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MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

How do you see the United States role in a Middle East settlement Q: process? Are you optimistic about further movement on a settlement?

I am fully committed to continue the efforts which the United States has undertaken to help the nations and the peoples of the Middle East achieve a just and durable peace. The meetings which Secretary Kissinger and I had in August and September in Washington and New York with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, King Hussein and Prime Minister Rifai of Jordan, and the Israeli and Arab Foreign Ministergwere for the purpose of maintaining the momentum for peace which began with the Geneva Conference and the disengagement agreements between Egypt, Syria and Israel. It was clear from these talks that the governments of the area very much want and need our assistance in moving ahead toward a settlement through negotiations within the Geneva Conference framework. As a result of these talks, and at the invitation of the governments concerned, Secretary Kissinger visited the area earlier this month to clarify the prospects and procedures for another round of negotiations. He will return to the area in the near future to try to work out the specific modalities to be followed.

Some may ask why the United States is playing such an active water and a star of a star of a role in an area far removed from our shores. The consequences

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of another conflict in the area are potentially more dangerous than ever before for the peoples of the area and the world as a whole. It would be totally irresponsible were the United States not to make every effort to help the parties themselves find a permanent solution to their differences and to help work out a new cooperative relationship among the countries and peoples of the Middle East and between them and the rest of the world.

Our efforts have taken a number of different forms. The most visible has been the determined, skillful diplomacy of Secretary Kissinger. Also, we have continued our past policy of seeking to maintain that strategic military balance in the area which is essential for the preservation of peace and movement toward a settlement. Less visible but equally important are our efforts to assist and encourage the development of a new economic and social climate conducive to continued peace rather than renewed conflict.

I am encouraged by the progress made so far. The important thing now is that movement continues in a process of step-by-step agreements to maintain the momentum toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

- 2 -

Q:

During Prime Minister Rabin's recent visit to the U.S., he reportedly asked for \$1.5 billion a year in military assistance for the next several years. How did you respond? Was your response tied to Israeli concessions in the negotiations?

A: I discussed all aspects of our relations with the Prime Minister. Military assistance is only one aspect of the long-standing close U.S.-Israeli relationship and is an expression of our commitment to the security and well-being of the State of Israel. We have affirmed that commitment many times. Israel's ability to defend itself is essential to stability and to achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and I assured the Prime Minister that our military supply relationship will continue and that we will not bargain with the security of our friends. As for the precise financial implications, they remain under continuing review.

MIDDLE EAST - AID TO THE ARABS

Do you support the proposed economic aid to the Middle East -- \$250 million for Egypt and \$100 million Special Requirement Fund (Syria) -- presently under Congressional consideration? What would happen if no aid Bill passed this year?

I strongly support the proposed legislation authorizing the extension of economic assistance to several countries in the Middle East, including Israel and Egypt. The Middle East assistance package is of the greatest importance to the success of our efforts to help bring peace to that part of the world and to further develop the cooperative bilateral ties between the United States and nations of that area. We should be in a position to do all we can to assist the countries in that area turn their efforts toward reconstruction and economic development as part of their movement toward a durable peace settlement. Given the obvious interest for the United States as well as the countries of the area in peace and mutual good relations at this critical period, I intend to continue to work with the Congress in an effort to achieve an acceptable Foreign Assistance Bill including Middle East assistance by the end of this year.

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- Q:
- Where do the Palestinians fit into any Middle East peace settlement you foresee?
- A: The question of the future of the Palestinian people is another important aspect of the Middle East problem, one which becomes increasingly important as progress is made on other issues. There can be no question but that full consideration must be given the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people if there is to be a just and durable settlement. The United States recognizes this vital fact and we are determined to do our best to assist the parties to find an equitable solution for the Palestinians who have for so long been displaced, as well as for Israel and the other states and peoples in the areas.

Q:

A:

In light of concern about nuclear non-proliferation and Arab oil supplies, how do you explain our willingness to supply nuclear technology and materials to a volatile area such as the Middle East, including Egypt and Israel?

It is our belief that nuclear power, no less than conventional technologies, can make an important contribution to economic progress in the area and thereby contribute to stability. As Secretary Kissinger indicated in his UN speech, we are involved in an intensive review of our non-proliferation objectives with a view to assuring that a threat to international peace will not arise because of the spread of nuclear technology. Our proposals to cooperate with Egypt and Israel in the field of nuclear power include strict safeguards designed to prevent the misuse of U.S.-supplied assistance.

I can assure you that the United States opposes nuclear proliferation and is determined that our cooperation in the supply of nuclear power should not be diverted to any unintended uses. We must also keep in mind that the United States is not the only country in a position to supply nuclear technology and that other countries may not insist on equally vigorous safeguards.

ARMS AID TO PAKISTAN

- Q: How about our arms supply policy? Pakistan is pressing for a change. Are we going to go along with that?
- A: Our objective in South Asia is to see that area move towards long-term peace and stability. We will determine our particular policies within this framework, so that our policies will contribute to, rather than upset, South Asian stability and contribute to meaningful progress towards long-term regional relationships resting on the independence and integrity of each state in the area. No decision has been made to revise our current policy, but that policy remains under continuing review.

<u>Q:</u> How do you assess the current state of US-European relations?
<u>A:</u> Since I entered the Congress in 1949, I have believed that it is important for the United States to have a strong alliance with NATO and Western Europe. This policy has paid -- and continues to pay -- sizable dividends to all members of the Alliance.

The Atlantic Declaration signed in Brussels this summer provides a fresh affirmation of the NATO Alliance by its members and marks a renewed spirit of unity and common purpose in the West. I intend to continue efforts to broaden and strengthen the partnership the Declaration symbolizes.

In recent weeks, I have met with a number of Allied leaders -the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and West Germany, and the Presidents of Italy and Portugal. In the near future, as part of these continuing meetings, I will meet with the President of France, the West German Chancellor and the Canadian Prime Minister.

In all of these meetings, I have stressed and will continue to stress the importance of close consultations on matters of mutual interest. I have emphasized that the nations of the West face major challenges -- financial, energy, security -- that will require our best common efforts if we are to meet them successfully. US-European relations currently are very good. Based on my meetings with Allied leaders and the will to cooperate expressed in the Atlantic Declaration, I am optimistic that jointly we can meet and overcome the problems that confront us.

U.S-SOVIET RELATIONS

Q: Detente with the Soviet Union has become a controversial issue, both in the press and on the Hill. Could you comment on the general state of US-Soviet relations and on the proposition that the Soviets have made real gains under detente while we have gotten little in return?

A: The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union expresses the continuing desire of the vast majority of the American people for an easing of international tensions while safeguarding our security. I am committed to continuing to work for better relations with the Soviets in the belief that it is in our real interests and in the interests of a more peaceful world.

Now, there is no question that the Soviet Union obtains benefits from detente. How else could Soviet leaders justify it? But the essential point surely is that detente serves American interests as well. On the global scale, in terms of the conventional measures of security, our interests, far from suffering. have generally prospered. In many areas of the world, the influence and the respect we enjoy are greater than was the case for many years. Real detente -- the course I am committed to -- does not involve gains at US expense.

Continued effort to engage the Soviets in a relationship characterized by mutual restraint and accommodation is an absolute imperative in the present world situation. Equally imperative, of course, are the needs to maintain a strong defense posture and close ties with our traditional friends. The task before us is to conduct US-Soviet relations in a way that will protect our own security and other interests, benefit other nations of the world, and progressively deepen the commitment of the USSR to mutual restraint, accommodation and increasing cooperation as the governing principles of our relations.

In this context, I believe the prospects for major progress are good insofar as they depend on our actions. I have informed the Soviet leaders that it is my intention to continue the course of Soviet-American relations charted in summit meetings in Moscow and Washington, in agreements reached by our two governments, and in the general spirit of cooperation that has been established. I am firmly committed to that course. My Administration will approach the negotiations with the USSR already in progress or projected in coming weeks with utmost seriousness and determination to achieve concrete and lasting results -- results in the best interests of the United States and in the interests of improved international stability. Personally, I am hopeful that the Soviet Union shares these objectives and will continue to work in earnest with us in this approach.

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US-SOVIET SUMMIT IN VLADIVOSTOK

(FYI: Your meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev in Vladivostok will be announced on Saturday, October 26 at 11:00 a.m. Your interview with Mr. Reasoner will precede the announcement. Mr. Reasoner will be aware of a possible Vladivostok meeting and presumably will question you about it. To make the interview as current as possible, you will want to respond as if the announcement had been made.)

- Q: What do you hope to accomplish during your meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev in November? What will be the focus of your discussions?
- A: From the outset of my Administration, I have stressed my commitment to working for improved relations with the Soviet Union in the interests of world peace. It is in this spirit that I will meet General Secretary Brezhnev in November. I look forward to the working meeting in Vladivostok as an opportunity to become acquainted with the General Secretary and to exchange

views with him on matters of mutual interest. Inasmuch as this will be our first meeting, I expect our discussions to cover a broad range of issues in US-Soviet relations, including the several negotiations in which our two countries are now engaged. We also will be looking ahead in our talks to the General Secretary's visit to the United States next year. Q: Reports say you have assured the Soviet leaders of extensive efforts to further arms limitation negotiations. Other reports say the US has no agreed SALT position. Where do you plan to go next on SALT?

A:

Shortly after I took office, I sent a message to General Secretary Brezhnev reaffirming our commitment to further substantive negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms. I personally gave this same message to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko during our discussions in Washington last month.

The SALT negotiations resumed in Geneva in mid-September and have now been in continuous session for almost six weeks. As agreed at the recent Moscow Summit, this round of negotiations is focusing on an agreement covering the period until 1985. The US Delegation in Geneva has been putting forth the US position on the framework for the 1985 agreement. The Soviets have similarly been putting forth their position. Obviously, at this stage of the negotiations we have not resolved all the differences in the positions of the two sides. We believe, however, there is common ground which can form the basis for an agreement.

Secretary Kissinger was in Moscow last week discussing a number of topics of mutual interest with the Soviet leadership. SALT was a major topic of discussion and some progress was made in narrowing our differences with the Soviets and laying a foundation for movement toward an agreement. I am looking forward to additional discussions on SALT in the Vladivostok meeting.

GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS

Your Administration is being accused of "tilting" toward Turkey, Q: being unfair to Greece, and thus seriously damaging our relations with that country. Could you comment on this and the U.S. role in the Cyprus crisis?

We have not "titled" toward Turkey. The diplomatic efforts of the United States have focussed on three essential objectives:

-- to stop the fighting on Cyprus;

-- to assist in relieving the human suffering of the people of

Cyprus;

-- to assist the parties toward productive negotiations for the

restoration of peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. We have made progress in each area. A ceasefire has been achieved and is holding. The United States has urged military restraint and we have supported every UN Security Council resolution on Cyprus, including the most recent resolution disapproving unilateral military actions taken against the Republic of Cyprus and urging that negotiations be resumed among the parties.

The United States has been a major contributor to international efforts aimed at relieving suffering on the island. I have directed that money and supplies be provided to the International Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. By December 31, we will have contributed more than \$7.6 million to this Cyprus relief effort.

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In seeking to bring the parties into productive negotiations, the United States has maintained direct and frequent contact with the leaders of the Greek, Turkish and Cypriot Governments. We have been encouraged by the talks which have begun on Cyprus between Acting President Clerides and Vice President Denktash.

The United States is prepared to play a more active role, if that is what the parties desire, in helping to find a solution to the difficult Cyprus problem. Such a role would be in the context of the continuing overall goals I have set; to preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus and to restore stability and peace to the Eastern Mediterranean. I want to emphasize that the U.S. greatly values the friendship of Greece, Cyprus and Turkey, and it is in this context that we will continue to offer our assistance.

I believe that our ability to pursue these goals depends on being able to maintain a constructive relationship with the parties involved. I concluded that the cut-off of assistance to Turkey imposed by the restrictive provisions of the Continuing Resolution would be destructive of that relationship and might, in fact, destroy any hope for the success of initiatives the U.S. has already taken or may take to restrictive to a just settlement of the Cyprus problem. These restrictions threaten our relations with Turkey, a crucial member

of an alliance vital to the strategic interests of the U.S., and instead of encouraging the parties to return to the negotiating table, an arms cutoff to Turkey could mean the postponement of meaningful negotiations. As a result of my vetoes of two earlier versions of this Continuing Resolution, Congress eased the most troublesome of the earlier restrictions and after a three-week delay in providing necessary funds for the operation of several departments and agencies, I signed, with serious reservations, the Continuing Resolution.

The problems created by these legislative restrictions with respect to our relations with Turkey are not compensated for in any way by benefits to Greece or the Greek Cypriots. Contrary to the intentions of the supporters of these restrictions, this bill can only hinder progress toward a settlement which is so much in the interest of both Greece and the people of Cyprus.

Nevertheless, I will do my best to accomplish the goals which we had set. Q: Why are you going to Japan? How would you describe our relationship with Japan as you prepare for your trip?

<u>A:</u> I told Prime Minister Tanaka that I consider our close relationship with Japan of vital importance to the United States. I am happy to say that it is probably closer now than it has ever been. Japan's economic well-being as well as her security are closely linked with our own.

We shall continue to work closely with Japan which is one of the most important countries in the world and one of our strongest allies. My forthcoming visit to Japan -- the first by any American President -- best symbolizes this new era in our relations and I look forward to discussing additional areas of US - Japanese cooperation in the common challenges we face.

JAPAN - NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROTESTS

Q: Are you concerned that the recent protests in Japan may offset your plans to visit there? Have you assured Prime Minister Tanaka that American ships do not carry nuclear weapons when they visit Japanese ports?

All of the information that has come to me indicates that the
vast majority of Japanese people want me to come to Japan just
as the American people will welcome the Japanese Emperor's
visit to the United States next year.

It has long been U.S. policy not to confirm or deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons deployed anywhere. This is something we do not discuss for valid security reasons. Let me simply assure you that the United States Government has no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese Government.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The opening to China was one of the most distinctive aspects Q: of former President Nixon's foreign policy. Do you intend to sustain his efforts to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China? Why has there been no apparent movement in U.S.-PRC relations in the past year? When do you foresee full normalization and establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC?

In many ways Mr. Nixon's successful efforts to open an official A: dialogue with the People's Republic of China marked the breakthrough in his policy of moving from an era of confrontations to one of negotiations. I fully subscribe to those past efforts, and intend to pursue the policy of further normalizing U.S. - PRC relations outlined in the Shanghai Communique.

I disagree with the view there has been no movement in U.S. -PRC relations. The United States has made very rapid progress since 1971 in establishing contact with a country from which we had been completely isolated for two decades. We have set up Liaison Offices in Peking and Washington. Our trade with the PRC has grown from about 5 million dollars in 1971 to what is expected to be a billion dollars this year. We continue to have an active cultural and scientific exchange program with the Chinese. A Congressional delegation, headed by Senator Fulbright, recently returned from a two-week tour of China. I expect that Secretary Kissinger will be visiting Peking later this year.

As I indicated in my address to Congress on August 12, I remain committed to the course of improved relations charted in the Shanghai Communique. We look forward to continuing progress in strengthening those relations in the months and years ahead.

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- Q: How do you justify your visit to Korea in light of the repressive regime governing that country? Do you favor continuing US military and economic aid to the Park regime in Korea, which uses US support to strengthen its repression of human rights?
- <u>A:</u> In planning my trip to Japan, I gave careful consideration to an invitation from the Korean Government. You will recall that Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson visited Korea. Korea is one of our long-standing allies, and we have important security interests in the Korean peninsula. We still maintain a sizeable military presence there. I took all of these factors, including criticism of recent Korean internal political policies, into careful account and decided that, on balance, it was in our national interest to accept the Korean invitation.

We have made clear to the Korean Government our views on the question of human rights, and shall continue to do so. But whatever may be our disagreements, Korea is, some twenty years after a devastating communist invasion and war, a strong and independent country. The US has lessened its overall assistance substantially, and grant aid is continuing to decline. But the existence of an independent, self-reliant Republic of Korea is a key element of our efforts to maintain the stability and security of Northeast Asia. We consider these interests of paramount importance. I believe the prevention of war on the Korean Peninsula is the first and most important step toward making possible conditions in which free political and social institutions can develop. Withholding essential economic and military assistance could well have the opposite effect.

OUR OVERALL POLICY IN VIETNAM

Q: After all we have been through with Vietnam over the past ten years, it is still a major issue in the country. What is your policy in regard to Vietnam, what obligations do we still have there and what actions do you plan to take over the next two years?

A:____

Our basic objective in Vietnam is to make the peace agreements work and thus give the Vietnamese people a reasonable chance to decide their future for themselves. Those agreements were reached after considerable effort. They represented, and they still represent, a major contribution to world stability. We want to see them carried out.

In pursuit of this objective, our policy follows two lines:

-- First, we encourage observance of the specific provisions of the Agreement. For example, we have supported the International Control Commission and we are urging all parties to contribute their share of the funds needed to permit it to continue its work. We are also doing all we can to get a full accounting for our men missing in action. We are encouraging the Vietnamese parties to talk to each other. Most important, we have kept our obligation to withdraw all American troops and to provide war materials to SouthVietnam only on a replacement basis.

-- At the same time, while trying to make the agreements work, we must help our friends as long as the fighting continues. The North Vietnamese have sent over a hundred and sixty thousand men into South Vietnam since the cease-fire along with large quantities of new supplies. It is quite proper for us to provide enough economic and military assistance to help our friends defend themselves and reconstruct their economy. We are no longer doing the fighting, but our aid is essential for those who are. It is also essential in demonstrating to the Vietnamese and the rest of the world that we are reliable and responsible allies.

We believe that the combination of these policies will work. We have been encouraged by the efforts of the South Vietnamese Government to implement the agreement and by its attempts to reach a peaceful settlement with the other side. We regret that the Communists have rejected out of hand Saigon's proposals for direct talks with Hanoi and for free general elections. We continue to hope that a momentum can be started toward a political settlement.

Some Americans are discouraged about Vietnam. But we should not forget the positive developments that show the progress made:

-- Americans are no longer fighting in Vietnam, and the South Vietnamese are able to defend themselves without our troops.

-- Even though the cease-fire is not completely effective, the level of fighting is lower than it was before the cease-fire.

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We are not yet at the end of the road. There may even be an upsurge in the fighting. Our continued economic and military assistance is still essential. But I do not believe that Americans should be discouraged or speak of walking away from a part of the world where so much has already been accomplished.

VIETNAM

Why do We Continue to Support President Thieu?

There have been a number of recent reports from South Vietnam indicating that several popular demonstrations against President Thieu have taken place. Other reports outline the corruption and undemocratic repressive measures which pervade his administra-Still others state that it is Thieu who refuses to make the tion. necessary accommodations with the Communists to bring about a genuine peace. In the face of all of this, why do we continue to support President Thieu? Would it not be more in our interest now to endorse a more moderate man who can really bring peace?

President Thieu is the elected head of the constitutional government in South Vietnam seeking to maintain the independence of this country. That is why we support him and his administration.

Under the circumstances -- a continued high level of infiltration from the North and heavy attacks by enemy forces in many areas --I believe that the achievements made in the past year toward rebuilding the economy and getting on with the process of nation building have been truly remarkable.

Let me give you a couple of examples:

-- One of the largest and most successful land reform programs in history has been carried out.

-- Hundreds of thousands of war victims and refugees have been resettled.

I believe the record clearly shows that the Communist side, not President Thieu, is mainly to blame for the absence of a

Q:

A:

peaceful settlement. The Thieu Government has gone far in implementing the Agreement and in attempting to reach a peaceful settlement with the other side.

On March 29, 1974 the Government of South Vietnam proposed in Paris a specific date for free general elections to be preceded by the formation of the National Council of reconciliation and Concord and by negotiated agreements on other democratic internal problems. The South Vietnamese Government has also proposed direct talks with Hanoi on improving relations between North and South Vietnam. All of these South Vietnamese proposals were rejected out of hand by the Communist side.

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Why do we continue to provide so much aid to South Vietnam? Does not this just allow the war to go on and the destruction continue? Specifically in Vietnam by cutting aid won't we be able to force President Thieu to make a political settlement? It has also been charged that the United States is violating the Paris Agreements by continuing to provide military assistance to the Thieu Government. With inflation so rampant at home, shouldn't we now drastically cut aid to Vietnam?

First of all, it is the Communist side, not the GVN, that is A: continuing the war by refusing to implement the ceasefire:

> -- The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese have refused to contribute to the International Commission on Control and Supervision (ICCS) budget and have never assisted the ICCS in implementing the ceasefire.

-- They have walked out of the talks in Paris and they have boycotted the talks in Saigon.

-- They have refused to let us search for any of our MIAs. South Vietnam has repeatedly called for a complete implementation of all political provisions of the Agreement with a fixed date for elections. The Communist side has refused even to discuss these proposals.

If by cutting off aid and political support we force the GVN to accommodate the Communists while the Communists are blatantly violating the Agreement, it will undermine the political stability of the GVN side and could lead to a Communist takeover.

Q:

If we leave the South Vietnamese without sufficient means to defend themselves, this may convince Hanoi that it can win a military victory and lead to a renewed offensive.

I am very disappointed with the moves in Congress to cut military assistance drastically. In my meetings with the bipartisan leadership, I have asked the Congress to reconsider its actions. On the military side, we have asked for minimum amounts to assure adequate replacement of equipment on a onefor-one basis, as provided in the Paris Agreement, and to cope with increased levels of fighting. The amount of assistance recently approved by both Houses is inadequate to provide for all of their critical needs, if South Vietnam's enemies continue to press their attacks. I intend to discuss with the leaders of the Congress how we can provide the assistance necessary.

Our request for economic aid has thus far been cut about in half by Congressional action. Such an amount would fail even to maintain the status quo. We would hope to be able to help in the vital reconstruction process and to give South Vietnam an opportunity to build a viable, self-sufficient economy. Over the long run, that would mean less American aid.

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CAMBODIA - US MAJOR POLICY AIMS

- Q: What are our policy aims in Cambodia? Why are we still actively involved there? When do you see this involvement ending?
- A: Our major goal now is to see a negotiated settlement in Cambodia. The war there has gone on far too long. The other side has failed in its efforts to take Cambodia by military means. We believe negotiations should take place now. The Cambodian Government has recently called for unconditional talks. We fully support this move. Until there is a settlement, we will continue to support and assist our friends. We believe that only when the other side firmly believes it cannot win, will they be willing to talk.

Mr. President, you have just returned from a meeting with the President of Mexico at which you discussed a range of subjects, including hemispheric affairs. What is your view of U.S. policy toward Latin American and what can we expect in the coming year in this area of foreign policy?

Q:

A:

Over the past year, the U.S. has been giving renewed attention to its relations with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Together we have been working to broaden and deepen our relations, and important progress has been made toward establishing a frank, open dialogue and regular consultations on a broad range of subjects. Periodic conferences of the Foreign Ministers have been established to facilitate this development. Also, I have met in recent months with a number of leaders from the Hemisphere, and most recently with the President of Mexico, to discuss regional matters and to hear the views of these leaders on subjects of interest or concern to them. I expect this process to continue.

We have also made significant progress toward resolving some longstanding bilateral problems in the region over the last year and we will be continuing our efforts to resolve remaining problems. I am sure that with a continuing spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, our efforts to resolve such issues through negotiation and mutual compromise and to strengthen further Hemispheric relations will be productive. I assure you the efforts of my Administration over the coming years will be directed toward this end.

10/22

The Organization of American States (OAS) has begun consideration on possible lifting of the sanctions against Cuba: Senators Javits and Pell visited Cuba and reported that Prime Minister Castro is interested in better relations with the U.S. and that his release of four U.S.-citizen prisoners is evidence of this desire; and Prime Minister Castro in a CBS interview indicated he thought an improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations would be possible under your Administration. What is your position on U.S. policy toward Cuba and do you regard these as signals from Cuba indicated its desire for improved U.S.-Cuban relations.

A:

As you know, the Organization of American States, which voted against the Castro Government because of charges brought by member governments that Cuba was intervening in their internal affairs, has approved a resolution calling for reconsideration of the Cuba sanctions question. There will be a meeting of the Rio Treaty parties in Quito in November to discuss the issue. During this OAS process, we will be consulting with other governments in the Hemisphere regarding their views. Should the members of that forum decide that the conditions which gave rise to the Cuba resolutions no longer obtain, then that would certainly be one element we would weigh in any considerations of our own policies.

Now, it has long been our position that we would be prepared to consider a change in our policy toward Cuba if and when Cuba demonstrates that it has changed its policies. Of course we always look for consistent indications of a desire on Cuba's part to establish a peaceful and constructive relationship with the U.S.

Q:
CHILE - COVERT OPERATIONS - 40 COMMITTEE

Q: You have expressed your support for CIA and covert operations such as those in Chile. Do you intend to "destabilize" other governments in the future? Will the 40 Committee continue to operate?

A:

The U.S. had no role in the coup in Chile; we did not encourage or support the coup. Our efforts were designed to support the democratic process in Chile and to preserve media outlets. So while I reject your characterization of what the government did in Chile, there may be occasions in the future, as there have been in the past, where the national interest may require that some action be taken in support of our foreign policy which it would not be appropriate to announce publicly.

The 40 Committee is a component of the NSC system. It provides a forum to review and evaluate sensitive operations. I can assure you -- and I have discussed this with the leaders of Congress and CIA Director Colby -- that all such actions are subject to critical review and careful control through the NSC system and approved by me. They are taken under laws approved by the Congress, using funds provided by the Congress, and are reported to the committees designated by the Congress to review these operations.

Future covert operations, if required, will be authorized only to protect our national security and only then when other means will

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not accomplish that necessary objective. I am satisfied that our current procedures will ensure that this will be done.

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AFRICA

Q: There continues to be criticism that your Administration is ignoring Africa. What is your Administration's policy towards Africa?

A: African interests will be taken seriously in the foreign policy of my Administration. Our goal is to increase our understanding of the problems and aspirations of Africa and to find new ways in which we can be helpful. Recently, I met with President Siad [See-AHD] of Somalia, who is the current President of the Organization of African Unity, and had an opportunity to pursue with him matters of common interest. I look forward to continued contacts of this sort with Africa's leaders.

Recently there have been some heartening developments in Africa, particularly with regard to the Portuguese territories. We have recognized the new state of Guinea-Bissau and supported its membership in the United Nations. We follow with keen interest the developments in Mozambique and Angola and have expressed our appreciation to the Portuguese for their efforts to provide self-determination to these peoples, a step we have urged all along.

Lastly, I think we should keep in mind the basic humanitarian concern the American people have always felt for the peoples

of Africa. The United States response to the disastrous drought in Africa which began in 1972 is a clear example of that concern. The United States Government has been the largest donor throughout the emergency period, providing approximately 40 percent of the total in foodstuffs and other relief supplies. Through the end of fiscal 1974 we had committed over 600,000 tons of foodstuffs worth approximately \$120 million, and have given another \$29 million in non-foodstuffs. This type of assistance will continue. We are also joining with others to assist the affected states in medium and long-term development projects which will permit them to provide for their own needs.

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SOUTH AFRICA

Q: There have recently been news reports that your predecessor's Administration adopted a "secret tilt toward the white supremacist states."

A: Our policy toward Africa is not secret, and U.S. actions toward Africa make quite clear the unfairness of such characterization The United States Government's views about South Africa's dehumanizing system of apartheid have been expressed repeatedly in the United Nations, other international forums, and in public statements. We also continue to enforce an embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa. We have a ban on naval visits and a neutral stance on U.S. investment. On the other hand, we do not believe that isolating South Africa from the influence of the rest of the world is an effective way of encouraging them to follow a course of moderation and to accommodate change. Nor can we associate ourselves with violent solutions to the problems of southern

Africa.

World Food Problem

A:

Q: What is the United States doing to help meet the world food crisis? What will be the U. S. position at the World Food Conference in Rome?

> As I said at the United Nations, the United States recognizes the special obligation we bear because of our extraordinary agricultural productivity, advanced technology and our tradition of humanitarian assistance. This is why we proposed a World Food Conference and we are determined to make a contribution equal to the magnitude of the problem.

We are convinced that an international cooperative response to the problem of food is essential to the kind of world we seek. Secretary Kissinger will put forth comprehensive U. S. proposals when he speaks in Rome next week.

FOREIGN AID IN GENERAL

Mr. President, in the post-Vietnam era foreign assistance has come under increasing attack as a cause and sympton on unnecessary involvement overseas and a source of support for undemocratic regimes. Congress has cut funding levels and restricted your powers. You have vetoed two temporary bills and accepted a third only very reluctantly. Do you think you can get the mutually acceptable foreign aid legislation you have called for when Congress returns?

A: Yes, I do. I know from my own experience in Congress that foreign assistance is not a popular issue. It grows more unpopular just before an election, when the foreign aid dollar to protect our interests abroad seems to compete with the need for dollars for domestic projects. When Congress returns I will do what every President has always had to do: try to find the common ground on issues, try to forge agreement, and to articulate the interests of all the people rather than of various areas and constituencies.

In the past whenever we have had to take in our belts at home there has been a rush to cut back on our programs abroad -- to isolate ourselves. This is understandable, but in today's world it is dangerous.

Nothing has demonstrated our interdependence with other countries and their reliance on American leadership and cooperation than the shortages we are facing in food and energy. For many countries, without the help made available by our foreign aid, there would be starvation, and sickness. We cannot ignore these needs

Q:

for if they go untended they will only worsen and spread. There can be no doubt that America's interests lie in helping countries in need to help themselves.

We spend less than 1/2 of 1% of our Gross National Product on foreign aid. Surely this is a small price to pay for the difference between life and death to many people.

Apart from our food programs our assistance goes to enable friendly countries to defend themselves so that we will not have to do it for them.

I am going to continue the process of reducing our direct involvement in the defense of friends around the world without jeopardizing either their security or our own. I believe there is broad support in Congress for this policy.

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OIL PRICES

You and Secretary Kissinger have both called oil prices a world peril and sounded threatening. What actions does the U.S. plan to take?

The very serious problems caused by high oil prices are receiving the priority attention of this Administration. Most immediately, we must intensify our efforts to conserve energy and move ahead rapidly under Project Independence to develop alternative sources of energy to reduce our dependence on imported oil. We and the other oil importing countries simply cannot afford to permit our oil import bill to continue to rise, and we must all limit our use of oil. In order to be most effective, these conservation policies must be carried out in close cooperation with other consuming countries. We are now working with a number of other countries to develop a framework for this cooperation.

At the same time, we seek to improve our cooperative dialogue with the oil producing countries. It is a misreading of our intentions to say the United States is seeking a confrontation: we are calling for a recognition of the interdependence of the modern world and the need for cooperation. I am confident that the oil producers will realize that their own economic well-being is intimately linked to the economic health of the rest of the world and that they will conduct their oil price and production policies accordingly. We are

A:

Q:

also working within the international financial system to provide a means to make the oil income surpluses available to nations whose balance of payments are seriously threatened. We also expect the trade reform act to provide opportunities for expanded world trade by enabling the U.S. to work with others to improve the international trading system and lower artificial barriers to trade.

There is still another measure which is essential. That is the avoidance of nationalistic policies whereby each nation attempts to protect itself at the expense of others. The international economy can be strengthened only through international cooperation, with each nation accepting its share of the burden in meeting our common difficulties.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY

- Q: For the past several years US foreign policy has been attacked for being insensitive to human rights issues in Greece, Korea, Chile and elsewhere. Do you contemplate any change in this approach to policy?
- A: As Americans, we can never acquiesce in the suppression of human liberties. Many Americans have fought and died to preserve freedom in foreign lands. We will continue to adhere firmly to the human principles and rights stated in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights -- not only in international forums, but also in our exchanges with other governments.

We want people everywhere to be free and we will use our influence to encourage respect for human rights, but we cannot refuse to deal with other states on grounds that they do not meet our standards.

I assure you we will continue to work for human rights in the manner that will be most effective in enhancing those rights. Q:

A:

What is the U.S. doing and what actions are open to us to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world, with its obvious threat to peace and security?

Our desire to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is a key factor in our foreign policy. That this desire is shared strongly by most other nations is reflected by the fact that over 80 countries have ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This Treaty constitutes a pledge by non-weapon states not to develop nuclear explosives and, equally important, requires comprehensive safeguards so that international nuclear sharing in the peaceful use of nuclear energy can be carried out without contributing to the problem of proliferation.

We must realize, however, that there are a number of countries who have shown little interest in associating themselves with the Treaty. Moreover, the effect of any treaty is not immutable. Thus, the potential for proliferation continues to exist. We must work to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but we also recognize the necessity of taking additional steps outside the framework of the Treaty to prevent proliferation as effectively as possible.

It is our objective to establish conditions and to take actions so that countries do not develop nuclear explosives either for weapons or so-called peaceful purposes. Of course, the most important condition to achieve is that of stability and interdependence so that no country feels that it is in its security interest to acquire nuclear weapons. Beyond that, our specific actions are aimed at easing nuclear tension through arms control, which we are pursuing now with the USSR, and strictly controlling the export of technology and materials intended for civil nuclear energy programs, but which could be used to assist the independent development of nuclear explosives. In effecting such controls, it is vital to have the close cooperation of those other countries in the world who are nuclear exporters, since the network of controls will be only as strong as its weakest link. Without these controls, we will not be able freely to share nuclear technology. With them, the world can safely derive the benefits of this important energy source.

Secretary Kissinger has dwelt on the issue of proliferation in his recent UN speech, and we will make it the subject of diplomatic and technical discussions in every appropriate forum where we can hope to influence nations toward prudent policies in this area.

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Q: What are your views on national defense	What are	your '	views	on	national	detens	e
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A:

Our interests are best served by maintaining a strong national defense. Peace can only be built upon the clear ability and will of the American people to protect our interests whenever they may be threatened.

There are several critical facets to the need for a strong military posture. A strong defense is our principal deterrent against aggression. This is crucial not only to us, but to our allies as well, since we bear the main burden of maintaining the security and survival of the Free World. Our Defense posture is a fundamental underpinning of our alliances, and reinforces the will of our allies to make our common defense work. Moreover, our military strength underwrites our diplomatic strength. It insures that negotiation is the only rational course, and thus lays the groundwork for achieving, through negotiation, a relaxation of tensions with our adversaries, and an enduring framework for peace.

I recently signed into law the Defense Appropriations Bill for FY 1975 which Congress had approved. Although the Congress did not accept all Administration recommendations, I fully recognize and appreciate the bipartisan efforts made by the House-Senate conference committee to produce a Defense Appropriations Bill acceptable to both Houses and sufficient for our national security needs.

In any event, from my experience in Congress I know all too well the conflicts that defense bills can produce in the name of economy and other national interests. Thus, as I mentioned when I signed the FY 1975 defense bill, I want to renew my pledge to build a new partnership between the Executive and Legislative branches of our Government, a partnership based on close consultation, compromise of differences and a high regard for the constitutional duties and powers of both branches to work for the common good and security of our nation.

Each Administration and Congress since the Second World War has supported -- on a bipartisan basis -- the maintenance of our military strength. I intend to continue to support a strong defense posture, and I believe the Congress will continue to do so also.

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