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EXCERPT FROM ~~KISSINGER~~ PRESS CONFERENCE THIS DATE 2-25-75

Q: Mr. Secretary, there have been a number of reports in recent weeks that you might consider resigning by the end of the year to avoid becoming a focal point of a partisan debate as the 76 campaign gets underway. Are these reports correct?

A: I think this is a permanent story that appears every year. I believe that one's service should be tied to the period in which one can be useful and that is a decision that has to be made largely by the President. And I have not made any such decision as these reports indicate.



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JULY 25, 1975

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

ROOM 450
THE OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

11:35 A.M. EDT

MR. NESSEN: This is all on the record, for immediate release and quotation. Maybe the best way to go at this would be to have 20 minutes or so of questions on the trip, which begins tomorrow, and 15 minutes or so, if there are other matters that interest you.

The Secretary has a crowded schedule today, and we would like to try to hold this to somewhere between 30 and 35 minutes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Barry, I understand you have the first question.

Q I was going to ask a Middle East question. There is a statement here that the White House has put out on the trip. In it, the President says the Helsinki declaration will further the aspirations of the people of Eastern Europe, and he restates our commitment to the peaceful changes.

In a specific way, can you tell us how somehow this will further the aspirations of the people now locked into the Soviet sphere?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, one has to analyze what the phrase "locked into the Soviet sphere" means.

Q Lithuania, Latvia and part of the Soviet Union.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In those countries, the existing situation in Europe reflects, among other things, a balance of forces and a state of affairs that has continued for a generation. It was not created by a document and it will not, as such, be changed by a document.

Therefore, the question that has had to be answered in the entire post-war period and has been answered in different ways at different times is, what is more helpful for a humane evolution, a policy of confrontation or a policy of easing tensions, whether peoples can realize their aspirations better under conditions in which there is political and a threat of military conflict, or under conditions in which the two sides are attempting to settle their disputes and ease tensions.

The judgment that has been made -- and it is important to remember that it is not only that of the United States, but of all West European countries -- is that a policy in which an attempt is made to settle political conflicts will help the humane values that they espouse.

This was the basis for Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik in 1969, in which he faced within his country the question of whether the objectives that he sought were best achieved by a policy of political confrontation or by a policy of easing tensions.

He gave the answer, he made the decisions as far as the Federal Republic and the German question was concerned, which in turn was at the heart of the European problem.

MORE



The agreement by the United States to attend the European Security Conference was in fact made conditional on progress on the German question, and particularly on the solution of the Berlin issue.

So, therefore, it is, I believe, that the easing of tensions in the world and easing of tensions in Europe will help ease the lives of people and may contribute to an evolution in which the problems that produced the Cold War can be dealt with more effectively.

No document is going to change the existing balance of power on the Continent, and therefore there are limits to what any agreement can achieve, but this is the sense in which the President used that paragraph.

Q Mr. Secretary, what do you foresee as being the consequences of yesterday's House vote on the Turkish aid embargo?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to answer that in the second part of the press conference.

Q Question please.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question was the consequences of the House vote on the Turkish aid embargo, and I would prefer to answer this -- if we could keep the first 20 minutes on the trip and the implications of the trip, and the second 20 minutes on general foreign policy questions --

Q Mr. Secretary, the President will be meeting with Secretary Brezhnev twice. Can you describe what will be discussed in those talks and how far apart and how difficult to narrow is the gap on the SALT negotiations?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course, every time the President and the General Secretary meet, there is a general review of the world situation. But, I would think that the three subjects that will receive most attention will be primarily SALT, then the further evolution of European negotiations, such as MBFR and finally undoubtedly there will be a discussion about the Middle East.

With respect to the SALT negotiations, Foreign Minister Gromyko gave us some replies to the American position on SALT while we met in Geneva. On several important categories, these represented distinct progress.

In other categories, there is still a gap. The issues on which a gap remains are substantially fewer in number than was the case a few weeks ago. So, what the President and the General Secretary will attempt to do is to see whether the issues on which progress has been made, how to turn them over to Geneva, and on the issues on which progress still remains to be made, whether they can narrow the differences.

It is our view that a SALT agreement is possible and that the issues on which the compromises have to be made are now quite clearly defined, and therefore it depends on political decisions in both countries.

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Q Mr. Kissinger, since the United States is going to go into the CSCE summit with absolutely no economic policy whatsoever except massive austerity and triage, which is backed up by the kind of international terrorisms that you are now personally implicated in, in the cold arms deal and various other things, New Solidarity would like to know what you are going to tell us will be the American response to the Soviet alternative to all of this, which is increasing trade arrangements with the Third World and Western Europe based on a transfer of rubles which would undercut the existing dollar debt structure --

Q Question?

Q What was the question, Dr. Kissinger?
(Laughter)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question was almost as complicated as my answers tend to be and probably a little more comprehensible. But if I understand the question it was, has the United States an economic policy -- I am leaving out the various personal allusions --

Q What would your response be to the Soviet policy which has now been made clear?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think we have to make clear that at the European Security Conference the Soviet Union is not likely to put forward an integrated economic policy to which we have to respond, because the European Security Conference really is primarily concerned with ratifying the agreements that have been reached in stage two and to permit each of the leaders to make a policy statement.

However, at the side there will be many bilateral discussions. The United States -- leaving aside the various comments about Soviet economic policy -- the United States requires a foreign economic policy for an extremely rapidly changing world and one which it is quite possible the Soviet Union may attempt to enter over the next five to ten years, but I do not believe that that issue will come up at Helsinki.

MORE



Q Mr. Secretary, why do you think the Russians seem so interested in having such a conference? What do they get out of it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to express that our policy has to be made in terms of our purposes. We should not gear our policy to preventing something that the Soviets may have a motive for doing. We have to assess whether it also serves our own purposes.

Now the European Security Conference has been a part of Soviet policy since 1953 and 1954. At that time, it had a totally different purpose. At that time, it was designed to keep the Federal Republic from entering NATO.

It has been rejected at periodic intervals by the Soviet Union. It was rejected for a long time by all the European nations as well as the United States.

In the 1960s an increasing number of West European nations moved towards acceptance of the idea of a European Security Conference. And then, in the late 1960s, with the beginning of the change in German policy, it gained a momentum in which the United States decided that it was wiser to participate in that process rather than to attempt to block it.

However, the conditions have changed importantly since this process was initiated and I would say that for the Soviet Union it was started at one time to prevent the Federal Republic from entering NATO.

In the 1960s it may have been conceived as a kind of substitute peace treaty, but then as the 1960s developed many of the issues which originally could have been discussed at the European Security Conference were settled in a series of bilateral agreements which the Soviet Union made with every West European country and the United States, so now the focus of the European Security Conference has drifted more to a general statement of principles rather than the character it had then.

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Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has continued to attach greater importance to it, perhaps in part because, like other governments, when something has been such a cardinal aim, once it is achieved, even if some of the original assumptions have been somewhat altered, it still retains its importance as an achievement as a long held goal.

But as far as the United States is concerned, we see the significance of the Security Conference as a useful step in a general pattern of the improvement of relations between the East and West. We do not consider it an additional ratification of any existing arrangement. We consider these principles of conduct that repeat what has already been stated in many bilateral arrangements and adds to it certain principles of peaceful change and improved human contact, which we consider useful progress but which we will confine to the words "useful progress."

Q Mr. Secretary, the United States initially came to the position of participating in the conference in the belief that also some parallel progress should be made in MBFR. Can you tell us now what progress is being made in MBFR?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, that is not a correct description of what the United States' position has been. The United States linked the opening of the European Security Conference to the opening of the MBFR discussion. During the course of it, it was never the position of the United States, and certainly never the position of our West European allies, that progress in both of these negotiations should be linked, and indeed on the one or two occasions that we explored the possibility of this link with our West European allies, they rejected the concept that the forced reduction negotiations should be conducted in step with the European Security Conference.

So the fact that they are not linked together is primarily due to discussions within the West and it has never been a condition that the United States made.

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The question is, where do we stand on the force reduction negotiations? The United States attaches importance to the force reduction negotiations. Without question, the President will raise this in his discussion with the General Secretary.

These negotiations are now in recess. They have followed the procedures and the general atmosphere that occurs in the general course of these negotiations, which is that they go through a long discussion of technical phases in which the positions of the two sides are not frequently compatible.

They are now at a point where some decisions have to be made on both sides. Some decisions have to be made on both sides modifying the positions that exist.


The positions that have been taken up to now, while they have been irreconcilable, have nevertheless enabled both sides to study the technical implications of a number of reduction proposals that have been put forth. We are now at a phase where this requires a decision -- which has happened also in the SALT negotiations -- to move things into a stage of more detailed negotiations.

Q Mr. Secretary, one criticism of this conference is that its purposes are so modest that it does not seem to warrant engaging the presence of the President of the United States and 34 other heads of government, to sign these papers. How do you respond to that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The position that the United States took throughout the conference was that we would attend at the highest level if this was the judgment of the other participants and if sufficient progress were made to justify it.

That sufficient progress was defined during the conference as progress in the so-called Basket 3 on human rights and progress on the military provisions of the advance notification of maneuvers, and finally on the clause with respect to peaceful change in Basket 1 on the statement of principles. These objectives were substantially attained.

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Nevertheless, the United States did not agree to the summit level until all the major West European countries had previously agreed to it, and it was our view that nuances that might separate one in one's assessment of this, did not warrant breaking allied unity on the subject.

Secondly, the conference will give a very useful opportunity, of course, for the meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev and also with other leaders for the President to exchange views and to make progress on outstanding issues.

So on the whole we consider the content of the conference useful and the visit will also make a significant contribution in a number of areas.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the meeting with Brezhnev, you had talked about SALT a little bit but can you be more specific? Has there been progress on the verification issue, and has the Soviet Union accepted American proposals on the counting of MIRV's or have they come up with a viable substitute?

And two, are you seeking Soviet forbearance for an interim agreement for American presence, as technicians in the Middle East? What do you want to talk about on the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to SALT, I have no question that within the next few weeks it will seep out of various elements in the Government, uncharacteristically, but in summer our standards relax a little.

But I have promised Foreign Minister Gromyko that until the negotiations were somewhat further advanced, not to go into a detailed description of the proposal.

I can only repeat what I have said before, that in some areas some significant progress has been made. In other areas, considerable differences remain. And, of course, the United States has attached importance to the verification issue, but I don't want to go into where the differences remain and where the progress has been made.

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With respect to the Middle East, to say the United States asked for Soviet forbearance is to imply a state of affairs that may not correspond to facts. We naturally, as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, periodically review the Middle East situation with the Soviet Union. We have also always had the view that no final settlement could be made in the Middle East that excluded Soviet participation.

So what we have to discuss with the Soviet Union is where down the road and in what manner the approaches to a final settlement will be made.

With respect to negotiations now in progress, it is not correct to say we are seeking Soviet forbearance so, of course, the restraint of all of the parties as well as outside countries in that process, is of utility.

MR. NESSEN: Let's open it up now for more general questions, for 15 minutes.

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Q I would like to ask this question to bridge the two subjects. Mr. Secretary, the Administration is encountering extraordinary criticism here of the President's trip to Helsinki. Simultaneously, the Administration suffered a major setback in Congress yesterday on the Turkish vote and also in committee on the Jordanian Hawk missiles.

Can it be the Administration is seriously misjudging the Congress and the public in terms of what their views are of what the traffic will bear on the foreign policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: One of the benefits of detente is that you can criticize detente, and if we did not have it, we would be criticized for missing opportunities for peace.

Is it true, is the Administration misjudging what the temper of the country is? We believe that in the basic direction of East-West relations, the Administration is in no way misjudging the temper of the country.

In any event, the Administration has an obligation to put before the country and to put before the Congress its best judgment of what is required for peace or progress towards peace in certain areas, even if it should get defeated on the issues.

First, on the East-West relations, we do not believe we are misjudging the temper of the country, and we ought to keep in perspective the nature of the criticism, the depth of the criticism and we should be aware of the fact that what makes the criticism possible at all is that we are not living under conditions of crisis.

So, there is a temptation to have all the benefits of peace, as well as all the benefits of looking tough.

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With respect to the Turkish aid vote, I believe this is a result of a special Congressional situation that existed before last year and of considerable pressures that were mounted.

We offered a compromise between the total cutoff and the total restoration, which we favored. We believe that it is a very unfortunate decision. We had no choice except to request a change in a Congressional decision, which is unfortunate for Greece, unfortunate for Turkey, unfortunate for the possibilities of a settlement in Cyprus and unfortunate for the security of the Eastern Mediterranean.

I think it is a tragic evolution, and I hope that when this subject continues to be discussed, it will not be seen in terms of a conflict between the Executive and the legislative and not trying to prove who was right to begin with, but trying to see it in terms of the fundamental interests of the United States and the basic requirements of peace.

It is in that spirit that we will try to live with the decision, and we will try to do the best we can. We will have to come back to the Congress with our best judgment later on.

Q Mr. Secretary, Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen says a CIA spokesman told him the Soviets are pumping about \$10 million a month into Portugal to finance a Communist takeover of that country.

Senator Bentsen says the State Department tells him there are unconfirmed reports of \$2 million a month. Can you tell us what you know about how the Soviets are intervening in the internal affairs of Portugal? Is this intervention not a violation of the European security agreement, and if it is a violation, why are we signing the agreement?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, with respect to the CIA estimates, we may have reached a point where the CIA estimates to nongovernmental personnel have a greater degree of precision than the CIA estimates which we received.

We have not been given that figure, but that is not the point. I have not seen any confirmed reports of any particular figure, \$10 million, \$2 million or any other figure.

What I have seen makes \$10 million seem high, but that is not the issue which you are raising.

With respect to Portugal, it is important to remember a number of things.

First is that the original change in Portugal had nothing to do with the Communist Party of Portugal or with the Soviet Union. That resulted from the colonial war and the inefficiency and lack of popular base of the previous authoritarian Government.

Secondly, when the change occurred, the evolution it took also was largely due to internal Portuguese trends, including the fact that the dominant armed forces movement had been serving in African colonial wars for a long time and had not perhaps been in the mainstream of Western European liberal democratic thought.

Thirdly, in assessing what outside powers did, it is important to assess not only what one side did do, but what the Western countries, for a variety of reasons, did not do.

In making a fair assessment of the evolution in Portugal, both of these factors have to be taken into account.

Fourthly, to the extent that the Soviet Union is active in Portugal, we consider it incompatible with the spirit of relaxation of tensions, and we will bring it to the attention of the Soviet leaders when we meet with them, as we already have brought it to their attention.

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Q Mr. Secretary, to follow that question, what do they say?

Q What do they say when you bring it to their attention?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question is, first of all, what is the degree of their intervention.

I will not go into the details of the diplomatic discussions. We have brought it to their attention. If there is any result from our approaches, the result is more likely to be reflected in actions, if there is any result, than in a long exchange because Governments are not in the habit of confirming this kind of activity.

I would like to stress, however, again, it is an easy way out for us to blame everything that goes against our interests on Soviet machinations. We have also to consider the failures of the West to do what it can do.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you say now or give any indication how close you believe Egypt and Israel are to reaching a new agreement and whether you believe another shuttle will be required?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Egypt and Israel, in my view, are now both making serious efforts. These efforts still have left considerable gaps between the two positions. Nevertheless, if the two sides can survive each other's public statements -- which is not yet self-evident to me -- I believe that they are beginning now to talk about the same range of issues in a negotiable manner.

Whether there will in fact be an agreement is premature to say. If we should get close to an agreement and if the success is probable, then I would think that a shuttle will be necessary to work out the language and the final details.

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We are not yet at the point where we can make that decision, but basically there has been a serious effort by both sides, which has led to a narrowing of the differences, which in several key areas, however, are still quite wide.

Q Can I follow that up, Mr. Secretary? Are you prepared at this point to offer any suggestion of your own in order to bridge the gap between the two sides?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In the mediating process in which we are engaged we obviously, when we receive ideas from either side, occasionally indicate what in our view the traffic will bear and occasionally make suggestion of the direction in which we believe progress can be made.

We have not thought, up to now, that the difference between the two sides was sufficiently narrow for us to put forward an integrated American plan, and we still do not think we have reached that point and, moreover, it is not necessary, as long as there is not any total deadlock, and we don't believe there is a deadlock now.

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Q Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that the CIA plotted to overthrow the Allende regime in Chile. In one instance, the plot included the kidnapping of a ranking military officer of that country. Is this indeed the case, and were you aware of it, and did you do anything about it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not believe that any purpose is served by discussing fragmentary reports that leak out of this or that office. All the documents on all the covert activities that have ever been planned or carried out in Chile have been submitted to the Church Committee.

The Church Committee, therefore, will be able to make a report based on all the documents in everybody's file, and it will be able to distinguish between things that may have been talked about and things that were actually done in a way that the press does not always do, in reporting about it.

Q Mr. Secretary, I am just interested in your answer to Murray Marder a while ago on this criticism where you said one of the things we have to do is keep in perspective the nature and depth of the criticism.

What does that mean? Does that mean the criticism is invalid in some ways?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, it does not mean that even remotely. The criticism is put forward by serious people with serious concerns, but I believe also that it does not necessarily reflect the majority of the American people.

It is inevitable that when you conduct a poll across as wide a range of issues as are involved in moving towards a less tense relation with the East European countries and the Soviet Union, that there are many aspects of it that will be objected to by this or that group.

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Our point is that one has to look at the evolution; and secondly, one has to look at the alternative, and one has to ask oneself what the alternative policy is that is being proposed.

We respect the views of the critics. We take them seriously, but we have to assess that criticism on its merits and we have to assess also its threats.

Q Would you answer a question on CSCE vis-a-vis the matter of human rights, which there has been skepticism raised about?

How far are the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries willing to go on the matter of respecting the human rights embodied in the CSCE document, and how optimistic are you that the Soviet Government and the Eastern European block will liberalize to that extent?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On the so-called Basket 3 which contains the human rights provisions, the outcome of the conference was substantially a Soviet acceptance of a joint Western proposal that was made as a final agreed position in early May. So if all of these provisions are carried out, we believe it would be a substantial step forward.

At the same time, of course, we cannot assert that this document is without legal force with respect to us, but is of legal force with respect to the other side. Therefore, a great deal depends on the general atmosphere that exists in the world on whether these guidelines and principles will in fact be implemented.

What the so-called Basket 3 does is to enable the West and the United States to appeal to agreed documents as a guide for conduct, and this is what we will do. And we will also hope to bring about a further improvement of East-West relations that would accelerate the process and improve the atmosphere. It is not absolutely binding, but it is a step forward, to have Communist agreement with these principles, and we will do our utmost to hold them to it.

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Q Mr. Secretary, what reaction do you anticipate the Turkish Government will take in response to what Congress has done? Will they now cause us to have to give up, leave, or otherwise terminate some of our bases there?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have learned one thing in recent months which is that if what you predict happens, you are blamed for having caused the result which you foresee by your prediction, and therefore, I am not going to make a prediction which we will then be accused of having encouraged the Turkish Government to take.

We believe that it was a very unfortunate and sad decision that was taken yesterday because it helped nobody, including those who passionately urged it. But we have made this case now.

We have been told by the Turkish Government on innumerable occasions that there would be some reaction. We are now engaged in talking to the Turkish Government -- I had a telephone conversation with Prime Minister Demirel this morning. The President sent him a message yesterday -- in trying to urge restraint and moderation on the Turkish Government because the basic values that are involved in our joint defense and that affect issues far beyond Turkish-American relations, have not changed as a result of this vote.

So we are hoping that Turkey will not take any precipitous action and give everybody an opportunity to see whether progress can be made on the issues that have produced this in the first place, so I would not want to make a prediction. I do not know what the Turkish reaction to our appeals will be.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 12:15 P.M. EDT)



OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT
AND

HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

YITZHAK RABIN
PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL
AND

ANWAR SADAT
PRESIDENT OF EGYPT
AND

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

CAMP DAVID, MARYLAND

12:00 NOON EDT

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Hello, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Henry, how are you?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am fine. How nice to hear from you.

THE PRESIDENT: The same to you. I have just been warned by Ron -- I have to tell you, and later when I talk to the Prime Minister and the President -- that WHCA is recording this conversation.

You don't have any objections, I trust?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I don't have any objection.

THE PRESIDENT: I think they wanted it for historical purposes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Right.

THE PRESIDENT: Let me say very, very deeply how very grateful I am for the tremendous effort that you have made in this last round of negotiations, but I know how long and how hard and devotedly you have spent many, many hours, not only with me, but with Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat.

I think this is a great achievement, one of the most historic, certainly of this decade and perhaps in this century, and I know that the American people will be most grateful for the successful efforts that you have made. I just want to express it very strongly and very deeply for myself.

MORE

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I appreciate this very much, Mr. President, and, of course, we have spent more time on the Middle East -- you and I -- than on almost any other problem.

THE PRESIDENT: I think if we added up the hours, it would be a good many days, and the fact that we finally made a successful conclusion I know gives you, as well as myself, and many others, a great deal of satisfaction. It is in the best interests of not only the two countries ourselves, but in my judgment, Henry, one of the great achievements for the world at this time.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it gives peace a chance in this area, and the consequences the U.S. pointed out repeatedly of stalemate are simply unacceptable.

THE PRESIDENT: I am sure there will be some critics, but I think in all honesty they have to understand what the alternatives would have been.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Exactly, Mr. President. That is the problem, that the continuation of the stalemate would have had both military and economic consequences for the world, that we had to do something about.

THE PRESIDENT: You are leaving very shortly, as I understand, for the actual initialing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am going to see Prime Minister Rabin now, and then we are going to initial the documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then shortly after that, I will go to Egypt to meet with President Sadat and participate in the initialing of the documents there.

THE PRESIDENT: You will actually carry the documents with you to Alexandria, then?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Exactly, the documents and maps.

THE PRESIDENT: I am going to call the Prime Minister after talking with you, and I will express to him my appreciation, but if you will do it in person for me, I would also be very grateful.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I will do that, Mr. President, and I look forward very much to seeing you on Thursday.

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THE PRESIDENT: You are getting in Wednesday night, as I understand?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right. I am getting in Wednesday night about nine or ten o'clock.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I will be at the airport to meet you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT: It is arranged for us to have a bipartisan leadership meeting on Thursday morning at 8 a.m.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Good.

THE PRESIDENT: I am sure that their reaction will be the same as mine, that this is a great achievement for not only the parties involved, but for the world as a whole, and I just can't express deeply enough my appreciation for your own magnificent efforts in this area.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. President, we have worked together on this, and your strong support and your leadership and your talks with Sadat and Rabin made this possible.

THE PRESIDENT: You go over there and participate with the Prime Minister, give him my best, and at the same time give Nancy my very best.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Thank you, and the best to Betty.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, and we will see you Wednesday night.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: See you Wednesday night.

* * * * *

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Prime Minister, how are you, sir?

PRIME MINISTER RABIN: I am fine, Mr. President. How are you?

THE PRESIDENT: I am excellent, thank you, and I just finished talking with Henry. I understand he is coming over to meet with you very shortly for the actual initialing, and let me congratulate you for the superb efforts you have made under most trying circumstances.

I think your role has been one of great statesmanship under terribly difficult circumstances, and I congratulate you and compliment you on the achievement of, I think, an outstanding negotiation that is culminated in a document that will lead to great progress in the Middle East for the benefit of the world as a whole.

MORE



PRIME MINISTER RABIN: Mr. President, thank you very much for your kind words. It was not an easy decision. They were complicated negotiations, but we have decided this time to take risks, and I stress to take risks, for an opening for peace.

I hope that what we have decided will set a new pattern in the area, and we all hope here that the agreement will really lead to both tranquility in the area and to bring closer the positions of at least Egypt and Israel.

I would like to thank you very much for the role that you personally -- the United States -- and your envoy, Dr. Kissinger, have served in the achievement of this agreement.

THE PRESIDENT: I thank you very much, Mr. Prime Minister. Let me assure you that you can count on us to continue to stand with you. We have a close relationship, and it will continue as we move forward under the basis of this outstanding agreement.

You have laid a solid foundation with this agreement, in my judgment, on which we can build for real peace efforts in the future.

PRIME MINISTER RABIN: We all hope for it here, and we really hope that it will be the beginning of something which we have not yet experienced in this area, and we hope that the other side, the Egyptian side, feels the same.

THE PRESIDENT: You can rest assured that we will work with you to make certain that the agreement is carried out, not only in the spirit, but in the letter, and that we expect to continue the relationship that we have had over a good many years, your country and ours.

You have heroic people, and the American people are most sympathetic to those that you so ably represent, Mr. Prime Minister.

PRIME MINISTER RABIN: Mr. President, as you are fully aware, we appreciate very much you, we appreciate very much the special relations that have been so significant in the past and the present between our two countries, and I am sure that what we have done there today will add a new dimension to the relations between our two countries.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you give my very best to Mrs. Rabin, and I hope that in the near future you can come back and see us again, sir.

MORE

PRIME MINISTER RABIN: Thank you, very much, Mr. President, and please convey our best wishes to Mrs. Ford.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, and we will see you, I hope, soon.

PRIME MINISTER RABIN: I hope so, too.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

PRIME MINISTER RABIN: Thank you very much, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye.

PRIME MINISTER RABIN: Goodbye.

* * * * *

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, President Sadat.

PRESIDENT SADAT: Hello. This is President Sadat.

THE PRESIDENT: How are you this morning?

President Sadat, I wanted to call you and congratulate you on the great role that you played in the negotiations that have culminated in this agreement.

PRESIDENT SADAT: (President Sadat's remarks are incomplete due to the poor telephone transmission from Egypt.)

Hello?

THE PRESIDENT: Unfortunately, I don't hear you too well, Mr. President. I hope that my conversation is coming through more clearly.

Let me express most emphatically on behalf of my Government the appreciation for your statesmanship, despite adversity, and some criticism, and the spirit with which you have approached the need for an agreement.

I am most grateful for the leadership that you have given, and I look forward to continuing to work with you in --

PRESIDENT: Hello?

THE PRESIDENT: Hello. Can you hear me, Mr. President?

MORE



PRESIDENT SADAT: No, I can't hear you very well.

THE PRESIDENT: I know that you and I recognize that stagnation and stalemate in the Middle East would have been potentially disastrous, and your leadership in working with Secretary Kissinger and with the Israelis, all of us are most grateful for.

As we continue to work together, personally, as well as Government to Government --

PRESIDENT SADAT: Hello?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I can hear you, Mr. President. I hope you can hear me, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT SADAT: President Ford, hello.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't hear too well, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT SADAT: President Ford, are you speaking?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, this is President Ford.

PRESIDENT SADAT: Go ahead, please.

THE PRESIDENT: The connection, unfortunately, is not too good for me to hear your comments, Mr. President.

Let me say, if I might, despite the difficulties that Mrs. Ford and I hope that Mrs. Sadat and you and your children will visit the United States sometime this fall.

Secretary Kissinger has told me of the very warm hospitality that you have extended to him and Mrs. Kissinger, and we look forward to reciprocating when you come to the United States in the fall of 1975.

I regret that I can't hear. The connection is very bad. I hope that you can hear me and my comments from the United States.

Mr. President, I understand that Secretary Kissinger is coming to Alexandria to personally deliver the document for your initialing, and I have asked Henry to extend to you on that occasion the gratitude and appreciation of the American people for your patience, your leadership and your understanding of the need and necessity for a forward step, an important step in the ultimate aim of total peace in the Middle East.

PRESIDENT SADAT: Hello, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Mr. President.

I can hear you better now, sir.

PRESIDENT SADAT: Mr. President, I hope you and your family are well.

THE PRESIDENT: I am feeling very well, Mr. President, and I hope you are, too.

PRESIDENT SADAT: I want to thank you for your personal message.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. President, I couldn't hear every word distinctly, but I got the thrust of your kind comments, and your encouraging words, and I can assure you that we will work with Egypt, not only in seeing that the agreement is implemented with the spirit, as well as the letter, that we will continue to develop the good relations between Egypt and the United States, working to make sure that we expand trade, tourism and our help to the maximum degree possible and that this is the way the United States can continue to play a constructive role in the most important area -- the Middle East.

You have my personal assurance, and I am sure the Congress will cooperate because it is recognized in the United States that the Middle East is in a vitally important area of the world and that our participation in a constructive way is an important element in the tremendous success that has been achieved in the negotiations between your country and Israel. I wish to thank you very, very much.

I said a few moments ago that Mrs. Ford and I look forward to having Mrs. Sadat, your family and yourself here in the United States early this fall.

PRESIDENT SADAT: Mr. President, I am looking forward to this visit with you and Mrs. Ford and your family, as a further step towards a successful and peaceful conclusion.

I again thank you, but it is essential, Mr. President, that we must keep the momentum of the peace going and continue it.

THE PRESIDENT: I can assure you, Mr. President, we are going to keep the momentum going in the peace process. We will not tolerate stagnation or stalemate. The momentum is on the way for a peaceful solution on a permanent and equitable basis, and you have my pledge that we will make sure that that momentum keeps going.

PRESIDENT SADAT: Thank you very much, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: I look forward to seeing you after that wonderful visit we had in Salzburg, and give my very best to Mrs. Sadat, if you will, please.

MORE

PRESIDENT SADAT: Thank you very much, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, sir.

PRESIDENT SADAT: I should like to add another point, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

PRESIDENT SADAT: I think I would like to --

THE PRESIDENT: I, unfortunately, cannot hear as well as I would like the last comments you made. The connection from here is not, apparently, as good as I hope you have there, but --

PRESIDENT SADAT: I hear you quite well.

THE PRESIDENT: The efforts of Secretary Kissinger and myself we feel were completely worth what we have done, but our efforts could not have been successful without the leadership and the statesmanship by you and the equally fine actions by the Israeli Government and Prime Minister Rabin.

As I said a moment ago, President Sadat, the momentum is moving in the right direction, and you have my personal assurance that we will continue that movement because it is vital, not only in the Middle East, but elsewhere for the benefit of all peoples.

PRESIDENT SADAT: Thank you, Mr. President, very much.

THE PRESIDENT: We will see you soon, I hope.

PRESIDENT SADAT: We are looking forward to coming, with pleasure, and convey my good wishes to your family.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, and the best to yours, sir.

PRESIDENT SADAT: Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT: Have a good day, and Henry will be there shortly, I understand.

PRESIDENT SADAT: I will wait for him.

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. Goodbye.

PRESIDENT SADAT: Bye.

* * * * *

THE PRESIDENT: I understand there is a statement to be released from the White House that points out the strong feelings that I have that this negotiation culminating in the agreement is a great success in not only preventing stagnation and stalemate in the Middle East but, more importantly, getting the momentum going for what all of us hope will be a continued effort to expand the permanent peace that all hope for that would conform, of course, to the resolutions in the United Nations, 242 and 338.

I suspect there can be anticipated some criticism, but I respectfully suggest that, if we had not achieved this historic settlement, the alternative would have been turmoil, increased tension, obviously greater dangers in the Middle East for a renewal of the kind of tragic conflict that took place in 1973.

By the agreement between Israel and Egypt, the momentum has been continued, and I am convinced that when the Congress and the American people see what has been achieved and objectively look at the alternative of no success, that the Congress and the American people will support our role.

QUESTION: What sort of criticism do you anticipate, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure there will be too much criticism, but there will be some legitimate questions asked, such as what is the anticipated role of the limited number of American technicians, civilian experts.

I can assure the Congress and the American people that the number will be in the range of 100 to 150. They will be civilians; they will be technicians; they will have no military role; they will be in the United Nations zone.

So, this contribution by the United States I think is a constructive one and not one that has great peril or danger. The United States will, of course, contribute assistance to Israel, and we will continue our aid to Egypt.

This, I believe, is another constructive effort by the United States to this peace agreement, this effort to, in the long run, provide a permanent, fair and equitable settlement of the many differences in the Middle East.

QUESTION: If Congress should not approve the stationing of technicians there, will the agreement fall apart?

MORE

THE PRESIDENT: It would have a very serious impact because the contribution of the United States is important and those technicians are a vital ingredient in assuring both Egypt and Israel that the agreement will be upheld.

So, a turndown by the Congress would have serious repercussions.

QUESTION: What will be their role, Mr. President? They are not acting as policemen to enforce the agreement, are they?

THE PRESIDENT: They are not. They are going to be stationed in what you can call warning stations, and their role will simply be that of a technician and have no other responsibilities.

QUESTION: Mr. President, has there been any Russian comment on the presence of technicians themselves as distinguished from criticism of having the early warning teams outside of the U.N. zone?

THE PRESIDENT: I have read of some questions being raised. I have not seen any -- and I don't believe there is any -- direct objection.

QUESTION: Mr. President, why is it necessary to have Americans to do that? Can't other people be trained to do that, or is it more than just the technical skills they will bring to that that makes it important?

THE PRESIDENT: It is a very highly, very sophisticated, technical knowledge, and we have Americans who are trained and who can carry on that responsibility. I believe that both Egypt and Israel have faith that ours will perform that function in a responsible and fair way.

QUESTION: I suppose the criticism that is going to be leveled against that, is that by putting those people there you increase the danger that they could become hostages and the United States could be drawn in in a direct way into a new conflict.

Is that part of the reason they are there?

THE PRESIDENT: They are not there for the potentiality of being held hostage. They are there to perform a technical responsibility, and I have no fear that they can or will be held hostage under any circumstances.

QUESTION: Mr. President, there has been some talk about the figure of \$3.1 billion in aid to Israel. Is that accurate?

MORE

THE PRESIDENT: That is not an accurate figure. Our aid will be significant, but I would not at this point wish to comment on the precise dollar total.

QUESTION: What is the next step in the Middle East? Are you going to try to negotiate a Syrian-Israeli agreement now?

THE PRESIDENT: I can only say that this is a step in the overall settlement. The precise next step has not yet been discussed.

I will, of course, talk to Secretary Kissinger on his return but, having achieved this, I can only say our overall objective fits in with the two U.N. resolutions, 242 and 338.

QUESTION: Is there any change in the picture on your dealings with Congress on the oil veto? It is still expected it will lead to a veto.

THE PRESIDENT: I wouldn't want to go beyond what we said -- when was it, Friday morning? I am encouraged. I am always optimistic, but until Congress returns and until we hear from the Democratic leaders, I don't believe I should comment further.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. President.

END (AT 12:31 P.M. EDT)

September 9, 1975

No. 475

#69

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
September 9, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will go right to questions.

Detente
Q Mr. Secretary, in view of Soviet unhappiness over your latest peace mission in the Middle East, and in view of what appears to be growing skepticism at home about detente, I wonder whether you would tell us how you feel today about detente, whether you are satisfied that it works or perhaps disappointed by the interpretation in Moscow.

A Detente has become almost a slogan in our public debate, and I think it is important to summarize again what it means to the United States.

The policy of relations with the Soviet Union, and of attempting to ease the tensions between the two great nuclear superpowers, derives from the conditions in which we find ourselves.

The United States and the Soviet Union have the capability of destroying humanity. Their conflicts, therefore, are different from the conflicts between nations throughout history. They have a special obligation to conduct their affairs in such a manner that the risk of war is minimized.

For further information contact:

if this is at all possible.

It is this conviction that has led successive administrations in attempting to find a relationship with the Soviet Union less prone to the dangers of conflicts that can arise sometimes even without the direct intentions of the two countries.

Now this attempt to ease tensions takes place at several levels:

① First, it takes place on the level of the control of arms, especially nuclear arms, and in that connection the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—the agreement that has been concluded and the agreement that we are attempting to conclude—are of prime significance. The problem of the nuclear arms race is a problem that must be dealt with that will be solved at some time, and the sooner the better.

② Second, we are attempting to bring about restraint in areas of direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as in central Europe. That has been reasonably successful.

③ Third, there is the problem of conflicts, disagreements, tensions in areas where there is no direct

confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, such as the Middle East. In such areas, the conflict can develop as a result of the tensions that are inherent in the area, the lack of restraint of the superpowers, and other factors.

In the conflict in peripheral areas, the process of relaxing tensions has not made as much progress as in the area of the control of armaments and in the areas where there has been a direct confrontation. In those areas, further efforts and mutual restraint are necessary.

We do not believe that relations with the Soviet Union are idyllic. We are ideological opponents. We have conflicting national interests in addition to the ideological differences. Nevertheless, we believe we have an obligation to attempt to ease tensions, if only to demonstrate to our own people that if there is a conflict we have done everything in our power, honorably, to avoid it.

So, on the whole, we believe that the policy of relaxation of tensions is essential -- that we are going to continue to pursue it -- and that it can be done only on the basis of reciprocity. We will not give up vital American interests.

We will resist attempts to exploit it, but we will cooperate on the basis of reciprocity with any effort that can ease tensions on both sides, on the basis that the process is a two-way street.

*Soviet Union -
Middle East*

Q Mr. Secretary, with regard to this easing of tensions in the Middle East, you say that the United States won't give up any of its vital interests and presumably the Soviet Union won't give up any of its vital interests. In peripheral areas such as these, is it not possible that what is considered progress by one side may be considered dangerous provocation by the other -- and thereby have an adverse effect on your general picture?

A Of course, when you assess vital interests, you also have to remember that in order to vindicate them you have to survive. So that the definition that "both sides have a vital interest" must take into account the realities of the contemporary period.

I believe that it is --

Q I wasn't talking about that . . .

A I will come to your question in a minute -- or in five minutes. [Laughter.]

In the Middle East I do not believe that the

essential interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are, in any sense, incompatible. I do not believe that the recent agreement between Egypt and Israel is, in any sense, detrimental to the interests of the Soviet Union or a unilateral advantage for the United States.

The significance of the agreement is that it defuses the tensions in the area and if it is implemented properly will open, or can open, a door to general peace in the area.

And if we consider that every war in the Middle East has involved the danger of confrontation of the two nuclear superpowers, it is in the mutual interest of both the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce the tensions of war.

The United States seeks no unilateral advantage in the Middle East. The United States recognizes that in a final settlement in the Middle East, a Soviet role will be important and therefore, we are debating now certain procedural questions about the Soviet role in the recent negotiations -- rather than a unilateral advantage gained by the United States at the expense of the Soviet Union.

Technicians

Q Mr. Secretary, a number of Pentagon officials have been saying that there is no military role that can be played by the 200 American civilian technicians in monitoring the Agreement that could not be played by either airborne or satellite intelligence.

Can you say, apart from the political or psychological effect of having these Americans in the Sinai passes, whether there is any monitoring function that is essential to their being there. In other words, that they have to be physically in the passes?

A These "Pentagon officials" have not shared their judgments either with me or with the President. And therefore, I don't know who they are and on what their opinion is based.

The monitoring that is going to be done in the limited area in the Sinai -- that is, the area that is geographically bounded by the Giddi Pass in the north and the Mitla Pass in the south -- it is about a distance of roughly twenty miles. The monitoring has two strategic warning stations, one by Israel and one by Egypt under American custody, and there will be Americans stationed at each of these stations.



And secondly, three manned tactical warning stations.

In the negotiations extending over several weeks that we participated in, neither of the parties thought that either of these types of stations were dispensable.

And I might also point out that there was a unanimous vote in the National Security Council before I left, which included the participation of the Defense Department, that agreed that as a last resort, if it was necessary to make the agreement, we should go ahead with the American technicians.

Q Mr. Secretary, what about the risks that may emerge as a result of the PLO threat that the "Palestine revolution regards the U.S. military presence in the Sinai as an enemy target and should be shot by every struggler and every nationalist in our Arab nation?" How do you plan to handle that?

A There aren't that many strugglers in the Sinai because it is a substantially unpopulated area and the American warning stations are located in an area between the two armies, in an area that contains several thousand of the United Nations personnel and in which there is no

*Threats to
civilian
technicians*

civilian population of any kind.

Secondly, we believe that once the immediate passions have died down, and the various Arab nations and the various groupings look at the agreement, they will realize that it was the only step possible towards peace that could now be taken, and that compared to the alternative of a stalemate, it was the best course for all of the parties in the area.

So we believe, when a more sober calculation is undertaken, that all of the parties in the area will return to the realization that the process of negotiation is the only road by which peace can be achieved.

Q Mr. Secretary, there is a good deal of backing and filling going on at the Hill about the issue of what is classified and what is "secret" and how to handle it, involving the U.S. commitment.

And there does seem to be some confusion about secret or classified commitments made by the United States -- either verbally or written -- in the interim agreement, and I wonder if you could clear this up with answering two simple questions:

First, will the American people know every detail of any U.S. commitment to the parties?

*Secret
Commitments*

And will all of Congress know these commitments in toto?

Or will full disclosure be made only to committees or to certain members of certain committees?

A We have made an unprecedented effort to put before the Congress any American undertaking, to either of the parties. We have gone, not only through any written undertakings that may exist, but through the entire negotiating record, to extract from it any undertaking of the United States. We have put those before the relevant committees.

Q (Inaudible)

A Let me finish -- I will answer both of your questions.

We have put those before the relevant committees.

In addition, we have gone over the negotiating record with other members of the committees, in order to make sure that their definition of what constitutes an undertaking does not differ from ours.

more →
Now with respect to -- and if there is a disagreement, we will work it out.

Now with respect to what we consider to be



undertakings, we are now working out with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and we will work out with the House International Relations Committee, a form in which these undertakings can be made public -- the difficulty being that a few are not really "undertakings" in the strict sense, but general diplomatic statements of intention.

But any "undertaking" will be put before the entire Congress and before the public in a manner agreed to between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee and the Administration.

Q Do I get from that that there is a portion of -- what? the diplomatic intent? -- that is not going to be made public under any circumstances?

A Any undertaking of the United States will be made public.

There is, however, an area of diplomacy that no country has ever made public and that does not involve undertakings, commitments of the United States.

We will go to the absolute limit and we have made an absolutely unprecedented effort in making available documents that have never been made available to Congressional

committees before. We will then work with these committees on an agreed method of publication. And it will be the fullest disclosure of a diplomatic record that has ever been made.

Q Mr. Secretary, have you told these committees of Congress that the United States will pay for 55 to 75 percent of the oil supplies of Israel, for years to come?

A First of all, that is not a correct statement of --

Q What is a correct statement in regard to what we will pay for Israeli oil for years to come?

A May I answer the first question?

We have put before these committees -- and no doubt we will make public -- any commitment, and undertakings of the United States with respect to the oil supply of Israel.

The United States has not committed itself to a separate funding of the oil purchases of Israel. The United States has agreed that it would take into account in its total aid package the additional sums that Israel has to spend for foreign purchases of oil.

There is no precise sum, in fact there is no sum, attached to this general proposition, as will become apparent

*Oil for
Israel*

when the documentation become available.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have said repeatedly -- you have said repeatedly on this last trip -- that the momentum now toward peace must be maintained. What does that mean in a specific practical way, beyond the rhetoric?

A We have maintained -- and, indeed, it is part of the agreement -- that the agreement between Egypt and Israel is not a final peace settlement. The agreement states it is considered a significant step towards peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

It has always been understood that a final settlement must involve the question of frontiers, must involve the question of reciprocal Arab commitments to peace, must involve some solution of the Palestinian question, and it must involve international guarantees of some sort. This can be pursued either by step-by-step policy -- for example, through negotiations between Syria and Israel -- or by a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, or by both efforts being pursued simultaneously.

The United States has repeatedly stated its commitment to promote a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

*M.E.
Final
Agreement*

We will be prepared to help the parties either in a multilateral framework or in a bilateral framework. And we believe -- and we believe that the parties agree -- that the process towards peace can not be arrested.

Q What is your appraisal of the Syrian and Israeli interest in another step along this process?

A Well, in the immediate future Israel and Egypt will have to negotiate the practical arrangements involved in their current agreement. That will take some weeks. Then the process of implementation will have to begin. But somewhere in this process, if Syria and Israel are prepared to start negotiations, and if it is their judgment that the United States can be helpful, we will be prepared to play a role.

Q Mr. Secretary, has the interim agreement had any visible effect on other areas of U. S.-Soviet relations? And, in addition to that, whether it has or not, could you give us an assessment of the current state of SALT negotiations in particular -- what obstacles there are, if you can tell us -- and what the prospects are for

Israel-Syria?

*SALT
Brezhnev
visit*

the visit by Mr. Brezhnev to the United States?

A As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko is going to visit the General Assembly and on that occasion will pay his customary visit to Washington. I expect to meet with him several times while he is here. The President will meet with him for an extended review of the situation. On that occasion we will certainly review the situation in the Middle East, and -- at least from our side -- we will make every effort to overcome whatever misunderstandings may exist.

As far as SALT is concerned, the basic issues of principle were settled at Vladivostok. Several other issues of great consequence have been settled in the meantime. We are now down to two or three issues of great importance on which agreement has not yet been reached but on which, if agreement were reached, the negotiation could be concluded within six to eight weeks after that.

We expect to discuss those issues with Foreign Minister Gromyko when he is here, and we still expect to receive the General Secretary in Washington before the end of this year.

more →



RECEIVED
VISIT

Q Mr. Secretary, this is somewhat --

Q Mr. Secretary, that time table would seem to run awfully late into the year. You say six to eight weeks after a breakthrough. And what is your estimate of a foreseeable date, even if all things would go somewhat --

A I cannot give an estimate of a date, but I have said that we still expect to see Chairman Brezhnev here before the end of this year.

Q Mr. Secretary, did the somewhat unprecedented intervention of your African Desk with the Governor of Delaware on behalf of two members of ZANU -- an African terrorist group without UN diplomatic credentials -- did this have anything to do with the widely reported resignation of Ambassador Davis?

A No, because I don't even know what you're talking about.

Q It's been reported on page one of the Star and the Post, Mr. Secretary.

A Well --

Q You don't read those papers, or --

*Another
Kinsolving
biggie!*

A I don't want to offend the press, but I regret to say that I am not familiar with this particular incident; but I will be within 15 minutes of leaving here. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Secretary, in a memorandum of understanding some months ago the Administration announced there was a policy reassessment taking place regarding the Middle East. Are we ever to hear of that again -- or, if we're not, can you give us some tentative conclusions that may have been drawn as the result of this months-long reassessment?

A The reassessment had two aspects.

① It had the aspect of the diplomatic framework within which progress towards peace could be pursued in the Middle East, in the wake of the failure of the March shuttle.

② And, secondly, it had the aspect of the aid levels that were requested for both Israel and some of the Arab countries.

Both of these issues were clearly related to each other.

In the wake of the March failure, we had to assess whether the step-by-step approach was still valid or whether a more comprehensive approach offered the only

Reassessment

REASSESS
MENT



possibility. I think that the diplomatic framework of the reassessment has been settled by the recent negotiation between Egypt and Israel. Similarly, the problem of aid levels is in the process of being settled. It's been substantially settled. And these will be submitted to the Congress before the end of the month, I would expect.

Q Yes, but to follow for a minute, in response to a question a while back I got the impression that we still have not made a decision whether step-by-step from here on in is the preferred approach. Is that correct?

A Which approach should be pursued depends not only on the preferences of the United States but on the preferences of the parties, and the issue was not only which of these should be approached but in what manner it should be approached.

I believe that as a result of the examination here of recent months and of the events of recent weeks that there is now a much greater clarity of the limits and the possibilities that exist in moving the process forward towards peace.

Similarly, as I pointed out, we will submit aid levels. And, of course, we had the benefit, during the reassessment, of learning the Congressional judgment of appropriate aid levels in the letter of the 76 Senators and in other approaches. And, therefore, in assessing the aid levels, as I pointed out previously, what one has to consider is the difference between what would have been submitted or voted anyway and what is being requested as a result of the agreement. And we do not think that that is a very significant figure.

Q Mr. Secretary, is there an inter-Government study under way now concerning the recruitment of American personnel to be sent to the Sinai? And, if so, will these personnel be recruited from the Defense Department, from any of the Government intelligence agencies -- or, if not, will these personnel reflect that work experience? And will the organization established to administer the monitoring function in the Sinai be a private corporation -- perhaps like the Vinnell Corporation -- or more like Air America? (Laughter)

A I am not sure that I quite get the implication of that last remark. And I don't want you to

*Study
on
technicians*

explain it. (Laughter.)

We are undertaking a study, on an urgent basis, of all of these questions. Our preference is to recruit people out of civilian life. We have not yet made a decision as between a private organization or a Governmentally-sponsored one. It is clear that the personnel will not be under the Defense Department, because we do not want to give them a military role. The personnel will report to both sides and to the UN as well as to the United States Government. But the questions you ask, which are important ones, we will be able to answer within about ten days.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said --

A You have to remember, incidentally, that American personnel will not begin manning these stations for five months after the implementing protocol has been signed; and that is about two to three weeks away. So we have about five and a half months to work out all the details.

Portugal

Q I was going to ask you to evaluate the recent developments in Portugal with regard to your earlier statements on that country -- also with regard to the role of the Soviet bloc in Portugal -- and with regard to the possibilities for American assistance to Portugal, economic assistance.

A I have made so many statements about Portugal that I'm not absolutely sure which ones you are referring to.

I was concerned, as were my colleagues, that events in Portugal might be dominated by a minority group -- the Communist Party -- distinguished, primarily, by its discipline and its dogmatism, against the expressed wishes of the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese people. And the United States, together with its West European allies, repeatedly pointed out its dismay at an evolution in which such a small minority would take over the effective control of Portugal.

Now, recent events have reduced at least some of the



manifestations of this dominance. We are not yet clear what will emerge out of the deliberations, both with respect to the formation of a new government and with respect to the organization of the Revolutionary Council.

The Communist Party still remains a significant political force in Portugal -- probably out of proportion to its numerical strength -- and we cannot yet fully assess what is taking place within the military movement. But, on the whole, we believe that the events of the last two weeks have been encouraging. The United States supports the emergence of a pluralistic system there reflecting the public's view as they were expressed in the election to the Constitutional Assembly. And we are working in the closest harmony on this problem with our European allies.


With respect to the Soviet Union, we have made clear our view about possible Soviet intervention in Portugal; and those views have not changed.

Q Will it be a matter of United States policy



that any aid to Portugal will depend on whether or not we still think that the Communist Party remains a force beyond its numerical strength?-

A That will certainly influence our judgment.



Q You said the Soviet Union would continue to play a procedural role in the Middle East. Will it be just procedural? Could it be more than procedural?

A No, I did not say the Soviet Union would play only a procedural role. I said that the Soviet objection to the recent negotiation between Egypt and Israel seems to me to have concerned procedure more than substance. And I also said that in a final settlement in the Middle East, Soviet participation would be important, and not only procedural but substantive.

Q I meant to ask whether you could conceive of the possibility that the Soviets could play an actual peace-keeping role in the Middle East in the same way we will be in the Sinai passes?

A Well, the role that the United States is playing is at the request of both parties. It was not proposed by the United States. In fact, I am giving away no secrets if I point out that we were not particularly anxious to play this role.

If both parties should ask the Soviet Union in some other area to play a similar role, that would be for both parties to discuss with the Soviet Union. I do not see that this is the most immediate foreign policy

*Soviets
in M.E.*

problem before us, however.

Q Mr. Secretary, is there in the memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Israel, any sort of formal commitment to consult with Israel on the nature of assistance in the event of an attack by an outside power, and if so, why is it necessary?

A The memorandum of understanding between us and Israel -- which is not incidentally unprecedented, because this has been concluded after many previous diplomatic watersheds -- has traditionally been classified.

We will make public, as I have stated before, all of the essential undertakings, and I would rather deal with them as a unit than to deal with speculative clauses before the committees have fully considered them. This will be fully discussed.

Q Mr. Secretary, why in your judgment has the Middle East agreement been such a hard sell for you and the Administration, especially in the Congress?

A First of all, let me state my judgment of the agreement. I consider this agreement more significant than the previous two disengagement agreements that

Memorandum of understanding

Congress

MEMO
OF UNDER
STANDING



received much less criticism.

... It certainly gained some time for the peace process, and it may open the door to a general peace settlement.

① Now, why has it been more difficult to present? I think part of the reason is that it involves -- in the year of the collapse of our Indochina effort -- a commitment of some American personnel in a faraway part of the world. To be sure, the commitment is different from the Indochina commitment. It is for a peace-keeping role and not for participation in a military conflict. But I think there may be a sort of subconscious rebellion against this.

② Secondly, it coincides with our submission to the Congress of a substantial aid bill at a time when our country is undergoing a recession. And it may not be fully realized, first, that a substantial aid bill would have been submitted in any event, even without the agreement; and that, secondly, the costs of a war have been demonstrated to be incomparably higher than any aid bill that will be submitted this year.

So, for all these reasons, it has been a

3 somewhat more complex case to make. And there may be the general attitude of suspicion that has befallen this town as a result of Watergate and other events.

But I must say, in fairness, that the questioning before the Congressional committees has been very constructive. We have no complaint about harassment or negativism. I think serious people have made an effort to look into the implications for the United States of a major foreign policy move, and we think that the debate is, on the whole, a healthy one.

Q Mr. Secretary, on a related part of the Middle East, do you think there is a compromise possible between the Administration and Congress on the projected sale of 14 HAWK missile batteries to Jordan?

A First of all, the issue is not between the Administration and the Congress so much as between Jordan and the Congress, in the sense that a compromise must be acceptable to the Government of Jordan, in order to be viable.

We are prepared to discuss with the Congressional committees whether we can find some formula that would ease their concerns.

There are definite limits to what can be done, because King Hussein has pointed out on innumerable occasions that he will not compromise on the numbers.

Now, whether any compromise is possible with respect to deployment, rate of delivery, or similar matters, we are now exploring with the Congressional committees in both the House and the Senate, and then of course we will have to discuss it with the Government of Jordan.

Hands to Jordan

Q Mr. Secretary, is there any basis for a new German-American offset agreement now that the deficits and the American balance of payments have disappeared?

A Well, I think it is no secret that your Chancellor is not an unqualified admirer of offset agreements.

We have had some discussions on that subject, and we have not yet reached any conclusions.

Q Mr. Secretary, what are the prospects now for the normalization of relations with Cuba, especially in view of the recent forum being held in Havana for the so-called independence of Puerto Rico?

A We have pursued a policy with respect to Cuba of moving by reciprocal steps towards an improvement of relations. This policy has shown some progress and we are prepared to continue this policy.

At the same time, the meeting in Havana can only be considered by us as an unfriendly act, and as a severe setback to this process, and as a totally unwarranted interference in our domestic affairs.

Q Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Union's grain shortfall is estimated by U.S. Government agencies as anywhere from 20 to 50 million tons, and there has already

Offset

Cuba
normalization

CUBA



been considerable opposition to shipping the ten million tons that they have purchased.

How do you see the Soviet grain deals relating to our foreign policy and detente as you have described it this morning?

A Well, 50 million tons is a wild exaggeration.

I have not seen any estimate like this. But, at this moment, we are not undertaking any new contracts for sale to the Soviet Union until the crop returns for October are in.

We are also interested in discussing with the Soviet Union the possibility of a long-term agreement which would avoid the fluctuations and the sudden invasions of our market and which would enable our farmers to plan over a more extended period of time, and which would therefore have less of an impact, or a minimal impact, on our prices.

All of these are now under consideration, and they are not directly related to detente. They are being discussed on a general level.

Q Mr. Secretary, is there some consideration being given to a long-term agreement which would involve a trade-off for oil or other Soviet resources?

S.U.
Grain
Deal

A There has been a very general discussion on that subject. There are no negotiations on that subject going on right now. In fact, there are no negotiations going on either about the long-term agreement or about a possible use of Soviet resources. But if a long-term negotiation should begin, that is one of the factors that might be considered.

*CIA -
toxins*

Q Mr. Secretary, the Church Committee claims to have evidence that the CIA violated a Presidential directive on the destruction of biological toxins. What are the diplomatic consequences of this, and when did you first learn about it?

A Frankly, I first learned about it on television this morning.

Q Ambassador Helms apparently has been recalled to testify tomorrow.

A That is right. I would assume that there has been some discussion between the White House and the Church Committee on this subject, but I have been away for recent weeks.

I would have to know the quantities that are involved before I can make a judgment. We committed

ourselves by treaty to destroy biological warfare agents.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have talked an awful lot about the momentum, of the need for momentum, and certainly the Egyptians are discussing the need for momentum. On the other hand, the Israelis, in all of their public statements since the agreement, have indicated they have virtually nothing more to give. Premier Rabin talked about a few hundred yards in the Golan.

In this case, have you perhaps simply postponed the inevitable, or do you think perhaps the Israelis are posturing at this stage?

A Well, I do not want to speculate about a negotiation that has not even been agreed to in principle at this moment, and in which I have not heard the detailed position of either side.

Inevitably, somewhere along the line, there must be further progress towards peace. And therefore any progress that has been made, even if it gains only time, permits time for the peace process to occur under conditions of less pressure and less tension. What will develop in the Syrian-Israeli negotiation, I would have to leave to the beginning of such a negotiation, and I do not want to prejudge it now.

Q Mr. Secretary, thank you, very much.

* * * * *



REMARKS TO THE PRESS

BY

SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER 29 AM 10.13

AND

FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO KUAN-HUA

WALDORF TOWERS, SEPTEMBER 28, 1975, NEW YORK

QUESTION: Can you tell us how the dinner was, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Foreign Minister? SITUATION

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We had a very friendly talk.

QUESTION: Have you set your trip to China, Mr. Secretary?

FOREIGN MINISTER (in answer to first question): Of course we talked about our relations.

QUESTION: Mr. Foreign Minister, can you tell us when you expect President Ford to be visiting China?

FOREIGN MINISTER: Please ask your Secretary of State.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Good night, Mr. Foreign Minister.

Nice to see you. See you soon. (FOREIGN MINISTER DEPARTS)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why didn't you ask him what he thought about the multilateral conference without preconditions?

QUESTION: What multilateral conference? Can you tell us any more about the dinner?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We had a very full and friendly talk

about every aspect of our relationship. We reviewed the world situation. One of the topics discussed was Korea.

QUESTION: Is he (Foreign Minister) ready to go to a conference?

QUESTION: Did he sound a little better than his speech when you were talking to him in here?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I said we had a friendly talk.

QUESTION: Is he ready to go to a conference--the small conference on Korea?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We didn't go into that in any detail.

QUESTION: How about the large conference?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The large conference can't take place until the small conference has taken place.

QUESTION: When are you going to China?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We'll announce that in a little while.

QUESTION: Is everything on schedule for your trip and the President's?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Everything is on schedule.

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UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 4 SECTD 16030

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO WHITE HOUSE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN. FOLLOWING IS CORRECTED VERBATIM TEXT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S REMARKS TO PRESS DURING ANCHORAGE STOPOVER

E. O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER)

SUBJ: CORRECTED VERSION OF SECRETARY'S ANCHORAGE NEWS CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 17

Q. CAN YOU GIVE US YOUR VIEWS ON THE TWO-HUNDRED-MILE LIMIT?
A. WELL AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON THE TWO-HUNDRED-MILE -- ON THE LAW OF THE SEAS WHICH IS ONE OF THE MOST COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS AND POTENTIALLY ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT THAT OUR NATION IS ENGAGED IN. I HAVE GREAT UNDERSTANDING AND GREAT SYMPATHY FOR THOSE WHO ARE ADVOCATING THE UNILATERAL LEGISLATION. I AGREE WITH THEM THAT FISHING SHOULD BE PROTECTED AND THEREDFORE I SUBSTANTIALLY AGREE WITH THEIR OBJECTIVE. HOWEVER, IT IS MY POSITION THAT THE FISHERIES CAN BEST BE PROTECTED BY HAVING AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED AGREEMENT IN WHICH ALL NATIONS APPLY AN ACCEPTED STANDARD AND WHICH PRESERVES ALL THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. THE DANGER IS THAT IF ONE NATION GOES UNILATERALLY ALL OTHER NATIONS ARE ALSO GOING TO GO UNILATERALLY AND THAT THE OUTCOME OF THIS IS LIKELY TO BE THAT NOT ONLY FISHING RIGHTS BUT TRANSIT THROUGH STRAITS AND OTHER INTERESTS WE HAVE ON THE OCEANS ARE GOING TO BE AFFECTED. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE LAW OF THE SEAS NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT BE CONCLUDED IN A REASONABLE TIME, THEN I WOULD SUPPORT UNILATERAL LEGISLATION SO WE ARE REALLY TALKING NOW ABOUT GIVING US AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONCLUDE THE LAW OF THE SEAS NEGOTIATIONS.

Law of the Sea

Q. MR. SECRETARY, IF THE U.S. COULD BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT IN ENERGY, WOULD IT MAKE SENSE TO EXPLORE DOMESTIC OIL AND GAS IN ORDER TO PERHAPS UNDERSSELL OPEC ON THE MARKET?



*****HHSR COMMENT*****

SCOWCROFT, VANDERHYE FOR NESSEN, SDO

A. WELL, UNTIL THE 1950'S WE WERE IN A POSITION REALLY TO SET THE WORLD OIL PRICES BY SELLING OUR OIL ON THE WORLD MARKET AND THEREFORE WE COULD REGULATE THE WORLD PRICE BY SETTING OUR PRICE AT A CERTAIN LEVEL AND THEREFORE MAKING SURE THAT NO ONE COULD GO MUCH ABOVE THAT. THAT CONDITION DISAPPEARED WHEN WE NEEDED ALL OF OUR OIL FOR OURSELVES AND BECAME EVEN MORE ACUTE WHEN WE HAD TO IMPORT UP TO THIRTY PERCENT OF OURS. IF WE SHOULD EVER AGAIN GET INTO A POSITION WHERE WE CAN AGAIN EXPORT ENERGY THAT WOULD OF COURSE CHANGE THE NEGOTIATING POSTURE OF ALL OF THE SIDES AND IT WOULD BE A HIGHLY DESIRABLE POSITION. BUT THAT CONDITION WILL NOT EXIST UNTIL THE MIDDLE 80'S, IF THEN.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOU SAID ON THE FISHING SITUATION THAT IF THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE COMPLETED IN A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME YOU WOULD SUPPORT UNILATERAL ACTION. WHAT IS A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME?

A. WELL, WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT WE CAN ARRANGE FOR A DOUBLE SESSION NEXT YEAR. THERE WILL BE A SESSION THAT STARTS IN MARCH IN NEW YORK. WE ARE GOING TO PROPOSE THAT IN ADDITION TO THAT SESSION THERE BE ANOTHER ONE IN THE FALL, SO WE HOPE THAT AT LEAST THE SO-CALLED ECONOMIC ZONE CAN BE NEGOTIATED NEXT YEAR, THAT IS, THE ZONE IN WHICH A COUNTRY--OF TWO HUNDRED MILES--IN WHICH A COUNTRY WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXPLOIT THE RESOURCES INCLUDING FISHERIES, AND AGAIN OUR CONCERN IS THAT IF ONE NATION GOES UNILATERAL AND THEN EVERY OTHER NATION STARTS GOING UNILATERAL IF THEN THESE UNILATERAL ACTIONS OF THESE NATIONS DON'T MESH AND IF SOME NATIONS DON'T RECOGNIZE IT AND ABROGATE THEIR EXISTING AGREEMENTS THAT WE ARE LIKELY TO HAVE CHAOS AND THAT WE ARE LIKELY TO BE HURT WORSE THAN WE ARE NOW. BUT I AGAIN WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT I UNDERSTAND THE CONCERN OF THOSE WHO ARE SUPPORTING THE UNILATERAL LEGISLATION; AND I HAVE A GREAT SYMPATHY FOR THE PLIGHT OF THE FISHERMEN. WE JUST BELIEVE WE CAN PROTECT IT BETTER BY GETTING AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AND WE HOPE THAT PERHAPS WITH SOME PATIENCE AND ANALYZING THE SITUATION, THAT WILL BE CLEAR TO OTHER PEOPLE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WITH WHOM WILL YOU BE NEGOTIATING IN CHINA AND WHAT DO YOU EXPECT TO HAPPEN AS A RESULT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT...HOW SOON AN AMBASSADOR?

A. HOW SOON AN AMBASSADOR? WELL, IN THE PAST MY DISCUSSIONS ON CHINA--MY DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN EITHER WITH THE PRIME MINISTER CHOW EN-LAI, WHO IS NOW ILL; AND THEREFORE I WOULD ASSUME THAT THEY WOULD BE WITH THE VICE PREMIER, TENG HSID-PING. I WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE



A BETTER ESTIMATE OF WHAT IS GOING TO BE ACHIEVED BY THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP AFTER I HAVE CONCLUDED MY NEGOTIATIONS OR MY VISIT THERE. I WOULD NOT EXPECT THAT WE WILL ACHIEVE FULL NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS THIS YEAR, BUT WE CAN MAKE SOME PROGRESS. AND OF COURSE AS I SAID IN THE UNITED NATIONS WE ATTACH VERY GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA, EVEN AT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF DIPLOMATIC CONTACT.
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UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 4 SECTO 16030

Q. MR SECRETARY, THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT REPORTS OUT OF THE FAR EAST OF THE CHINA NEWS AGENCY CRITICIZING SOVIET GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY. DO YOU THINK THAT THIS RENEWED SINO-SOVIET CRITICISM OF EACH OTHER WILL HAVE ANY AFFECT UPON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND OR SOVIET DETENTE?

A. WE CONDUCT OUR RELATIONS WITH BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA INDEPENDENT OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER. AND, THEREFORE WE HAVE OUR OWN INTERESTS WITH RELATION TO EACH OF THEM, OUR ONE OBJECTIVES, AND WE LEAVE THEIR OWN RELATIONS TO EACH OTHER TO THEM TO WORK OUT.

Q. SO YOU DON'T SEE IT AS POSING ANY KIND OF A PROBLEM?

A. I THINK THAT WHATEVER DIFFICULTIES MAY EXIST IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS WILL NOT AFFECT THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHICH, FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY POINT OF VIEW, ROUTE FOR THE GAS LINE FROM ALASKA WOULD YOU CONSIDER SAFER, DOWN THE COAST WITH TANKERS OR ACROSS CANADA?

A. I DON'T REALLY KNOW WHETHER THAT FROM A NATIONAL SECURITY POINT OF VIEW, THIS IS DECISIVE, THIS IS BEING LARGELY CONSIDERED FROM AN ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW AND FROM A TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE TWO-HUNDRED-MILE LEGISLATION, IF THE HOUSE WAS ALREADY PASSED IT AND IT'S UP BEFORE THE SENATE NOW WHAT HAPPENS IF THAT BILL IS APPROVED BY THE SENATE? ARE YOU GOING TO URGE PRESIDENT FORD TO VETO THAT LEGISLATION IN ORDER TO GET THE TIME YOU NEED?

A. WELL I THINK THE PRESIDENT KNOWS THE ISSUES; AND I CAN ONLY STATE MY VIEW WITH RESPECT TO THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS. HE WILL HAVE TO WEIGH IT IN RELATION TO DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS AS WELL, WE WILL SPEND OUR EFFORTS IN THE NEXT MONTHS TRYING TO PERSUADE A NUMBER



OF SENATORS THAT THE COURSE WE ARE PROPOSING IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF EVEN THE FISHERMEN AND IN THE BEST OVERALL INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY. BUT I DON'T WANT TO TAKE A POSITION AS TO WHAT I WOULD RECOMMEND IN CASE THAT BILL PASSES THE CONGRESS, AND OF COURSE I CAN'T SPEAK FOR THE PRESIDENT AS TO WHAT HE WOULD DO IF IT PASSES THE CONGRESS.

Q. ON THE SUBJECT OF OIL, THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT REPORTS THAT CHINA MAY HAVE SUBSTANTIAL OIL DEPOSITS. AND WILL THAT COME UP IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS AT ALL?

A. WELL, YOU SEE, FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW--I DON'T EXPECT IT TO COME UP, BUT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW IF THERE IS MORE OIL ON THE MARKET, IF THE WORLD-WIDE SUPPLY OF OIL INCREASES, THE PRESSURE ON PRICES INCREASES, TOO, EVEN IF IT ISN'T SOLD TO US, BECAUSE THE WAY THE PRICES ARE BEING MAINTAINED IS BY THE OPEC NATIONS CUTTING PRODUCTION SO THAT THE PRODUCTION IS IN LINE WITH WHATEVER LEVEL OF PRICES ARE SET. OBVIOUSLY THE MORE SUPPLY THERE IS, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WILL BE TO REGULATE AN AGREED MARKET.

Q. AS FOR CHOU EN-LAI'S HEALTH, HOW DO YOU THINK THAT AMERICA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA WOULD BE AFFECTED IF CHOU EN-LAI DIED SAY WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF MONTHS? HAVE YOU CONSIDERED THIS?

A. IT WOULD'NT BE A TACTFUL THING FOR ME TO SAY ON THE WAY TO CHINA --

Q. BUT IT IS A CONSIDERATION.

A. WELL, WE'RE ALL MORTAL, BUT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC AND THE UNITED STATES DON'T DEPEND ON PERSONALITIES. THEY DEPEND ON THE BASIC INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES; AND WE WOULD THINK THAT THE MAIN LINES OF BOTH POLICIES--THE POLICIES OF BOTH COUNTRIES-- WOULD CONTINUE REGARDLESS OF WHO IS IN OFFICE IN EITHER COUNTRY, THOUGH OF COURSE, CHOU EN-LAI IS A MAN OF OUTSTANDING ABILITIES.

Q. MR SECRETARY, IT WAS REPORTED TODAY THAT NEGOTIATORS IN MOSCOW ARE CLOSE TO A LONG-TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA. WOULD YOU TELL US EXACTLY WHERE THE STATE DEPARTMENT STANDS? WHAT ARE YOU LOOKING FOR IN A LONG TERM AGREEMENT?

WELL, WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO AVOID A SITUATION WHERE WE HAVE TO--WHERE SUPPLIES OF GRAIN TO THE SOVIET UNION ARE DETERMINATED BY THE EMERGENCIES IN THE SOVIET UNION, SO THAT WHEN THE SOVIET UNION BOUGHT MASSIVELY IT WOULD LEAD TO STEEP INCREASES IN PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES, AND SINCE WE DIDN'T KNOW FROM YEAR TO YEAR WHAT THE SOVIET NEEDS WOULD BE, AND INDEED THE SOVIET UNION DIDN'T NECESSARILY KNOW FROM YEAR TO YEAR WHAT ITS NEEDS WOULD BE, THIS INTRODUCED



AN ELEMENT OF GREAT UNCERTAINTY INTO THE CALCULATIONS OF THE FARMERS AND INTO THE PRICES. SO WHAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO IS TO GET A FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT WITH AN AGREED MINIMUM PURCHASE AND A MAXIMUM PURCHASE, THAT WAY OUR FARMERS CAN PLAN THEIR PRODUCTION AND THE SOVIETS CAN MAKE THEIR PURCHASES WITHOUT A MAJOR EFFECT ON THE PRICE OF FOOD FOR THE CONSUMER, AND IN EFFECT, IT MEANS THEY ARE SPREADING THEIR PURCHASES OVER MANY YEARS RATHER THAN TO GO INTO A PEAK BUYING PERIOD IN WHICH THEY OSCILLATE FROM ABOUT EIGHTEEN MILLION TONS IN 1972 TO A MILLION TONS A YEAR OR TWO LATER; AND NOW THIS YEAR THEY'RE GOING UP AGAIN AND WE ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THIS AGREEMENT, Q. DO YOU CONSIDER THIS JUST A PART OF THE OVERALL DETENTE POLICY--

A. WELL EVERYTHING IS PART OF THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. BUT WE ARE NOT SELLING GRAIN TO THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE OF DETENTE, WE ARE SELLING IT IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST, IT'S IN THE INTEREST OF OUR FARMERS, IT'S IN THE INTEREST OF THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP AND IT'S IN OUR INTEREST TO HAVE IT ON A LONG-TERM BASIS.
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UNCLAS SECTION 3 OF 4 SECTO 16030

Q. SINCE THE CRACK DOWN IN INDIA BY INDIRA GANDHI EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NOT TAKEN ANY KIND OF STAND. I WAS WONDERING, DO YOU HAVE ANY KIND OF PROPOSALS FOR TAKING A STAND ON THAT?

A. WELL THAT ISN'T EXACTLY TRUE, THE PRESIDENT HAS EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS, BUT, AS A BASIC PROBLEM FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, WE HAVE TO CONSIDER THAT WE CAME INTO OFFICE AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD OVEREXTENDED ITSELF BY GETTING INVOLVED IN TOO MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACT BOTH AS A COMMENTATOR ON EVERYBODY'S PROBLEMS AND ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVERYBODY'S DOMESTIC EVOLUTION, AND AT THE SAME TIME GEAR ITS COMMITMENTS TO ITS CAPABILITIES. SO, AS A GENERAL RULE, WE GEAR OUR FOREIGN POLICY TO THE FOREIGN ACTIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO THOSE ACTIONS THAT AFFECT US. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR PREFERENCE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES, AND THAT APPLIES ALSO, OF COURSE, TO INDIA, BUT WE CANNOT-- AND AS I POINTED OUT, THE PRESIDENT DID EXPRESS HIS VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT.

Q. OKAY, SO THEN ECONOMICALLY WE HAVE NOT MADE ANY STEPS TO CHANGE OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP?

A. WELL ECONOMICALLY WE REALLY DON'T HAVE -- WE HAVE NO ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM TO INDIA AT THIS MOMENT, THOUGH ONE IS UNDER CONSIDERATION. SO THIS IS NOT A CASE WHERE WE ARE IN THE POSITION TO CHANGE VERY MUCH.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, IF INVITED, WOULD YOU REMAIN AS SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE SECOND FORD ADMINISTRATION?

A. I DON'T THINK THAT I SHOULD DECLARE MYSELF UNTIL THE PRESIDENT IS REELECTED AND HAS ASKED ME.

Q. A CRITICISM OF THE SINAI ACCORD IS THAT IT DOES NOT MEET WITH A QUESTION OF THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHTS,



OR GOLAN, AND DO YOU THINK A GOLAN HEIGHTS AGREEMENT WILL RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM?

A. WELL THE SINAI ACCORD DIDN'T DEAL WITH A QUESTION OF THE PALESTINIANS NOR DID IT DEAL WITH SOME OF THE OTHER QUESTIONS, THE REASON WE SUPPORTED AND HELPED NEGOTIATE THE SINAI ACCORD WAS OUR CONVICTION THAT THE ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH ALL ISSUES SIMULTANEOUSLY UNDER THE CONDITIONS THAT EXISTED AT THE END OF LAST YEAR WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY LED TO A STALEMATE, AND THAT A STALEMATE HAD A HIGH PROBABILITY OF LEADING TO AN EXPLOSION WHICH WOULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES, EVEN FOR OUR COUNTRY, SO WE TOOK THE LARGEST BITE THAT SEEMED TO US POSSIBLE AT THE TIME, WHICH WAS THE SINAI AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, AND ANYONE WHO SAW THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROBABLY AGREE THAT EVEN THAT NEGOTIATION STRAINED THE CAPABILITY OF THE COUNTRY'S CONCERN FROM A DOMESTIC POINT OF VIEW, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT, HAVING MADE THIS AGREEMENT, WHEN THINGS SETTLE DOWN AND WHEN THE IMPLEMENTATION GETS INTO FULL SWING, WHICH IS NOW THE CASE, THEN OTHER COUNTRIES WILL BEGIN TO TRY TO FOLLOW THIS EXAMPLE, BUT SOONER OR LATER WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OR CONTRIBUTE TO AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT; AND THAT WILL HAVE TO INCLUDE A CONSIDERATION OF THE PALESTINIANS, WE'VE ALWAYS SAID THIS, AND THAT REMAINS OUR POSITION.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, IT'S BEEN SUGGESTED RECENTLY THAT YOU'RE GOING TO TRY AND NEGOTIATE SOME KIND OF A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, I WAS WONDERING IF YOU HAVE MADE ANY SPECIFIC PLANS YET FOR THAT TYPE OF DIPLOMACY?

A. WELL WE HAVE INDICATED THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO FOR ANY OF THE ADJOINING STATES WHAT WE'VE DONE FOR EGYPT, SO WE ARE PREPARED TO ACT AS A MEDIATOR IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, AND ISRAEL HAS INDICATED ITS READINESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH SYRIA WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, SYRIA, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO BEGIN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THEREFORE WE ARE WAITING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING THE TWO PARTIES TOGETHER, AT THIS MOMENT THERE IS NO NEGOTIATION GOING ON, OR ANY IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS,

Q. DO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THIS CASE INVOLVE AS MUCH MONEY AS IT DID WITH EGYPT?

A. WELL I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL DID NOT INVOLVE ANY SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF MONEY, ISRAEL HAD ASKED US FOR A SUM OF MONEY (BEGIN UNDERLINE) PRIOR (END UNDERLINE) TO THE AGREEMENT AND (BEING UNDERLINE) INDEPENDENT OF (END UNDERLINE) THE AGREEMENT, WHICH SEVENTY-SIX SENATORS SUPPORTED, AND WHICH IS LARGER THAN THE AMOUNT WE ARE GOING TO



GIVE--RECOMMEND TO THE CONGRESS FOR NEXT YEAR. LAST YEAR THE CONGRESS VOTED THREE BILLION DOLLARS FOR ISRAEL IN A COMBINATION OF EMERGENCY AND CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS QUITE INDEPENDENT OF THESE AGREEMENTS. SIMILARLY, WE HAD ALREADY PUT INTO OUR PLANNING BUDGET A SIGNIFICANT SUM FOR EGYPT, WHICH WE WILL INCREASE ONLY marginally BECAUSE OF THE AGREEMENT AND BY marginally I MEAN A FEW HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS. WE'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT ORDINARY SUMS. SO IN SHORT, THE AID TO THE MIDDLE EAST IS AN INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST WHICH WE HAVE BEEN CONTINUING FOR OVER FIFTEEN YEARS AND WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY INDEPENDENT OF THE SINAI AGREEMENT.
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UNCLAS SECTION 4 OF 4 SECTO 16838

Q. JUST WHAT IS THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO GAS LINES.

A. THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONTINUING AND WE HOPE TO BRING THEM TO A CONCLUSION BUT I CAN'T ESTIMATE WHEN THAT WILL BE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, IN LIGHT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD THE ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS BE SUCH THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO GO THROUGH CANADA WITH THE PIPELINE IF NEGOTIATIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL RATHER THAN GO THROUGH ALASKA?

A. THAN THE ONE WE ARE BUILDING THROUGH ALASKA?

Q. THE NATURAL GAS PIPELINE.

A. I DON'T KNOW, I REALLY HAVEN'T THOUGHT THAT ONE THROUGH.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, SINCE RECENT ATTEMPTS ON THE PRESIDENT'S LIFE, HAVE YOU INCREASED YOUR SECURITY, LIKE, ARE YOU WEARING A BULLET-PROOF VEST?

A. NO, NO I'M NOT WEARING A BULLET PROOF VEST. I'M GAINING WEIGHT SO RAPIDLY THAT THAT WOULD BE NO PROBLEM. THAT'S MY BEST PROTECTION.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOU WERE AT THE SECOND GAME OF THE WORLD SERIES. WOULD YOU TELL ME WHICH TEAM YOU WERE FAVORING IN THE SERIES?

A. WELL AS A YANKEE FAN I'M SORT OF AN AMERICAN LEAGUE ADHERENT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WITH THE NEW SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO TURKEY, JUST WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF OUR BASES OVER THERE NOW?

A. WELL IT'S ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO RESTORE A RELATIONSHIP ONE IT HAS BEEN DAMAGED, THE ISSUE OF OUR BASES IN TURKEY HAS NOW BECOME A DOMESTIC ISSUE IN TURKISH POLITICS. WE HOPE AND INDEED WE EXPECT, THAT OPERATIONS CAN BE RESTORED AT OUR BASES NOW THAT WE HAVE LIFTED AT



LEAST THE MOST IRRITATING PARTS OF THE EMBARGO. WE ALSO HOPE THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON NEGOTIATIONS ON CYPRUS. WE ARE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT ON BOTH OF THOSE ISSUES.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, I KNOW IT'S A TERRIBLE CHOICE BUT WHICH DO YOU PREFER: NEWSMEN LISTENING IN ON YOUR PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, OR READING THE GARBAGE?

A. THEY FOUND LESS IN THE GARBAGE THAN THEY DID IN THE TALK.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOU HAD A FEW MINUTES WITH SENATOR GRAVEL BEFORE YOU CAME TO TALK WITH THE PRESS, WHAT WERE YOU DISCUSSING WITH THE SENATOR?

A. SENATOR GRAVEL HAS BEEN VERY HELPFUL TO US IN THE LAW-OF-THE-SEAS NEGOTIATIONS: AND I GOT HIS LATEST VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, IN LIGHT OF YOUR EARLIER COMMENT THAT THE MORE OIL THAT CAN GO ON THE MARKET IT WILL BRING PRESSURE ON THE OPEC PRICE SETUP--THE ALASKA OIL HAS TO BE SOLD IN THE UNITED STATES, WOULD IT, PERHAPS IN THE FUTURE, BE A GOOD IDEA TO CHANGE THAT LEGISLATION SO THAT IT COULD BE--

A. NO, BECAUSE THE ALASKA OIL THAT IS SOLD IN THE UNITED STATES MEANS THAT WE HAVE TO IMPORT LESS OIL. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE IMPORT LESS OIL, THAT MEANS THAT OIL WILL THEN GO ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET, SO IT DOESN'T REALLY MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE WHERE THE TOTAL POOL OF AVAILABLE OIL IS SOLD, JUST AS LONG AS THE POOL INCREASES AND THAT THE COUNTRIES THAT ARE NOT PREPARED TO CUT PRODUCTION IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN THE PRICE GET IT ON THE MARKET.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, THE ALASKA PRESS CORPS APPRECIATES VERY MUCH YOU STOPPING TO CHAT WITH US.

A. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

HODGSON

BT

