Geneva."

American-Israeli relations, Sheehan concludes, have reached a state of "chronic crisis." "Israel has no foreign policy," Kissinger lamented to a friend, "only domestic politics." As a result, Sheehan writes, Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy bought time and prevented war, but never addressed the central problems in the Middle East, problems that cannot be postponed much longer.

-end-

FOR MORE INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT THE WASHINGTON OFFICE OF
FOREIGN POLICY
11 Dupont Circle, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 797-6420

STEP BY STEP IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by Edward R. F. Sheehan

For over two years, newspapers and newscasts around the world have been filled with the chronicle of Henry Kissinger's comings and goings in the Middle East, his seemingly ceaseless shuttling between Cairo, Jerusalem, Damascus, Riyadh, Amman, and other capitals to find partial agreements between the Arabs and the Israelis.

It has been, at best, a difficult saga to follow, full of sound and some fury—but signifying what? Even the expert will be excused for having on occasion failed to follow the course of the negotiations, or having lost interest in them.

But their importance is clear. They have established, in the words of one of America's leading Middle East experts, Edward R. F. Sheehan, our first postwar "Arab policy." Beyond that fact lie further questions, about the long-term value of the accomplishment, and about the future of U.S.-Israeli relations. Whatever lies ahead, however, a specific phase in the tortured history of Mideast diplomacy is now over, although it is too early to pass definitive judgment on it.

In the lengthy article that follows, Sheehan presents the first comprehensive account of that phase and of Kissinger's efforts. Based on extensive talks with American, Arab, and Israeli officials on three continents, Sheehan's article continues the effort of this magazine to present major investigative diplomatic reporting to our readers. An expansion of this article will appear as a book to be published next autumn by Reader's Digest Press.

The direct quotations of dialogue in the article are verbatim, condensed from the actual conversations between participants only

3.

when necessary for space reasons.—The Editors.

Since the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has devoted more of his time and craft to the consequences of that conflict than to any other issue of foreign policy. Never has American diplomacy—or the man who conducts it—been so visibly committed to the solution of a problem. Throughout a dozen missions to the Middle East, throughout thousands of hours of negotiations there and in Washington, throughout three hundred thousand miles or more of flying to and fro, Kissinger has summoned all the power of his prodigious intellect to the fashioning of a new equation between the greatest of the Semitic peoples, aspiring to prevent another war that might overwhelm the world beyond. Today, nearly two and a half years after he began, we must assess his achievements, his failures, and his method—step-by-step diplomacy.

The most crucial of Kissinger's labors occurred in moments of great tension: between October 6, 1973, when the war broke out, and late December of that year, when the Geneva conference was convened; during January 1974, when he separated the Israeli and Egyptian armies and asserted the necessity of his personal intervention to achieve interim solutions; during May 1974, when he separated the Israeli and Syrian armies whilst the Syrians were waging a war of attrition; during March 1975, when his endeavor to negotiate a new agreement in the Sinai collapsed amidst recriminations with the government of Israel; and in August 1975, when he finally achieved that agreement at a high cost to the United States—though much lower, he insisted, than its alternative, another war.

Some significant features of Kissinger's diplomacy emerge from the multitude of his decisions:

> In the aftermath of the October war, he

4.

Some items in this folder were not digitized because it contains copyrighted newspaper articles or cartoons. Please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library for access to these materials.

B.R.:
this is the follow-up as it appeared on our wire
Roy Gutman

[9/30/76]

***R388

R A7773ZYRRYRAYR

MIDEAST - FORD

WASHINGTON, SEP 30; REUTER - PRESIDENT FORD HAS NO PLANS AT PRESENT TO VISIT THE MIDDLE EAST IF HE IS ELECTED TO A FOUR-YEAR TERM ON NOVEMBER 2; THE WHITE HOUSE SAID TODAY.

A SPOKESMAN WAS RESPONDING TO A REPORT IN THE TEL AVIV NEWSPAPER YEDIOTH AHARONOT THAT MR. FORD HAD TOLD AN INTERVIEWER HE HOPED TO VISIT ISRAEL AND ARAB CAPITALS SOON IF HE WON THE ELECTION.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID MR. FORD TOLD A YEDIOTH CORRESPONDENT LAST APRIL HE WOULD LIKE TO GET TO THE MIDDLE EAST AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE IF ELECTED.

BUT; HE ADDED; THERE WERE NO PLANS AT PRESENT REGARDING A VISIT AND MR. FORD HAD NOT GIVEN ANY RECENT INTERVIEW TO THE NEWSPAPER.

THE NEWSPAPER ALSO QUOTED MR. FORD AS SAYING THE U.S. PLANNED A NEW ROUND OF DIPLOMACY AIMED AT A FINAL MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT; BUT THE SPOKESMAN SAID MR. FORD HAD SAID NOTHING IN THE INTERVIEW TO INDICATE ANY SUCH DECISION.

"THE UNITED STATES IS WORKING CONTINUOUSLY IN AN EFFORT TO REACH A FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST;" THE SPOKESMAN COMMENTED.*

REUTER 1553



S. FELDMAN: Can you be more specific on why you feel Israel does not need the extra \$550 million in aid?

THE PRESIDENT: If you look at -- in the 25-month period the United States was contributing in military assistance \$1 billion 500 million and economic assistance in a 25-month period, \$1 billion 500 million. That is a very substantial contribution to a country of 3 million people. All of my technical advisers, Defense Department, State Department, and others that have the background and information, advise me very specifically that those amounts for that 25-month period are ample to take care of both economic and military assistance to Israel.

So you have to have some belief that the technical people who spend all their time on these matters are being fair and being proper as to the amount that Israel needs for its security, its survival, both economically and militarily.

MS. FELDMAN: Why did you cancel your Middle East trip? Was there any reason for that?

THE PRESIDENT: I think the main reason, Trude, was I felt that the pre-convention campaign demanded that I stay here and win the nomination and it would not have been feasible for me to be traveling for ten days in the Middle East when some of these primaries and some of these domestic political issues were being developed. I certainly hope to get to the Middle East.

MS. FELDMAN: But not this year?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't rule out this year because after the election that is a possibility. But I certainly intend to go as quickly as possible.

MS. FELDMAN: Let's jump for a minute to you, the man, that I think everybody is going to judge you on more so than all the issues, I think. The man behind the Presidency. Do you really enjoy the decision-making process and why?