The original documents are located in Box 14, folder “Middle East (1)” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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MAIL-TELEPHONE COUNT

9 a.m. Wednesday

Telegrams

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The interim agreement being initialed by Egypt and Israel this evening reduces the risk of war in the Middle East and provides fresh opportunities for further progress toward peace for a troubled area whose turmoil has affected the lives and prosperity of peoples of all nations.

Under the agreement Israel will withdraw its forces from the Sinai Passes and oil fields, both parties agree not to resort to force, and to continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace settlement. I have consistently worked for this outcome. I am deeply gratified by it and proud of the contribution America has made. By reducing the dangers of military and economic warfare this agreement is of great significance for the well-being of every American.

The Parties have taken an important and indispensable step on the long and hard road to peace. The countries concerned made clear that they wanted America's effort to continue. Following my meetings with President Sadat in Salzburg and with Prime Minister Rabin in Washington, the United States intensified its active mediation.

The agreement is fair and balanced, and we hope that as a further practical test of peace on the ground it will contribute to building the confidence between the two sides which is required if ultimate peace is to be achieved.

The United States does not consider this agreement an end in itself, and it is strongly committed to continue to help make progress on all aspects of the problem.

I will be speaking personally with Prime Minister Rabin of Israel and President Sadat of Egypt to congratulate them on their leadership and statesmanship which in large measure made the agreement possible. I commend Secretary Kissinger for his tireless efforts in bringing about a successful conclusion to the negotiations.

# # #
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE               SEPTEMBER 1, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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Dear Mr. Speaker:

I am enclosing for the immediate information of the Congress, the text of a proposal to be signed by the President of Egypt regarding the terms under which American civilian personnel could play a role in connection with an early warning system in the buffer zone between the Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai.

A similar proposal will be signed by the Prime Minister of Israel. The text of that document is also enclosed. I intend to request formally that Congress approve this document. I would appreciate your views on the form which this approval should take. As soon as the official texts of the other documents related to the Egypt-Israel agreement initialled on September 1st have been signed by the parties in Geneva, I will be making a formal transmission of the texts of the agreement and related documents for the information of the Congress.

Sincerely,

/s/ Gerald R. Ford

The Honorable
The Speaker
The House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
September 2, 1975

Dear Mr. President:

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Sincerely,

/s/ Gerald R. Ford

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
TELEGRAM

9/2/75

Dear Mr. President:

We wholeheartedly support your call for the use of American civilians to monitor the new Sinai agreement. A U.S. presence there is essential for progress towards peace in the Middle East and for reducing world tensions.

The fact that small numbers of American civilian technicians will be stationed on both sides—and will be there at the request of both parties—should eliminate any serious apprehension that Americans will be drawn into some future conflict.

American citizens will not be there in any partisan capacity and will not be identified with the cause of either side. Any analogy to America's past involvement or to conflicts in any other part of the world is wholly misleading.

We trust that Congress—recognizing the crucial nature of the American commitments to monitor the agreement, to providing substantial military and economic aid to Israel and to assuring her oil supplies—will take appropriate action to ratify those commitments.

We are grateful for the contributions of our government in bringing about the agreement which carries with it the potential of an historic event for Israel and the Jewish people. If the parties faithfully and honestly carry out their promises and responsibilities the agreement can become the first affirmative step toward bringing genuine peace to the Middle East.

We commend you, Mr. President, and Secretary of State Kissinger for your remarkable and successful diplomatic effort.

Respectfully,

Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg
President
American Jewish Congress

The President of the United States
White House
CONGRATULATIONS ON THE COMPLETION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE
SINAI. IN ADOPTING THE COURSE FOR PEACE THAT OUR GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN
URGING, ISRAEL HAS HAD TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL STRATEGIC CONCESSIONS. IT
IS ONLY FITTING THAT ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
AID AND CIVILIAN MONITORS TO POLICE THE AGREEMENT. IT WOULD BE
UNTHINKABLE IF THE HARD-WON SECOND STEP TOWARDS A MIDDLE EAST PEACE
SHOULD FAIL BECAUSE OF CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL.

DAVID M. BLUMBERG PRESIDENT B'NAI BRITH INTERNATIONAL
WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON MID-EAST AGREEMENT. YOU HAVE MY FULL SUPPORT FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

RAYMOND EPSTEIN
PRESIDENT COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS AND WELFARE FUNDS 320 CENTRAL PARK WEST NEW YORK NY
WE WELCOME THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT INITIALED YESTERDAY BY BOTH SIDES AS A PROMISING STEP ON THE ROAD TO PEACE IN THAT TROUBLED AREA. WE COMMEND YOU AND SECRETARY KISSINGER ON YOUR INITIATIVE IN HELPING TO ACHIEVE THE AGREEMENT. WE HOPE THAT IT WILL PROVE TO HAVE LAID THE GROUND WORK FOR PROGRESS TOWARD THE STABLE AND JUST PEACE WITH SECURITY THAT HAS BEEN THE GOAL SHARED CONTINUALLY BY ISRAEL AND UNITED STATES.

LEWIS D COLE CHAIRMAN NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATION ADVISORY COUNCIL
The White House

Washington

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PMS PRESIDENT GERALD FORD
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON DC

WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR LEADERSHIP TOWARDS THIS DAYS MOVE
FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

ARTHUR HERTZBERG ACTING CHAIRMAN CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS AND PRESIDENT AMERICAN
JEWISH CONGRESS

NNNN
The White House
Washington

September 1, 1975

The President

The Sinai Accord represents a historic step towards world peace and American security. All Americans can take pride in this extraordinary achievement of your administration. I will do all I can to support and help implement this great opportunity for all mankind. Respectfully,

Edward Sanders, President
American Israel Public Affairs Committee
1600 Avenue of the Stars
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Dear Mr. Speaker:

I am writing to emphasize the importance of a Congressional decision in the coming week on U.S. participation in the Early Warning System which is an integral part of the Agreement signed between the Governments of Egypt and Israel on September 4 in Geneva.

Over the past two years, our Government has played an essential role in helping defuse the tensions in the Middle East. We have chosen this course because we recognized, as has every American Administration over the past 30 years, that the issues involved in that troubled area are central to the American national interest.

The September 4 agreement, like the two preceding disengagement agreements, was negotiated with the assistance of the United States. The parties themselves have described it as a significant step towards peace in the Middle East. It will reduce the risks of war, create new opportunities for negotiating peace, and help provide a stable environment in which global economic dislocations can be avoided. This Agreement is in the overall national interest of the United States.

There would have been no Agreement without provision for American participation in the Early Warning System. That System is designed to reduce the danger of surprise attack, and the parties to the Agreement were able to agree to entrust the System only to the United States. The special American role was the only one in which both sides had adequate confidence.

I want to be certain that the leaders of the Congress fully understand the consequences of further delay in acting on this important matter.

The first step in the implementation of the basic Agreement under the timetable negotiated and agreed to by Egypt and Israel in Geneva on September 22 is scheduled to be taken October 5. This process will not begin, however, until the
Congress has acted on the proposed United States role in the Early Warning System. Delay in Congressional action will, therefore, delay implementation of the basic Agreement. It will risk causing the lengthy and difficult negotiations on the entire five-month implementing timetable to be reopened. It will prevent a lessening of the risks of war. If for any reason the agreement should fail, the responsibility would be heavy indeed.

The issue before the Congress now is whether the Congress will approve acceptance by the United States of the role that has been proposed for it. There are other issues which the Congress must eventually consider in connection with our continuing relations, policies, and programs in the Middle East -- particularly our programs of military and economic assistance there. The Congress will want to consider those carefully at the appropriate time, but they are not integral to the implementation of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel. Voting in favor of the U.S. role in the Early Warning System will not commit anyone to take a position one way or another on these issues.

In summary, I met with the leadership three weeks ago to describe what was involved in the new Agreement between Egypt and Israel and to request urgent approval of U.S. participation in its implementation. This question has been under intensive discussion in the Congress for nearly three weeks. All relevant papers and all U.S. commitments related to the Agreement have been submitted to the appropriate committees of the Congress. If action is not completed in the coming week, the United States will be in the position of holding up implementation of an Agreement which two key Middle Eastern countries have signed as a significant step towards peace. The Middle East is an area where American policy has long had broad bipartisan support. The issue presently before the Congress offers an opportunity to reaffirm that tradition and to demonstrate how the Executive and Legislative branches can work together on a foreign policy matter of high importance to the national interest and for the benefit of world peace. I, therefore, urge strongly that action be completed as early as possible and no later than Friday, October 3.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honorable
The Speaker
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
TO IMPLEMENT THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR THE EARLY-WARNING SYSTEM IN SINAI

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TOGETHER WITH SUPPLEMENTAL AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON House Joint Resolution 683

OCTOBER 6, 1975.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1975
the first year of oper-

As noted earlier, the executive branch on a preliminary basis estimates the cost of recruiting and installing the technicians will be $10 million with an additional $10 million cost for annual operations, equipment, and personnel. Thus the cost for fiscal 1976 would be an estimated $20 million, with a projected annual expense of $10 million for succeeding years.

It should be noted that the joint resolution does not contain any authorization of appropriations. Funding for the technicians will be requested by the executive branch at a later time.

Statements Required by Rule XI(1)(3) of House Rules

A. Oversight Findings and Recommendations

No oversight findings are possible since the activity involved in the resolution is still in prospect. The committee did, however, insert in the resolution a reporting requirement which will help insure adequate review in the future.

B. Budget Authority

This resolution creates no new budget authority or tax expenditures.

C. Congressional Budget Office Estimate and Comparison

No estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 has been received by the committee.

D. Committee on Government Operations Summary

No oversight findings and recommendations have been received which relate to this measure from the Committee on Government Operations under clause 2(b)(2) of Rule X.

Inflationary Impact Statement

No funds are authorized to be appropriated by this resolution. It does, however, give congressional approval to an activity which will require dollar outlays. The estimate is for $20 million during the current fiscal year and $10 million thereafter.

Because the amount involved is a very small fraction of Federal outlays, and because a significant part of it is likely to be spent for the support of, and by, the American technicians, its inflationary impact should be miniscule.

Section-by-Section Analysis

Preamble

The joint resolution contains four prefatory ("whereas") clauses which are designed to put the resolution in an appropriate context:

Clause 1 notes that the agreement signed on September 4 between Egypt and Israel, when it enters into force, may constitute a significant step toward peace in the Middle East.
Clause 2 states that the U.S. proposal calls for the United States to assign up to 200 American civilian personnel to carry out specified noncombat functions under agreed-on conditions and terms.

Clause 3 points out that the proposal would permit the United States to withdraw such personnel if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that their role is no longer necessary.

Clause 4 asserts that the implementation of the U.S. proposal for an early-warning system in Sinai may enhance the prospect of compliance with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreements and thereby promote the cause of peace.

RESOLVED CLAUSES

The substantive or “resolved” clauses of the resolution are encompassed in five sections:

Section 1—Implementation

This provision authorizes the President to implement the “United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai,” subject to the proviso that U.S. personnel assigned to Sinai under the proposal will be removed immediately under two specific contingencies: (1) if there is an outbreak of hostilities between Egypt and Israel; or (2) if the Congress by concurrent resolution determines that the safety of such personnel is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary.

Department of State witnesses, in testimony before the committee, asserted that the executive branch has no objection to the inclusion of such provisos.

Section 2—Concurrent Resolution “Privilege”

This provision states that the concurrent resolution provided for in section 1 should be privileged in the same manner and to the same extent as a concurrent resolution described in section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148) is privileged under section 7 of that law. Following are the two sections:

Sec. 5. (c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

Sec. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the House the proposal within three days and shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such concurrent resolution shall become the pending business of the Senate the proposal within three days after the Senate shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays. The committee on which the concurrent resolution is referred shall report it back to the House and Senate with its recommendations within the time provided for in section 5(c). Such concurrent resolution shall become the pending business of the Senate within three days and shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such concurrent resolution shall become the pending business of the Senate the proposal within three days after the Senate shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

Section 3—Voluntary Participation by Individuals

This provision states that during the implementation of the program, individual technicians associated with the agency or any agency of the United States or any other country would be assigned to the United States mission in the Sinai to participate voluntarily.

Section 4—Review of Participation

This section provides that the Department of State shall review the participation of individuals in the program and submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
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Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between
the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on
within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall
otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall
be referred to the committee of the other House named in
subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee
together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar
days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such
House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days,
unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two
Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution
passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed
and the committee of conference shall make and file a report
with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar
days after the legislation is referred to the committee of con-
ference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concern-
concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such
report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six
calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event
the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall
report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

Section 3—Volunteers
This provision emphasizes that U.S. civilian personnel participat-
ing in the early-warning system in Sinai should include only individ-
uals who have volunteered for such an assignment.

During the hearings on the Sinai early-warning system, executive
branch witnesses testified that they did not intend to employ as civil-
ian technicians anyone presently employed by the Central Intelligence
Agency or any other foreign intelligence gathering agencies. To the
extent that this personnel policy would be fully in keeping with the
civilian character of this undertaking and the peacekeeping purposes
which the technicians are supposed to serve, it is the expectation
of this committee that none of the Americans serving in such a capacity
in the Sinai will be an employee of any foreign intelligence gathering
agency of the U.S. Government.

Section 4—Reporting Requirement
This section contains a reporting requirement obligating the Presi-
dent to submit a written report to Congress whenever American civil-
ian technicians, pursuant to this congressional authorization, partici-
pate in any early-warning system. The section stipulates the circum-
cstances requiring such a report, prescribes its form, specifies the nature
of its contents, and states the timing of its submission. The reporting
requirement has two key purposes: first, to cause the President to
review the participation of American civilian technicians; and second,
to provide the Congress with information on which it can render judg-
ment and exercise its prerogative of ordering the removal of such
civilian technicians by concurrent resolution.
The circumstances which would require a report are enumerated in the resolution as follows: "Whenever American civilian technicians, pursuant to this authorization, participate in an early-warning system". This language applies to the participation of American civilian technicians in the Sinai as long as they remain in that role.

The latter half of the section deals with the timing, form, and scope of the report submitted by the President.

1. Timing.—The language specifies that reports from the President shall be submitted to the Congress "periodically, but no less frequently than once every 6 months." That time frame was determined by the committee as adequate enough for events to be gathered and appropriately analyzed yet not constitute an undue administrative burden.

2. Form.—The report by the President is required to be in writing. Moreover, to the maximum extent possible, it is to be unclassified. If classified information must be included the President is free to do so. In keeping with established procedures of the Congress, the reports would be submitted to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate. In addition, appropriate committees should promptly hold hearings on the reports and report their findings and recommendations to the Congress.

3. Contents.—Three stipulations are made on the contents of the report. They are:

(a) Status.—The intent of the committee here is that the report include reference to the general welfare of the civilian technicians, particularly with reference to their safety and security as threatened by any hostile attacks or impairment of their function and purpose.

(b) Scope.—In this connection, the committee's intent is that the report include specific reference to the nature of their activity, any changes in that activity, and the freedom with which they are able to conduct that activity effectively.

(c) Anticipated duration.—By this language the intent of the committee is that the report make precise and specific reference to the estimated length of time the presence of such civilian technicians will be necessary. In this context the view of the committee is that every possible effort be exerted by all parties concerned to minimize that period of presence. To that end the committee's intent is that the report concentrate on two possible avenues of reducing the presence of the civilian technicians:

1. We recognize that prevailing political circumstances militate against an international monitoring arrangement. We appreciate that both parties place great faith in the credibility of the United States. Nonetheless, we would hope that over time an improved political climate would permit some broadening of the existing arrangement so as to include nationals of other countries.

2. The committee recognizes the parties' interest in an American physical presence in the Sinai. We are concerned, however, that that presence be as limited and secure as possible. We are interested in knowing, then, to what extent new or alternative technological options might permit a reduction of our personnel or their relocation to a somewhat less vulnerable spot.

Section 5—Interpretation

This provision of the resolution does not in any way purport to bind the United States which interprets it as understood by the executive in accordance with Section 1 of the executive agreement.

It is intended to interpret the Warning System stricture to, constitute (1) of any assurance, promise, or commitment (2) of any character, or "codification" of anything, as understood by the United States which Israel construes or interprets.
Section 5—Interpretation of Resolution

This provision makes clear that the authority contained in this joint resolution does not signify approval of the Congress for any other agreement, understanding, or commitment which may have been made by the executive branch, particularly any such which relate to a settlement in the Middle East.

It is intended to make clear that the authority contained in this joint resolution to implement the “United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai” does not, and shall not in any way be construed to, constitute congressional approval, acceptance, or endorsement (1) of any other oral or written commitment, understanding, assurance, promise, or agreement, whether expressed or implied, or any other expression, oral or written, by any official of the United States which Israel, Egypt, or any other nation or organization might construe or interpret as a basis on which it could rely or act; or (2) of any characterization of any such commitment, understanding, assurance, promise, or agreement, or other expression, as constituting a “codification” of existing, congressionally approved, U.S. policy.
Honorable Clifford P. Case  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC  20510  

Dear Senator Case:

The Secretary has asked me to respond to your letter of November 12, 1975, in which you inquired about several recent press reports on the use of U.S.-supplied military equipment in the Middle East. I will answer your questions in turn:

Saudi F-5E's in Syria. The Saudi Arabian Brigade stationed in Syria held a short training exercise in early November. Some Saudi F-5's participated in the exercise. All the Saudi F-5 aircraft remained under Saudi control throughout the exercise and returned to their home bases in Saudi Arabia immediately after the exercise. To the best of our knowledge, the exercise was entirely a Saudi one. The United States was informed in advance of the Saudi Government of its proposed exercise.

Americans in Syria. No U.S. Government or American contractor personnel working with the Royal Saudi Air Force were involved in this exercise. The Northrop Corporation contract involving F-5's provides only for in-country support.

Egyptian Purchase of F-4's from Private Sector. The Department maintains a close and continuing interest in sales of military aircraft, particularly of advanced-model aircraft like the F-4 Phantom. We know of no way that "private arms brokers" would be able to obtain F-4's without specific U.S. Government approval. Certainly, no such approval has been given.

Iranian Training of Egyptian Pilots in F-4's. We understand that during a high-level visit to Iran, Senior Egyptian Air Force officers were given
demonstration flights in Iranian F-4's. However, Egyptian pilots are not receiving training in Iranian F-4's or other U.S.-supplied aircraft. It is not unusual for one country to show another friendly country some of its aircraft inventory, or to permit a visiting delegation to observe flying operations. We would not normally expect foreign governments to inform the United States of this kind of activity.

Libyan Transfer of U.S.-Origin Aircraft to Turkey. U.S. relations with the Libyan Arab Republic are currently poor. Sales of the F-5's by the United States to Libya were made in 1967 prior to the current change in regime. We presently have virtually a total embargo on sales of military equipment to Libya. Our influence, therefore, on the current regime is limited. We did, however, instruct our Embassy in Tripoli to make a formal complaint on the transfer.

Transfers of Military Equipment Between Arab States. Transfers of U.S.-Origin military equipment—without U.S. Government concurrence—would be a serious matter and one that we think any country—Arab or otherwise—would seriously consider before acting. We believe that we have made it very clear that under current legislation—which we believe is adequate—transfers of U.S.-origin military equipment between governments must have U.S. Government concurrence. Obviously, there is no way that we can provide absolute assurances that there would not be unauthorized transfers of military equipment between one Arab country and another, particularly in a period of stress. The possibility of a transfer is one of the factors which we consider in determining whether the U.S. Government will make a particular sale to a particular Arab country. In this respect, however, it is important to note that the United States has worked hard at developing improved relations with the Arab world. We believe this new relationship is reciprocated.

Effects of Military Equipment Transfers on the Military Balance in the Middle East. The United States has stated that it would not permit the military balance
in the Middle East to become adverse to Israel. Military transfers of equipment within the area would, of course, be considered in evaluating the balance of power in the Middle East.

I hope that the above information is responsive to your request. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Robert J. McCloskey
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations
Honorable Clifford P. Case  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

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U.S. relations with the Libyan Arab Republic are currently poor. Sales of the F-5's by the United States to Libya were made in 1967 prior to the current change in regime. We presently have virtually a total embargo on sales of military equipment to Libya. Our influence, therefore, on the current regime is limited. We did, however, instruct our Embassy in Tripoli to make a formal complaint on the transfer.

Transfers of Military Equipment Between Arab States.
Transfers of U.S.-Origin military equipment—without U.S. Government concurrence—would be a serious matter and one that we think any country—Arab or otherwise—would seriously consider before acting. We believe that we have made it very clear that under current legislation—which we believe is adequate—transfers of U.S.-origin military equipment between governments must have U.S. Government concurrence. Obviously, there is no way that we can provide absolute assurances that there would not be unauthorized transfers of military equipment between one Arab country and another, particularly in a period of stress. The possibility of a transfer is one of the factors which we consider in determining whether the U.S. Government will make a particular sale to a particular Arab country. In this respect, however, it is important to note that the United States has worked hard at developing improved relations with the Arab world. We believe this new relationship is reciprocated.

Effects of Military Equipment Transfers on the Military Balance in the Middle East. The United States has stated that it would not permit the military balance
Military transfers of equipment within the area would, of course, be considered in evaluating the balance of power in the Middle East.

I hope that the above information is responsive to your request. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Robert J. McCloskey
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations
NOTE FOR: Connie C.
FROM: Ron Nessen

Contains classified cable

R N
Yesterday, by a vote of 11 to 1 the Security Council voted to seat the PLO with all privileges of representation except the vote. Our remarks on the Middle East debate should remain the same, emphasizing the following points:

1. ) We consider Resolutions 242 and 338 the relevant resolutions for the Middle East.

2. ) We will veto any resolutions not helpful to the peace process.

3. ) We will not speculate on what we may or may not do prior to the introduction of a given resolution.

4. ) We have stated publicly that we do not favor transferring the issues concerning the Middle East from the forum of the Geneva Conference.

5. ) Additionally, the United States was unable to use its S.C. veto because a veto is possible only on substantive resolutions, not in procedural debates, such as those on agenda or participation.

FYI ONLY: See attached cable on first day's proceedings. Further information will be provided as available.
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AMBASSADY AMMAN PRIORITY 4444
AMBASSADY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5882
AMBASSADY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 379
AMBASSADY CAIRO PRIORITY 4439
AMBASSADY COLOMBO PRIORITY 141
AMBASSADY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 438
AMBASSADY DAR-ES-SALAAM PRIORITY 998
AMBASSADY DOHA PRIORITY 0519
AMBASSADY GEORGETOWN PRIORITY 285
AMBASSADY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1313
AMBASSADY JIDDA PRIORITY 1468
AMBASSADY KUWAIT PRIORITY 689
AMBASSADY LONDON PRIORITY 1283
AMBASSADY MANAMA PRIORITY 186
AMBASSADY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6184
AMBASSADY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0638
AMBASSADY PANAMA PRIORITY 495
AMBASSADY PARIS PRIORITY 3180
AMBASSADY RABAT PRIORITY 915
AMBASSADY ROME PRIORITY 4596
AMBASSADY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 1642
AMBASSADY TEHRAN PRIORITY 849
AMBASSADY TELAVIV PRIORITY 5174
AMBASSADY TOKYO PRIORITY 3902
AMBASSADY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 572
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 2666
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USLO PEKING PRIORITY 664
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TAGS: PFC, UNSC, XF
SUBJ: SC MIDDLE EAST DEBATE: SOVIETS MISREPRESENT SC UNDERSTANDINGS ON PLO PARTICIPATION AND ATTACK US.
SUMMARY: PLO SEATED WITH RIGHTS OF MEMBER STATE AFTER US-USSR DUSTUP OVER FALSE SOV PORTRAYAL OF SC UNDERSTANDING ON PLO PARTICIPATION.

1. FIRST DAY'S SECURITY COUNCIL MIDDLE EAST DEBATE WAS MARKED BY CRUDE AND PERSISTENT SOVIET MISREPRESENTATION OF COUNCIL'S EARLIER UNDERSTANDING ON PLO PARTICIPATION AND BY HARSH USSR ATTACKS ON US. BOTH IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS IN THE MORNING AND IN FORMAL SESSION LATER, SOVIET AMB MALIK FALSELY CLAIMED COUNCIL HAD ON NOVEMBER 30 "DECIDE" THAT THE PLO SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE CURRENT DEBATE. MALIK MOUNTED A BROAD-GUAGE ATTACK AGAINST THE US, ALLEGGING PROCEDURAL TRICKERY TO SUBVERT THE COUNCIL'S WILL IN CHARACTERIZING US TACTICS AS "BANGSTERISM", US AND UK VIGOROUSLY RESPONDED, AMB MOYNIHAN SAID SOVIET EFFORTS TO ERODE OPEN AND AGREED PROCEDURES WERE HISTORICALLY THE FIRST STEPS TO TOTALITARIANISM. UK AMB RICHARD CALLED MALIK'S STATEMENT "A MISLEADING AND MISCHIEVOUS DIATRIBE", NOTING THAT NOVEMBER 30 EXPRESSION OF MAJORITY VIEWS IN NO WAY CONSTITUTED A DECISION. (TEXT OF AMB MOYNIHAN'S STATEMENTS BEING TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY.)

2. FOLLOWING THESE EXCHANGES, PLO WAS AS EXPECTED INVITED TO PARTICIPATE ON THE SAME BASIS IT HAD IN EARLY DECEMBER MEETINGS ON ISRAELI RAIDS IN LEBANON--THAT IS, NOT UNDER RULE 39 BUT WITH RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF A MEMBER STATE. VOTE ON THIS WAS 11 IN FAVOR, ONE AGAINST (US) AND THREE ABSTENTIONS (UK, ITALY AND FRANCE).

3. IN OTHER PROCEDURAL STEPS, COUNCIL ADOPTED WITHOUT OBJECTION AGENDA USING LANGUAGE OF SC RES 381, I.E., "THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION," IT ALSO AGREED TO REQUESTS OF EGYPT, JORDAN, SYRIA, UAE AND QATAR TO PARTICIPATE WITHOUT THE RIGHT TO VOTE, THE FOUR EXTRA SEATS AT THE COUNCIL TABLE ARE OCCUPIED BY EGYPT, JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE PLO.

UN, THE US, ISRAEL'S SUPPORTER, WAS ISOLATED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL RIGHTS. THE COUNCIL SHOULD ADOPT A RESOLUTION RECTIFYING ITS PAST ERRORS.

5. OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL, THE MAIN ACTIVITY WAS AT A MORNING ARAB CAUCUS. OUR CONTACTS TELL US THAT THE MAIN BUSINESS WAS TO SET UP A DRAFTING GROUP, COMPRISING EGYPT, SYRIA, LEBANON, IRAQ, LIBYA, UAE, JORDAN, KUWAIT AND THE PLO. THEY CONSIDERED IT UNLIKELY A RES WOULD EMERGE BEFORE MID-WEEK.

6. SC WILL NEXT MEET JANUARY 13 AT 3:00PM, WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA AMONG THE SPEAKERS.

7. FULLER ACCOUNT OF DEBATE IS BEING SENT BY UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY.

MOYNIHAN BT
EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION

NOTE:

The above mentioned Executive Order posted this morning at 10:00 a.m. is self-explanatory. The Order establishes the U.S. Support Mission for the purpose of carrying out U.S. responsibilities for monitoring the latest peace agreement in the Middle East between Egypt and Israel. The organization of the Mission is clearly spelled out in the Order.

While a Director for the Mission has not yet been selected, we expect to have an announcement soon. Those wishing further information on the Mission may contact Mrs. Cloy McMann, 632-566.
NOTICE TO THE PRESS

Questions regarding the Executive Order Establishing the United States Sinai Support Mission released on Tuesday morning, January 13, may be directed to Mr. McNanaway, 632-2258 at the Department of State.

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