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6. What is the President's reaction to statements in House hearings that ~~the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has been severely weakened~~ in the past few years and should be given a much stronger role in U.S. arms control efforts?

10/2/74

Guidance: The President feels that ACDA has an important role to play in U.S. arms control efforts and he will be looking to that agency to play a significant role in the SALT talks and other arms control efforts. I would point out that ACDA Director Fred Ikle ^{May} will be testifying before the House Subcommittee tomorrow on the role of ACDA. The President of course has full confidence in Director Ikle. -- He met with Director Ikle a number of times as V.P.

7.

February 5, 1976 ,

KRAFT STORY ON ARMS CONTROL POLICY

Q. What can you tell us about the Kraft story today to the effect that Secretary Kissinger's negotiating position in Moscow was at variance with the Administration's agreed upon SALT strategy and that by an NSC meeting it was determined that Kissinger should be called home?

A. The article is quite misleading. The President had planned before the Secretary's departure to hold an NSC meeting on January 21 to review the situation at the time.

It is absolutely false that Kissinger operated at variance with NSC decisions. There were agreed upon positions prior to his departure. The positions he took in Moscow were directed by the President, and agreed upon by NSC members. The January 21 NSC meeting was planned in advance in order to review the bidding at that point.

Furthermore, the Secretary's schedule was dictated by his appointments in Brussels and Madrid, as well as the Rabin visit to Washington.

2/19/76

Senate Votes Arms Aid Bill of \$3 Billion

Q: The Senate approved by a vote of 60-30 a foreign military aid bill that includes "unprecedented Congressional powers" to monitor U.S. overseas arms trade. What is your reaction to the Legislation and what changes would the President like to see made?

A: We have strong reservations about some provisions of the Legislation (S.2662). Without going into all of them, I would cite as an example the provisions regarding legislative veto of Executive actions by concurrent resolution, which we feel gives rise to very serious Constitutional questions. Early enactment of acceptable legislation is, however, of great importance to the foreign policy of the United States. We are therefore hopeful that the House of Representatives will also complete action on its bill very soon and that the differences between the House and Senate bills can be quickly resolved in an acceptable way that will strengthen and not impair the conduct of our foreign affairs.

(Supplemental Fact Sheet attached)

ADMINISTRATION VIEW OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

Q. The Washington Post, and other papers, carry stories and comments on the Senate passed arms export control act due to be voted on in the House today. What is the Administration position on this legislation, which, after all, would give Congress the tools to share with the President the controls over U. S. commercial arms sales?

A. The Senate passed measure is, as you may know, a part of the FY 1976 Security Assistance legislation. As we have a number of strong reservations about the Security Assistance legislation. Nevertheless, we feel that the legislation is important for carrying out needed programs of its recipients, especially in the Middle East. We are hopeful that during the conference process, we can get a timely and acceptable bill to carry out these objectives.

July 6, 1976

U. S. ARMS RELATIONSHIP WITH AFRICA: A NEW RACE?

Q. The Washington Post reports today that the U. S. is rushing head-long into a new arms supply relationship with Africa to bolster our traditional allies and counter a growing Soviet threat. Can you comment on the assertions in the story?

A. It would appear to me that the story is not new, because our military relationships with the countries mentioned in the story are not new. I would refer you to the Pentagon for details on specific levels of aid and the nature of assistance provided, but basically we have had a military supply relationship with Ethiopia for over twenty years. As for Zaire, the current increase in our aid levels is intended to counter the massive influx of Soviet arms into Angola. Secretary Rumsfeld discussed this general issue following his trip to Africa last month. In Kenya, likewise, the buildup of Soviet-supplied arms in neighboring countries (e. g. Somalia), prompted the Kenyan request for U. S. assistance.

Because of the increasingly uncertain security situation facing friendly nations in Africa today, we have been in consultation with the governments of several African countries to determine how the U. S. can assist these countries in bolstering their defense

capabilities. We have no intention of engaging in an arms race
in Arica, but we will not fail to assist our friends who are increasingly
threatened by the inflow of Soviet arms and Soviet and Cuban presence
in neighboring countries.

NEW ARMY TANK

Q: Was the decision taken by Defense today to grant the contract for a new army tank to General Motors but to give both Chrysler and General Motors 120 days to come up with modifications and improvements a cheap political move to put a decision off until after the election? Did the President and Chancellor Schmidt decide to put off the decision on the new army tank until after we receive the Leopard II?

A: The answer to both of those questions is no. The decision on the new army tank is a technical procurement issue and I would refer you to the Department of Defense for any questions on this.

U. S. ARMS SALES POLICY

Excerpts from Secretary Kissinger's Testimony before House
International Relations Committee, November 6, 1975:

All foreign policy still begins with security. Our alliances and the military assistance programs which support them have been the bedrock of our security and of world peace throughout the post-World War II years. To maintain our nation's safety there simply is no substitute for a strong national defense bolstered by mutually supporting defense ties with other nations which share a commitment to peace and a determination to protect the independence of their nationhood.

* * *

Every nation great or small, whether part of the central strategic balance or not, is fundamentally concerned with its ability to defend the integrity of its territory and maintain internal order. No government can be indifferent to its security, however it defines it; and security requirements will compete with economic and social development for a share of whatever resources are available.

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It is of substantial political importance to the United States that we be able to respond to the felt needs of nations with which we seek constructive relations across the broad range of contemporary issues. The United States cannot expect to retain influence with nations whose perceived defense needs we disregard. Defense supply links to these countries can significantly strengthen efforts to achieve cooperation on other issues -- whether political, economic, or cultural.

Thus a careful security assistance policy is a crucial instrument of our national policy in much the same sense as are our political support and economic assistance for others.

ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS

Q: Sunday's New York Times reports that Senate aides claim that the Administration has totally failed to meet recent law requirements that the Administration submit arms control statements on key U.S. weapons systems. What is your reaction to these charges?

A: The Administration has fully complied with the requirements of the Foreign Relations Act of 1975. Due to the timing of the passage of this legislation in late 1975, the Administration submitted in July a set of preliminary impact statements on a selected set of key weapons systems. It is our intention to submit statements on all weapons systems in the FY 1978 budget cycle in accordance with the law.

FYI: Refer all detailed questions to the State Department and the Arms Control Disarmament Agency.

Question:

You announced in the second debate that the Commerce Department would "disclose those companies that have participated in the boycott." But the day after the debate, Secretary Richardson said he only intended to permit disclosure for companies which received Arab boycott requests on October 7 or thereafter. Why did the Secretary of Commerce disobey your directive?

Answer:

The Secretary of Commerce carried out my directive precisely as I intended it to be carried out. My intent was to order prospective disclosure of boycott reports and not retroactive disclosure which would raise serious questions about due process because of the assurances of confidentiality under which those reports were filed.

I also want to state again here that the purpose of prospective disclosure is to enable the American public to assess for itself the nature and impact of the Arab boycott and to monitor the conduct of American companies.

In this regard, it should be noted that the boycott requests which must be reported to the Department of Commerce and which are being made available for public inspection include requests received by companies that do not intend to comply as well as by those companies that do intend to comply. Also, none of the requests released so far has indicated specific discrimination against Jewish owned or operated American firms.

Also, as you know, on April 29, 1976, Secretary Richardson directed that all charging letters issued by the Commerce Department against companies for failure to report boycott requests be made public. Since April, the Secretary has issued a number of press releases, each containing charging letters and in the last 3 or 4 weeks approximately 13 letters have been released.

October 20, 1976

US POLICY CONCERNING NUCLEAR FIRST-STRIKE

Q: Would you clarify US policy concerning nuclear weapons "first-strike" and "first-use" plans.

A: As I mentioned in a letter to Senator Brooke on July 25, the policy of my Administration has been and continues to be that we will not develop a first-strike doctrine.

As improved command and control and newer systems permit, we are increasing the flexibility of our forces to be more fully prepared for all possible contingencies. However, I wish to reemphasize that this in no sense implies development of a first-strike capability.

With regard to the "first-use" question, we cannot categorically rule out the use of nuclear weapons in response to major non-nuclear aggression which could not be contained by conventional forces.