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SOVIET SPYING ON U.S. EMBASSY

Q. Senator Robert Byrd urged today that the Soviet Union not be allowed to build a new embassy in Washington until they were forced to stop the alleged practice of using radiation to eavesdrop on the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Do you agree with the Senator, and if not, what are we doing about this allegation?

A. Any problem in that area is being handled through normal channels.

DOBRYNIN MEETING

Q. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin has visited the White House twice under very mysterious circumstances. Your Press Secretary won't tell us anything about these meetings. Can you tell us what these mysterious meetings were all about?

A. Ambassador Dobrynin's meetings were with Secretary Kissinger, not with me. The Ambassador and the Secretary meet frequently. During these two particular meetings they discussed several matters of mutual interest to our two countries but I believe that diplomacy in these areas will be more fruitful if it is conducted quietly for the time being.

Q. How can you denounce the Soviet Union for its actions in Angola and at the same time continue to negotiate with the Soviet Union for a SALT Agreement and other actions aimed at furthering detente? How do you answer Ronald Reagan's charge that the only thing the United States has gotten out of detente is the right to sell Pepsi Cola in Siberia? What do we get out of detente besides giving the Russians the chance to build a bigger and better military force?

A. There seems to be a misunderstanding about detente among those who look for quick and easy answers to complex problems.

Let's look first at our objective: We want peace and stability in the world so that we can pursue our own vital interests.

Detente- and that word has become so charged with emotion it might be better to use the simple English phrase "lessened tension" - is one important component of world peace. Because if we do not lessen tensions, they will be heightened, and we will go back to the dangerous days of the Cold War, living every moment under the threat of an annihilating nuclear war.

Those who simplistically see these efforts to lessen tension as merely a chance to sell sodas in Siberia overlook the important progress we have made. The Berlin Agreement of 1971 enabled us to _____.

The Vladivostock Accords of 1974, which I carefully worked out with Chairman Breznev, enabled us to _____.

Angola, important to us a maintaining its independence is, only a small part of the larger picture of trying to work for better world relations. We regret Soviet interference, and we regard it as evidence that they are not working as hard as we are to lessen tensions. But that does not mean we should give up our goal of world peace and stability. We have given nothing away. We have gained much already and we expect to gain a great deal more.

Gunslinger mentality.

1- Ambassador

2- Tricky being

Had: 3- US - staying same
USSR - cult back.

*Simplest, Tendency to
view Soviet Policy
Shootout at OK Corral
We live in more
complex world.*

US-SOVIET TRADE

13. What does the President intend to do specifically with respect to requesting "remedial legislation" to deal with the matter of trade with the Soviet Union?

US-USSR trade - Informal discussions have been in progress with the Congress and we wish to work cooperatively with Congressional leaders in finding a way to meet their concerns while at the same time serving U.S. interest.

20. What did the President mean when he said, "We cannot expect the Soviet Union to show restraint in the face of United States weakness or irresolution?"

Soviet restraint vs U.S. weakness and irresolution - The President's remarks were intended to convey his concern that actions which weaken our institutions or restrict our ability to support a vigorous foreign policy could be misinterpreted as reflecting diminished resolve to carry out our commitments and carry forward with the necessary leadership in solving the many complex international issues before us.

Q. What is the \$40 million for Soviet refugees intend for?

A. Of the \$40 million sought in this amendment, most will be used to help resettle Soviet refugees in Israel. A portion will also be used to help resettle Soviet refugees going to the United States and other countries.

For fiscal years 1973 and 1974 the Congress appropriated a total of \$86.5 million for these purposes. The current flow of Soviet refugees is now about 20,000 per year, with increasing numbers (about 4,100 in 1974) coming to the United States.

This aid will meet an increasingly difficult financial need in Israel, which has absorbed about 100,000 Soviet refugees since 1971.

June 18, 1975

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH IGNATIY NOVIKOV

The President met briefly this morning with Ignatiy Novikov, Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman, USSR State Committee for Construction Affairs. The meeting permitted the President to emphasize the importance he attaches to continuing mutually beneficial steps to improve US-USSR relations and strengthen detente. It also gave him an opportunity to endorse the 1974 Agreement on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction, to express satisfaction with its implementation and to note the meaningful bilateral cooperation it symbolizes.

FYI:

Mr. Novikov (NOH-vee-kof) is in the United States this week for the first meeting of the Joint Commission established to implement the 1974 Housing and Construction Agreement. The Agreement was signed in Moscow on June 28, 1974 by President Nixon and Premier Kosygin and provides a range of scientific and technical activities in the field of housing and other construction which will be carried out "on the basis of mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity."

Following the Joint Committee's final session on June 19, Co-Chairmen Hills and Novikov will sign documents outlining the results of their meetings, designating the working parties responsible for formulating and carrying out the details of a work program for the coming year, and establishing regulations for the operation of the Joint Committee. The Soviet delegation will then make study tours of the United States from June 20-27.

DETENTE AND VIETNAM

Q: The Russians and the Chinese have been supplying weapons to the North Vietnamese, and those weapons have enabled the North Vietnamese to take over South Vietnam. Is this consistent with detente? Is it consistent with our belief, so often stated, that detente is indivisible? How can we accept this?

A: We have indicated publicly and privately that we do not approve the shipments of military aid by the Russians and the Chinese to North Vietnam. We believe these shipments facilitated the violations of the Paris Accords by North Vietnam. Such actions are inconsistent with improving the chances for peace and stability around the world. But we must also remember that our failure to supply arms created the real gap.

At the same time, it has never been a condition of detente that either we, the Soviet Union or the Peoples' Republic of China would end our support of our allies.

The principal purpose of detente has been, and remains, to lessen the danger of nuclear conflict and to reduce the tensions among the superpowers, tensions that carry the potential seeds of nuclear war. We have in addition, achieved settlements in some areas, and dampened crises in others, and developed a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union.

Through a combination of firmness and flexibility, the United States has in recent years laid the basis of a more reliable relationship based on mutual interest and mutual restraint. Last November, at Vladivostok, General Secretary Brezhnev and I reaffirmed the determination of the United States and the Soviet Union to further develop our relations and to continue the search for peace. Last week, in Helsinki, we continued this work. As a result of these talks, I believe the prospects for further improvements in US-Soviet relations are good.

NIXON LETTER ON AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

Q: Hanoi media on April 16 quoted parts of President Nixon's February 1, 1973 letter to the Premier of North Vietnam, in which he stated the U. S. would provide postwar reconstruction aid to North Vietnam and that preliminary studies indicated the appropriate range of such aid would be about \$3.25 billion over five years. Is this a correct reading of President Nixon's letter? And, if so, are we now refusing to provide aid which Nixon promised to the North Vietnamese?

A: It is totally incorrect to say that the United States made any secret pledges outside the Paris Agreement that we would provide a specific amount of aid to North Vietnam. President Nixon's February 1973 message to Premier Pham Van Dong indicated only the initial range in which we were prepared to discuss postwar assistance within the provisions of the Paris Agreement. President Nixon's message also stipulated that we would of course follow our Constitution processes in any implementation of this part of the Accords. In other words, the Congress would have to approve any financial assistance to North Vietnam.

North Vietnam was also aware that our aid was predicated on its observing the cease-fire. In 1973, when it became clear that North Vietnam had no intention of living up to the Paris Agreement, we suspended any consideration or discussion of providing aid.

US-USSR TRADE RELATIONS AND EMIGRATION

Q: What is the Administration's reaction to the Senatorial delegation's visit to the USSR and their meetings there with Soviet Jews?

A: We welcome the Senators' visit to the Soviet Union as part of the expanding contacts in a wide variety of areas, including the Congressional/parliamentary area, between our countries. The Senators, of course, arranged their own agenda for this trip and I don't have any specific comments on their schedule.

only if asked on follow-up

Q: Does the Senators' meeting with Soviet Jews complicate matters for the Administration's policy toward the USSR, particularly in view of the Congressional Link between trade and emigration?

A: As I indicated before, I would have no comment on the Senators' detailed schedule while in the USSR. ~~With respect to the general question of trade and emigration, the Soviet Union regards the question of emigration of its citizens as strictly an internal matter -- a matter not related to the question of trade relations with any other country.~~

The Administration's position on emigration and on the trade
~~The position of the United States -- that emigration is a fundamental human right -- is well known.~~

legislation as it affects the Soviet Union is well known.

REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Q: The states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have recently concluded a conference in Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Treaty and its contribution to checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons. What is your assessment of the results of the Conference?

A: It is my view that the Conference was quite successful. I think it is clear that the NPT is of great value to all the parties to the Treaty and that it deserves the widest possible adherence. The work done at the Conference represents an important contribution to our common goal of assuring that the peaceful use of nuclear energy does not contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Proliferation -- Brazil and Argentina

Q: Would you comment on recent reports that countries such as Brazil and Argentina are buying nuclear reactors and seeking fuel processing and uranium enrichment plants? Are you concerned by the increasing number of countries that are acquiring such capabilities with a potential use for weapons development?

A: We are, of course, concerned that all expansion of nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes be accompanied by controls and safeguards designed to prevent diversion for nuclear explosive purposes. This longstanding U.S. policy is not focused on any one country, and we have reaffirmed our commitment to the principles and objectives of non-proliferation at the recently concluded Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. We also are seeking to gain the agreement of other nuclear suppliers to new and stricter safeguards.

[FYI: Brazil has been negotiating an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany to buy reactors to expand its electrical generating capacity. The agreement also provides for acquisition of fuel reprocessing capabilities and uranium enrichment plants. Brazilian officials have publicly stated their intention to attain eventually a complete nuclear fuel cycle. Brazil is not party to the NPT but the FRG is and therefore is obligated to have IAEA safeguards applied to its nuclear exports. Argentina, also, attaches high priority to achieving a self-sufficient nuclear fuel cycle and is acquiring nuclear equipment from France. Of course, in this case neither Argentina nor France is party to the NPT.]

Nuclear Proliferation

Q: Is the U.S. satisfied that the safeguards which the Germans have placed on their arrangement with the Brazilians are sufficient?

A: It is my understanding that the exact terms and conditions of the arrangements between Brazil and the FRG have not yet been made public. However, I would note that Germany is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore is obligated under the terms of that Treaty to have its nuclear exports safeguarded through the International Atomic Energy Agency.

DETENTE

Q: Mr. President, in light of recent events on the international scene, notably in Vietnam, Portugal and the Middle East, how do you see our relations with the Soviet Union developing? Are US-Soviet relations entering a cooling period?

A: From the outset of my Administration, I have stressed my commitment to working for improved relations with the Soviet Union in the interests of world peace. The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship with the USSR expresses the continuing desire of the vast majority of the American people for easing international tensions and reducing the chances of war while at the same time safeguarding our vital interests and our security. Such an improved relationship based on strict reciprocity is in our real national interest.

On April 10, I observed that during this process, we have had no illusions. We know that we are dealing with a nation that reflects different principles and is our competitor in many parts of the globe.

However, through a combination of firmness and flexibility, the United States has in recent years laid the basis of a more reliable relationship based on mutual interest and mutual restraint. Only last November, at Vladivostok, General Secretary Brezhnev and I reaffirmed the determination of the United States and the Soviet Union

to develop our relations further and to continue the search for peace. I believe the prospects for further improvements in US-USSR relations -- taking into account recent international developments -- remain good.

MOYNIHAN-AMIN

- Q. Your Ambassador to the U.N., Daniel P. Moynihan Friday called Ugandan President Idi Amin a "racist murderer" after Amin proposed the "extinction" of Israel. Do you agree?
- A. Ambassador Moynihan, who was joined by ~~President~~ Clarence Mitchell ~~said what needed to be said.~~
OF THE NAACP
I consider the matter closed.

Note: This answer was proposed by Pat Moynihan.

Soviet
okay

MBFR PROGRESS

Q: In recent statements both you and Brezhnev have referred several times to the need for progress in the European force reduction negotiations in Vienna. Does the US intend to offer some of its tactical nuclear forces in Europe in an effort to break the stalemate as has been reported? Is there any reason to think this would move the talks forward? Could some reductions be made while the talks continue?

A: The issues being addressed in the MBFR talks go to the very heart of the structure of European security and affect the vital interests of some 19 participating countries. The negotiations are extremely complex and difficult, and we should not expect quick results.

However, we continually assess the state of play in the negotiations and we are prepared to take appropriate initiatives when that will help us to meet our objectives. In view of their expressed interest in MBFR progress we presume that the Soviet Union and its allies are also prepared to make progress on the common objective both sides should be working toward -- undiminished security for all but at a lower level of forces.

We remain optimistic that the talks will ultimately achieve a successful result. Until that time there will be no US troop withdrawals from Europe. US forces are in Europe for very good reasons and the level of those forces should be no lower given the levels of forces on the other side.

DETENTE

Q: Mr. President, in light of Soviet rejection of the 1972 Trade Agreement, some say that detente has been set back, and that US-Soviet relations may now enter a cooling period -- would you comment?

A: At the Vladivostok Summit, General Secretary Brezhnev and I reaffirmed the determination of the United States and the Soviet Union to further develop our relations and to continue the search for peace. With the Vladivostok agreement on offensive strategic arms we took another important step toward greater peace and stability. We will continue to approach our contacts and negotiations with the USSR with utmost seriousness and determination to achieve concrete and lasting results--results in the best interests of the United States and in the interests of improved international stability.

I believe therefore that the prospects for further improvements in US-USSR relations--the prospects for detente--are good insofar as they depend on our actions. It is my impression that the Soviet leadership continues to share in this desire for further progress.

Nevertheless, we must recognize that the process of detente is based upon mutual benefit and mutual confidence. Attempts to extract unilateral advantage or to condition cooperation on actions within the domestic province of the other party call into question the purposes and good faith of the other side and erode the confidence that must be present for the relationship to survive. Recent developments relating to US-Soviet trade relations must be viewed in this context.

VIETNAM, SOUTH KOREA UN MEMBERSHIP

Q: Can you comment on the State Department announcement that we will veto UN membership applications of the two Vietnams if South Korea is not admitted?

A: We are prepared to support the membership of all three of these states. However, we will not be a party to attempts to admit one state while excluding another. To do otherwise would be in direct violation of the principle of universality upon which the U.N. was founded. Therefore, the United States will continue to support the candidacy of South Korea and will vote against any proposal that does not include them.

D R A F T

~~STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT~~ *Statement*

As a general principle the United States takes grave exception to any action that weakens the United Nations as an effective forum for the peaceful resolution of international disputes.

We deplore in the strongest terms the recent vote in the Social Committee characterizing Zionism as a form of racism. Such action undermines the principles upon which the United Nations is based.

The spokesmen for the United States in the United Nations have expressed well and forcefully the views of this Administration and the American people on this issue.

NSC, DOS against

Brent neutral

Murphy - pro

Domestic - pro

Before Salal, ^② may be put off a year in UK so may not be necessary.



GRAIN SALES

Q: When will grain sales to the Soviets be resumed? Is the United States trying to work out a barter deal with the Soviet Union involving grain and oil?

A: At this moment, as you know, we are not undertaking any new contracts for the sale of grain to the Soviet Union. We will reassess this position again in October when additional information on world supplies and demand is available.

We are now in the process of exploring the possibility for a long-term grain purchase agreement with the Soviets, which would avoid the sudden fluctuations in Soviet demand for American grain exports. This would enable our farmers to plan with greater certainty. It would minimize shocks to our market and therefore minimize the impact of future Soviet purchases on our prices. We are also exploring in a very general fashion the prospects for purchases of Soviet oil.

Q: What about the reported moratorium on grain sales to Poland: Have we turned down their requests for American grain?

A: There is no moratorium on grain sales to Eastern Europe.

The Poles did make known their desire for additional grain shipments and we have asked the Polish government to defer purchases until October when we have a better view of the crop situation.

[In response to questions as to whose decision this was, we have proposed that State give the following response: that this was an Administration decision. No further explanation will be given as to who in the Administration made the decision.]

ek

DETENTE

Q: Mr. President, in light of recent events on the international scene, notably in Vietnam, Portugal and the Middle East, how do you see our relations with the Soviet Union developing? Are US-Soviet relations entering a cooling period?

A: From the outset of my Administration, I have stressed my commitment to working for improved relations with the Soviet Union in the interests of world peace. The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship with the USSR expresses the continuing desire of the vast majority of the American people for easing international tensions and reducing the chances of war while at the same time safeguarding our vital interests and our security. Such an improved relationship based on strict reciprocity is in our real national interest.

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Bever
okay

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A: The issues being addressed in the MBFR talks go to the very heart of the structure of European security and affect the vital interests of some 19 participating countries. The negotiations are extremely complex and difficult, and we should not expect quick results.

However, we continually assess the state of play in the negotiations and we are prepared to take appropriate initiatives when that will help us to meet our objectives. In view of their expressed interest in MBFR progress we presume that the Soviet Union and its allies are also prepared to make progress on the common objective both sides should be working toward -- undiminished security for all but at a lower level of forces.

We remain optimistic that the talks will ultimately achieve a successful result. Until that time there will be no US troop withdrawals from Europe. US forces are in Europe for very good reasons and the level of those forces should be no lower given the levels of forces on the other side.

U.S. -SOVIET OIL, GRAIN DEALS

Q: News reports over the weekend indicate that the grain deal is going quite well but that the negotiations on the oil deal have been stalled. Would you comment?

A: Under Secretary Robinson is in Paris now and will be returning to Moscow for further negotiations Tuesday or Wednesday. Under Secretary Robinson is satisfied that progress is being made and the President remains hopeful that agreements on grain and on oil can be reached in the near future.

Q: Are you seeking concessions on oil prices? Are the terms for one agreement conditioned on the other?

A: I prefer not to comment on specific questions and details of the negotiations while they are in this delicate stage.

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH COSMONAUTS AND ASTRONAUTS

The President will meet today at 12:30 pm with the Cosmonauts and Astronauts of the Joint Apollo-Soyuz Mission. He wishes to congratulate them personally for their successful mission in space, and to reaffirm the importance he attaches to the contributions the mission has made to U.S. -USSR space cooperation and to the general strengthening of relations between our two countries.

Background for dissemination if asked:

The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project set in the May 1972 U.S. -USSR Agreement on Space Cooperation signed at the Summit meeting was successfully concluded July 24, 1975. As the final phase of the Project, the two crews are jointly touring the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Apollo crew and their families flew to the Soviet Union on September 20th. They met with General Secretary Brezhnev on September 22 before travelling throughout the country.

Aside from this meeting with the President, the other highlights of the American tour include a joint House-Senate reception on October 22, and a reception in New York on October 25 by UN Secretary General Waldheim.

Cosmonaut Leonov and Astronaut Stafford will appear on the Today Show October 14.

Participants:

Dr. and Mrs. James C. Fletcher, NASA Administrator
Mr. and Mrs. John P. Donnelly, Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs
Chief Negotiator and Co-Tour Director of both Russian and US portions of the ASTP tours
General and Mrs. Vladimir A. Shatalov, Director, Soviet Cosmonaut Training Program and Mr. Donnelly's counterpart as Co-Tour Director
General and Mrs. Thomas P. Stafford, Commander Apollo crew
Mr. and Mrs. Vance Brand, Apollo crew
Mr. and Mrs. Donald K. Slayton, Apollo crew
General and Mrs. Aleksey A. Leonov, Commander Soyuz crew
Viktoria Leonova, Daughter, 14
Oksana Leonova, Daughter, 8
Mr. and Mrs. Valeriy N. Kubasov, Soyuz crew
Katya Kubasova, Daughter, 11
Nicholas Timacheff, US Interpreter
Konstantin Samofol, USSR Interpreter
Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin and Granddaughter, Katya, 6

OK.

US POLICY CONCERNING NUCLEAR FIRST-STRIKE

Q: Would you clarify US policy concerning nuclear weapons "first-strike" and "first-use" plans?

A: As I have indicated before, the policy of the Administration continues to be that the US will not develop a strategic capability or doctrine designed to deprive the Soviet Union of its basic retaliatory capability.

Recent strategic force improvements are intended to increase the flexibility of our forces to meet all possible contingencies. Because flexible options will increase the credibility of our deterrent, they will help to decrease the chance of conflict starting in the first place.

With regard to "first use," the US has never ruled out and cannot now preclude the use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, such as response to major non-nuclear aggression which could not be contained by conventional forces. However, US policy continues to be that the primary defense against conventional attack is the conventional capability of the United States and its allies.

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DETENTE

Q: Mr. President, you have just returned from Helsinki and a Conference which many observers consider an important victory for the Soviet Union. In this light, and taking into account developments in Portugal and the Middle East, how do you see our relations with the Soviet Union developing? Are the Soviets getting more out of detente than we and does this foreshadow a cooling-off period in our relations?

A: From the outset of my Administration, I have stressed my commitment to working for improved relations with the Soviet Union in the interests of world peace. The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship with the USSR expresses the continuing desire of the vast majority of the American people for easing international tensions and reducing the chances for war while at the same time safeguarding our vital interests and our security. Such an improved relationship is in our real national interest.

I have previously observed that during this process we have had no illusions. We know that we are dealing with a nation that reflects different principles and is our competitor in many parts of the globe. In Helsinki, I cautioned that detente must be a two-way street. Tensions cannot be eased by one side alone; there must be acceptance of mutual obligation. This is an important Western concept which has now been firmly established as an item on the East-West negotiating agenda. The conference thus did make an important contribution to the kind of detente which we in the West can consider meaningful.

5. There have been reports that negotiations with Senator Jackson regarding the trade bill ^{have broken down} and that a compromise may not be possible. If no compromise is worked out, will the President veto the trade bill?

Guidance: Secretary Kissinger spoke to this yesterday and I have nothing to add to what he said. The President is continuing to consult with the Congress to reach a mutually acceptable formula with regard to Title IV and he continues to hope for an acceptable trade bill this session. *President optimistic.*

FYI: If pushed on whether he would veto a nonacceptable trade bill, you should say that you would not want to speculate on a hypothetical situation but you prefer instead to stress that the President is continuing to work for an acceptable bill. End FYI.

SOVIET EMIGRATION AND THE TRADE BILL

Q: Can you tell us what you think Soviet rejection of the Trade Bill means for the emigration of people from the Soviet Union, especially Jews?

A: The Soviet Union regards the question of emigration of its citizens as strictly an internal matter -- a matter not related to the question of trade relations with any other country.

I would not want to speculate on numbers of emigrants. The position of the United States -- that emigration is a fundamental human right -- is well known.

DETENTE

Q: Mr. President, in light of Soviet rejection of the 1972 Trade Agreement, some say that detente has been set back, and that US-Soviet relations may now enter a cooling period -- would you comment?

A: At the Vladivostok Summit, General Secretary Brezhnev and I reaffirmed the determination of the United States and the Soviet Union to further develop our relations and to continue the search for peace. With the Vladivostok agreement on offensive strategic arms we took another important step toward greater peace and stability. We will continue to approach our contacts and negotiations with the USSR with utmost seriousness and determination to achieve concrete and lasting results -- results in the best interests of the United States and in the interests of improved international stability.

I believe therefore that the prospects for further improvements in US-USSR relations -- the prospects for detente -- are good insofar as they depend on our actions. It is my impression that the Soviet leadership continues to share in this desire for further progress.

Nevertheless, we must recognize that the process of detente is based upon mutual benefit and mutual confidence. Attempts to extract unilateral advantage or to condition cooperation on actions within the domestic province of the other side and erode the confidence that must be present for the relationship to survive. Recent developments relating to US-Soviet trade relations must be viewed in this context.

5. Yesterday the President said that he would meet with General Secretary Brezhnev if there was a reason to do so. Can you tell us what such a reason might be and where such a meeting might be held?

*SECRET
MFR
Inde.*

Guidance: I really have nothing to add to what the President said yesterday. As he pointed out we have important issues — under negotiation with the Soviet Union and if the substance of these negotiations and the opportunity for further progress indicate that a meeting with the General Secretary would be useful the President will consider such a meeting. In the meantime I therefore have nothing to announce to you about such a meeting or the details on where or when it might be held.

SUBJECT: Senator Jackson Interview on Vladivostok Talks

In an interview this morning (7:30 -8:45) on TV Channel 9, Senator Jackson made the following points about the Arms accord between the Soviets and the U.S.:

--He wants the facts out on the table this time. There were secret agreements between HAK and the Soviets and Mr. Nixon and the Soviets during SALT I and he did not want this repeated.

--Jackson said that it seems we have made progress in forward based systems.

--He would like to see a phased reduction in both the number of missiles, delivery systems, and size.

--He pointed out that the agreement did not change the 4 to 1 throw weight-advantage.

--He would like the number of missiles to be reduced to 1700 and not 2500.

--He alluded to trade and then said that we both can save billions of dollars if the numbers are reduced. He did not want to support the military-industrial complex.

--He notes that the agreement was verbal and he would like to see written summaries of the talks.

--His experience with the Soviets on immigration for 2 1/2 years showed that things must be written down.

--When questioned about Mr. Zarb's nomination, he said that Mr. Zarb was a highly qualified and competent person.

The interview opened by the commentator noting that Senator Jackson was not invited to the White House this morning.



7. We have heard the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Yigal Allon will be visiting Washington shortly. Can you confirm this report?

Guidance: I understand an announcement on this subject will be made at the State Department today.

FYI ONLY: State will announce at noon today that Minister Allon will be in Washington for talks with Secretary Kissinger on December 9. They will be discussing next steps in the Middle East situation. END FYI.

8. Why was the US Pacific Fleet carrier Constellation deployed in the Persian Gulf for the first time in 25 years?

Guidance: I understand that the Defense Department announced yesterday that the Pacific Fleet carrier Constellation sailed into the Persian Gulf area yesterday. It is my understanding that the Constellation has now departed the Persian Gulf area. I would refer any additional questions you may have to the Defense Department.



RE: SOVIET TRADE OK

7. What is the President's feeling about the Soviets repudiation of the Trade Agreement with regard to detente? Does the President see this as a set-back for U.S. efforts toward a relaxation of U.S. - Soviet tensions?

GUIDANCE: The President continues to believe that improved U.S. -Soviet relations are important to world peace and international stability. Therefore, the President is determined to continue his pursuit of a policy of relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union. Sec. Kissinger said in his press conference Tuesday evening, "we have no reason to believe that rejection of the Trade Agreement has implications beyond those communicated to us by the Soviet Union."

FYI: We would not comment, or speculate on the impact of this development on the rate of immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union.

THE
PRESIDENT
AGREES
WITH WHAT

5-10-75

BASIC GUIDANCE FOR ANDERSON AND NESSON IF ASKED

1. We view the resolution as supporting the Vladivostok accord.

2. To the extent that it calls for negotiations on matters not part of the Vladivostok accord, the Administration will be prepared to make an effort to undertake such negotiations as quickly as possible after the agreements flowing from Vladivostok have been completed.

3. It should be clear that we are already ~~is~~ committed to negotiate on reductions below the Vladivostok levels. This is part of the Vladivostok accord and we expect such negotiations to be referred to in the final agreements and have them commence at the earliest possible time after the final Vladivostok agreements are completed.

4. We are already committed to negotiate limitations on forces and armaments not limited by Vladivostok and of course will carry through with such negotiations. (e.g. MBFR, nuclear testing, environmental modification techniques, chemical warfare.)

5. We view this resolution and the work of the ~~three~~ Senators as an excellent example of how the Congress and the Executive can cooperate to advance the national interest.



*Delivery Immediately
to Ron Nessen*

Q: On October 30 Hanoi released nine American citizens including two U.S. Government employees. What is your reaction to this release?

A: We welcome the release of these nine Americans and hope that they can be speedily reunited with their families. Our reports indicate that they are all in reasonably good health and for this we are very thankful.*

At the same time, we are still concerned about the approximately 60 American citizens who remain in Saigon and have not been able to leave. We hope that they too will soon be able to return home. In addition, we remain concerned about achieving as full accounting as possible for the large number of military men who are still missing in Southeast Asia.

* *We appreciate the UN High Commissioner on Refugees' efforts in helping obtain the release of these people.*

Q: Does this release indicate a step forward or an improvement in U.S. -North Vietnamese relations?

A: I don't believe it would be useful to speculate about the course of future U.S. -North Vietnamese relations. We, of course, are continuing to study and review our future relationship with Vietnam. Hanoi's actions toward us and toward its neighbors will play a substantial role in

US-USSR RELATIONS

Q: Mr. President, with regard to our relations with the Soviet Union, several of your opponents -- both Democratic and Republican -- have charged that detente has become a one-way street, that the Soviets have used this period of improving relations in fact to extract one-sided concessions from the United States, to push us back to second place status in military strength, and to exploit the relationship for U.S. grain and technology while engaging in activities in Angola and elsewhere contrary to our interests and to the spirit of a more stable relationship. Would you respond to these charges and, in light of your dropping detente from your vocabulary, explain your policy toward the USSR.

A: At the outset, let me remind you ~~of our~~ ^{*But in dealing with the Soviet Union, we are dealing with*} strength ~~of the~~ ^{*second to none.*} ~~United States.~~

- Our military might is ~~second to none.~~ ^{*is the greatest on*}
- Our economic and technological strength ~~is second to none.~~ ^{*earth.*}
- Our heritage as a democracy of free people is ~~unrivaled.~~ ^{*the envy of.*}

hundreds of millions around the world.

- In virtually every aspect of human endeavor, we are the most advanced country anywhere.

* * *

~~The Soviet Union is a growing superpower. Because we and the Soviets are political opponents and military rivals, the US-Soviet relationship in this nuclear age has the most profound implications for global survival. When I use the term "peace through strength" to discuss our approach to the US-Soviet relationship, it is not because there has been a change in~~



U.S. policy -- it is because I want that policy to be clearly understood.

It is my policy to assure the security of this nation. In our dealings with the Soviet Union, it is my policy to move beyond an area of constant confrontations and crises, to develop a more stable relationship based on restraint and respect, but to counter

any Soviet expansionism.

My policy toward the Soviet Union is Peace through strength. This is a policy involving reciprocity. It is ~~one-way~~ ^{NOT A}

will negotiate with the Soviet Union ONLY when street. We pursue this policy because it is in our national

We will oppose Soviet and Cuban interest to do so.

military expansion BUT we will try to lower tensions and reduce the risk of nuclear war when ~~strategic arms~~ we can. I think most Americans support that policy. Most Americans do NOT want

- We have taken positive steps to limit strategic arms; To return to the dangerous confrontations of the Cold War.
- We halted a Soviet build-up;
- Now for the first time, we can cap the growth of Soviet and American nuclear weapons at equal levels.
- We have avoided a very costly and futile ABM race -- in our current negotiations we are seeking to avoid a very costly and futile offensive arms race. This is in our interests; it is not a unilateral favor we grant to Moscow; our security is fully safeguarded in this process.

-- Trade

In trade, we have reached agreements on grain assuring income to American farmers and the enormously productive U.S. agricultural sector, earning foreign exchange for our economy (\$2 billion last year) and protecting American consumers from fluctuations in grain prices due to Soviet actions in the international grain market. We will remain vigilant to ensure that US-Soviet trade does not affect our national security interests. Our country benefits -- in jobs and dollars -- from the sale of goods to the USSR. This is not a give-away; it is in our interests.

When we have faced Soviet threats -- wherever they have come -- we have moved to counter them. We will continue to do so for there can be no real accommodation of interests if we do not react with firmness when challenged.

* * *

There should be no misunderstanding about the United States

intention or resolve. We ~~will~~ ^{will} never be second best in a world where there is still so much hostility to freedom and where many ~~will~~ look to us for the strength to ensure the peace. We can not bestow our trust simply because we share with ~~another nation~~



~~a desire to avoid nuclear holocaust~~

The suspicions and rivalries

of more than a generation cannot be swept away in a short time, or by signing a piece of paper.

Our political rivalry and military competition with the Soviet

In the real world,

Union will continue. ~~As the recent past has shown,~~ our policy

requires us ^{to} ~~simultaneously and with equal vigor~~ to resist

~~Soviet expansion and to shape a more constructive relationship.~~

~~There are many other~~ ways to reduce tensions. That's what "Peace with Strength" means.

H. W. B.



FAILURE OF SOVIET SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR

Q: Do you have any comment on the failure of the Soviet Satellite Interceptor?

A: In keeping with our policy, I would have no comment on intelligence collection activities.

[If you get any questions on whether this interceptor is a violation of the SALT Treaty or Outer Space Treaty, please take the questions.

Q: Are the TTB/PNE Treaties legally binding under international law?

A: No. although the usual practice is that during the period between signing of the treaties and their entry into force, the parties will not behave in a manner inconsistent with the principles and objectives of the treaties. Such a provision is included in the Vienna Convention, but this is itself unratified. Thus there is no legally binding commitment.

Q: Was there an informal understanding with the Soviets on this issue?

A: The TTB Treaty was intended to come into effect on March 31 of this year. However, we had not completed the PNE negotiations by that date, which we had specified as an essential condition prior to having the TTB Treaty take effect. The US stated that for the immediate future it had no plans for tests above the 150 KT threshold ^{and} ~~in~~ the Soviet side said that it did not intend to take any action ~~in~~ incompatible with the provision of the treaty.

Statement on Threshold Test Ban

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed on July 3, 1974, and scheduled to take effect on March 31, 1976. However, Article III of that treaty calls for the US and USSR to negotiate a separate agreement governing the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs). At the time of signing the TTBT and on several subsequent occasions, we stated that in view of the close relationship between the verification of a threshold on nuclear weapon tests and the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions, we would not present the TTBT to the Senate for ratification until a satisfactory PNE agreement had been concluded.

The negotiations for a PNE agreement began in October 1974 with the agreed objective of ensuring that peaceful nuclear explosions would not be conducted so as to provide weapons-related benefits that were otherwise precluded by the TTBT. The two sides have made considerable progress in completing an agreement and the negotiations are continuing in Moscow to resolve the few remaining issues.

The two sides hope that a satisfactory agreement can be concluded within the next several weeks. During this period, we expect that neither side will conduct weapons tests above the threshold of 150 kilotons. For the immediate future, we have no plans for high yield weapons tests above the threshold of 150 kilotons.

~~Statement on Threshold Test Ban~~

Notice to the Press

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed on July 3, 1974, and scheduled to take effect on March 31, 1976. However, Article III of that treaty calls for the US and USSR to negotiate a separate agreement governing the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs). At the time of signing the TTBT and on several subsequent occasions, we stated that in view of the close relationship between the verification of a threshold on nuclear weapon tests and the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions, we would not present the TTBT to the Senate for ratification until a satisfactory PNE agreement had been concluded.

The negotiations for a PNE agreement began in October 1974 with the agreed objective of ensuring that peaceful nuclear explosions would not be conducted so as to provide weapons-related benefits that were otherwise precluded by the TTBT. The two sides have made considerable progress in completing an agreement and the negotiations are continuing in Moscow to resolve the few remaining issues. We remain hopeful that a satisfactory PNE agreement can be concluded very soon.

For the immediate future, we have no plans for high yield weapons tests above the threshold of 150 kilotons. In light of the considerable progress made toward completing the PNE agreement we are willing to continue the negotiations for another 30 to 60 days before reexamining our

testing plans. Of course, we would expect the Soviets not to conduct any tests above the threshold or any peaceful nuclear explosions during this 30-60 day period required for completion of an agreement.

TTB Fact Sheet

Following negotiations in Moscow in the spring of 1974 an agreement was reached during the July summit meeting which bans nuclear weapon tests having a yield above 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT). Both nations have the capability by their own national technical means to distinguish between underground nuclear explosions and earthquakes when the yield is this high. The treaty contains a specific commitment by the parties not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other, and provides for regular consultations to take care of any questions which might arise relating to the implementation of its provisions.

The treaty is accompanied by a protocol detailing technical data to be exchanged and limiting testing to specific designated test sites to assist verification. The data to be exchanged includes information on the geology of the testing areas. Geological data -- including such factors as density of rock formation, water saturation, and depth of the water table -- are useful in verifying test yields because the seismic signal produced by a given underground nuclear explosion varies with these factors at the test location. After an actual test has taken place, the geographic coordinates of the test location are to be

furnished to the other party, to help in placing the test in the proper geological formation and thus in assessing the yield. Other information available to the United States will be used to cross check the data provided.

The treaty also stipulates that data will be exchanged on a certain number of "calibration tests." By establishing the correlation between given yields of explosions at the specified sites and the seismic signals produced, this exchange will help improve assessments on both sides of the yields of explosions based on the measurements derived from their seismic instruments. The tests used for calibration purposes may be tests which have been conducted in the past or may be new tests.

Agreement to exchange the detailed data described above represents a significant degree of direct cooperation by the two major nuclear powers in the effort to control nuclear armaments. For the first time, each party will make available to the other data relating to its nuclear weapons program.

For the purposes of the treaty, all underground nuclear explosions at specified test sites will be considered nuclear weapon tests. Engineering applications of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) must be at locations away from the specified test sites. Since it is not possible to distinguish between the technology of nuclear devices for

peaceful engineering purposes and that for nuclear weapons, the question of how a program for peaceful nuclear explosions might be carried out without violating the threshold treaty is a complicated one. Article III of the treaty committed the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue this problem in subsequent discussions.

These discussions began in Moscow in October 1974 and have continued to the present -- in a series of six rounds. As noted in today's statement, considerable progress has been made and negotiations are continuing in Moscow to resolve the few remaining issues. We remain hopeful that a satisfactory PNE agreement can be concluded in the near future.

CAUSE OF SOVIET REJECTION OF TRADE BILL

Q: Mr. President, in your State of the Union address you seemed to lay blame for Soviet rejection of the Trade Bill and subsequent decision not to put into force the 1972 US-USSR Trade Agreement at the doorstep of Congress. Do you think the Congress is to blame for this setback in US-USSR relations?

A: I do not think any useful purpose would be served by speculating on the reasons for the Soviet decision or by engaging in recriminations here at home. As the Secretary of State has said on recent occasions, there was no disagreement between the Congress and the Administration as to objectives. We differed with some Members of the Congress about the methods to achieve these objectives.

Now, however, we should put the debate of recent months behind us. As far as the Administration is concerned, it will continue to pursue a policy of improved relations with the Soviet Union -- a policy in the best interests of the United States. We will do so in a spirit of cooperation with the Congress. In the near future we will begin consultation with the Congress on appropriate steps for new trade legislation written on the basis of a consensus between the Administration and the Congress which we hope will avoid some of the difficulties that arose previously. A growing, mutually beneficial trade relationship with the Soviet Union is an important part of our overall efforts to improve relations. For this reason, we will continue our efforts to develop a normal trading relationship with the Soviet Union.

Question: The Chicago Tribune has reported that the Defense Department has uncovered a massive KGB operation of monitoring the private telephone calls of Americans, including Government and business leaders. Two things bother me about this: first, that the KGB could do it at all and what steps we have taken to counteract that kind of activity; and second, don't we have to monitor American conversations ourselves in order to be able to determine what the KGB is monitoring?

Answer: I don't believe any comment on that subject is appropriate for national security reasons. I have, however, discussed the matter with appropriate members of the Congress.

Q Mr. President. Some people are saying **your trip to Japan, South Korea and the Soviet Union is** poorly timed. That you should stay at home and concentrate on the problem of inflation. Do you have any comment on that criticism?

A A President has many responsibilities. I have put forward my recommendations for **dealing** with our current economic problems. It is now up to the Congress to act.

In addition, I have responsibilities for conducting American ~~and~~ foreign policy. The trip to Japan, South Korea and the Soviet Union is vital to America's long-term interest and to the hopes of all Americans **FOR whom** achieving progress in halting the nuclear arms race and building a more peaceful world.



7. Why are the South Vietnamese abandoning 3 provinces in South Vietnam? Is there any reason to persist in aiding a country that will not defend itself?

GUIDANCE: Since the ceasefire, the balance of forces has changed markedly. Over 220,000 North Vietnamese troops and three other North Vietnamese divisions have infiltrated the South. Significant amounts of equipment have been brought in as well. The North Vietnamese input is strong and the South Vietnamese cannot defend all areas, especially in light of the aid cuts in Congress. Even though there is no fighting in the three highland provinces, the fear of Communist incursions has led the populace to begin moving toward more secure government controlled areas to the South. Clearly, the need for U.S. assistance is urgent. The South Vietnamese are strong and they have the desire to defend themselves, if only we will assist them. The President has stated his willingness to work with the Congress to ensure that the \$300 million he has requested is provided quickly.

8. FYI ONLY: Attached is a fact sheet on the Executive Branch position on the Foreign Aid Bill currently before the Senate Appropriations Committee. We are supporting this bill enthusiastically (with the two amendments) and are encouraging others to do so. Though the levels of aid are less than requested, they still constitute a workable foreign aid package we would like passed quickly. Any chance you have to discuss our support with the media would be helpful.

SOVIET MISSILES AND STRATEGIC BALANCE

- Q. Secretary Schlesinger recently announced that the Soviet Union is deploying two intercontinental missiles armed with multiple nuclear warheads. What impact will this have upon the strategic balance?
- A. This action will not reduce in any way the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent forces. The deployment of multiple warheads by the Soviet Union has been anticipated for some time. Deployment of up to 1,320 missiles with multiple warheads is permitted by the Vladivostok SALT agreements.

However, we should not allow ourselves to be lulled into a false sense of security. If the United States is to maintain an unassailable nuclear deterrent and keep its military forces second to none, we must be prepared to devote the resources necessary to do so.

6/23/75

Russian
UN
Speech

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wash. Post.

Ron -

Ambassador Scranton commented on the Soviets "decrying hysteria" among U.S. political candidates. He reportedly called the Soviet ^{note} to the U.N. "inappropriate". We wouldn't want to amplify upon his remarks. They may want to check with State, but we wouldn't want to go beyond Scranton's comments.

BUILT-IN VIOLATIONS OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN

- Q: According to radio reports, the Threshold Test Ban Agreement we signed with the Russians carries with it a secret understanding that violations will be overlooked. Is there any truth to these reports?
- A: That story relates to a very technical point dealing with potential minor differences between actual yield of a test as compared with planned yield of nuclear devices. It, and all other aspects of the treaty will be explained in detail in the course of the Senate review and will become part of the public record, but if you want the details now I suggest you ask at DOD, ERDA or ACDA.

Q: Evans and Novak claim that President Ford is pushing for consensus on a new SALT agreement that would sacrifice cruise missiles and permit unconstrained deployment of Backfire in return for Soviet reductions in the 2400 ceiling agreed at Vladivostok. Is this true and can we expect a new US initiative to attempt to break the current impasse in the SALT negotiations?

A: *In keeping with our policy, I* *of*
~~We will not publicly discuss the details of the NSC meeting on SALT~~
~~or comment on any other aspect of the~~ Evans and Novak article.

We are continuing our efforts to obtain a new SALT agreement.

~~H~~ If and when we get a new agreement, it will be an agreement in our national interest and unrelated to domestic politics. We are continuing to pursue this important subject in a careful and deliberate manner without regard for any imagined or arbitrary timetable.

Two Soviet Nuclear Blasts

Q: There have been recent press reports that the Soviet Union conducted two underground nuclear tests in July that were above the 150 kt limit of the TTB and PNE treaties. Is this true?

A: The Soviet Union detonated underground nuclear explosions in the Semipalatinsk Test Area on July 4 and the vicinity of Azgir near the Caspian Sea on July 29. Measuring the precise yield is a difficult technical problem and a band of uncertainty exists as to the yield of the explosions. The assessment of these data will require several more weeks, I should point out that the TTB/PNE treaties contain provisions for the exchange of data which will significantly improve our ability to make these yield measurements once the treaties take effect.

Q: Are these tests violations of the TTB and PNE Treaties, and have we raised this with the Soviets?

A: Neither government has completed ratification of these treaties, so they are not yet legally binding on either party. The Soviet Union has stated that these tests did not violate the TTB threshold and repeated their earlier assurance that they would observe this limit pending ratification of the TTB Treaty.

a preparatory conference to work out the structure of future negotiations. But the purpose of this meeting was not to reach decisions. It was to exchange views. They agreed to continue close consultations in the future, with a view toward finding the best way to proceed on the peace front.

QUESTION: Did they reach a common assessment of the recent Soviet call for a return to Geneva, as well as on the current Soviet position in the Middle East?

ANSWER: The two leaders had a wide-ranging exchange of views on where matters stand in the Middle East today, but I am not going to get into the substance of those exchanges.

QUESTION: Did they discuss the situation in Lebanon?

ANSWER: As I said they discussed the overall situation in the Middle East. That obviously includes the Lebanese situation. I have no details of that discussion.

QUESTION: Did they discuss the question of U.S. arms deliveries to Israel?

ANSWER: I have nothing to say on the details of the U.S. military supply relationship with Israel.

FYI: The FY 77 Budget provides \$1 billion in Foreign Military Sales credits for Israel.

Deny Pershings missiles

The Simon visit to Moscow has been planned for over a year. It is the annual meeting of the U.S. -U.S.S.R. ~~Trade~~ Trade Council, of which Simon is an honorary director. It is customary procedure for the directors to address this meeting, and both Simon and his Soviet counterpart will do so. (Wire stories this AM say he may ~~be~~ well meet with Brezhnev..)

This is Simon's third official (Treasury is calling this an "official" visit) visit in two years, and the emphasis of the ~~trip~~ establish trip is ~~to place~~ to place closer commercial ties between the two countries. The military transport was arranged through the U.S. Air Force.

N.B. Apparently the Mexico trip has been cancelled, although Treasury has not yet announced it.