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ISSUE: Situation in Lebanon

Administration Position:

"The United States will continue its role of a peacemaker in Lebanon. We will continue our role as a party to try and achieve the long-sought peace and security in the Middle East." [June 20, 1976, comments following US evacuation]

Administration Actions:


Since the very outset of the crisis, the United States has been active in trying to help end the fighting and encourage a political solution and we have also been providing much-needed humanitarian assistance to those affected by the tragic fighting. We believe that the inauguration of President Sarkis offers fresh hope for progress towards a settlement and the US will continue to render all appropriate assistance to encourage this.

Our policy in the complex Lebanon crisis has been consistent since the outset of the tragic events there: (1) Lebanon is a friend of long-standing whose independence, territorial integrity and national unity we strongly support. We are opposed to partition or de facto partition as a solution to the Lebanese crisis. (2) Lebanon, as a friend, deserves our assistance in its hour of need. At the same time, Lebanon's problems involve their internal affairs which cannot be resolved by outsiders. Ultimately, the Lebanese themselves will have to agree on a solution. (3) The conflict in Lebanon must not be allowed to touch off a broader conflagration in the volatile Middle East area. We have taken major efforts to help avoid this.

The US has undertaken a number of useful actions, both unilaterally and in concert with others:

--The US has been active diplomatically with a number of interested governments and various Lebanese parties to discourage any broadening of the conflict. Our approaches have minimized the chances that this would occur, particularly earlier this year when the risk was quite high.

--The US has remained in close touch with interested governments, the United Nations and the Lebanese parties to encourage progress



towards a negotiated settlement. We have not been deterred in this by the brutal murder of our diplomats or the breakdown in normal communications within Lebanon. We have sent special envoys when this was needed to ensure an adequate exchange of views.

--The US has ~~let~~ maximum encouragement to the efforts by interested parties to find a political settlement, including suggestions for a round-table conference in which the parties would sit down and try to resolve their differences.

--The US has been providing humanitarian relief assistance, already amounting to more than \$10 million in hospital and other medical equipment and supplies and foodstuffs distributed as fairly as possible on both sides of the lines. We are exploring ways of increasing our assistance. Also, the President requested the Congress and it has now approved \$20 million in special relief funds for Lebanon.

The United States will continue to be active diplomatically to encourage a settlement based on Lebanon's independence, territorial integrity and national unity which we strongly support. We will work closely with the new Lebanese government and President Sarkis towards this objective.

NSC  
9/29/76

[Attached: State Department release on the inauguration of President Sarkis of Lebanon.]

ISSUE: The GAO Report on the Mayaguez Affair

Administration Position

"I was very disappointed in the fact that the GAO released that report because I think it interjected political partisan politics at the present time.

"But let me comment on the report. Somebody who sits in Washington, D. C. , 18 months after the MAYAGUEZ incident can be a very good grandstand quarterback.

"And let me make another observation: This morning I got a call from the skipper of the MAYAGUEZ. He was furious because he told me that it was the action of me, President Ford, that saved the lives of the crew of the MAYAGUEZ. And I can assure you that if we had not taken the strong and forceful action that we did, we would have been criticized very, very severely for sitting back and not moving.

"Captain Miller is thankful, the crew is thankful. We did the right thing. It seems to me that those who sit in Washington 18 months after the incident are not the best judges of the decision-making process that had to be made by the National Security Council and by myself at the time the incident was developing in the Pacific.

"Let me assure you that we made every possible overture to the People's Republic of China and, through them to the Cambodian Government, we made diplomatic protest to the Cambodian Government through the United Nations.

"Every possible diplomatic means was utilized, but at the same time I had a responsibility, and so did the National Security Council, to meet the problem at hand, and we handled it responsibly and I think Captain Miller's testimony to that effect is the best evidence."

President Ford's Remarks at  
Ford-Carter Debate, October 6, 1976  
San Francisco

NSC  
10/18/76

ISSUE: MIA's in Southeast Asia and UN Membership for Vietnam

Administration Position

"Let me assure you we are employing every effective means to account for your loved ones. Let me assure you without any hesitation or reservation that I will continue that effort . . . . You have not been abandoned. I promise you I will not rest until the fullest possible accounting of your loved ones has been made."

President Ford's Remarks to the  
National League of MIA/POW Families  
Washington, D.C.  
July 24, 1976

"Let me restate our policy. As long as Vietnam, North Vietnam, does not give us a full and complete accounting of our missing in action, I will never go along with the admission of Vietnam to the United Nations. If they do give us a bona fide, complete accounting of the 800 MIA's, then I believe that the United States should begin negotiations for the admission of Vietnam to the United Nations, but not until they have given us the full accounting of our MIA's.

President Ford's Remarks at  
Ford-Carter Debate  
October 6, 1976  
San Francisco

Administration Actions

There are a large number of American servicemen who have not been accounted for in Southeast Asia. There are still 875 men listed as missing in action and an additional 1529 whose bodies have not been recovered.

We raised the issue at the United Nations. In 1974 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution based on our proposal calling on all parties to armed conflicts to provide information on prisoners, facilitate an accounting for the missing, and repatriate the remains of those killed.

The President discussed this issue with the Chinese leadership during his visit to Peking in November 1975. At that time, the Chinese provided

information to the President on the fate of 24 Americans who had died on the territory of the PRC or in its territorial waters.

President Ford declared January 21, 1976 a National Day of Prayer for Servicemen Missing in Southeast Asia, and January 27, 1975 as National MIA Awareness Day.

The President has cooperated fully with the House of Representatives Select Committee on MIA's. In response to requests from that Committee and other members of the Congress, the North Vietnamese have returned the remains of five U.S. servicemen.

In late March 1976 the President approved the State Department's sending a note to the North Vietnamese in Paris offering to discuss the MIA problem along with other issues. The State Department is continuing this dialogue.

NSC  
10/18/76

- Thus, we faced the inevitable bloc obsolescence of a large portion of our fleet at the same time that over a decade of Soviet shipbuilding effort was coming to full fruition.
- Our challenge is to maintain a naval force adequate to meet the Soviet threat in the near-term, while building a naval force for the future that would continue the American tradition of a combat-ready fleet fully capable of carrying out the maritime mission.

#### Administration Action

- In January of 1975 the President's budget proposal for fiscal year 1976 contained \$5.4 billion for Navy shipbuilding. In the FY 77 budget request, some \$6.3 billion was included to build 16 new ships for our Navy.
- Last January when the FY 77 budget was submitted, the President indicated that, because he viewed the shipbuilding issue as highly complex, he was initiating within the NSC system an intensive study of our future naval requirements out beyond the time horizon of our normal budget process. The President made it clear that should this study indicate a need for further expansion of our shipbuilding program, he would not hesitate to seek the required funds from the Congress.
- Already this study has shown that we need to increase our near-term efforts. For this reason, the Administration proposed a \$1.2 billion supplemental to its original budget request for fiscal year 1977, bringing the total number of ships that would be authorized in FY 77 to 21. The Congress failed to support this program.
- Our study of our future naval requirements is continuing and should result in a long-term blueprint for our naval forces in the 1980s and 1990s.

NSC  
10/18/76

Administration Position

President Ford stated on November 5, 1975:

" . . . stagnation and stalemate (in the negotiations) over the long pull or over a long period of time will heighten the prospects for additional conflict . . . there has to be a broader settlement that would fall within the guidelines of the UN Resolutions 242 and 338 . . . it is essential that continuous progress be made . . . "

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 11, No. 45, p. 1247

The President's policy in the Middle East is to take advantage of what is now an historic opportunity to help the area move to a secure, just and comprehensive peace settlement. So long as this conflict remains unsolved, it poses the constant danger to us of renewed war, international crisis and economic disruption, strains in our major alliances and nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. These are intolerable dangers. Because the United States is in a unique position of trust with all the parties, we have -- at their request -- been engaged for the last two years in a peacemaking effort without precedent in three decades. The President is determined that this effort continue until the achievement of a negotiated peace as foreseen by the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Administration Actions

Since the October 1973 war, significant steps have been taken. Security Council Resolution 338 -- which reaffirmed Resolution 242 -- began a negotiating process between the parties, and set up the first Geneva Conference. Agreements to disengage military forces and establish UN buffer zones to strengthen the ceasefire were successfully negotiated between Egypt and Israel in January 1974 and Syria and Israel in May 1974. Major Arab countries that broke diplomatic relations with the US in 1967 moved in 1973 and 1974 to restore their ties with us; our traditional ties with Israel have been reinforced in crisis and in the long months of close association in negotiations. The Suez Canal was reopened in June 1975.

In the Spring of 1975, President Ford had an intensive series of meetings with Egyptian President Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, Jordan's King Hussein, Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Khaddam, and other important leaders in the area, to advance the negotiating process. He consulted widely with Congressional leaders throughout the period, and with concerned civic leaders and experts.



In September 1975, a second, interim agreement was reached between Egypt and Israel. This agreement reaffirms and strengthens the cease-fire, and widens the buffer zone. It publicly commits both sides to settle the Middle East conflict by peaceful means and to refrain from use or threat of force or military blockade, and permits non-military Israeli cargoes to use the Suez Canal. This is the first agreement between Israel and an Arab country that was not simply to halt fighting or disentangle military forces. Both President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin have hailed it as a possible turning point in Middle East history.

This agreement will help establish a climate of confidence that will make further peace efforts possible. Any stagnation of the negotiating effort poses intolerable risks to the interests of the United States -- economic, political and security -- and to world peace. The President is determined to move forward until the achievement of a final, just and durable peace.

President Ford submitted the recent Egyptian-Israeli agreement, including the provision for stationing of 200 American technicians to monitor the surveillance of the ceasefire, to the Congress for its scrutiny and won Congressional approval. He has submitted foreign assistance requests to the Congress, including assistance to Israel and moderate Arab states, to strengthen their ties with us and their survival against extremist pressures which seek to undermine the process of peace. Our relationship with Israel is traditional since its founding. We will maintain, as we have for decades, military supply programs commensurate with Israel's defense needs and our commitments to her survival and security. At the same time, American support will be requested to help nations in the moderate Arab world who are our friends and supporters of the peace process.

President Ford intends to maintain our peace effort, to prevent the momentum of events in that volatile region from rushing again towards war. This effort serves important American interests, the interest of world peace, our moral commitments in the area and the desire of the American people to see the specter of war and dislocation banished from the Middle East.

NSC

1-9-76

ISSUE: Multi-National Corporations/Foreign Payments

Administration Position

In President Ford's March 17, 1976 message to Congress, he stated:

"Multinational corporations (MNC's) continue to be a highly visible and controversial factor in international affairs. MNC's have made major contributions to world economic development and will continue to do so in the future. While the major portion of foreign investment by multinational corporations is concentrated in industrial nations, many developing countries actively seek investments by MNC's, recognizing their potential contribution to economic development. Recognizing the generally positive impact of MNC's on world trade and production, I am distressed by reports of corrupt practices by some companies. For that reason, I have directed that members of my Administration undertake efforts, both domestically and internationally, to assure that multinational corporations obey the laws and conform with the public policies of the countries in which they do business.

"We are participating in the development of an international code to provide guidelines for responsible corporate behavior. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has made substantial progress toward drafting a code, and similar efforts will be undertaken in the United Nations and the Organization of American States in 1976. It is highly important that such codes of conduct provide that both multinational corporations and host governments share the responsibility for eliminating abuses."

Presidential Documents

Administration Actions

Secretary of State Kissinger has established an Interagency Committee on International Corporations chaired by the State Department which is currently responsible for clarifying the US position for discussion in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development on guidelines for multinational enterprises and government responsible to these enterprises. The Committee will also develop a position for negotiations in the United Nations and OAS on a code covering multinational corporations and trade ethics. (FYI: Opposition by certain countries in each organization may water down or eliminate clauses on bribery and solicitation for payment.)

NSC  
3/18/76

ISSUE: Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction TalksAdministration Position:

Since October of 1973, the US and its NATO allies have been engaged in negotiations with the Warsaw Pact over the possible reduction of military forces in the area of Central Europe. Through MBFR we and our allies have sought to reduce the risk of war and achieve a more stable military balance in Central Europe. The President clearly stated our objectives in these negotiations in a speech to the World Affairs Council in Portland, Oregon, in May of this year:

This is the only place where American and Russian ground forces are positioned literally eyeball-to-eyeball and thus involves the danger of triggering a direct confrontation.

The issues are very complex in these mutual and balanced reductions of forces talks and involve our allies in NATO and the members of the Warsaw Pact. Progress has been slow, but we intend to continue them because agreement would enhance military stability in Western and Eastern Europe at lower force levels.

The Warsaw Pact countries currently have a significantly greater number of ground forces in Central Europe than does NATO. We and our allies see this existing disparity, along with a substantial Pact advantage in tanks, as potentially the most destabilizing factors in Central Europe. For this reason we believe that the best way to achieve a more stable military balance in the area is to reduce these disparities. Together with our NATO allies, we have proposed that the military manpower on both sides be reduced to a common level and that a ceiling be put on the military manpower of both sides at this reduced level. As a first step toward this manpower common ceiling, the US and the Soviets would agree to the reduction of a Soviet tank army in exchange for a reduction of a proportionate number of US soldiers. This proposal formed the basis of the NATO negotiating position for the first two years of the discussions.

Administration Actions:

-- After extensive internal review, the Administration made a major initiative last December in the hopes of moving the MBFR talks forward. After close and thorough consultation with our allies, we proposed to add

some US nuclear weapons and delivery systems to our first phase reduction package in exchange for Pact agreement to the NATO reduction proposal.

-- Warsaw Pact negotiators have responded to our proposal and negotiations are continuing in a serious vein. However, the issues in MBFR are extremely complex and go to the very heart of the structure of European security. Resolution of these issues will take time.

NSC

6/17/76

Administration Position

"We must have a balanced Navy, one that can deter conflict but one that can, if necessary, handle the full spectrum of possible conflict, from firing a warning shot across the bow, to winning an all-out war.

"Our Navy must be modern and it must be balanced. Such a Naval force requires a major effort to build new ships and requires that we continue to modernize an existing fleet, and its arsenal . . .

"We are strong today, and our allies and our adversaries know it, and that is why America today is at peace. Let there be no doubt whatsoever, we intend to stay strong so that we can stay at peace. "

Remarks of the President  
before the Chamber of  
Commerce and San Diego  
Navy League Council  
San Diego, California  
May 24, 1976

Background

- The US emerged from World War II with the strongest naval force the world has ever seen, and had a virtual naval monopoly.
- During the 1950s and 1960s, while the US added aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, much of our fleet remained primarily World War II-vintage ships. During the 1960s and early 1970s, we faced the bloc obsolescence of these ships, and our force levels fell accordingly.
- At the same time, the Soviets -- learning from us the great advantage of a formidable naval force -- undertook a major shipbuilding effort in the 1950s and 1960s, transforming a largely coastal defense fleet into a major ocean-going naval force.

- Thus, we faced the inevitable bloc obsolescence of a large portion of our fleet at the same time that over a decade of Soviet shipbuilding effort was coming to full fruition.
- Our challenge is to maintain a naval force adequate to meet the Soviet threat in the near-term, while building a naval force for the future that would continue the American tradition of a combat-ready fleet fully capable of carrying out the maritime mission.

#### Administration Action

- In January of 1975 the President's budget proposal for fiscal year 1976 contained \$5.4 billion for Navy shipbuilding. In the FY 77 budget request, some \$6.3 billion was included to build 16 new ships for our Navy.
- Last January when the FY 77 budget was submitted, the President indicated that, because he viewed the shipbuilding issue as highly complex, he was initiating within the NSC system an intensive study of our future naval requirements out beyond the time horizon of our normal budget process. The President made it clear that should this study indicate a need for further expansion of our shipbuilding program, he would not hesitate to seek the required funds from the Congress.
- Already this study has shown that we need to increase our near-term efforts. For this reason, the Administration proposed a \$1.2 billion supplemental to its original budget request for fiscal year 1977, bringing the total number of ships that would be authorized in FY 77 to 21. The Congress is now considering this program.
- Our study of our future naval requirements is continuing and should result in a long-term blueprint for our naval forces in the 1980s and 1990s.

NSC  
9/26/76

ISSUE: Pacific Trust Territories and Northern Marianas

Administration Position: On March 24, 1976 the President signed H. J. Resolution 549, approving the Northern Mariana Islands Commonwealth Covenant. The President noted that:

It is an important occasion, first it is a significant step in carrying out our obligations under the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement which has been the basis of the United States administration of these islands since 1947. Second, it confirms our national commitment to the principle of self-determination by honoring the freely expressed wishes of the peoples of these islands for political union with the United States. And third, the joining together of all of the Marianas under one flag and one common citizenship represents the first major addition to the United States territory in the Pacific since 1898.

Presidential Statement

March 24, 1976

Administration Actions:

Northern Marianas

The Secretary of Interior has appointed a separate resident commissioner for the Northern Marianas, and he has established an administration separate from that of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. In keeping with provisions of the Compact, the people of the Northern Marianas will now draw up and ratify their own constitution and establish their own internal government. The commonwealth will come into full effect when the Trusteeship ends, possibly in 1980 or 1981.

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Ambassador F. Haydn Williams, the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, met with the Micronesian Joint Future Status Commission in late May and early June 1976. The meeting resulted in the initialing of a Compact for Free Association between the five remaining districts of the Trust Territory and the United States. The negotiators left blank a key portion dealing with control over marine resources. The Administration is currently developing a position on this issue for further negotiation with the Micronesians.

NSC

7/19/76

## ISSUE: Panama Canal

### Administration Position

Every President of the United States since Franklin Roosevelt has recognized the need and supported negotiations to modernize our relationship with Panama concerning the Canal.

"We are talking about a treaty with an extended duration . . . . We are going to insist, during the period of that treaty, that we have the right to operate, to maintain and defend it. . . . in addition, after the termination of the treaty, there would have to be an absolute insistence that there would be right of free access by all parties to the utilization of the Canal."

Interview with the President by  
Editors of Harte-Hanks Newspapers  
April 19, 1976

In 1959 President Eisenhower recognized that "titular sovereignty" of the Canal Zone remains with Panama. This is, however, a complex legal subject because the United States has been granted by treaty all the rights that go with sovereignty. It is simply not true that the Canal Zone is the same as Alaska or the states that made up the Louisiana Purchase. The central point is that we are involved in negotiations with Panama because they are the best way to protect our national interest in access to the Canal, an interest which is not assured by the current treaty.

### Administration Actions

The President determined that the best way of protecting United States interests in the Canal was through continuation of negotiations with Panama on the possibility of arriving at a new treaty relationship. The goal of these negotiations is to reach an agreement which will accommodate the needs of both the United States and Panama while protecting our basic interests in defense and operation of the Canal. The basic outlines of the negotiations have been public since their publication in 1974 in the Statement of Principles agreed to by the United States and Panama. The negotiators' instructions continue to be based upon those principles. Negotiations are continuing, but there are a number of difficult questions remaining to be resolved. At this stage in the talks it is not possible to predict when agreement on a treaty might be possible.



The President has stated repeatedly that he has no intention of proposing to the Congress any agreement with Panama that would not protect our vital interests. Any treaty we reach with Panama will be submitted to the full constitutional process, including Senate approval, and the Administration is consulting closely with the Congress as the discussions continue.

NSC 8/6/76

ISSUE:      Portugal

Administration Position

Our relationship with Portugal is more cordial now than at any time in recent decades. In June, with the election of President Eanes, Portugal emerged from two years of transitional political activity. The President looks forward to working closely with President Eanes and Prime Minister Mario Soares.

Administration Actions

On July 13, 1976, the President sent a letter of congratulations to President Eanes upon Eanes' inauguration expressing our admiration and respect for Portugal's democratic triumph.

Later in July the President sent his congratulations to Mario Soares upon his inauguration as Prime Minister.

The United States has provided \$55 million in economic supporting assistance, \$25 million in PL 480, and special commodity loans to Portugal in 1976. Similar programs are planned for 1977.

NSC  
8/9/76

Administration Position

On June 26, at the opening of the Puerto Rico Summit, the President said:

"The important thing about Rambouillet and our meeting here today is that they are part of an essential and continuing bilateral and multilateral effort by the leaders of the key industrialized democracies to address common problems and to improve mutual understanding. The complexity of our nations' economies, individually and collectively, means that we as leaders cannot afford to allow major difficulties to arise and then, by dramatic meetings, attempt to resolve them. It requires that we concert our efforts to prevent problems from arising in the first place -- to shape the future rather than reacting to it. It is with that objective in mind that this Summit is being held."

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 12, No. 27, p. 1089

Administration Actions

Rambouillet resulted in:

-- Strengthened confidence among the peoples of the industrialized democracies in the economic outlook, which supported efforts in this country and abroad to achieve economic recovery.

-- Agreement between the U. S. and France on international monetary issues which contributed substantially to the reform of the international monetary system.

-- Agreement to avoid protectionist measures which contributed to the collective ability of the industrialized democracies to maintain an open trading order even during the depths of the recession.

-- Agreement to work to conclude the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva by the end of 1977.

At Puerto Rico, agreement was reached on:

-- The importance of achieving sustainable rates of growth which will reduce unemployment without creating new inflation.

-- On the need for each nation to manage its economic affairs so as to correct or avoid payments imbalances.

-- On the importance of coupling financial support to developed countries in special need with a firm program by the recipient to restore equilibrium.

-- On the need for a cooperative rather than a competitive approach by the developed countries toward the problems of the developing nations.

-- On the need to ensure that economic ties with the Communist nations make a constructive contribution to overall East-West relations.

NSC

7/16/76

Administration Position

At the Puerto Rico Summit, the President stated:

"Our economic relations with the developing world have reached a key decision-making stage. Clearly, we must continue to improve our political and economic relationships with the developing countries, to quicken the pace of their development and to avoid the risk of a return to the rhetoric and actions of confrontation. This requires a kind of preparation and collaboration which we have not yet achieved. It requires the same commitment, the same political will which we achieved at Rambouillet in pursuit of cooperation in sustaining economic recovery.

"We have no need to be defensive in our relations with developing countries. We have a strong position from which to propose and pursue long-term strategies in our interest as well as theirs. We are not under siege. To be effective, however, we have to avoid disarray and competitive efforts to gain monetary favor. Such competition may appear to be good short-term politics but it does not advance substantive achievement.

\* \* \*

"Our posture with respect to internationally traded commodities will continue to be a key issue in our relations with the developing world. The United States' policy objectives in this area are to reduce excessive price fluctuations, improve market access for processed products of developing nations, ensure security of supply for consumers, and increase investment for resource development."

On May 6 in his UNCTAD speech at Nairobi, Secretary Kissinger said: "At this Conference the U. S. proposes its own comprehensive approach to commodity issues." It contains the following elements:

-- Ensuring sufficient financing for resource development and for equitable sharing in the benefits of such development by the host nation.

-- Improving the conditions of trade and investment in individual commodities, and moderating excessive price fluctuations.

-- Stabilizing the overall export earnings of the developing countries.

-- Improving access to markets for processed products of developing countries while ensuring consumers reliability of supply.

In addition, Secretary Kissinger laid out a comprehensive approach in the area of technology which provides a broad range of programs and incentives to transfer both technology and the fundamental skills that will give it root and effectiveness. In addition, U. S. proposed a number of approaches to deal with balance of payments and debt problems of the developing countries and with the urgent problems of the poorest nations.

#### Administrative Actions

-- The 7th Special Session of the UN General Assembly adopted proposals made by the U. S. to help ensure basic economic security against cycles that devastate export earnings and undermine development. In January 1976 this was implemented when the IMF expanded its Compensatory Financing Facility, as we had proposed, to make available several billion dollars to stabilize developing country export earnings.

-- In September 1975 we pledged to improve developing country access to capital and new technology. To these ends the U. S., other industrialized nations, and several oil-producing countries have begun to marshal increased capital, technical and human resources to promote development.

-- The U. S. has been instrumental in establishing the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, where four committees (energy, raw materials, financial issues, and development problems) have been meeting in Paris since the beginning of this year to analyze and find answers to key development problems. The Conference members include industrialized, developing and OPEC countries. This is now moving from an analytical to a more action-oriented phase seeking balanced results supportive of our desire to meet developing country needs in the context of strengthened international economic cooperation and prosperity.

-- We have pledged to examine individual commodities to find ways to reduce excessive price fluctuations and improve the conditions of trade and investment. To this end we have participated actively in discussions on a number of commodities, and successfully concluded agreements on coffee and tin. We have also put forward a proposal for an International Resource Bank to reduce the non-commercial risks of foreign investment in developing countries, enabling them to diversify and expand their exports.

NSC  
7/16/76

ISSUE: RESTORATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY

Administration Position

"Our goals in the Eastern Mediterranean in the months ahead -- to help the parties involved achieve a Cyprus settlement, to rebuild a relationship of trust and friendship with both Greece and Turkey, to alleviate the suffering on Cyprus and to meet Greece's needs for assistance -- are objectives on which we all can agree. Let us now join in working together to achieve them."

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 11, No. 40, p. 1112

United States military assistance to an old and faithful ally, Turkey, was cut off in February 1975 by action of the Congress. This resulted in an embargo on military purchases by Turkey, extending even to items already paid for. The aid cut-off by the Congress was intended to influence Turkey in the Cyprus negotiations. But the effect of the Congressional action has been to block progress toward reconciliation, thereby prolonging the suffering on Cyprus; to complicate our ability to promote successful negotiations; and to increase the danger of a broader conflict.

The total U.S. embargo on military assistance to Turkey imposed a strain on our relationship with this important NATO ally. Following the failure of the House in late July to partially restore military assistance to Turkey, the Turkish Government suspended operations at our intelligence monitoring facilities on Turkish soil. This action has caused a significant loss of intelligence on Soviet activities. The U.S. installations in Turkey provided information of great value on Soviet research and development activity, and early indications and warnings of Soviet force readiness and movement in the area.

Administration Action

Realizing the damage done to U.S./NATO security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and lack of progress to date in reaching a Cyprus settlement, the Congress on October 2, 1975, acted to partially lift the embargo on U.S. arms for Turkey. Following the Congressional action, the President outlined the objectives of U.S. policy toward Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in the next few months. The President also stated on October 3, 1975:

"First, we will seek to rebuild our security relationship with Turkey to underscore that Turkey's membership in the Western alliance and partnership with the United States serve the very important interest of both nations.

"Second, we will make a major effort to encourage resumption of the Cyprus negotiations and to facilitate progress by the parties involved -- Greece, Turkey and Cyprus -- toward a peaceful and equitable settlement of this dispute. In this connection, we will fulfill whatever role the parties themselves want us to play in achieving a settlement acceptable to all. In accordance with S. 2230, I will submit to the Congress within 60 days of enactment a report on progress made in reaching a solution to the Cyprus problem.

"Third, the Administration will intensify cooperation with appropriate international humanitarian agencies to find ways to alleviate the suffering of the many people displaced as a result of the 1974 hostilities. The plight of these unfortunate people makes progress towards solution of the Cyprus problem all the more important.

"Finally, the Administration intends to provide support to the democratic government of Greece. In that regard, we will pursue efforts to help that country overcome its current economic and security problems. Also, in compliance with S. 2230, I will submit within 60 days my recommendations for assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976." On October 30, the President submitted to the Congress his request for assistance to Greece.

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 11, No. 40, p. 1112

NSC  
1-9-76



Administration Position

Speaking to members of the Radio and Television News Directors Association at the White House on January 30, 1976, the President said:

"Just a few weeks ago, Secretary Kissinger came back from a visit to the Soviet Union where further efforts were made to try and minimize differences between the Soviet Union and ourselves as far as a SALT II agreement is concerned. It is important that we do what we can, if possible, to put a cap on a runaway race in the nuclear arms field. We are operating under a SALT I agreement, but I think it is not sufficient to really find an answer, in the long run, to the dangerous potentialities of a nuclear arms race.

"We have not reached an agreement. We still have some unresolved problems, but we are slowly and, I think, constructively narrowing the gap. I think it is in the national interest if we can find a good agreement, to take further action in this important area."

Presidential Document  
Vol. 12, No. 6, p. 105

In a Press Conference held in New Hampshire on February 8, 1976, the President said:

"I believe that SALT I was a good agreement. I believe that if we can get a SALT II agreement, it is in the best interest of this country.

"Let me just point out some of the things that will happen if we don't get a SALT II agreement. In the first place, Backfire will run free. There won't be any limitations or constraints on it. If we don't get a SALT II agreement, there won't be any definition of a launching weight or throw weight. If we don't get a SALT II, there will be no limitation on launchers or MIRVs after October 1977."

Presidential Document  
Vol. 12, No. 7, p.

The Administration is seeking to obtain a new strategic arms agreement that would supersede the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms signed by the US and the USSR in 1972. The Administration's goal in seeking the new agreement, which must be based upon the principle of equality and equal security, is to reduce tensions and the risk of nuclear war and to strengthen international peace and security.

The US and the Soviet SALT Delegations are continuing the negotiation of the detailed terms of a new agreement. These negotiations recently resumed in Geneva. This work involves putting the basic provisions already agreed upon at Vladivostok into treaty language and resolving other issues essential to an agreement which will protect US interests and command the confidence of both sides.

#### Administration Actions

President Ford met with General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November 1974. The two leaders agreed upon the guidelines for a new agreement that would replace the Interim Agreement. The basic guidelines agreed on at Vladivostok were that each side would be limited to 2400 strategic delivery vehicles and 1320 missiles equipped with MIRVed warheads.

President Ford also met with General Secretary Brezhnev at the Conference on European Security and Cooperation in Helsinki in August 1975. They renewed their discussions on SALT and made progress on several issues which must be resolved before a new agreement based upon the Vladivostok guidelines can be completed.

Secretary Kissinger met with General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow at the end of January 1976 and discussed the status of the SALT negotiations. Progress was made on several of the outstanding issues at that meeting.

President Ford submitted a new SALT proposal to General Secretary Brezhnev in February, and in March Brezhnev sent a reply to the President. The Administration is currently reviewing the Soviet proposal and developing a response. Our objective is to achieve a SALT agreement that is in the national interest, and the resolution of the issues will be unrelated to domestic politics.

NSC  
9/27/76

ISSUE:    Selective Service

Administration Position

The President's program for an All-Volunteer Military Force includes provision for a standby Selective Service program. Under this plan, annual registration of eligible young men has been eliminated. The Selective Service System will retain a residual planning function and could be reinstituted on a national basis, should circumstances necessitate such an action.

As the President said on April 23, 1976 in Indianapolis:

"I am absolutely convinced that as long as we have a well-led military force, as long as we create the right environment, as long as we pay them a proper wage and as long as we inspire them, I think we can get all of the active duty military personnel that we need under a voluntary program and, therefore, do not need to utilize a selective service program."

Administration Actions

The President has acted to:

- Remove the requirement for annual registration of young men.
- Phase out local draft board operations, while maintaining national and state headquarters capabilities, mainly on a standby basis. In case of emergency, the local board system could be reactivated.

ISSUE:      Selective Service and Reserve and National Guard Forces

Administration Position - Selective Service

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Administration Actions - Selective Service

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- Remove the requirement for annual registration of young men.
- Phase out local draft board operations, while maintaining national and state headquarters capabilities, mainly on a standby basis. In case of emergency, the local board system could be reactivated.

Administrative Position - Reserve and National Guard Forces

The All-Volunteer Force also involves a more central role for our National Guard and Reserve forces, and these forces are being integrated further into operational and deployment plans.

As the President stated in the Rose Garden on September 17, 1976:

"Our total force defense policy in which the National Guard plays a very crucial part is vital to this preparedness. Our active all-volunteer armed forces are no bigger than they have to be because of the outstanding contributions of our capable reserves and National Guard forces. I congratulate each and every one of you and your associates back home.

"My policy in this area is clear. Since we are giving the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard ever greater responsibility, we have to give you the best training and the best combat equipment available, and we will. We can never again afford to treat our National Guard as the poor relations of our regular forces. Hand-me-down weapons are not enough for the National Guard.

"My Administration has made every effort to upgrade your equipment and your training. Our guard forces are being equipped and trained to fight on the first team against any potential enemy. You are now being assigned some of the world's most modern combat equipment. In the future, I will fight to make certain that you get even more of the best."

#### Administration Actions - Reserve and National Guard Forces

The President has acted to:

- Sign legislation giving him the authority to call to active duty up to 50,000 members of the Selected Reserve to serve for a period not to exceed 90 days. This may be done prior to declaration of national emergency, and could indeed prevent certain situations from deteriorating into such emergencies.

In signing the new Reserve Call-Up legislation, the President noted on May 14, 1976 in Louisville:

"Under this legislation, we can more effectively utilize many key elements of our Reserve and National Guard forces. For example, over 60 percent of our tactical airlift and over 50 percent of our strategic airlift capability are made up of Reserve and National Guard personnel."

NSC  
9/29/76

In this regard, the President and Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil met on March 24, 1976 to reaffirm our long-standing ties of friendship and alliance, and agree on the importance of building on and strengthening this relationship.

On March 26, 1976 the United States and Turkey signed a new Defense Cooperation Agreement providing for U.S. military assistance over the term of the agreement (\$1 billion total in a combination of grants, loans and guarantees plus \$400 in EximBank credits) in exchange for a resumption of U.S. operations at the joint defense bases. The agreement will take effect after acceptance by both nations. On June 16, 1976, in submitting the DCA to the Congress for approval, the President stated:

"This Agreement restores a bilateral relationship that has been important to Western security for more than two decades. I believe it will promote U.S. interests and objectives on the vital southeastern flank of NATO and provide a framework for bilateral cooperation designed solely to reinforce NATO and our common security concerns. To the extent that the Agreement restores trust and confidence between the United States and Turkey, it also enhances the prospects for a constructive dialogue on other regional problems of mutual concern."

Presidential Message to the Congress  
June 16, 1976

Congressional action on the DCA is pending. Administration witnesses testified on September 15, 1976 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Administration favors rapid Congressional approval of the DCA. Meanwhile, Congress has passed and the President signed the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 which makes up to \$250 million in military sales, credits, and guarantees available to Turkey in FY 1976-1977.

On July 29, the President met with Turkish Opposition Leader Bulent Ecevit to discuss the interests Turkey and the United States share.

NSC  
9/28/76

ISSUE: The Situation in Southern Africa

Administration Position:

The situation in southern Africa requires a clear Administration position on the questions of majority rule in Rhodesia, independence for Namibia, and racial equality in South Africa.

On behalf of President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger made a major address on April 27 at Lusaka, Zambia, pledging United States commitment and cooperation to the tasks of racial justice and economic development in southern Africa.

The Secretary listed a ten-point United States policy for a rapid negotiated settlement in Rhodesia, leading to majority rule with minority rights. Of particular importance were: his pledge to urge the Congress this year to repeal the Byrd Amendment, which authorizes Rhodesian chrome imports to the United States despite UN sanctions; an offer of economic assistance to Mozambique, whose closure of its border with Rhodesia to enforce sanctions has imposed economic hardships; a commitment to help any other countries neighboring Rhodesia that decide to enforce sanctions by closing their frontiers; and a call for international support to the people of Rhodesia as they make the peaceful transition to a newly independent Zimbabwe.

On Namibia the Secretary reiterated United States support for an independent Namibia and the United States view that South Africa's occupation of Namibia is illegal. He urged the South African Government to announce a definite timetable acceptable to the world community for achievement of self-determination.

The United States policy toward South Africa has remained fundamentally unchanged for over a decade. We maintain relations with the Government of South Africa and conduct a dialogue with all elements of that society, but we have made clear the inherent opposition of the American people to the South African Government's internal policies. We maintain an arms embargo policy on South Africa, we neither encourage nor discourage American investment there, but we do not extend ExImBank loan facilities for economic transactions in South Africa. In his Lusaka speech the Secretary appealed to the Government of South Africa to bring about a peaceful end to institutionalized inequality in that country.

Administration Actions:

The Secretary's Lusaka speech is only the latest in a series of public statements calling for majority rule in Rhodesia. In addition, since the early days of his Administration the President has supported the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, which permits the importation of Rhodesian strategic minerals, particularly chrome, despite a United Nations economic embargo against Rhodesia which was supported by the United States. Most recently, April 6, 1976, the United States joined, as co-sponsor, in the unanimous decision of the Security Council to broaden the scope of the UN economic sanctions.

NSC

5/21/76



ISSUE:      Spain

Administration Position

With the beginning of the reign of King Juan Carlos I in November 1975, Spain entered a new era. US-Spanish ties of friendship and cooperation are longstanding. Additionally, through its bilateral defense cooperation with the United States, Spain makes a significant contribution to the security interests of the Western world. In the period ahead, the United States looks forward to continuing and strengthening the policy of friendship and cooperation which is central to the excellent relations between the American and Spanish people.

On the occasion of King Juan Carlos' State Visit to the United States, June 2-3, 1976, the President said:

"Spain has entered a new era under your wise and able leadership. It holds great promise for the future of Spain and for the western community of nations. I am confident that your leadership will prove more than equal to the great task ahead and that the promise of the future will be fulfilled.

"Both of our countries today face very complex challenges. We look to our own future with confidence and we take great confidence from the assurance that the Spanish people will meet these challenges with the qualities they have shown in their long and illustrious history, courage, dignity, strength and pride.

"Our bilateral relationship as confirmed in the recently concluded Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation is excellent. I stated last year and I reaffirm today that Spain, through its bilateral defense cooperation with the United States, makes a major contribution to the western world. We are agreed on the interests of our two countries, share in common objectives, and common burdens promoting the prosperity and security of the Atlantic and Mediterranean region."

White House Arrival Ceremony  
June 2, 1976

Administration Actions

On May 31-June 1, 1975, the President paid a State Visit to Spain and met with Spanish leaders for a review of current US-Spanish ties and consultations aimed at future cooperation.

On January 24, 1976, the United States and Spain signed a new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

The principal elements of the new treaty are as follows:

-- Establishment of a strengthened security relationship between the United States and Spain, including provision for military coordination and planning related to Western defense matters. In this connection, the treaty does not establish a mutual defense obligation, but underscores the interests that the two nations share in having a strong and credible defense in the Western European/Atlantic area.

-- An assistance package for Spain amounting to approximately \$770 million over the next five years -- over \$600 million in loans and credits and the balance in various forms of grants. Independent of the treaty, we are planning to provide \$450 million in Export-Import Bank loans -- thus explaining the total shown in press reports of \$1.2 billion for the agreement.

-- Retention of all existing U. S. installations and facilities on Spanish soil, with the following exceptions. We have agreed to remove most of our tanker aircraft from Spain to locations elsewhere in Europe and to withdraw, by July 1, 1979, the ballistic missile submarines based at Rota. These revised basing arrangements reflect changes in military technology and requirements that have taken place over the last few years or are expected to occur in the near future.

The Senate gave advice and consent to the Treaty on June 21, 1976 and approved authorizing legislation on June 18. The legislation also has been approved by committee in the House and now will go to the floor.

On June 2-3, 1976, King Carlos I paid a State Visit to the United States.

NSC  
8/6/76

ISSUE: Threshold Test Ban/Peaceful Nuclear Explosives

Administration Position:

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) limits all nuclear weapons tests to a maximum yield of 150 kilotons (KT). However, at the time of the signing of the TTBT, Soviet insistence that peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs) should not be subject to the TTBT limit resulted in agreement between the sides in Article III of the TTBT to negotiate a separate agreement governing PNEs. We made clear, however, that we would not begin ratification of the TTBT, which has an effective date of March 31, 1976, until the PNE agreement was concluded. We also insisted on the right to have on-site inspection of every PNE above 150 KT.

Administration Actions:

After 19 months of difficult negotiations in Moscow, we have completed a joint draft PNE treaty. As you noted in a recent press conference, the agreement is precedent-setting in view of its far-reaching provisions for on-site observers under certain conditions, and the complexity of its verification provisions. The draft treaty is currently being reviewed by the two governments and is expected to be initialed by Delegation chiefs in Moscow later this month. It would then be signed at an appropriate time and combined with the TTBT for submission to Congress for ratification.

NSC  
4/16/76

ISSUE:           Threshold Test Ban (TTB) / Peaceful Nuclear Explosives  
                 (PNE) Treaty Ratification

Administration Position

"This new (PNE) Treaty, together with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, will govern the conduct of every underground nuclear explosion for military or peaceful purposes for both parties. The two Treaties impose the same limit of 150 kilotons on all individual underground nuclear explosions." (President Ford at Signing Ceremony, May 28, 1976)

In signing the PNE Treaty, the President described it as:

" . . . an historic milestone in the history of arms control agreements: For the first time it provides for extensive cooperative arrangements for on-site observation in monitoring underground nuclear explosions."

During ratification hearings on these Treaties, we expect to encounter considerable opposition from critics. Some will assert that the threshold is much too high and that "legitimization" of PNEs may block progress towards a comprehensive test ban (CTB) which they argue is presently achievable. Others may argue that in view of TTB/PNE verification uncertainties, the treaties will constrain us more than the Soviets. There are convincing arguments in rebuttal, however:

- The 150 kiloton threshold will prevent continued testing of the numerous higher-yield weapons in each side's strategic arsenal and is the first progress toward a comprehensive test ban in many years;
- PNE agreement constrains PNEs which would otherwise be unlimited and is precedent-setting in view of its provision for on-site inspection; and
- Our verification capabilities under the agreement are adequate to guard against any asymmetries in test practices.

2

The most compelling argument, however, and the one that may be the major factor in completing ratification is that the agreements constitute continuation, in an otherwise difficult period, of U.S. and Soviet efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

#### Administration Actions:

After 19 months of difficult negotiations in Moscow, agreement was reached on a PNE treaty which was signed by President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev on May 28 in simultaneous ceremonies in Washington and Moscow. President Ford noted at the signing ceremony that "the agreement demonstrates that our two countries can soberly negotiate responsible and beneficial agreements despite the difficulty of the challenge." The PNE Treaty was subsequently combined with the TBT and on July 29 the President submitted them to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification noting that:

"The TBT Treaty and the PNE Treaty, taken together as integrated and complementary components of this important limitation on nuclear explosions, provide that very large yield nuclear explosions will no longer be carried out by the Parties. This is one more useful step in our continuing efforts to develop comprehensive and balanced limitations on nuclear weapons. We will continue our efforts to reach an adequately verifiable agreement banning all nuclear weapon testing, but in so doing we must ensure that controls on peaceful nuclear explosions are consistent with such a ban. These Treaties are in the national interest, and I respectfully recommend that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification."

ISSUE:        The Uganda-Kenya Situation

Administration Position:

The United States is not directly involved in the dispute between Kenya and Uganda. The dispute has its roots in territorial claims of Uganda against Kenya, and more recently in Ugandan allegations of Kenyan complicity in the Israeli rescue of hijacking hostages from Entebbe Airport near Kampala.

Obviously, it is the hope of this Administration that the Uganda-Kenya dispute can be settled peacefully.

There is no truth in the report that the United States, Britain and Kenya are involved in an orchestrated campaign to topple President Amin of Uganda.

NSC  
8/4/76

Administration Position:

In response to a vote in the Social Committee in the United Nations characterizing Zionism as a form of racism, the President on October 24, 1975 issued the following statement:

"It has been a general principle of the United States to take grave exception to any action that weakens the United Nations as an effective forum for the peaceful resolution of international disputes.

"We deplore in the strongest terms the recent vote in the Social Committee characterizing Zionism as a form of racism. Such action undermines the principles upon which the United Nations is based.

"The spokesmen for the United States in the United Nations have expressed well and forcefully the views of this Administration and the American people on this issue."

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 11, No. 43, p. 1191

Subsequently, following a vote on the same issue in the plenary of the United Nations, the President said at a press conference in Atlanta on November 14, 1975:

"I think the United Nations by that resolution has seriously handicapped, at least to some extent, its usefulness. I hope and trust, however, it will realize and understand the ramifications and will not proceed any further in that direction or anything comparable to it.

"I do not, however, think that the United States should withdraw from the United Nations just because of the unwise action of this resolution. You can always do better trying to correct something from within than from without.

"We have no particular plans for any recriminatory action for any of those 32 nations (that abstained on the United Nations Zionism resolution vote). We just think they were very wrong."

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 11, No. 47, p. 1287

The Administration believes that a strong viable United Nations whose membership works in a spirit of cooperation is essential to world peace and prosperity. It is important in advancing that goal for the United States to speak out when it feels the United Nations is being threatened. The Administration is concerned by trends in the United Nations system over the past year or so toward politicization of the system and the use of it for narrow political purposes. Such a trend does severe injury to the viability of the United Nations. The Administration believes it is important for the U.N. body to give appropriate weight to the views of its members and to seek to work in a spirit of consensus and not through mechanical voting majorities.

Administration Actions:

In response to the action in the United Nations equating Zionism with racism, the Administration has refused to participate in any way in the observance of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, now that it has been totally perverted from its original intent by including Zionism as a form of racism.

The United States took a leadership role in the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations in September 1975 making concrete proposals for improving the economic development of the developing nations.

In response to certain negative trends we saw in the organization, the United States on November 6 indicated its intention to withdraw from the International Labor Organization (ILO), one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. This notice does not mean that the U.S. has irrevocably decided to withdraw from the ILO, but expresses our concern about the following developments in the organization: the weakening of the tri-partite principle; denial of due process to some countries; a double standard in the implementation of human rights convention; and, politicization of the organization. It is our hope that these problems, leading to the notice of our intent to withdraw, can be resolved and that U.S. membership in the ILO will continue.

NSC  
1/12/76



ISSUE: UN Membership for Vietnam and North and South Korea

Administration Position

President Ford stated on September 12, 1975:

"We believe in the universality of the United Nations. We feel it is in the interest of the world as a whole to have all nations that want to become a part of the United Nations to be members, but the effort of North and South Vietnam to get in was predicated on their coming in alone.

"We felt if North and South Vietnam were to be a part of the United Nations, South Korea, that has had its application in to be a member for a good many years, also ought to be included. You can't be selective on who or what nation should be part of the United Nations".

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 11, No. 38, p. 993

Moreover, the Vietnamese have failed to provide a full accounting of Americans missing in action in Vietnam. Their inaction on this issue is inconsistent with the humanitarian principles which guide United Nations membership.

Administration Actions

The United States has twice vetoed the admission of North and South Vietnam into the United Nations and has more recently indicated it would similarly veto the application of a unified Vietnam at this time. On two occasions we took this action because the Communist members of the Security Council blocked consideration of the request for admission by South Korea, and we refused to adhere to a policy of selective universality. At the same time, we must insist on the Vietnamese obligation to provide an accounting of Americans missing in Vietnam.

United Nations Ambassador Moynihan stated on August 11, 1975:

"The United States today has, for the first time, vetoed the admission of a new member to the United Nations.... This is an action my country hoped it would never take.... What in the end changed our mind was the decisions of the Council taken at its 1834th meeting on August 6, 1975. It became absolutely clear that on that occasion that the Security Council, far from being prepared to support the principle of universal membership,

was denying to one applicant (South Korea) even the right to have its case considered.... The United States had made clear that we were prepared to vote for the admission of each and all of the three applicants before us.... "

Ambassador Moynihan  
United Nations  
August 11, 1975

On September 13, 1976, Ambassador Scranton further expounded on our position:

"The President has instructed me today to veto that admission.

"For some time, we have been trying to work with the Vietnamese to have them be interested in the problem of the MIA's and their families, and so far have had very little in the way of either information or helpfulness from them concerning them.

"As you probably know, there are two major criteria concerning membership in the United Nations. One is the matter of peace loving, and if it is a peace loving nation, then we want it to be a member of the United Nations; and the other is, is it interested in humanitarianism?

"Certainly there is no object or no issue currently in the United States in regard to our relationship with Vietnam and in the world generally to indicate inhumanity more than their complete lack of reasonableness concerning bringing us information about these men who were lost in that area. "

Ambassador Scranton  
Press Interview at the White House  
September 13, 1976

NSC  
9/28/76

ISSUE:    Normalizing Relations with Vietnam

Administration Position

"In Indochina, the healing effects of time are required. Our policies towards the new regimes of the Peninsula will be determined by their conduct toward us. We are prepared to reciprocate gestures of goodwill -- particularly the return of the remains of Americans killed or missing in action or information about them.

"If they exhibit restraint toward their neighbors and constructive approaches to international problems, we will look to the future rather than to the past."

President Ford's speech at the East-West Center, University of Hawaii  
December 7, 1975

"We are willing to talk with the Vietnamese. At my direction, we have exchanged messages with them, indicating our willingness to discuss outstanding issues in our two countries. We have made clear that our primary concern is to obtain an accounting for our servicemen who are missing in action. Without a satisfactory solution of the MIA issue, no further progress in our relations is possible."

President Ford's Remarks to  
National League of MIA/POW Families  
July 24, 1976

"It is callous and cruel to exploit human suffering in the hope of diplomatic advantage. The Vietnamese have an obligation to provide a full accounting of all Americans missing in action. I call upon them to do so without further delay. Normalization of relations cannot take place until Vietnam accounts for all our men missing in action."

Statement by President Ford  
at the White House, September 7, 1976

Administration Actions

We have reciprocated all Vietnamese gestures. In response to Hanoi's release of Americans they had detained and the return of the remains of five members of our Armed Forces, the Administration has expanded both the categories and the amount of equipment and material we would

approve private and humanitarian agencies sending to Vietnam. This action has permitted the shipment of some \$4 million worth of aid to Vietnam.

We have continued to look to the future in our relations with Vietnam. At the President's direction, the Department of State informed the Vietnamese in March 1976 that we were prepared to discuss with them the whole range of issues facing our two countries, including an accounting for our men still missing or held prisoner in Indochina. Six notes were exchanged in which we indicated our willingness to hold talks. Despite Hanoi's making these notes public in early September 1976, we are continuing this process.

NSC  
10/18/76

On January 24, 1976, the United States and Spain signed a new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which supersedes the expired 1970 agreement of friendship and cooperation. The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification subject to a declaration on June 21, 1976. The President ratified the treaty on September 4, 1976 and the instruments of ratification were exchanged on September 21, 1976.

The principal elements of the new treaty are:

-- Establishment of a strengthened security relationship between the United States and Spain, including provision for military coordination and planning related to Western defense matters. In this connection, the treaty does not establish a mutual defense obligation, but underscores the interests that the two nations share in having a strong and credible defense in the Western European/Atlantic area.

-- An assistance package for Spain amounting to approximately \$770 million over the next five years -- over \$600 million in loans and credits and the balance in various forms of grants. Independent of the treaty, we are planning to provide \$450 million in Export-Import Bank loans -- thus explaining the total shown in press reports of \$1.2 billion for the agreement.

-- Retention of all existing U.S. installations and facilities on Spanish soil, with the following exceptions. We have agreed to remove most of our tanker aircraft from Spain to locations elsewhere in Europe and to withdraw by July 1, 1979, the ballistic missile submarines based at Rota. These revised basing arrangements reflect changes in military technology and requirements that have taken place over the last few years or are expected to occur in the near future.

On June 2-3, 1976, King Carlos I paid a State Visit to the United States.

NSC  
10/18/76

ISSUE: U.S. Relations with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia

Administration Position

In his December 7 speech in Hawaii in which he enunciated his Pacific Doctrine, the President said:

"In Indochina, the healing effects of time are required. Our policies towards the new regimes of the Peninsula will be determined by their conduct toward us. We are prepared to reciprocate gestures of good will -- particularly the return of remains of Americans killed or missing in action or information about them.

"If they exhibit restraint toward their neighbors and constructive approaches to international problems, we will look to the future rather than to the past."

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 11, No. 50, p. 1357

Administration Actions

In response to North Vietnam's release of nine Americans whom they were holding captive, and the return of the remains of five members of the Armed Forces, the Administration expanded the categories of equipment and material already approved for private and humanitarian agencies to send to Vietnam thus enabling them to ship over \$3 million worth of aid to that country.

The Department of State indicated on March 25 that we are prepared to discuss with Vietnam the whole range of issues facing our two countries, including an accounting for our men still missing or held prisoner in Indochina. Secretary Kissinger sent a March 26 letter to North Vietnam's Foreign Minister conveying this message.

NSC  
3-31-76

Administration Position

The President said on August 19, 1975 to the American Legion Convention in Minneapolis: "The process of detente -- and it is a process -- looks toward a saner and safer relationship between us and the Soviet Union. It represents our best efforts to cool the cold war, which on occasion became much too hot for comfort.

"To me, detente means a fervent desire for peace, but not peace at any price. It means the preservation of fundamental American principles, not their sacrifice. It means maintaining the strength to command respect from our adversaries and provide leadership to our friends not letting down our guard or dismantling our defenses or neglecting our allies. It means peaceful rivalry between political and economic systems, not the curbing of our competitive efforts.

"Since the American system depends on freedom, we are confident that our philosophy will prevail. Freedom is still the wave of the future. Detente means moderate and restrained behavior between two superpowers, not a license to fish in troubled waters. It means mutual respect and reciprocity, not unilateral concessions or one-sided agreements.

"With this attitude, I shall work with determination for a relaxation of tensions. The United States has nothing to fear from progress toward peace."

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 11, No. 34, pp. 871-2.

From the outset of his Administration, the President has stressed his commitment to work for improved relations with the Soviet Union in the interests of world peace. The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship with the USSR expresses the continuing desire of the vast majority of the American people for easing international tensions and reducing the chances of war while at the same time safeguarding our vital interests and our security. Such an improved relationship is in our competitor in many parts of the globe.

Through a combination of firmness and flexibility, however, the United States has laid the basis of a more stable relationship based upon mutual interest and mutual restraint.

Building from the understanding and objectives we share with our European allies, the United States has made progress with the Soviet

Union and Eastern Europe on an important range of issues aimed at lessening the chances for war and improving the opportunities for cooperation.

#### Administration Actions

In November 1974 at Vladivostok the President and General Secretary Brezhnev agreed on the general framework for a new strategic arms agreement that will set firm and equal limits on the strategic forces of both sides through 1985. The United States and the Soviet Union are currently engaged in negotiations to translate the Vladivostok accord into a formal ten-year agreement.

We have continued to exercise an active leadership role within the NATO Alliance in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. As expected, these negotiations have been both complex and difficult. The issues being addressed go to the very heart of the structure of European security and affect the vital interests of some nineteen participating countries. We are confident that if the discussions continue to be treated seriously by both sides, it will be possible to achieve a result that will advance the cause of peace in Europe and the security of all participants.

Pursuant to Article III of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of July 3, 1974, the United States and Soviet Union are engaged in negotiations to conclude an agreement at the earliest possible date governing the conduct of nuclear explosions, including peaceful nuclear explosions. The delegations have met regularly in a promising effort to achieve this goal.

In the European Security Conference, we have reached agreement on provisions aimed at assisting the process of reducing tensions and increasing contacts and cooperation between East and West. The CSCE document specifically recognizes the right of self-determination of peoples, includes a strong re-statement of the principle of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and gives a public commitment to a greater measure of freedom of movement of people and ideas than has existed in the past. The President believes that the inclusion of these provisions, in which the United States played an energetic part, has advanced the cause of peace in Europe and promoted the cause of human freedom. At the same time the Final Act was not a binding legal document. It did not ratify post-war frontier changes. The Final Act states only that frontiers cannot be changed through the use of force, a concept to which we have subscribed in the UN Charter. In addition, the document expressly provides that frontiers can be changed by peaceful means, thus indicating broad acceptance that the possibility for peaceful evolution, and frontier changes,



quite properly exists in Europe. This was a major concession by the Warsaw Pact and it refutes the charge that present borders are being permanently frozen.

By attending the Summit level conclusion of the Conference, the President helped place CSCE into perspective as an important element in our overall efforts toward a relaxation of tensions in Europe, which will require concrete efforts to carry out the commitment for freer movement of people and ideas which were undertaken in the Final Act of the Conference.

President Ford has met regularly with Soviet officials to further develop our bilateral relations and to continue the search for peace. His talks with General Secretary Brezhnev, Foreign Minister Gromyko and a number of government ministers with responsibilities for the wide-range of joint US-Soviet cooperative endeavors have contributed to progress on important negotiations and to a more reliable relationship based on mutual interest and mutual restraint.

NSC  
1/12/76

ISSUE:        US-Greek Relations

Administration Position

"Our goals in the Eastern Mediterranean in the months ahead -- to help the parties involved achieve a Cyprus settlement, to rebuild a relationship of trust and friendship with both Greece and Turkey, to alleviate the suffering on Cyprus and to meet Greece's needs for assistance -- are objectives on which we all can agree. Let us now join in working together to achieve them."

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 11, No. 40, p. 1112

On April 5, 1976, in his remarks to the AHEPA Banquet, the President stated:

"... my policy toward Greece is a policy toward positive action based on the many interests we share bilaterally, on our important ties as allies and on the very great ties of friendship and kinship between our peoples. This is my policy, this will continue to be my policy...."

Earlier, on October 3, 1975, in signing into law S.2230, the bill partially lifting arms restrictions on Turkey, the President stated in part:

"... the Administration intends to provide support to the democratic government of Greece. In that regard, we will pursue efforts to help that country overcome its current economic and security problems. Also, in compliance with S.2230, I will submit within 60 days my recommendations for assistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976." (On October 30, the President submitted to the Congress his FY 76 request for assistance to Greece.)

Administration Action

In FY 1976 the United States provided Greece with \$156 million in FMS credit, \$34 million grants, and \$65 million in security supporting assistance. In FY 1977 the US provided \$127 million in FMS credits and \$33 million in grants for a 27 month total of \$415 million in assistance.

On April 15, 1976, the President met in the White House with the Greek Foreign Minister to review US-Greek relations. On the same day, an announcement was made that the United States and Greece had initialed a "framework" bilateral security agreement, the details of which are now being negotiated. The agreement provides for our continued use of U.S. bases on Greek soil. In the

agreement, the United States will provide Greece over the next four years with security assistance totalling approximately \$700 million in a combination of grants, loans and guarantees. Negotiation of a few specific provisions of the agreement are continuing in Athens.

In August, the United States cooperated with three European allies to develop a UN Security Council Resolution on the Aegean dispute which was mutually acceptable to Greece and Turkey.

NSC  
10/18/76

Issue: U.S. -Philippine Military Base and Economic Negotiations

Administration Position

In the Joint Communique issued at Manila December 7 President Ford and Philippine President Marcos addressed the two major subjects on which we are now negotiating with the Philippines: a revision of our military base agreement and new agreements on trade and commercial relations. The communique stated:

"In the field of economic and commercial relations, they agreed that it was timely to conclude negotiations on a new agreement on trade, investment and related matters as a means to enhance economic cooperation between the two countries. This agreement would modernize the terms for conducting economic and commercial relations, taking account of the end of the Laurel-Langley agreement and giving due consideration to the requirements for the development of the Philippine economy. The Philippine Government stressed its urgent desires regarding United States tariff treatment for such significant Philippine products as mahogany and coconut oil.

"In the field of security cooperation, they declared that the alliance between the United States and the Philippines is not directed against any country, but is intended to preserve the independence and promote the welfare of their two peoples, while at the same time contributing to peace and progress to all. They considered that the treaty of August 30, 1951 enhanced the defense of both countries, strengthened the security of the Pacific region, and contributed to the maintenance of world peace. They agreed that the military bases used by the United States in the Philippines remain important in maintaining an effective United States presence in the Western Pacific in support of these mutual objectives."

Department of State Bulletin  
Vol. LXXIII, No. 1905, p. 925

Administration Actions

Joint Economic Negotiations opened in Washington March 29, 1976 and recessed two weeks later. Both sides are now considering the others' positions, and it is anticipated the talks will resume late in 1976.

Carlos P. Romulo, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, led a delegation to Washington April 12, 1976 to open bilateral negotiations to revise our military base agreements. Following this formal opening session, the talks resumed in Baguio in the Philippines June 15 with Ambassador William Sullivan leading the U.S. delegation.

NSC  
6/18/76

ISSUE: U. S. Relations with Vietnam

Administration Position

In his December 7 speech in Hawaii in which he enunciated his Pacific Doctrine, the President said:

"In Indochina, the healing effects of time are required. Our policies towards the new regimes of the Peninsula will be determined by their conduct toward us. We are prepared to reciprocate gestures of good will -- particularly the return of remains of Americans killed or missing in action or information about them.

"If they exhibit restraint toward their neighbors and constructive approaches to international problems, we will look to the future rather than to the past. "

Presidential Documents

Vol. 11, No. 50, p. 1357

"We are willing to talk with the Vietnamese. At my direction, we have exchanged messages with them, indicating our willingness to discuss outstanding issues in our two countries. We have made clear that our primary concern is to obtain an accounting for our servicemen who are missing in action. Without a satisfactory solution of the MIA issue, no further progress in our relations is possible. "

Remarks to National League of MIA/  
POW Families

July 24, 1976

Administration Actions

We have reciprocated all but the most recent Vietnamese gesture, the August 1, 1976 release of Americans and their relatives detained in Saigon since the fall of South Vietnam. In response to Hanoi's release of nine Americans whom it held captive, and the return of the remains of five members of our Armed Forces, the Administration expanded the categories of equipment and material we would approve private and humanitarian agencies sending to Vietnam. This action permitted the shipment of over \$3 million worth of aid to Vietnam.

We have also taken steps to improve our relations with Vietnam. At the President's direction, the Department of State informed the Vietnamese in March 1976 that we were prepared to discuss with them the whole range of issues facing our two countries, including an accounting for our men still missing or held prisoner in Indochina. The Vietnamese replied to this message and that dialogue is continuing.

NSC  
8/4/76

ISSUE:      US-Soviet Relations

Administration Position

The President said on March 5, 1976, at Bradley University, "This Administration believes that we have an obligation not to go back to the cold war where confrontation in effect took place literally every day of the year. We have an obligation to try and meet every problem individually, specifically, every issue as it comes up in an effort to negotiate rather than to confront, whether it is with the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China.

"We can do this effectively if we have the strength militarily and otherwise to have a two-way street. Now, the United States, despite what some critics have said, has not under any circumstances gotten the short end of the deal. We are good Yankee traders, and we have done darn well by the United States.

"Now, let's take the grain sales to the Soviet Union. I know some candidates for the Presidency have said that we ought to not make any sales, that we ought to buy all the grain from the farmers and store them in Government-owned warehouses, put that heavy lid over the price structure of our agriculture at a cost, as it was some ten years ago, of \$1 billion a day, about \$400 million a year.

"That is what it costs to store grain when we were not selling it overseas. I just don't think we should make our farm export problem the pawn of the international politics. By strong, effective negotiations we came out with a good agricultural deal with the Soviet Union.

"If we get a SALT II agreement that will keep a lid on strategic arms in the next seven to ten years, it will be to the benefit of the United States.

"Let me ask this very simple question: Is it better to have a mutual limit of 2,400 launchers and 1,320 MIRV missiles -- isn't that better than having 4,000 or 5,000 launchers or 2,000 or 4,000 MIRV missiles?

"Isn't that better for all of us? It really would be better if we could go below 2,400 and 1,320 as long as we had rough equivalents between the two super-powers.

"If we had an open thermonuclear arms race, that is not in the best interest of the United States on the world as a whole. We have an obligation to have rough equivalency that will deter aggression, either by us or by them, and permit us to do some things that are needed and necessary for the world as a whole, as well as for the United States.

"Any of these people that challenge us in these kinds of day-to-day negotiations, issue by issue, problem by problem, have not been in the ball game. They have lots of rhetoric, but I don't think they understand the problems."

#### Administration Actions

From the outset of his Administration, the President has stressed his commitment to work for improved relations with the Soviet Union. The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship with the USSR expresses the continuing desire of the vast majority of the American people for easing international tensions and reducing the chances of war while at the same time safeguarding our vital interests and our security.

The President has stated that the United States is the strongest nation on earth. Our military might is unmatched. Our economic and technological strength dwarf any other. Our heritage as a democracy of free people is envied by hundreds of millions around the world. In virtually every aspect of human endeavor, we are the most advanced country anywhere.

At the same time, the Soviet Union is a growing superpower. Because the United States and the Soviets are political opponents and military rivals, the US-Soviet relationship in this nuclear age has the most profound implications for global survival. When the President uses the term "peace through strength" to discuss our approach to the US-Soviet relationship, it is not because there has been a change in U.S. policy -- it is because he wants that policy to be clearly understood.

From the U.S. position of strength, it is the President's policy to assure the security of the United States. In U.S. dealings with the Soviet Union, it is the President's policy to move beyond an era of constant confrontations and crises, to prevent Soviet expansionism, to develop a more stable relationship based on restraint and respect. In keeping with this policy, the President on October 1, 1976 again met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko for a discussion of the major issues before the United States and the Soviet Union.

This is a policy involving mutual restraint, mutual respect and mutual benefit. There is no give-away, no one-way street. We pursue this policy because it is in our national interest to do so.

In November 1974 at Vladivostok the President and General Secretary Brezhnev agreed on the general framework for a new strategic arms agreement that will set firm and equal limits on the strategic forces of both sides through 1985. The United States and the Soviet Union are currently engaged in negotiations to translate the Vladivostok accord into a formal ten-year agreement.

-- We have taken historic and positive steps to limit strategic arms, steps that safeguard our vital interests while for the first time, promising to cap the growth of Soviet and American nuclear weapons at equal levels. Through mutual agreement, we have avoided a very costly and strategically futile ABM race -- in our current negotiations we are seeking to avoid a very costly and strategically futile offensive arms race. This is in our interests; our security is fully safeguarded in this process.

-- In trade, we have reached agreements on grain assuring income to American farmers and the enormously productive U. S. agricultural sector, earning foreign exchange for our economy and protecting American consumers from fluctuations in grain prices due to Soviet actions in the international grain market. We remain vigilant to ensure that US-Soviet trade does not affect our national security interests. Our country benefits -- in jobs and dollars -- from the sale of goods to the USSR. This is not a give-away; it is in our interests.

-- The President has made high-level contacts, including meetings at the summit, a more normal practice. These discussions have given each side a clearer understanding of the other's views; they have diminished the chances of misunderstanding or miscalculation. These discussions have increased the prospects for solutions to problems in our interest; they have lessened the risk of US-Soviet differences escalating to the flash-point.

The suspicions and rivalries of more than a generation cannot be swept away in a short time. Our political rivalry and military competition with the Soviet Union will continue. As the recent past has shown, our policy requires us simultaneously and with equal vigor to resist expansionist drives and to shape a more constructive relationship. There is no responsible alternative.

NSC  
10/18/76



the industrialized countries in a number of key areas. If we nurture the sense of common purpose and vision which has characterized these discussions, we have an opportunity to shape events and better meet the needs of our citizens and all the world."

Presidential Documents

Vol. 12, No. 27, p. 1090

On September 15, 1976, the President continued the process of intensive consultations with our NATO partners meeting at the White House with the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council and NATO Secretary General Luns.

NSC  
10/18/76

ISSUE:      US-Turkish Relations

Administration Position

"Our goals in the Eastern Mediterranean in the months ahead -- to help the parties involved achieve a Cyprus settlement, to rebuild a relationship of trust and friendship with both Greece and Turkey, to alleviate the suffering on Cyprus and to meet Greece's needs for assistance -- are objectives on which we all can agree. Let us now join in working together to achieve them. "

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 11, No. 40, p. 1112

United States military assistance to Turkey was cut off in February 1975 by action of the Congress. The aid cut-off by the Congress was intended to influence Turkey in the Cyprus negotiations. But the effect of the Congressional action has been to block progress toward reconciliation, thereby prolonging the suffering on Cyprus; to complicate our ability to promote successful negotiations; and to increase the danger of a broader conflict.

The total U.S. embargo on military assistance to Turkey imposed a strain on our relationship with this important NATO ally. Following the failure of the House in late July 1975 to partially restore military assistance to Turkey, the Turkish Government suspended operations at the joint US-Turkish defense bases and called for negotiation of our bilateral security agreement with Turkey.

Administration Action

Realizing the damage done to US/NATO security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and lack of progress to date in reaching a Cyprus settlement, the Congress at the urging of the President acted on October 2, 1975, to partially lift the embargo on U.S. arms for Turkey. Following the Congressional action, the President on October 3, 1975, outlined the objectives of U.S. policy toward Turkey:

"...we will seek to rebuild our security relationship with Turkey to underscore that Turkey's membership in the Western alliance and partnership with the United States serve the very important interest of both nations. "

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 11, No. 40, p. 1112

In this regard, the President and Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayanil met on March 24, 1976 to reaffirm our long-standing ties of friendship and alliance, and agree on the importance of building on and strengthening this relationship.

On March 26, 1976 the United States and Turkey signed a new Defense Cooperation Agreement providing for U.S. military assistance over the term of the agreement (\$800 million total in a combination of grants, loans and guarantees plus \$400 in EximBank credits) in exchange for a resumption of U.S. operations at the joint defense bases. The agreement will take effect after acceptance by both nations. On June 16, 1976, in submitting the DCA to the Congress for approval, the President stated:

"This Agreement restores a bilateral relationship that has been important to Western security for more than two decades. I believe it will promote U.S. interests and objectives on the vital southeastern flank of NATO and provide a framework for bilateral cooperation designed solely to reinforce NATO and our common security concerns. To the extent that the Agreement restores trust and confidence between the United States and Turkey, it also enhances the prospects for a constructive dialogue on other regional problems of mutual concern."

Presidential Message to the Congress  
June 16, 1976

Congressional action on the DCA is pending. Meanwhile, Congress has passed and the President signed the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 which makes up to \$250 million in military sales, credits, and guarantees available to Turkey in FY 1976 - 1977.

On July 29, the President met with Turkish Opposition Leader Bulent Evevit to discuss the interests Turkey and the United States share.

NSC  
8/9/76

ISSUE: US-USSR Relations -- The Affront of Angola

Administration Position

The President said in February 1976, in response to a question from the Inland Daily Press Association, at the White House, "First, I categorically deny that in our relations with the Soviet Union they have benefited more than we. That is just totally inaccurate.

"If we are going to talk about Angola, the blame should not be laid at the White House. The blame should be laid at Capitol Hill because I strongly said that we had to meet the challenge without U.S. military personnel in Angola.

"I signed a necessary document that said we would use certain amounts of money to provide arms to the FNLA and to the UNITA forces -- two out of the three forces in Angola. With the release of that money those two forces were beating the MPLA. Until the Congress said no, the forces we were supporting were prevailing.

"But the minute the Congress said no, and we couldn't provide our allies with what they needed, then the Soviet Union and Cuba won. It is just that simple.

"That is not a fault of the Administration or the Executive Branch. The Congress just failed to stand up and do what they should have done. So there can't be any blame of the Executive Branch in failing to challenge the Soviet Union. The Congress bugged out. That is just what it amounted to.

"So I can assure you, whether it is in Angola, or any place else, we are going to meet forthrightly the challenge of any nation that has aggressive interests beyond what we think are reasonable and fair. We challenged them in Angola, but we were precluded from doing what was necessary.

"I hope the Congress, if it happens again, will have a different attitude. And if they will, I think we can prevent expansionism any place throughout the world, as I think we should.

"What really worries me -- and I was talking to a very astute person this morning about this -- if you will refresh your memory you will recall in the 1930's when Mussolini went into Ethiopia and the allies did nothing, absolutely nothing, that was the invitation for further aggression, whether it was in Africa in that instance or elsewhere.

"Now I am not saying Angola is identical, but it has enough similarity that we ought to look in past history and learn from it. And I hope the Congress recognizes that every time we fail to act where aggression is obvious, it just invites a greater action someplace else.

"We are going to meet the challenge unless the Congress continues to handcuff us.

"Let me assure you if we sign the SALT agreement, it will be an agreement in our interest in world peace; it will be a good, two-way, Yankee trader agreement, nothing more, nothing less."

Presidential Documents  
Vol.12 , No.9 , p. 289

#### Administration Actions

The President believes that the success of our relations with the Soviet Union depends very much on what we do. If we unilaterally cut our defenses; if we deprive ourselves of economic tools as instruments of our diplomacy; if we undermine SALT negotiations and leave Soviet programs unconstrained; if -- as has been the case -- through the actions of the Congress we fail to block Soviet moves in local conflicts such as Angola, we are tearing down both their incentives for restraint and the penalties for their improper action. If we deprive ourselves of the tools of our own policy, we cannot then be surprised at the unsatisfactory results. Building better US-USSR relations and the peace this promises depend upon America meeting its responsibilities. This is common sense.

NSC

3/15/76

ISSUE:      Western Europe

Administration Position

In remarks at the Pentagon on March 29, 1976, the President said:

All of us recognize that the aim of our Alliance is not strength for its own sake but strength for peace. Our aim in Europe is security and the true relaxation of tension -- not perpetual confrontation. The stability that we have insured in Europe by maintaining the military balance for 30 years, which we must maintain, creates opportunities for confident diplomacy. To diffuse powder kegs such as Berlin or to negotiate on mutual and balanced force reductions -- this has been NATO's declared policy for nearly a decade.

The stability also creates opportunities for building bridges, for seeking greater communication and understanding among peoples of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the West. It builds an environment in which free movements of people and ideas can take place.

As I stated emphatically before all of the leaders of the Communist as well as the Western countries of Europe, there can be no true security and cooperation in Europe until human rights and freedom are expanded everywhere. The United States and the Atlantic Alliance stand for freedom. That is our policy and that is the policy of the American people.

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 12, No. 14, pp. 506-507

A week later, at the swearing in of Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupe as the new representative to the North Atlantic Alliance, the President underscored that:

For over a quarter of a century, NATO has served as a bulwark of Western defenses. It has successfully deterred aggression against the North Atlantic community. The United States is totally committed to the NATO alliance. It is a cornerstone of our foreign policy -- has been and is and will be in 1976 -- as it has been over a quarter of a century, and it will continue to be in the future. We have stood firm in the defense of liberty for two centuries, and we shall also always be faithful to that heritage.

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 12, No. 15, pp. 572-573

The President's foreign policy has been aimed at one central objective -- that of safeguarding and advancing the interests of all Americans in the face of strategic, political, economic and energy challenges and opportunities of immense complexity. In this process, our relations with our friends and allies in Western Europe and Canada have been of the greatest importance.

Over the two years, we have strengthened the process of consultations with our friends and we have made progress in negotiations with competitors aimed at producing a more peaceful, more stable world. Our foreign policy has reflected a total commitment to working with our friends to safeguard and advance U.S. and allied interests.

Little more than an hour after the President took the Oath of Office on August 9, 1974, he asked the Ambassadors of the NATO nations to meet with him at the White House, and in that meeting emphasized that the Atlantic Alliance remains the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and that he looked forward to working as closely as possible with the nations of Western Europe to ensure a strong and prosperous trans-Atlantic relationship. Since that meeting he has met at least once with the leaders of every member of the Alliance. The very productive NATO summit in Brussels on May 29-30, 1975, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation Summit in late July 1975 provided welcome opportunities for intensive consultations. President Ford believes these meetings, characterized by a spirit of friendship and candor, have helped bring about impressive achievements by the industrialized democracies in recent months -- above all, clear demonstrations of the capacity of the West to deal with common problems.

#### Administration Actions

We have improved the process of consultation with the Allies.

Together, the United States and Western Europe have created the International Energy Agency to face economic problems and an energy challenge of unparalleled proportions. We are tackling the problems of energy conservation and alternate sources and continuing our discussions with the producer countries to further understanding and to seek solutions in our mutual interest.

We have worked hard to maintain a strong and credible defense at a time when each NATO member must cope with severe budgetary demands. Initial steps have been taken to achieve more efficient use of existing defense resources, for example, through standardization of equipment -- an effort underscored by the decision in 1975 of four allies to adopt and to co-produce the U.S. F-16 fighter aircraft and the U.S. Army's recent decision to purchase Belgian-built machine guns.

President Ford's trip to Europe in May 1975 for the NATO summit afforded the welcome opportunity for meetings not only with NATO heads of government but also with leaders in European countries of great importance to the Spanish ties and consultations aimed at future cooperation. In Rome, talks with Italian President Leone and Premier Moro resulted in renewed confidence in the strength of Italian-American friendship and the clarity of the goals we share as Allies and as democracies. The President's meeting at Vatican City and Pope Paul VI permitted a valuable review of major humanitarian issues confronting mankind.

Similarly, the President's trip to Europe in July-August 1975 served to reinforce our ties with our traditional allies through his visit to the Federal Republic of Germany and by demonstrating at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki our deep and continued interest in European affairs and our commitment to the maintenance of peace and security, and the advancement of human rights throughout Europe. In his remarks to the Conference, the President sketched his vision of European-American relations when he said that "My presence here symbolizes my country's vital interest in Europe's future. Our future is bound with yours. Our economic well-being as well as our security, is linked increasingly with yours. The distance of geography is bridged by our common heritage and our common destiny. The United States, therefore, intends to participate fully in the affairs of Europe and in turning the results of this conference into a living reality."

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 11, No. 32, p. 813  
August 1, 1975

The President's affirmation of the United States' intention to participate fully in the affairs of Europe was demonstrated soon thereafter when he met in November with the heads of the governments of several of our NATO allies and of Japan at Rambouillet, France to discuss the world economic situation and economic problems common to the industrialized democracies. Agreement was reached at Rambouillet that sustained, stable economic growth in the industrial nations would be facilitated by cooperative efforts.

Encouraged by significant progress toward economic recovery in the months following the Rambouillet conference but foreseeing new challenges ahead, the President proposed in late spring that a second such meeting be convened in Puerto Rico in June to establish a cooperative, coordinated approach to managing effectively the transition to sustainable economic expansion without a resurgence of inflation. At the conclusion of the Puerto Rico summit, the President noted the positive results and concluded that the meeting and his bilateral talks with the leaders of France, West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan and Canada had "strengthened prospects for progress by



the industrialized countries in a number of key areas. If we nurture the sense of common purpose and vision which has characterized these discussions, we have an opportunity to shape events and better meet the needs of our citizens and all the world. "

Presidential Documents  
Vol. 12, No. 27, p. 1090

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8/6/76