

The original documents are located in Box 122, folder “China (1)” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Ron Nessen donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

CHINA TRIP

Q. Why can't Chinese leaders come here, inasmuch as there has been so much official American travel to China?

A. The Chinese take the position that while there are diplomatic representatives of the Government of the Republic of China in Washington, they would not be prepared to send their top leaders here. At the same time, as you know, they have a Liaison Office in Washington, which is headed by one of their senior diplomats. But it is more significant that China and the United States, estranged for two decades, are now seeking to resolve their differences by political means, and to cooperate on issues where they see it in their common interest to do so.

Q. But what do you expect to come out of your visit, and what would you like to see develop as a result of this visit?

A. The significance of the trip is to review the full range of bilateral and international issues of common concern. I visited China as House Minority Leader in 1972, but this will be my first opportunity as President to meet with the top leadership and to review developments in a world that has changed significantly in the last three years. I will be quite satisfied if we have a full and frank exchange of views. Let me remind you that there were no pre-conditions for my visit as to the issues we would discuss or to the outcome. Both sides find it very useful to have their periodic exchanges.

Q. Who will you be talking with? Will you meet with Chairman Mao?

A. I anticipate that my primary interlocutor will be Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing. This is the arrangement the Chinese have pursued with other recent visitors in the absence from active participation of Premier Chou En-Lai.

Q. But will you see Mao?

A. This is, of course, a Chinese decision, not an American one. The Chinese have made it clear that our party will be received with all courtesy and appropriate protocol. I assume that it is in their interest, as it is in ours, to exchange views at the highest levels. I would certainly look forward to a session with the Chairman.

Q. But will your visit be a failure if you do not meet with him?

A. It would be quite inappropriate for me to speculate about my arrangements on the Chinese side.

Q. What will you talk about with the Chinese leadership?

A. First of all, I expect to discuss the full range of international issues of common interest, and then I hope to review the status of our bilateral relations.

Q. Will you discuss detente? They have been quite critical of your detente policies in recent months.

A. I think it is important they understand our approach to international relations in the nuclear area. I am well aware that we have our differences of view, but we proceed from the principles of the Shanghai Communique. This is precisely why I think it is important to hold talks at this time.

Q. Will you discuss the Korean situation?

A. Neither we nor the Chinese approach these talks in the spirit of two major states seeking to settle issues affecting third countries. However, I expect to review with the Chinese the full range of international issues to see where we can agree and clarify our differences.

Q. But do you expect a positive visit given the fact that there has been no real progress in our relationship since the Shanghai Communique?

A. I don't agree with your judgment that there has been no progress in our relations since the Shanghai Communique was issued. Our trade with China has gone from about \$5 million in 1972 to nearly a billion dollars last year. We have developed an active cultural and scientific exchange program over the last three years. We have

established Liaison Offices in our respective capitals, and have maintained a periodic authoritative dialogue through Secretary Kissinger's various meetings with Chinese officials in New York and Peking.

At the same time, it is clear that there are still unresolved issues between us. It is important, therefore, that we and the Chinese avoid miscalculations or misunderstandings as much as possible, and cooperate where we can.

CHINA

Q: Much has been said about the President's trip to China and Secretary Kissinger is there now laying the groundwork for the President's trip. What do we hope to accomplish by this visit?

A: The President is going to China to maintain active contacts at the highest levels with the Chinese to further the process of normalization begun in 1971. You may recall the President's own remarks to the Joint Session on April 10 about the necessity for further developing our relations with the Peoples' Republic:

"With the People's Republic of China, we are firmly fixed on the course set forth in the Shanghai communique.

Stability in Asia and the world require our constructive relations with one-fourth of the human race.

" After two decades of mutual isolation and hostility, we have, in recent years, built a promising foundation. Deep differences in our philosophy and social systems will endure, but so should our mutual long-term interests and the goals to which our countries have jointly subscribed in Shanghai."

As for our policies with regard to China, we are guided by the Shanghai Communiqué and we will continue to pursue the process of normalization begun several years ago.

Q: What are the main features of the Shanghai Communiqué?

A: The Shanghai Communiqué is a cardinal element of our foreign policy. It provides ^{the framework upon which} ~~for a peaceful resolution of~~ our relations with China will be structured. ~~differences governing the Taiwan question by the Chinese~~ S.C. details basic perspectives which themselves. the Admin. brings to the normalization process. We remain committed to its strict implementation in all aspects.

1. reduce danger of confrontation by force
2. oppose hegemony.
3. agree or understanding. - directed to ^{not to be a provocateur} ~~other states~~ ^{over}
4. normalization + move toward detente
5. Basic direction of our overall China policy
6. U.S. looks forward to peaceful resolution of differences between Chinese themselves.

KISSINGER PUSHING FORD ON PRC NORMALIZATION

Q. Is there any truth to reports that Secretary Kissinger is pushing the President to resume full diplomatic relations with the PRC but that Ford decided to postpone normalization because of the defeat in Indochina and the Reagan threat?

A. There is no foundation whatever to those charges. There is no difference between the President and the Secretary on any aspect of the process of normalization of relations with the PRC.

CHINA

(Note: Marder was one of four journalists recently invited to the PRC Liaison Office in Washington apparently for the specific purpose of telling them that the only way to liberate Taiwan is by means of force. The Chinese obviously wanted the story printed, but not attributed to them.)

- Q: Senator Scott has indicated that the Chinese took a hard line with him on non-peaceful liberation of Taiwan. Can you give me some more details of what he reported to you about that?
- A: No, I've made it a practice not to discuss private conversations. I will say, however, that our exchanges with the Chinese reflect no apparent change in their wish to normalize relations with the U.S. as envisioned in the Shanghai communique, Our position toward normalization in peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves is also reflected in the Shanghai Communique.
- Q: Well, the Chinese here at the Liaison Office in Washington invited four journalists, including me, for dinner, and their message was that the only way to liberate Taiwan is by force. Don't you think this line will make normalization harder?
- A: Our views on the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question were not spelled out in the Shanghai Communique. I would not want to jump to conclusions as to just what the hard line you describe might mean.
- Q: Why do you think they are spreading this word? Are they perhaps losing patience with the U.S. and fearful that we will try to hang on indefinitely at the present semi-official level of relations?
- A: I really don't know why they told you that, and I don't think it would be useful for me to speculate. As far as their patience is concerned, I have no reason to believe their basic position has

changed from what it has been. And for our own part, I have made clear on a number of occasions that we are committed to completing the normalization process on the basis of the Shanghai Communiqué.

Q: Senator Scott urged that the U.S. take a hand in pressing Taipei to negotiate with Peking. What is your reaction to that?

A: Our position on that was spelled out in the Shanghai Communiqué when we reaffirmed our interest "in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves."

Q: Senator Scott indicated that he doesn't think our treaty commitments to Taiwan mean very much and that Taiwan's safety is assured primarily by Peking's reluctance to act because of the fear of political repercussions with Japan and us and military consequences vis-a-vis the Soviets. Do you agree?

A: Let me make clear that this Administration will stand by our treaty commitments around the world. But I don't think the PRC is about to undertake a military attack against Taiwan, so I think the question is rather academic.

Q: Several people have suggested that we move to establish relations very soon with the PRC but that we not abandon Taiwan. There is in fact a move to amend the Republican platform in the same vein. Isn't this an impossibility? Doesn't establishment of relations with Peking by definition mean cutting our ties with Taipei?

A: You are correct that that approach is unacceptable to both the PRC and Taiwan. Our own views are stated in the Shanghai Communique, and as I have said on several occasions, we are committed to completing the normalization process on the basis of that document. There is no agreement as to the modalities or timing of that process. Throughout we have been acting responsibly and we will continue to act responsibly on matters affecting Taiwan.

Q: Is it true, as recent press stories assert, that our arms sales program for Taiwan is designed so that the island can defend itself without U.S. participation against an attack from the PRC?

A: It is our general policy to encourage greater self-reliance among all countries with which we have defense relations. It would therefore be inaccurate to draw the conclusions stated in the question.

DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

Q: Apparently the Chinese have selected Hua Kuo-feng as new Chairman of the Communist Party and have arrested all of the leading leftists. How do you see these developments affecting US-PRC relations?

A: There have been personnel changes in the People's Republic resulting from the death of Chairman Mao. The developments being reported in the press recently are solely a domestic matter for the People's Republic. We are not aware that the US-PRC relationship is a subject of partisan debate within China and I see no reason to expect that changes in personnel will have any impact on our bilateral relations.

Thomas S. Gates Announcement

Q: Will the Gates appointment have to be confirmed by the Senate?

A: The President has designated Mr. Gates as Chief of our Liaison Office in Peking. His name will be submitted to the Senate in order to confirm Mr. Gates in the rank of Ambassador during his tenure of service as Chief of our PRC Liaison Office.

Q: Since we do not have formal diplomatic relations with Peking, and as the head of our Liaison Office is designated as "Chief," why is Mr. Gates being given the rank of Ambassador?

A: As you know, the two predecessors at that post, Ambassador David Bruce and Ambassador George Bush, both were referred to by the courtesy title of "Ambassador" as a result of their prior diplomatic service. While it is quite true that our Liaison Office Chief is not formally an "Ambassador," in view of the fact that the two prior incumbents in this position held such personal rank we would not want to imply any diminution in the importance we attach to this post. Hence, because of the significance the President attaches to our relations with the People's Republic of China, as well as an expression of his personal respect for Mr. Gates -- who as you know was formerly Secretary of Defense -- the President wishes to have him conferred the rank of Ambassador, even though his formal position will be "Chief" of the Liaison Office.

Q: When will there be hearings on the nomination?

A: As soon as they can be scheduled by the Senate.

Q: Who else was considered for this post? Can you confirm that Ambassador William Scranton was previously asked to take this position?

A: A number of names were considered for this position, but it obviously would be inappropriate to go into specifics. I can assure you that Mr. Gates is the President's personal choice. The President is delighted that a man of his broad experience in both private and governmental affairs has been able to accept the appointment. He attaches particular significance to our relations with the People's Republic of China; hence, he was anxious to find a man of Mr. Gates' stature and experience.

Q: What significance should be attached to the fact that the President is sending a former Secretary of Defense to Peking?

A: The choice of Mr. Gates reflects the President's desire to have someone in that post who has broad public experience and a good grasp of world affairs. The President believes Mr. Gates admirably meets these criteria.

Q: Does the President know Mr. Gates personally?

A: Mr. Ford has had a long personal association with Mr. Gates. They served together in the Navy during World War II, and worked together during the period when Mr. Gates was at the Pentagon and Mr. Ford was in Congress.

Q: But does he know anything in particular about China?

A: Neither Mr. Gates nor his predecessors have had any specialized experience regarding China, although our Liaison Office in Peking is well staffed with specialists acquainted with the country and Chinese language. The important thing, in our view, is that the Chief of the Liaison Office have a broad grasp of world affairs, a feel for our national policies, and a good understanding of our country. His primary purpose in China is to share our perceptions of world developments with Chinese leaders, and to explain American policies to them. Again, the President believes Mr. Gates' background and experience have admirably prepared him for this role.

Q: When will Mr. Gates go to Peking?

A: I assume it will be sometime shortly after the confirmation hearings are over, and when he has had a chance to complete his briefings

here at the White House and the State Department. I would anticipate his taking over the post in a month or so.

Q: Since word of Mr. Gates' possible appointment was floating around several weeks ago, why has it taken so long for an announcement to be made? Were the Chinese consulted about his nomination? Did they approve this appointment?

A: The Chinese were given prior notification that the President intended to nominate Mr. Gates to be Chief of the Liaison Office. They indicated they would welcome Mr. Gates in this position.

CHINA-CANADA

Q: Is it true that Canada's expulsion of a PRC diplomat for "security" reasons was taken on the basis of a request from the US Government?

A: We made no such request, and officials in Ottawa have released a statement affirming that the Chinese official was asked to leave Canada solely at the initiative of the Canadian government.

Q: Is it true that the Chinese official was making frequent trips from Canada to the US to pass money to revolutionary groups in this country?

A: I have no further comments on the matter.

Q: Will the former President brief President Ford upon his return from China?

GF was just there,
No current plans. He is traveling, or
A: ~~That has not been discussed. As you know, President Ford a~~
~~met very recently with the Chinese leaders, but the Administration~~
~~would in this instance, as it has in other cases, be pleased~~
~~be apprised of any items of particular interest.~~
citizen.
Treated as
citizen. I believe

Q: What is the duration of the former President's trip? What cities will he visit?

A: I would suggest that you approach Mr. Nixon or the Chinese Government for any details of the trip.

Q: Does President Ford attach any significance to the fact that this invitation is being extended in an election year?

A: No.

Q: Will Mr. Nixon be briefed by the Administration before he goes?

A: I would point out that former President Nixon is making this trip as a private citizen, but within that context the Administration would try to respond to any specific requests for background materials.

Q: Will Mr. Nixon be carrying a message from President Ford?

A: I am sure the President would want his best wishes to be conveyed to the Chinese leaders.

NIXON CHINA TRIP

Q: Does the fact that China is openly demonstrating its official admiration for Richard Nixon and his past policies have any impact on Gerald R. Ford -- either personally or officially.

A: We wouldn't speculate on that, but we fail to see why the former President's visit would have ^{any particular} ~~the~~ impact.
~~you mention.~~

NIXON CHINA TRIP

Q. Does Nixon plan any other stops enroute?

A. You will have to ask him.

NIXON CHINA TRIP

- Q. Does the President plan to confer with Nixon prior to the trip?
- A. Other than the phone call ~~BE~~ ^{Thur} we know of no plans for additional contact.

NIXON CHINA TRIP

Q: Did Julie and David help lay the groundwork for this visit when they were in China?

A: You'll have to ask them, but you will recall that the Chinese extended an invitation to the former President to visit China at the time of the Eisenhower visit.

[Eisenhower-Mao readout attached.]

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Q. Can you comment on recent reports that the Chinese are not satisfied with the present state of the relationship with the US, particularly with respect to the Taiwan question. Has a date been set for your visit to China and what do you hope to accomplish there.

A. Our basic relationship with the People's Republic of China remains sound. It is my general impression that the recent National People's Congress reaffirmed the policies that China has pursued over the past several years; the senior leaders--such as Premier Chou En-lai and Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying--who we have been dealing with since 1971, are still in office. Thus, we do not anticipate any change in policy on the part of the PRC, just as my Administration's policy toward China will continue to follow the course set by the Shanghai Communiqué.

There has been no discussion as yet of a precise date but I would think it will be in the latter part of the year. The visit is part of the normalization process and will enable me to establish personal contact with Chinese leaders.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Q: How would you characterize the results of Secretary Kissinger's recent trip to Peking?

A: The discussions were frank, cordial and went well and we maintained the momentum of our relationship. Secretary Kissinger reviewed the entire range of international and bilateral issues of mutual concern with senior PRC leaders. There is no question but that there remain areas of difference between us; but we are discussing such differences in an honest and friendly way. At the same time, we are identifying areas of common interest. I am pleased with the outcome of the trip, one result of which, as you know, is that I will be visiting the PRC next year. We are on track in our relations with the PRC, and I intend to support the evolution of our relationship along the lines set by the Shanghai Communique.

Q: There doesn't seem to be very much in the way of concrete results from Kissinger's visit to the PRC.

A: I would not say this is the case at all. In part what we have here is an on-going process of exchanging ideas at the leadership level in order to develop confidence and explore common points of interest. This may not always produce spectacular results, but

we are definitely maintaining ~~our~~ momentum in the process of rebuilding relations with a country we were separated from for 20 years.

Cultural and scientific exchanges, and trade, will continue in the year ahead. We consider this an important indicator of a more normal relationship.

In addition, of course, I expect to be visiting Peking myself in 1975, and I consider this a very positive result of the Secretary's visit.

Q: Will your visit lead to establishing diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking?

A: Frankly, at this early stage of planning we have no set agenda and -- I can assure you -- no fixed outcome of the trip. I can only say at this point that I look forward to holding concrete discussions with the Chinese leaders on a range of international and bilateral issues in an effort to strengthen the relationship that has already been established.

Q: Why didn't Chairman Mao receive Secretary Kissinger on this trip?

A: I can't give you a clear answer to that. Frankly, Secretary Kissinger did not go there seeking such a meeting. We do not read

any significance into the fact that there was no meeting with the Chairman on this trip. I think the fact that it was mutually agreed that I should visit China next year is a clear indication of the desire on both sides to maintain this relationship at the most authoritative levels.

Q: There was some speculation in the press that the issue of U. S. private claims and blocked PRC assets was under discussion during the Secretary's visit. Was any progress made toward resolving this issue?

A: This is a highly technical issue, and it is my understanding that discussions on it are continuing. But I am confident that in the fullness of time we will find a solution to this problem.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Q: The opening to China was one of the most distinctive aspects of former President Nixon's foreign policy. Do you intend to sustain his efforts to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China? Why has there been no apparent movement in U.S.-PRC relations in the past year? When do you foresee full normalization and establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC?

A: In many ways Mr. Nixon's successful efforts to open an official dialogue with the People's Republic of China marked the breakthrough in his policy of moving from an era of confrontations to one of negotiations. I fully subscribe to those past efforts, and intend to pursue the policy of further normalizing U.S. - PRC relations outlined in the Shanghai Communiqué.

I disagree with the view there has been no movement in U.S. - PRC relations. The United States has made very rapid progress since 1971 in establishing contact with a country from which we had been completely isolated for two decades. We have set up Liaison Offices in Peking and Washington. Our trade with the PRC has grown from about five million dollars in 1971 to what is expected to be almost a billion dollars this year. We continue to have an active cultural and scientific exchange program with the Chinese.

A Congressional delegation, headed by Senator Fulbright, returned in September from a two-week tour of China. Secretary Kissinger is just now completing a visit to Peking where he has been holding

discussions on matters of common interest with Chinese leaders.

So I would say that our relations are developing well. We look forward to continuing progress in strengthening those relations in the months and years ahead.

Q: Will the former President brief President Ford upon his return from China?

A: That has not been discussed. As you know, President Ford met very recently with the Chinese leaders, but the Administration would in this instance, as it has in other cases, be pleased to be apprised of any items of particular interest.

Q: What is the duration of the former President's trip? What cities will he visit?

A: I would suggest that you approach Mr. Nixon or the Chinese Government for any details of the trip.

Q: Does President Ford attach any significance to the fact that this invitation is being extended in an election year?

A: No.

Q: Will Mr. Nixon be briefed by the Administration before he goes?

A: I would point out that former President Nixon is making this trip as a private citizen, but within that context the Administration would try to respond to any specific requests for background materials.

Q: Will Mr. Nixon be carrying a message from President Ford?

A: I am sure the President would want his best wishes to be conveyed to the Chinese leaders.

NEW CHINESE PREMIER

Q. Can you give any additional information on the new acting Premier Hua kuo-feng? Did President Ford meet him when he was in China in December?

A. We are checking the records but as far as we can determine, no, he did not meet Hua during his trip.

Q. Do we have any indication that the Nixon visit is connected with the timing of the announcement on the new acting Premier?

A. If there is a connection, we don't know of it.

NIXON CHINA TRIP

Q. Does the President plan to confer with Nixon prior to the trip?

A. Other than the phone call 2/5, we know of no plans for additional contact.

ALBERT - RHODES VISIT TO CHINA

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: How will they be travelling?

A: By government aircraft, as was the case with the previous Congressional trips.

Q: What is the purpose of the trip?

A: The purpose of this trip, as with the previous Congressional visits, is to develop greater understanding between leaders of the two countries.

Q: Is this a Presidential mission?

A: They will not be going as emissaries of the President, but the President, of course, is pleased that Speaker Albert and Congressman Rhodes have the chance to visit China as a part of our efforts to promote the further normalization of relations between our two countries.

Q: What will they do?

A: They hope to have discussions with Chinese leaders on questions of common interest between our two countries. In addition, they will do some travelling in order to obtain an overall view of life in the People's Republic of China. Details of the itinerary are still being worked out.

Q: Who will pay for the trip?

A: As with the previous Congressional trips, the Executive Branch will provide transportation for the delegation to and from China. While in the PRC, the two leaders will be guests of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs.

Q: When were the six previous visits by members of Congress to the PRC?

A: The previous visits were those by Senator Mike Mansfield and Senator Hugh Scott in April 1972, Representatives Hale Boggs and Gerald Ford in June 1972, a group led by Senator Warren Magnuson and Representative Thomas Morgan in July 1973, a visit by Senator Henry Jackson in July 1974, a group led by Senator William Fulbright and Representative Peter Frelinghuysen in September 1974, and a visit by Senator Mike Mansfield in December 1974. In addition, a delegation of six state governors, led by Governor Daniel Evans of Washington, visited the People's Republic of China in May 1974.

CHINA-CANADA

Q: Is it true that Canada's expulsion of a PRC diplomat for "security" reasons was taken on the basis of a request from the US Government?

A: We made no such request, and officials in Ottawa have released a statement affirming that the Chinese official was asked to leave Canada solely at the initiative of the Canadian government.

Q: Is it true that the Chinese official was making frequent trips from Canada to the US to pass money to revolutionary groups in this country?

A: I have no further comments on the matter.

Tour by Chinese Entertainers Barred

CHINA, From A1

Kissinger's concern, expressed privately, that China would soon try to take advantage of the deteriorating U.S. position in various parts of the world—Southeast Asia, Portugal, the Middle East.

The dispute arose on March 8 when the Chinese sought to include in the troupe's program the song "People of Taiwan, Our Own Brothers" containing the line "We are determined to liberate Taiwan."

The Chinese insisted the song be included in the Chinese and English program notes, a spokesman for the citizens' committee said.

Negotiations between the State Department and the Liaison Office continued until "early this week" when it became clear that the Chinese would not drop the song, a State Department spokesman said.

On Wednesday, the New York-based citizens' committee which handles a number of cultural exchanges with China, partly with the help of grants from the cultural affairs bureau of the State Department, announced the postponement.

Between 12,000 and 14,000 tickets had been sold in the cities where box offices had already opened—Los Angeles, Minneapolis, St. Paul and

Chicago—a spokesman for the committee said.

In New York, approximately 4,000 tickets, or half the house, had been sold through mail orders. The troupe was scheduled to come to Washington and its tour was to end April 27.

The committee announcement of the postponement said that "recently new program material was introduced by the Chinese which brought a highly political element into a cultural presentation and was a source of serious concern to the National Committee.

"Since a political issue had arisen the problem was taken up directly by the governments of the United States and the People's Republic of China.

"The inability of the two governments to resolve the issue satisfactorily has left the National Committee with no alternative but regretfully to postpone the tour at this time."

A State Department spokesman said the request to the Chinese to drop the song on Taiwan did not "represent any change in our adherence to the policies contained in the Shanghai Communiqué." That communiqué, issued at the end of the visit to China by President Nixon in 1972, stated that there is only one China and the future of Taiwan is for the Chinese to decide.

The State Department spokesman said of the postponement: "We con-

sider this an episode which need not and should not affect improving relations with the People's Republic of China which are in the basic interest of both the United States and the People's Republic of China. Our sole concern was to avoid the kind of controversy which we believe the inclusion of this song would have created."

An earlier political flap occurred when an exhibit of archeological finds opened at the National Gallery of Art last December. Chinese representatives in Washington canceled a press viewing of the exhibit because invitations were issued to journalists from Taiwan, South Korea, South Africa and Israel.

In September, 1973, when the Philadelphia Orchestra visited China it agreed to drop certain selections that the Chinese considered objectionable.

Among the other exchanges now under way or about to begin are a scheduled visit to China in May of an American track and field team and, in April an American delegation to study schistosomiasis—a disease carried by snails that China claims to have successfully controlled. A Chinese delegation studying solid-state physics is currently in the United States.

Yesterday, the speaker of the House of Representatives, Carl Albert, and the minority leader, John J. Rhodes, left for a tour of China.

PRC TOUR CANCELLATION

Q. We understand that an American tour of a performing arts troupe from the People's Republic of China has been cancelled because of the inclusion in their program of a song with political overtones. Was the cancellation of an entire tour because of one objectionable song really necessary, and will it have serious implications for US-Chinese relations?

A. The United States requested that the tour be postponed in the belief that it is ~~highly~~ inappropriate to inject political issues into a cultural exchange program.*

The inclusion of the objectionable song -- which stressed the issue of liberating Taiwan -- is not in conformity with either the Chinese or U. S. positions as expressed in the Shanghai Communique to which we remain fully committed.

We hope and intend to further the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and we look forward to having the performing arts troupe from China tour this country in the future as part of our cultural exchange program.

~~* Precedent: The U.S. cancelled a press interview of a PRC archaeological exhibition when the Chinese insisted that press representatives from Israel, South Vietnam and the Republic of Korea be excluded.~~

CHINA

Q: In the President's news conference of May 6, Mr. Ford talked about "reaffirming our commitments to Taiwan" in the months ahead. Does this mean there has been a change in his policy toward Peking, the People's Republic of China?

A: Absolutely not. The President continues to believe that normalization of U.S.-PRC relations is a cardinal element of the Administration's foreign policy. He remains firmly committed to the Shanghai Communiqué, which sets the general direction of our China policy.

*American policy
toward PRC*

Q: Why didn't he mention his trip to Peking later this year as one of the things that would lead to additional progress in foreign policy? Is there some doubt now about his making a trip to China in 1975?

A: Absolutely not. As the President mentioned in his speech to the Congress on April 10, he looks forward to visiting the PRC later this year in order to seek ways of accelerating the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations.

with the

relations

Q: Why didn't the President mention the development of a new relationship with Peking as one of the major foreign policy accomplishments of the Republican Administration?

A: I can assure you he does consider the opening of a political dialogue with Peking, the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, and the progress that has been made to date in improving U.S.- PRC relations to be among the major accomplishments of the Administration's foreign policy. He considers it a central set of developments, vital to the evolution of more secure international relationships in the Asian region, and in the world.

Q: But what is the Administration's policy toward Taiwan (Formosa), the Republic of China?

A: As the President told the American Society of Newspaper Editors last month, we value our relations with Taiwan. We remain concerned about the security and stability of the island. ?

he didn't go beyond what Pres
has said publicly

we maintain commitment + (defense treaty)
with Taiwan

Q: But what if Peking demands that you drop your relations with Taiwan as a price for U.S.-PRC normalization?

A: Again, I don't want to get off into a speculative discussion on this issue. It would serve no constructive purpose.

CHINA

Q: Can you clarify where the Administration stands on China policy?

A: It is a cardinal element of the Administration's foreign policy to seek the further normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China. The Shanghai Communique details the basic perspectives which the Administration brings to the normalization process. We remain committed to the Shanghai Communique.

Q: But in your news conference of May 6 you said you reaffirmed the American commitments to Taiwan. Isn't this inconsistent with your efforts to improve relations with Peking? Aren't you really pursuing a "two China" policy?

A: Again, I can only emphasize that the Shanghai Communique provides the basic direction of our overall China policy. In that document the U.S. looks forward to the peaceful resolution of the differences between Peking and Taipei.

COMPUTER SALE TO THE PRC

Q: According to Aviation Week Magazine, Control Data Corporation is negotiating the sale of highly advanced computers to the PRC. This sale is reported to be favored by the State Department but opposed by DOD and ERDA. Can you confirm that report?

A: A number of American companies have been discussing the sale of oil exploration equipment, including computers for the processing of seismic data, with the PRC. It would be inappropriate to comment on the details of any specific license application. Businesses provide such information to the government in confidence. Any export license application will be handled in accordance with the provisions of the Export Administration regulations, as continued in force by Executive Order. Under these laws and regulations, such proposed exports are subject to extensive inter-agency review designed to assure that no exports occur which would be detrimental to the national security of the US. The views of all the agencies affected, including the Department of Defense, ERDA as well as State are reflected in this review.